Population characteristics and settlement changes in the Gaza Strip.

Dahlan, Ahmed Said Mohammed

POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS AND SETTLEMENT CHANGES IN THE GAZA STRIP

By

Ahmed Said Mohammed Dahlan

(Graduate Society)

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Faculty of Social Science, Department of Geography.

University of Durham. UK
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TO

MY PARENTS, SISTER AND BROTHERS

Abstract

This study is the first academic analysis of population and settlement patterns in the Gaza Strip, the third most densely populated entity in the world (area : 364 square kilometres, 1985 population 525,500) after Hong Kong and Singapore. The research involved a sample survey of 2604 respondents carried out by the author between October 1985 and January 1986.

The Gaza Strip emerged as a territorial unit in 1948 after the creation of the State of Israel in Palestine. Huge numbers of Palestinians took refuge in the Gaza Strip, resulting in radical changes in its population characteristics and settlement geography.

The study firstly analyses the Strip's population growth, population distribution, population/area relationships and settlement geography. Particular emphasis is put on identifying the impact of Israeli colonial policy in the Gaza Strip. Secondly, the population structure is analysed, including the effects of fertility, mortality and family planning on the youthfulness of the population, and the effect on population structure of the population displacement after the 1967 war. The employment composition of Gaza's labour force is examined, along with the contribution to Gaza's economy from migrant workers abroad and commuter-workers to Israel. Finally, the study shifts to concentrate on Israeli policy and its impact on Gaza's population and settlement since the 1967 occupation. Demolition of Gaza's dwellings, the Israeli-sponsored resettlement programme for the refugees, its political aims, the refugees' response to this programme, the housing conditions and public services in the Strip as a whole, and in the refugee camps in particular, are all examined.

The study concludes with an analysis of the future prospects of Gaza's population and the refugee camps. Various solutions to the population problems in the Gaza Strip are considered, bearing in mind the area's political uncertainty.

Declaration

I declare that the contents of this thesis have not previously been submitted at this or any other University.

Ahmed S. Dahlan

A. S. Dahlan

Department of Geography
University of Durham
July 1987.

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Ahmed S. Dahlan
The Islamic University of Gaza
P.O. Box 108
Gaza, Gaza Strip
Via Israel.

Author's Preface

For nearly forty years since 1948, a huge volume of literature on the Israeli-Arab conflict and the Palestinian question has been produced. This has repeatedly adopted a political and legal perspective to the conflict. Furthermore, both scholars and politicians have rather neglected the Gaza Strip and paid little attention to it. However, this study of the population and settlement of the Gaza Strip breaks through the usual approaches.

Quite often, when the Palestinian question and the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is discussed, reference is made to the West Bank but not to the Gaza Strip, despite the fact that the Strip is proving to be a key factor in any future settlement of the Palestinian problem. So, it is not surprising that it is described as the forgotten man in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The above situation and the unique individuality of the Gaza Strip, particularly the composition of its population have sustained the author's interest in carrying out this research. For example, over 70% of Gaza's population are Palestinian refugees from 1948 and some 48% of the total population live in refugee camps, largely separated from the indigenous population. Also, the population is economically dependent on work inside Israel or abroad.

This work has involved three years of research, although it began as early as 1982, when the researcher started to gather information and documents to cover the planned research. Bearing in mind the severe shortage of data on the Gaza Strip, two fieldtrips were made to the study area. The first was carried out during July-August 1984, aiming to set up a solid background about the subject under analysis, and to produce the basic maps. The second was held between October 1985 and January 1986, when a large-scale questionnaire survey was undertaken. However, throughout this research regular contact has continued with the author's family in Gaza in order to provide all the up-to-date information needed.

It is a difficult task to conduct research on the Gaza Strip, because the chances of success are low. Several people in the Gaza Strip advised

the author to stop thinking of doing this research as no data were available and no access to them is allowed. These constraints could have jeopardized the author's academic future if the attempt had failed. Despite this pessimistic viewpoint, the research has come to light and become a fact.

Being a member of the Gaza Strip population and having lived there all my life assisted greatly in understanding the population dynamics of the area, particularly since the 1967 occupation. As the subject is sensitive, the author has, hopefully, attempted to provide an objective analysis of this vital subject, supporting the study by all available documents and statistics, as well as by the viewpoints of the population sampled with some review in particular circumstances.

It is hoped that this work will be the starting point toward more research on the Gaza Strip as the area has its particular problems, needs, desires, and political demands which are generally overlooked. However, it is of great value to mention that during 1985-86, three books were published on the Gaza Strip (Locke and Stewart, 1985; Cossali and Robson, 1986; and Roy, 1986; see the bibliography). These books consitute an encouragement to start further research, even though they focus on the political and historical development of the Gaza Strip rather than analysing the population characteristics, the socio-economic problems of the Gazan people, and the patterns of settlement.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor Professor John I. Clarke (Pro-Vice-Chancellor and Sub-Warden of the University of Durham, and Chairman of the International Geographical Union Commission on Population Geography) for his unique supervision and generous assistance during my research. He has read the whole manuscript with the careful and critical eye of an expert. Much of the significance of this work is a result of his constant advice, suggestions and encouragement. Also, I am greatly indebted to him for securing me a travel award (from the British and Foreign School Society - Sarah Walker Travel Fund) for the fieldwork in the Gaza Strip.

My sincere thanks go also to Professor J.C. Dewdney, my second supervisor, for his advice and encouragement in the first year of my research. Also, I would like to express my gratitude to the secretaries (particularly Mrs. J. Dresser), staff and technicians of the Department of Geography who have assisted me in various ways, and my colleagues for providing a pleasant atmosphere of kindness and encouragement. In addition, I am greatly indebted to the staff of the Science Library, the Middle East Documentation Centre, and the Oriental Library in Durham, UNRWA's Public Information Offices in Gaza and Vienna and the International Labour Office in Geneva. The staff of the Graduate Society should not be forgotten for their help during my stay in Durham.

I owe a great debt to my family for financing the study; without their continuous support this research would not have been possible. Also, my thanks go to the Committee of Vice Chancellors and Principals of the Universities of the United Kingdom (O.R.S. Award) for awarding me financial support for one year.

In the Gaza Strip, my appreciation goes to everyone, both from the Islamic University of Gaza and from outside the University, who assisted in the interviewing. In particular I must thank my brother Walid and Mr. Abd el-Hai Mussa. I am also grateful to Mr. Salah el Sa'dawi who helped with computer analysis and to the Islamic University administration who allowed me to use the computer unit of the University.

Perhaps the biggest thanks should go to the 2604 respondents who agreed to be interviewed, often at length and sometimes with fear and embarrassment. Without their cooperation this work would not have been possible.

My sincere thanks go to Dr. Walia Kani for undertaking the proof-reading.

Last but not least, I would like to register my particular and heartfelt appreciation to my parents, sister and brothers who have made sacrifices to secure me a better education and a happy life.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AFSC	:	American Friends Service Committee
ANERA	:	American Near East Refugee Aid
CBR	:	Crude birth rate
CDR	:	Crude death rate
GNP	:	Gross national product
ILO	:	International Labour Organization
IMR	:	Infant mortality rate
MCH	:	Maternal and child health
MERIP	:	Middle East Research and Information Project
PLO	:	Palestine Liberation Organization
UAE	:	United Arab Emirates
UFSI	:	University Field Staff International
UN	:	United Nations
UNCCP	:	United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine
UNECWA	:	United Nations Economic Commission for Western Asia
UNESM	:	United Nations Economic Survey Mission
UNICEF	:	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNIDO	:	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNRPR	:	United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees
UNRWA	:	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
WHO	:	World Health Organization
WZO	:	World Zionist Organization

GLOSSARY

Colony movements : Organizations which established colonies, including the Israeli Ministry of Housing, Amanah (Gush Emunim), United Kibbutzim Movement, Moshav Movement and World Zionist Organization.

Eretz Yisrael : The Hebrew name for the land of Israel. This term is derived from biblical sources. It refers to an area much larger than the present-day state of Israel. Its use often denotes the "Holy" land of Israel as well as the promised land, according to the Israeli argument.

Gush Emunim : The Hebrew name for "Block of the faithful", a colonist pressure group founded in 1974 by young "Whole Land of Israel" (Eretz Yisrael) according to the biblical sources. Supported by fundamentalist Jews from the National Religious Party.

Hamouleh : The Arabic acronym for an extended family. The structure of Palestinian village society was highly patriarchal and usually confined to two or three hamoulehs in the broadest sense. Social consciousness was usually limited to the family and never extended beyond the tribe.

Hapoel Hamizrachi : The Hebrew name for "Eastern Labour" moshav movement. A religious group whose public life is governed by the Torah (The Jews Book). The most active Jewish colonial movement in the Gaza Strip.

Kibbutz : The Hebrew name for a rural locality where both production and consumption are collective.

Mekorot : The Israeli National Water Company.

Moshav : The Hebrew name for a co-operative agricultural village, generally comprising 60-100 families. The purchase of agricultural equipment and the marketing of produce are collective.

Nahal : The Hebrew acronym for Fighting Pioneering Youth. The Nahal programme combines military and specialized agricultural training as part of three years compulsory military service. Nahal is designed specifically to prepare volunteer Youth groups desiring to joint or to establish a collective farm (Kibbutz); in addition it provides the volunteers with training in establishing agricultural outpost colonies on the frontiers of Israel or beyond them, i.e. inside the occupied Arab lands.

One Dunum = 1000 sq. metres or about one quarter of an acre.

The Occupied territories : The West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

CHAPTER ONE
Introduction

1.1 Research Strategy and Aims

The prime purpose of this research is to depict the population characteristics in the Gaza Strip and to identify the changes in its settlement geography. In fact, since the establishment of the Strip as an artificial geographical unit in 1948, both population characteristics and patterns of settlement have been hugely affected by the Israeli-Arab conflict both militarily and politically. The influx of Palestinian refugees into the area in 1948 has led to several socio-economic problems: increasing population pressure upon the very limited and poor land, and the altering of the population balance of the Strip between refugees and indigenous inhabitants.

However, the most radical changes in population structure and settlement patterns occurred in the Gaza Strip after the Israeli occupation of 1967. Mass out-migration from the Strip happened, distorting the normal distribution of population structure. Also, population resettlement schemes and demolition of Gazan dwellings have taken place. On the other hand, the Israelis are allowed to colonize the Gaza Strip through land acquisition and confiscation.

The Gaza Strip population is continuing to increase by a high annual growth rate without indications of a demographic transition in sight, coinciding with no efforts toward improving the socio-economic standard of the residents. Economically, the Gaza Strip relies heavily on work inside Israel and remittances from relatives abroad, where more than 50% of Gaza's workforce are employed.

Since rapid population increase has been a universal concern, "geographers came to realize that it was not enough to know about population numbers and their increase, but one should know about the process of demographic transition from high to low vital rates as well as the changes in population characteristics" (Clarke, 1984). With this in mind, the researcher wanted to study the main characteristics of the Gazan population to find out to what extent they have been affected by the

political situation and fertility behaviour of Gazan couples over the years. Several demographic variables have been considered in this study in order to discover their impact on future population growth. Furthermore, the changes and expansion in Gaza's geography of settlement have led to several problems such as : housing, public services and environmental health. Several case studies have been considered to pinpoint the main problems facing Gaza's population in general and the refugees in particular.

Considering the above-mentioned aim of this research, there are many other aims in studying the population characteristics and settlement changes in the Gaza Strip, such as:-

(a) The first goal of this research is to fill a gap in the literature. An examination of the bibliography shows that very few papers have focused on the Gaza Strip in general and on population and settlement in particular. Quite often, the term Gaza Strip appears in the title of several articles, but an examination of the texts shows that not more than one or two paragraphs actually mention it. For this reason it appears important that a study should be carried out on this subject and on this area.

(b) Analysis is necessary of the components of population growth and factors affecting it since 1948, the causes and trends of migration, the mode of distribution, and the population structure and employment composition in this most densely populated entity.

(c) The study must also examine the territorial conflict between the Palestinians and the Israeli colonists which could transform the Gaza Strip demographic map and settlement geography in the future.

(d) The Israeli-sponsored resettlement programme for Gaza's refugees is an important subject in this research. Its procedures and aims, its impact on housing conditions of the resettled refugees, and the Israeli policy and the refugees' response are all very significant issues for analysis.

(e) The core of this research is to provide a clear picture about housing conditions and public services in the Gaza Strip in general and the

refugee camps in particular. The thesis attempts to answer the following questions:

- Have the housing conditions in the Gaza Strip been comfortable for living?

- What is the average housing occupancy ratio in the Gaza Strip, and what is the degree of overcrowding?

- Have Gazan people been provided with adequate public services?

(f) Finally it is hoped to pinpoint the elements of the population problems and to try to suggest solutions to cope satisfactorily with them, particularly the problems of population growth, housing and public services. However, it can be recognized that such solutions have very few chances of success, because no national authority exists to carry them out.

1.2 The Unique Nature of the Study Area

The Gaza Strip represents a unique phenomenon in the Palestine problem. Despite about two decades of Egyptian rule (1948-67), the Strip's land and population remained Palestinian. In contrast, the Jordanians claimed sovereignty over the Palestinian land of the West Bank and annexed it to the Transjordan which became later the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Hence the Palestinians of the West Bank were granted Jordanian citizenship. This situation has complicated efforts to identify the world Palestinian population and their numbers. However, it is of interest to quantify the size of Gazan population relative to the Palestinian community as a whole, aiming to demonstrate the weight of the Gazan population.

"The regional total of Palestinians is difficult to estimate because several Arab host countries (e.g. Jordan and Saudi Arabia) are unwilling to encourage an identifiable Palestinian community in their midst, and are reluctant to publish separate statistics about Palestinians. In addition, intermarriage and prolonged residence outside Palestine can make the definition of the nationality of offspring difficult at times. Recently,

the PLO has taken the initiative by publishing an annual abstract of statistics, as well as sponsoring some researchers on Palestinians in Kuwait and the refugee camps of Lebanon and Syria. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 has seriously damaged the highly regarded work begun by the Palestine Research Centre in Beirut, and indirectly has resulted in the cancellation of the Palestinian census project being conducted by the Population Division of the UN Economic Commission for Western Asia" (Hill, 1981 and 1983).

"Furthermore, every author writing on Palestine or the Palestinians faces the same set of insoluble problems connected with the definition of "Palestine" and the "Palestinians". Probably the nearest we can come to a set of definitions acceptable to the Palestinians themselves is to use those put forward by the PLO. The area of Palestine accepted by the PLO is the territory administered under British Mandate. Anyone born or living in this area before 1948 or descended in the paternal line from these original inhabitants is recognized as a Palestinian by the PLO" (Hill, 1983).

Table 1.1 shows that in 1982, the world total of Palestinians numbered more than 4.7 million. Of this total some 59.69% were residing outside the territory of mandatory Palestine as defined above, while the remaining proportions lived either inside so-called Israel or in the West Bank or in the Gaza Strip. The majority of Palestinians in the diaspora were living in Jordan, where Palestinians represent over half of the total population. On the other hand, the Gaza Strip accommodates over 10% of the Palestinian community.

In terms of Palestinian refugees registered with UNRWA (for the definition of refugees see chapter Four), the Gaza Strip has the second largest community in the region after Jordan, with more than 427,000 refugees residing there, giving Gaza 20.4% of the total refugee population (see Table 1.2).

As demonstrated in Figure 1.1, there are 61 refugee camps in the UNRWA's area of operations, of which only 8 are located in the Gaza Strip. This low number of camps is disproportionate with the large numbers of refugees in the Strip, compared with the situation in the other areas (see Table 1.2). So, the Gaza Strip can be described as the Strip of refugees.

Table 1.1. Estimate of Palestinian People by Place of Residence, 1982

Place of residence	No. of population	%
Arab States:	2,564,633	54.35
Jordan	1,189,600	25.21
Syria	229,868	4.87
Lebanon*	492,240	10.43
Kuwait	308,177	6.53
Iraq	21,284	0.45
Libya	23,759	0.50
Egypt	35,436	0.75
Saudi Arabia	147,549	3.13
United Arab Emirates	38,665	0.82
Qatar	25,372	0.54
Other Arab States	52,683	1.12
Rest of the world:	251,825	5.34
U.S.A.	108,045	2.29
Other states	143,780	3.05
Total outside Palestine (a)	2,816,458	59.69
Total inside Palestine (b):	1,902,000	40.31
Israel(1)	554,100	11.74
The West Bank(2)	871,600	18.47
Gaza Strip	476,300	10.10
Total Palestinian population	4,718,458	100.00

Source : (a) Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics, 1983

(b) Central Bureau of Statistics, 1983

(1) The total population of the Syrian Golan Heights (12,200) annexed by Israel on 14 of December 1981, and the total population of Arab East Jerusalem (124,100) annexed in 1967 and made official on 30 July 1980 by the Israeli Knesset (parliament) have been deducted.

(2) The 124,100 persons deducted from the figure for Israel (see note 1) have been added to the West Bank population as Palestinians.

* The 1981 figure is used here due to lack of data

Table 1.2 Distribution of Registered Palestinian Refugees in UNRWA's Area of Operations
(as at 30 June 1985)

Field	Population	% population	Number of camps	Total camp population	Registered persons not in camps	Percentage of registered camp population
Lebanon	263,599	12.6	13	135,941	127,658	51.6
Syria	244,626	11.7	10	72,549	172,077	29.7
Jordan	799,724	38.2	10	201,750	597,974	25.2
West Bank	357,704	17.1	20	91,231	266,473	25.5
Gaza Strip	427,892	20.4	8	236,486	191,406	55.3
Total	2,093,545	100.0	61	737,957	1,355,588	35.2

Source: UNRWA, 1985.

FIG·1·1 SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS IN UNRWA'S AREA OF OPERATIONS

■ CAPITAL

● CITY

• Refugee Camp



So far, a significant proportion of refugees registered with UNRWA are maintained in camps, separated largely from the indigenous populations. Table 1.2 demonstrates that 35.2% of the overall registered refugees in the UNRWA's area of operations were living in camps. The lowest percentages of camps refugee were found in Jordan (25.2%) and the West Bank (25.5%), while the highest is in the Gaza Strip where 55.3% of registered refugees were still living in the 8 camps (see also Fig. 1.2). This individuality of the Gaza Strip has produced various socio-economic problems in the area.

1.3 Sources of Data and Technical Problems

This research relies on official data published by : (a) the Egyptians during their administration of the Gaza Strip 1948-1967, (b) the Israelis from 1967 onward, and (c) the UNRWA who have issued annual bulletins concerning numbers of Palestinian refugees, including Gaza's refugees, from 1950 onward. In fact, the Gaza Strip had no experience of population enumeration until September 1967, when the Israeli Army held the first ever census after their occupation of the area in June 1967.

Although the demographic characteristics of the Gazan population derived from the 1967 census are largely affected by the heavy losses of population, either because people were trapped abroad at the time of the 1967 war or emigrated after it, the census still constitutes the only available comprehensive source of data for analysis. Following that census, the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics has published annual comprehensive data (mainly economic) on the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Unfortunately, there has been no separate and complete publication of population data which could be of value for carrying out any detailed demographic analysis on Gaza's population. The Bureau publishes data concerning the total size of the Gazan population and their age-sex structure only, compiled from vital registration data which still remain incomplete.

Also, access to data is not allowed in the Gaza Strip. Roy (1986) reported that disclosure of information about Gaza is prohibited by the Israelis, where employees of Israeli-administered offices, both governmental and non-governmental, are unable to release information on the territory, and numerous requests by her to obtain such information were

FIG·1·2 PROPORTIONS OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES RESIDENT IN CAMPS AND NOT IN CAMPS IN THE UNRWA'S AREA OF OPERATIONS, JUNE 1985



denied. She said that official procedures do exist for securing the release of information which require permission from the appropriate government officials. However, this permission can take months or years to acquire, with absolutely no guarantee of approval.

It is with this difficulty and the lack of complete published population data in mind that the researcher has conducted a large-scale questionnaire survey to gather the data needed. The survey procedure and methodology are described in full detail in chapters five, nine and ten.

Throughout the undertaking of this research, the author has encountered three technical problems:

Firstly, up to the end of 1981, all data published by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics on the Gaza Strip were combined with data on North Sinai. Therefore, the appropriate deductions, from all population data used in this research, have been made to arrive at figures for the Gaza Strip alone. The researcher assumed that the population of North Sinai had the same demographic characteristics as Gaza's people. Hence, the percentage of the North Sinai population of the total population, was deducted from aspects of the total population in order to remove the North Sinai element. This method is similar to that used by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics when the data of North Sinai were deducted in 1982. According to the Israeli Bureau (1983) North Sinai data were deducted from the total number of inhabitants of the Gaza Area by age group and sex. Distribution by sex and age was assumed according to the distribution of the total population of the Gaza Strip.

Secondly, there is a severe shortage of data on the Gaza Strip among Palestinian sources. Roy (1986) attributed that, according to the local people, to the ongoing Israeli occupation, whereby specific military restrictions were placed on Palestinians prohibiting any form of research, survey, study or plan to be conducted on the Gaza Strip. Also, indigenous research is furthermore constrained by a severe lack of academic facilities inside the Strip.

Thirdly, there are clear discrepancies in the data published by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics. If its publications are examined, conflicting results can be detected. For example, the CBR for 1976 was

52.1% when calculated from the Statistical Abstract of Israel of 1977, while it becomes 49.8% according to the Judea, Samaria and Gaza Strip area Statistics of 1984 (see Chapter 2, Table 2.6). Considering this problem, the author has decided to avoid such contradictions as much as possible, and to rely on newly issued publications instead of older ones in his research.

1.4 The Thesis Framework

This volume is in three main parts. The first examines the population and settlement patterns of the Gaza Strip, where chapter two concentrates on reviewing the history of the Gaza Strip as a territorial unit, and analysing the population growth and the individuality of the Strip. Chapter three deals with population distribution and man-land relationships, while in chapter four patterns of settlement, nomads, rural and urban settlements, refugee camps and Israeli colonies are examined.

The second part is concerned with population structure. Chapter five explains the methodological procedures of four formats of questionnaire used in this section of study. Chapter six examines the age and sex structure, levels of fertility and mortality in general and infant and childhood mortality in particular, family planning, the impact of the 1967 war on age structure of the population, age index and dependency ratio. Employment composition of the Strip's labour force, their main characteristics, employment and unemployment, occupation, Gaza labour force working inside Israel and abroad and their impact on Gaza's economy are considered in chapter seven.

The third part concentrates on identifying the relationship between the Israeli authorities and the Gazan people since the 1967 occupation. Chapter eight deals with the effect of Israeli policy upon the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip; the demolition of Gaza's dwellings and the Israeli-sponsored rehousing projects for refugees are analysed. Chapter nine continues to deal with the Israeli resettlement projects and one of these projects (Al-Amal) has been taken as a micro-study; survey methods, resettlement procedures, housing conditions and the policy and response are discussed. Chapter ten explores in more detail the housing conditions in the Gaza Strip as a whole and the refugee camps in particular. Then a

micro-study is carried out to identify housing conditions in Khan Yunis camp, where the survey and methods, housing conditions, public services and refugee attitudes toward resettlement are treated.

Logically, the study should be preceded by an introduction and ended by a conclusion. So, the introduction in chapter one provides background to the research strategy and aims, the unique nature of the study area, and the technical problems facing the author in carrying out this research. The concluding chapter (eleven) demonstrates the future prospects of Gaza's population, refugee camps, patterns of settlement and the territorial and demographic conflict. It includes suggested solutions to the population problems and a political overview for the Strip's future.

Finally, the researcher has benefitted from his experience as a cartographer in mapping the available statistics and the data gathered in the 1985 survey, which greatly strengthened the value of this research. However, these maps can be considered as the first attempt to produce population maps for the Gaza Strip.

1.5 Data Analysis

Computer analysis of the samples and their responses had been carried out inside the Gaza Strip using the computer unit of the Islamic University of Gaza. The analysis proceeds in two steps: in the first, samples were analysed as a whole; while in the second, several variables were correlated with each other, aiming to examine the relationship between them and identifying the main characteristics of each group under analysis. Nevertheless, the author has used the computer centre of Durham University as well for re-analysing the questionnaire on housing problems in Khan Yunis camp. The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSSX) had been used in all steps concerning data processing, crosstabulation and analysis.

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PART ONE
The Population and Settlement Patterns of the Gaza Strip
CHAPTER TWO

Gaza Strip : Its Regional Emergence and Population Growth

2.1 The Emergence of the Gaza Strip as a Political Entity

The British mandate of Palestine officially terminated on 14 May 1948, and the British government completed the withdrawal of its troops from Palestine. On the same day the Provisional State Council in Tel Aviv (the forerunner of the Knesset, the Israeli parliament) proclaimed the establishment of a zionist state in Palestine. As a consequence, "the political committee of the Arab League decided to send the Arab armies into Palestine" (Khlousi, 1967) with the aim of preserving the permanent rights of the Palestinian Arab people in their homeland.

As a result of the ensuing war, the Zionists succeeded in the establishment of the State of Israel covering 20,700 sq.kms (Orni and Efrat, 1980) about 77.9% of Palestine. Meanwhile the Arab armies dominated two areas: the first was the land in the eastern part of Palestine comprising some 5505 sq.kms (Orni and Efrat, 1980) about 20.7% of Palestine, which was initially put under Jordanian protection, but it was later officially annexed to transjordan after the Jericho conference of 1st December 1948. This was called the West Bank, and on 13 December 1948, the Jordanian Parliament supported the annexation of Palestinian land (Salman, 1980). Thus, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was transformed.

The second area remaining under Arab control was the Gaza Strip. Its 364 sq.kms (1.4% of Palestine) remained under the domination of the Egyptian army, and received its political validity in the Armistice Agreement which was signed between Egypt and Israel on 24 February 1949 on Rhodes Island (The Geographer Office of Research in Economic and Science, 1965; Al-Dib, 1979).

The 1948 Israeli-Arab war resulted in the destruction of the demographic unity of the Palestinian people and the fragmentation of the geographical entity of Palestine (see Fig. 2.1).

FIG·2·1 THE FRAGMENTATION OF PALESTINE'S GEOGRAPHICAL UNITY IN 1948

Under the control of the new State of Israel 1948

Under the control of Egyptian administration until 1967

Under the control of Jordanian administration until 1967

Israel's frontiers according to the Armistice agreements of 1949

Armistice lines

LEBANON

SYRIA

JORDAN

MEDITERRANEAN SEA

WEST BANK

Dead Sea

GAZA STRIP

ISRAEL

EGYPT (Sinai)

N

0 Miles 100

0 40 80 120 160 Kilometres

AD

After the Armistice Agreement of 1949, the Government of Egypt continued to provide the Gaza Strip with protection and a military administration, headed by a Governor-General, who carried out the policy of the central government in Cairo. This area was described as "the submissive Palestinian land under the supervision of Egyptian military forces". This term continued in use until the publication of basic law number 55, in 1955, whereby the term Gaza Strip appeared according to the first item of the aforementioned law (Khlousi, 1967).

The Egyptian army remained in control of the Gaza Strip, except for an interlude of Israeli occupation between 29 October 1956 and 7 March 1957 as a result of the Suez military campaign, until Egyptian control was terminated by the war of June 1967, which brought the Strip back under Israeli military occupation. Israel also occupied the West Bank, the Golan Heights and Sinai. Consequently, by June 1967, all Palestinian lands had fallen under Israeli occupation (Fig. 2.2).

2.2 Geographical Changes and Population Movement in the Gaza Sub-District of Palestine, 1948

The area which is presently called the Gaza Strip was formerly part of the Gaza sub-district of Palestine, one of its 18 sub-districts (see Fig. 2.3). Its area was 1111.5 sq.kms of which 49.3 sq.kms were Jewish owned. It included three towns (Gaza, Khan Yunis and Majdal) and 54 villages (Fig. 2.4) (Dabbagh, 1966 and Hadawi, 1970).

Most of the residents of Gaza sub-district depended for their livelihood on agriculture and a majority of them were Arabs (Table 2.1). As a result of the Israeli-Arab conflict in 1948, their ties with the remainder of Palestine were abruptly broken.

"Due to the prevailing unrest in Palestine, the influx of refugees into neighbouring Arab countries had begun as early as 1947, although the mass movement occurred during the period between April and August 1948" (UNRWA, 1983a). In a period of months, the Palestinian Arab majority became a minority; the composition was 67% Arabs, 31% Jews and 2% others before the Israeli-Arab conflict according to the racial classification of 1945. Some researchers estimated the Palestinian displacement from Palestine to be between 700,000 and 900,000 persons (Godwin, 1982).

Figure 2.2 The Political History of Palestine since 1948, and Its Influence on the Movement of the Palestinian Population Around the Neighbouring Arab Countries and within the Occupied Palestinian Territories ; The West Bank and the Gaza Strip



Sources of displaced people : The 1948 figures from Godwin, 1982 and Gilbert, 1984
The 1967 figures from Harris, 1980

FIG·2·3 ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS OF PALESTINE BEFORE 1948



FIG·2·4 THE EMERGENCE OF THE GAZA STRIP FROM GAZA SUB-DISTRICT, 1948



The population of the northern zone of Palestine from the sub-districts of Acre, Haifa, Safad and Nazareth went north into Lebanon and Syria; the majority of residents from Tiberias, Beisan, and Safad sub-districts crowded into Jordan; the inhabitants of Ramleh, Jerusalem and the coastal plain of Palestine fled to the West Bank and Jordan, while a large proportion of the residents of Gaza, Jaffa, Beer Sheba and Ramleh sub-districts poured into the Gaza Strip, and a small proportion poured into Egypt (Fig. 2.5).

Table 2.2 presents various estimates of the scale of population displacement into the Gaza Strip after the Israeli-Arab conflict of May 1948. The most important observation is the equality of Israeli (Efrat, 1977) and UNRWA estimates (UNRWA, 1962 and 1983a), but on the whole, Israeli sources have tended to minimize the scale of the displacement. Thus, the Gaza Strip became overcrowded by some "200,000 refugees, including 30,000 Bedouins from the Negev desert in southern Palestine (UNRWA, 1962). The refugees were settled near their occupied land, confidently expecting to return to their homes within a few weeks or months. These huge number of refugees were added to the indigenous residents of Gaza area - which became the Egyptian - controlled Gaza Strip - who numbered some "80,000 Palestinians by the end of 1948" (Abu Lughod, 1982).

Thus the Gaza Strip was crowded by approximately 280,000 persons on its limited land (364 sq.kms). The broad consequences of the Israeli-Arab war of 1948 were as follows:

(a) Gaza sub-district of Palestine lost 67% of its area, that is to say the Gaza Strip comprised 33%;
(b) The population increased more than threefold from 80,000 to 280,000 persons;
(c) About 70% of the Gaza Strip's inhabitants lost their livelihood in the hinterland of Palestine;
(d) The Gaza Strip contained the largest concentration of refugees (about 70% of the Gaza Strip population at the end of 1948); and
(e) The indigenous residents of the Strip also lost their livelihood in occupied Palestine.



FIG. 2.5. THE DISPLACEMENT OF THE PALESTINIAN POPULATION IN 1948

Table 2.1 : A Classification of the Population of the Gaza Sub-District of Palestine by Nationality

Year	Palestinian Arabs		Jews		Total
	No.	%	No.	%	
(a) 1922	71,765	99.5	330	0.5	72,095
(b) 1931	87,465	99.8	220	0.2	87,685
(c) 1945	134,290	98.0	2,890	2.0	137,180

Source : Calculated by the researcher from the following sources:

(a) Barron, 1922.

(b) Dabbagh, 1966.

(c) Hadawi, 1970.

Table 2.2 : Various Estimations of the Palestinian Population Displacement into the Gaza Strip, 1948

Source	Estimated Displacement
UNRWA	200,000
Efrat	200,000
Issa	190,000
Sayigh	200,000
Salman	198,000
Abu Lughod	201,100
Harris	190,000
Kossaifi	185,600
Gilbert	190,000

Source : UNRWA, 1962 and 1983a; Efrat, 1977; Issa, 1979; Sayigh, 1979; Salman, 1980; Aub Lughod, 1982; Harris, 1980; Kossaifi, 1980; Gilbert, 1984.

2.3 The Individuality of the Gaza Strip

The Gaza Strip first came into existence 39 years ago in 1948, after the first round in the Israeli-Arab wars, amidst extremely traumatic economic and political conditions. Geographically, the Gaza Strip is a part of the Palestinian coastal plain stretching from Haifa in the north to Rafah in the south. Situated in the south west of Palestine, it forms a long and narrow rectangle. "Its length is approximately 45 kms; its width 5.7 kms in the northern section, attaining a maximum of 12 kms at the southern end" (Orni and Efrat, 1980).

Sand dunes, geomorphologically called barchans, cover roughly 33% of its 364 sq. kms stretching along the Strip's coast. Despite this chronic hindrance, Palestinian farmers have succeeded to a large extent, in the reclamation process by the continuous removal of sand to gain access to the fertile soil and to the water table which lie beneath. Farms cultivated by the above-mentioned agricultural method are generally dubbed "Mawasi". Vegetables and fruits such as dates and guavas constitute the main produce of the Mawasi.

Economically, agricultural lands constitute 74% of the overall area of Gaza Strip. "Out of 364 sq.kms of the Gaza Strip, 267 were under cultivation in 1967" (Orni and Efrat, 1980), but this was reduced in 1982 to 210 sq.kms (Sawalha, 1983).

The reasons lying behind this decline in the amount of the cultivated land are:

(a) the Israeli's confiscated about 120 sq.kms to build their colonies (Dawud, 1982) because they were formerly partly government property;
(b) as a result of the rapid growth of the Palestinian population in the Strip and the limited land available, people were forced to buy agricultural lands for the sake of housing projects and industrial purposes, such as building small factories, workshops, repair shops and service stations;
(c) as a consequence of the sharp decline in agricultural income and the extremely high increase of land prices, landowners started selling their valuable lands (e.g. the price of one sq. metre in Gaza city was US $ 100-130 in 1982).

Mineral resources are non-existent, and industry is very limited and poor.

The broad population characteristics of the Gaza Strip are strongly influenced by political phenomena which have played a significant role in the growth and population distribution of the Strip. A new pattern of settlement evolved with the formation of the eight refugee camps in the Gaza Strip after 1948.

It is obvious that the Gaza Strip was extremely and negatively influenced by the Israeli-Arab conflicts which have stigmatized its population dynamics.

2.4 The High Growth Rate of the Gaza Strip Population

As a result of the unique political circumstances of the Gaza Strip which led to different administrations (an essential tenet if this is to be understood), the evolution of population growth in the Gaza Strip can be divided into two periods:

(a) the Egyptian period from 1948 to the 5th of June 1967, which was distinguished by huge numbers of displaced Palestinians pouring into the Strip after the Palestine tragedy; and
(b) the Israeli occupation period from the 10th of June 1967 until the present time, characterized by external migration following the war of June 1967.

By 1948, the Gaza Strip was transformed as a territorial unit under the Egyptian administration. In 1922, the population of the Gaza area (which contracted later into the Gaza Strip) reached 28,708 inhabitants (Barron, 1922). But by 1945, the area had been populated by about 64,970 (Hadawi, 1970). Thus the population increased by about 81.67% in that period, or 3.55% per annum.

Before the 1948 war, Gaza Strip was estimated to have a population of only 80,000 indigenous inhabitants. But the beginning of the actual quantitative extension and qualitative change was in 1948, when a flood of Palestinian refugees crowded into the Strip from occupied Palestine.

Those displaced were estimated to be roughly 200,000 refugees, who contributed to raise the Strip population to 280,000 (71% refugees and 29% indigenous). This displacement roughly quadrupled Gaza's population within a year.

2.4.1 The Egyptian Period 1948-67

During the decade 1948-58, the population of the Gaza Strip grew by 24.43%, with an average annual rate of 2.44%. In 1959 the total population decreased by 1.64% as a result of emigration, mainly, from the indigenous population, while the refugees increased by 4.0% in the same year. Then between 1960 and 1964 there was another rise in the rate of increase to 3.36% annually, so that the total population rose to 412,400 (see Table 2.3 and Fig. 2.6).

On the other hand, the refugee population went up from 200,000 in 1948 to 295,000 by 1964, with an annual rate of increase of 2.43%, despite the decrease of their numbers to 199,600 persons in 1950. This decrease has been attributed to emigration and the Measles epidemic which caused a high death rate of children after the Palestinian flight. At the same time, the indigenous population increased by 38.4% during 1948-1964, with an annual rate of increase of 2.4%.

Finally, between 1950 and 1964 the total population of the Gaza Strip apparently increased by 38.72%; an annual rate of 2.42%.

In a nutshell, the above discussion reveals that there was no significant difference between the population growth rate of the indigenous Gazans and the refugee population in the Gaza Strip.

2.4.2 The Israeli Occupation Period Following the War of June 1967

As a consequence of the 1967 war, the Gaza Strip fell under Israeli military occupation, the war having resulted in the termination of the Egyptian administration period of the Gaza Strip. Between 10 and 14 September 1967, the Israeli army held the only census in the Gaza Strip, and it reported the population as being about 354, 674 inhabitants. But according to the Egyptian estimate for 1966 there were 454,900 inhabitants (Central Bureau of Statistics, 1967).

Table 2.3 : Average Annual Rate of Population Change in the Gaza Strip, 1948-1984

End of Period	Indigenous (000's)	Refugees (000's)	Refugees %	Total of population (000's)	% annual change
1948	80.0	200.0	71.0	280.0	
1950	88.5	199.6	69.3	288.1	1.43
1951	90.8	204.1	69.2	294.9	2.33
1952	93.3	206.0	68.8	299.3	1.48
1953	97.1	209.2	68.3	306.3	2.31
1954	100.2	212.6	68.0	312.8	2.10
1955	102.5	216.2	67.8	318.7	1.87
1956	108.7	227.3	67.5	336.0	5.29
1957	112.2	233.6	67.5	345.8	2.87
1958	115.6	241.9	67.7	357.5	3.33
1959	99.9	251.8	71.6	351.7	-1.64
1960	102.3	258.2	71.6	360.5	2.47
1961	105.4	264.8	71.5	370.2	2.66
1962	109.1	273.0	71.5	382.1	3.16
1963	111.1	284.0	71.5	397.1	3.85
1964	117.4	295.0	71.5	412.4	3.78
1965	121.9	306.0	71.5	427.9	3.69
1966	129.6	325.3	71.5	454.9	6.12
1967(Sept)	-	-	-	354.7	-24.88
1968	-	-	-	326.0	-8.44
1969	-	-	-	332.7	2.03
1970	-	-	-	338.2	1.64
1971	-	-	-	346.1	2.31
1972	-	-	-	354.1	2.29
1973	-	-	-	367.9	3.82
1974	-	-	-	379.6	3.13
1975	-	-	-	390.5	2.83
1976	-	-	-	401.6	2.80
1977	-	-	-	414.3	3.11
1978	-	-	-	425.9	2.76
1979	-	-	-	437.9	2.78
1980	-	-	-	449.6	2.64
1981	-	-	-	462.0	2.72
1982	-	-	-	476.3	3.05
1983	-	-	-	493.7	3.59
1984	-	-	-	509.9	3.23

Sources : 1 - Egyptian period: Abu el-Hajaj, 1966; Baddran, 1981; Issa, 1979; and Khlousi, 1967.

2 - Israeli period: Central Bureau of Statistics, 1967; 1983; 1984a and 1984b.

Note: These figures need some clarification: The figures up to 1966 were collected from several sources and have been rounded to the nearest hundred. The figures from 1968 until 1978 included the population of North Sinai (Al-Arish and Rafah Salient) which was occupied by Israel until the first withdrawal from Al-Arish (30,000) in 1979 under the Camp David Accords. The figures from 1979 to 1981 also include the population of Rafah Salient (7000). Israel withdrew from this area in April 1982, the second phase of Camp David Accords.

The total population of North Sinai increased from 33,539 in 1967 to 37000 in 1978, an annual rate of increase of about 0.89%. Therefore, the appropriate deductions, rounded to the nearest hundred have been made to arrive at a figure for the Gaza Strip.

To allow for thosepopulation affected by the second place of the withdrawal (1982), similar deductions have been made for the years 1979-81.

* * *

The discrepancy of 22% or about 100,000 persons between the Egyptian estimate for 1966 and the Israeli census result was attributed by Israeli sources to "systematic errors in drawing up the annual estimates; for instance, greatly exaggerated figures of natural increase due to defective registration of deaths" (Central Bureau of Statistics, 1967). The only Israeli justification of this lower figure was illogical given the length of Egypt's experience of population censuses and estimation, which exceeded one century. Therefore, it seems impossible for the error in the Egyptian estimate to reach the aforementioned rate, particularly as the Gaza Strip was populated by 412,000 inhabitants by 1964 (see Table 2.3). If we project forward the population of the Strip using the annual increase rate of 3.36% for the period 1960-64, the projected figure of the Strip population reaches 426,500 in 1965 and 441,100 by 1966, with the hypothesis of stability of births, deaths and migration rates through the above-mentioned period. This period has been recommended because it is characterised as the best interlude of population constancy in the Gaza Strip. The dissimilarity between the 1966 Egyptian estimated figure and the calculated one was also 13,800 inhabitants; or in other words, the Egyptian figure of 1966 was overestimated by 3.1%.



FIG·2·6 EVOLUTION OF POPULATION IN THE GAZA STRIP, 1947–84

AD

The drop of about 84,800 in Gaza's recorded population, suggested by my calculation estimates and the Israeli census which was conducted by the Israeli army in the Autumn of 1967 was attributed to a number of different groups:

(a) at the time of the 1967 war, many people were trapped abroad and not included in the 1967 census. They were students, merchants, visitors and employees in the Arab oil countries. The 1967 census reported that 27,697 persons were trapped outside the Strip (Central Bureau of Statistics, 1968);
(b) the recruits of the Palestinian Liberation Army who were obliged to evacuate the Strip to Egypt;
(c) the civilians and soldiers who were killed in the 1967 war;
(d) the displacement of the masses towards Jordan during the period from the 10th of June to the 10th of September 1967, that is to say before the census which was done by the Israeli army, and estimated by Abu Lughod (1982) to be around 25,000 persons;
(e) some of the Gazans remained in the Strip for a while but were not included in the Israeli census, because they were afraid of the Israeli army and then fled out of the Strip, or clung to the land so as to resist the Israeli occupiers;
(f) the Israeli authorities imposed a curfew on the Strip during which several thousand young people were collected and exiled to Egypt; and
(g) some errors in the Israeli census occurred because the census did not cover the overall number of residents - a few weeks later the excluded people were added to the census, giving a total population of 356,261 (see Table 6.15).

The geographical differences of population distribution which appeared between the Egyptian estimates and the Israeli census are indicated in Table 2.4 and Figure 2.7. The most important point of note is the gain in Deir el Balah's population according to the Israeli census. This gain may be attributed to the mobility of the neighbouring rural residents who left their temporary nomadic shelters and mudbrick huts and returned to their homes in the city looking for safety and security.

On the other hand, all the remaining localities lost different proportions of their inhabitants (Table 2.4 and Figure 2.7). Khan Yunis lost about 29.4% of its total population. This decrease reflected the

population - wide dread of the probability that the Israeli army would perpetrate a massacre against the city's inhabitants, as happened in 1956 when the Israeli army occupied the Strip. At the same time Rafah lost 24.7% and Gaza lost 22.6%. The lowest decrease can be observed in the three refugee camps : between 10% and 13.6%.

The Israeli figure for the Gaza Strip population declined from 354,700 inhabitants in 1967 to 326,000 by 1968, as a result of the displacement towards Jordan, whereas the total population went up to 367,900 by 1973 (see Table 2.3). So that the population increased by 3.65% in the 1967-73 period, equivalent to an annual rate of 0.61%. This sharp decline of population growth in the above-mentioned period can be attributed to the role of emigration, particularly if we know that the average rate of natural increase during 1968-1973 reached about 28.3%. Later, this trend was reversed, and the population figures mounted again to reach 509,900 in 1984 (Table 2.3) with an annual rate of increase of 2.13% during 1967-84.

Table 2.4 The Different Figures of the Gaza Strip Population According to the 1967 Israeli Census and Egyptian Estimate for 1966

Principal Location	Egyptian estimate (1966)	Israeli census (Sept. 1967)	% change ratio
Total of the Gaza Strip population	454,900	354,700	-22.0
Gaza	152,776	118,272	-22.6
Jabalya camp	49,009	43,604	-11.0
Deir el Balah	15,002	18,118	+20.8
Bureij camp	14,204	12,786	-10.0
Nuseirat camp	20,416	17,638	-13.6
Khan Yunis	75,100	52,997	-29.4
Rafah	66,181	49,812	-24.7

Source : Central Bureau of Statistics, 1967.


0 Miles 5
0 2 4 6
Kilometres
N
Mediterranean Sea
Gaza
Jabalya
Nuseirat
Bureij
Deir el Balah
Khan Yunis
Rafah
EGYPT
AD
FIG·2·7 THE POPULATION SIZE OF SOME SELECTED LOCALITIES IN THE GAZA STRIP ACCORDING TO THE EGYPTIAN ESTIMATE 1966, AND THE ISRAELI CENSUS, 1967
Egyptian Est., 1966
Israeli Census, 1967
160000 Persons
100000
50000
20000
10000

However, between 1968 and 1984, the total population of the Gaza Strip grew by 44.73% with an annual growth rate of about 2.79%; in contrast to 2.42% during the Egyptian administrative period 1948-67 (excluding 1948-49 and 1965-66 because accurate data are unavailable).

2.4.3 The Refugees' Population Growth

To analyse the population growth of the Palestinian refugees in the Gaza Strip through the Israeli period, we must examine the disparity between the UNRWA figures and the Israeli ones. As of the thirtieth of June 1978, there were 354,103 Palestinians refugees registered with UNRWA, of which 199,050 were living in camps (Table 2.5). But according to Israeli estimates as of December 1978, the total number of refugees was 242,900, of whom 151,900 were living in camps (Directorate of Interior of Gaza, 1979).

The first inconsistency between the UNRWA registration figures and the Israeli ones arises from the question who is a refugee? The Israelis apparently consider Palestinians to be refugees if they were born in what is now Israel or if the head of their family was born there (Rowley, 1977).

On the other hand, UNRWA defines a Palestinian refugee for relief purposes, as a person whose normal residence was Palestine for a minimum of two years immediately before the outbreak of the conflict in 1948 and who, as a result of that conflict, lost both his home and means of livelihood. To be eligible for UNRWA assistance, refugees (and descendants born after 14 May 1948) must be registered with UNRWA, living within an area of UNRWA operations (Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, The West Bank and the Gaza Strip) and in need by the specified definitions (UNRWA, 1984 and Rowley, 1977).

The second factor contributing to the discrepancy is that the UNRWA registration figures often include refugees who left the Gaza Strip after the war of June 1967. UNRWA resources estimate this displaced roughly 38,500 refugees (UNRWA, 1983b).

However, the only source which gives us specific information about the Palestinian refugees is UNRWA. Therefore, we shall depend, in the

Table 2.5 The Evolution of the Palestinian Refugee Population in the Gaza Strip and Its Refugee Camps as Given by UNRWA Registration Data : 30 June 1968 - 30 June 1985

End of period	Total refugees	Total refugees in camps	% refugees in camps
30 June 1968	313,152	199,774	63.8
30 June 1969	307,714	195,446	63.5
30 June 1970	311,814	198,919	63.8
30 June 1971	318,103	201,670	63.4
30 June 1972	324,567	205,734	63.4
30 June 1973	327,629	199,255	60.8
30 June 1974	322,133	193,895	60.2
30 June 1975	329,108	197,549	60.0
30 June 1976	339,824	200,751	59.1
30 June 1977	346,007	197,594	57.1
30 June 1978	354,103	199,050	56.2
30 June 1979	363,006	201,672	55.6
30 June 1980	367,995	202,810	55.1
30 June 1981	370,629	205,445	55.4
30 June 1982	377,292	208,662	55.3
30 June 1983	382,549	210,625	55.1
30 June 1984	410,745	226,937	55.3
30 June 1985	427,892	236,486	55.3

Source : UNRWA, 1987 and Table 4.7.

study of the population growth of refugees, on the figures which are published by UNRWA during the Israeli period, because the Israeli Department of Statistics did not publish separate statistics for the refugees as a whole and camp refugees in particular, but included them in with all the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip.

As indicated in Table 2.5, the growth of the refugees has been steadily upward from 313,152 refugees in June 1968, to 329,108 in June

1975, to 367,995 in June 1980, and to 427,892 in June 1985. The annual growth rate of 0.71% for the period of June 1968 to June 1975 increased to 2.23% in June 1975-June 1980 and to 3.02% in June 1980-June 1985 (see Fig. 2.8). This increase can be attributed to the sharp decline of emigration which took place after the Israelis occupied the former Egyptian administered "Gaza Strip" in 1967. This effect of the 1967 out-migration can be clearly seen in the 1968 figure, where the number of refugees dropped to 307,714 by June 1969, or decreased by 1.75%.

Moreover, the proportion of refugees who were living in the camps reportedly declined from 63.8% in June 1968 to 55.3% in June 1985 (see Table 2.5). On the other hand, according to the Israeli figures for the census of 1967, there were 206,212 refugees who comprised 58.1% of the total population of the Gaza Strip and 148,564 (41.9%) were living in camps. By 1978, the refugee population had not changed as a percentage of the total population (58.2%), but the percentage living in camps had fallen to 36.4% according to the same sources.

During the above discussion, it can be observed that there was unanimity between the Israeli and UNRWA sources about the decline of the proportion of refugees residing in camps. This decline can be summarized as due to:

(a) a displacement from the camps toward Jordan after the 1967 war;
(b) the Israeli demolition programme of refugees shelters which has been carried out under several grounds such as : road widening, collective punishment measures, town planning, and resettlement of camp refugees in the governmental-sponsored rehousing projects (see Chapter eight); and
(c) the alternative removal to private houses in nearby villages and towns.

From the above historical analysis of the population growth in the Gaza Strip, it may be described as a Strip of refugees. This is not surprising, if we know that the Gaza Strip is a concentrate of eight major refugee camps stretching along the area.


FIG. 2.8 THE EVOLUTION OF THE REGISTERED REFUGEES BY UNRWA IN CAMPS / OUT CAMPS, 1968-85
Rufugees (000's)
1000
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
Total Refugees
in Camps
30 June 1968
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
30 June 1985
AD

2.5 Components of the Population Growth

Tables 2.3 and 2.6 show that the Gaza Strip increased its population at an abnormal rate of growth in 1948, but subsequently the population growth in the Strip is attributed mainly to natural increase. Also, migration has greatly affected population growth negatively; for instance, Gazan emigration toward Jordan after the war of June 1967.

2.5.1 Natural Increase

It is of great value to study natural increase and its participation in the population growth of any region. So, as illustrated in Table 2.6, we can perceive that the average annual rate of natural increase during 1950-1964 was 30.0 per thousand. In comparison, the average annual rate of population growth was 2.56% during the same period, which indicates that out-migration has led to losses of some 4.4 per thousand per annum during 1950-64.

The high natural increase during the Egyptian administrative period resulted from the high birth rates which became even higher in the Israeli occupation period. Table 2.6 shows that during the Egyptian period the average CBR was estimated at 40.6 per thousand, while the CDR reached 10.6 per thousand also. But the main point in this period was the variability in the CBR reported from year to year (see Fig. 2.9). For instance, the CBR began to decrease in 1954 and reached its lowest figure in 1960 despite the unusual rise of 1958; after that the rate began to rise again, whereas the CDR continued in its decline yet reached then its lowest figure in 1962, when the average of natural increase reached 39.0 per thousand.

The decline in CBR during 1954-60 may be attributed to the labour force's mobility outside the Gaza Strip towards the oil states, especially Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, after the discovery of oil and its exploitation, particularly because the Strip was suffering from an enlarged labour force as the result of the huge concentration of refugees. This mobility included only the head of the family, thus affecting, indirectly the birth rate.

Table 2.6 Gaza Strip: Changes in Birth, Death, Natural Increase Rates and Net Migration During the Egyptian Period 1950-64 and the Israeli Period 1968-84

Year	CBR	CDR	Natural Increase	Net Migration
A) Average rate (1950-64)	40.6	10.6	30.0	
1950	42.2	9.2	33.0	
1951	40.1	12.3	27.8	- 2730
1952	40.6	12.7	27.9	- 3900
1953	41.1	13.7	27.4	- 1300
1954	39.8	10.5	29.3	- 2590
1955	36.0	12.1	23.9	- 1650
1956	37.6	10.3	27.3	+ 8350
1957	35.6	9.5	26.1	+ 910
1958	39.5	9.9	29.6	+ 1300
1959	36.1	9.7	26.4	-15370
1960	34.7	9.8	24.9	- 430
1961	41.3	9.0	32.3	- 2230
1962	48.9	9.0	39.0	- 3000
1963	48.5	10.8	37.7	+ 30
1964	46.7	9.9	36.8	+ 130
B) Average rate (1968-84)	47.2	13.1	34.1	
1968	42.0	19.5	22.5	-30300
1969	46.6	18.9	27.7	- 2710
1970	43.6	18.0	25.6	- 3080
1971	46.7	16.8	29.9	- 2250
1972	47.8	15.7	32.1	- 3740
1973	48.4	16.2	32.2	+ 1590
1974	49.8	14.7	35.1	- 1680
1975	49.6	13.8	35.8	- 3270
1976	49.8	12.5	37.3	- 3930
1977	48.2	11.5	36.7	- 2710
1978	48.2	11.2	37.0	- 4390
1979	46.7	10.4	36.3	- 4720
1980	47.5	10.0	37.5	- 5020
1981	47.3	9.1	38.2	- 5220
1982	45.5	8.5	37.0	- 3100
1983	45.9	8.4	37.5	- 1000
1984	48.3	8.0	40.3	- 4800

Sources : 1. Egyptian Period : Figures for the period 1950-60 are calculated from Khlousi, 1967; and those for 1961-64 quoted from Issa, 1979.

2. Israeli Period : Calculated from : Central Bureau of Statistics, 1984(a) and 1985.

Note: Net migration figures for the Egyptian period have been calculated from vital registration and rounded to the nearest ten. Morover, net migration figures during 1968-81 have been modified and rounded to the nearest ten, because deductions have been made to exclude the North Sinai figures and to arrive at figures for the Gaza Strip only.

FIG·2·9 GAZA STRIP: BIRTH, DEATH AND NATURAL INCREASE DURING THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PERIODS, 1950-64 AND 1968-84.



EGYPTIAN PERIOD



ISRAELI PERIOD

AD

Another factor which may be considered to have effected the CBR during this period is that during the Israeli occupation of October 1956-March 1957 930 young men were massacred and 215 were reported missing, lowering the male married population by 1145 (Palestine Liberation Organization, 1983). But in the period 1961-64 the CBR went up again to an annual rate of 46.3 per thousand, and the CDR remained stationary around its lowest levels (see Table 2.6).

The broad characteristics of vital registration during the Egyptian period were distinguished by the palpable decline in the CDR, where the average attained 10.6 per thousand. In fact, the registration of mortality in the Gaza Strip was deficient and incomplete, particularly if we make a comparison with the average death rate of 13.1 per thousand reported during the Israeli period, which was characterized by better registration in the field of mortality.

In the Israeli period, which started after the 1967 war, the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics began to publish data about the population of the occupied territories, and, as illustrated in Table 2.6, the average rate of natural increase amounted to 34.1 per thousand which is 4.1 per thousand higher than the former Egyptian natural increase figure. This increase was imputed to the increase in the CBR, to an average of 47.2 per thousand whereas the average CDR reached 13.1 per thousand.

From Table 2.6, we can discern that while the average annual rate of natural increase during 1968-84 was 34.1 per thousand, the average population growth amounted to 2.79% per annum in the same period; the disparity of 6.2 per thousand annually being imputable to the impact of out-migration.

In the period 1968-70, there was a variable CBR which resulted from the continuation of emigration from the Strip, but subsequently the CBR rose and remained stable (Fig. 2.9). While the CDR is reported as a continuous decline, even reaching 8.0 per thousand in 1984 (Table 2.6).

However, the decline of death rates in the Gaza Strip during the Israeli period is not a consequence of good medical care, but of increasing hygiene awareness, higher education, the increase in the number of local doctors, the improvement in housing conditions relative to the

1950s and 1960s and a modest improvement in the economic situation due to the transfer of earnings from Palestinian employees in the oil states to their relatives as well from work in Israel. In addition, there was a sharp decline in the illiteracy rate (see Chapter Six). On the other hand, most of Gaza's residents found that the health service in the Israeli period deteriorated from the standards of the former Egyptian period.

As a consequence of the declining mortality rate combined with the continuation of the higher fertility rate, the natural increase of the Strip has been described as one of the highest rates in the Middle East and Muslim countries. In 1977, for instance the following rates of natural increase were recorded: Gaza Strip (36.7), Egypt (31.0), Libya (34.0), Tunisia (25.0), Mauritania (28.0), Bahrain (29.0), Jordan (36.0), Qatar (22.0), Syria (38.0), U.A.E. (23.0), Iran (31.0), Pakistan (30.0), Indonesia (17.0) (Clarke, 1985) and the West Bank (32.9) (Central Bureau of Statistics, 1984a).

2.5.2 Migration

With the exception of the abnormal population growth of the Gaza Strip caused by the huge displacement from Palestine after the 1948 war, migration had a limited effect upon population change during the Egyptian period.

Due to the unavailability of specific data about net migration during the Egyptian period, the researcher is forced to calculate the net migration rate from vital registration data (Table 2.6) and the actual figures of the population as given in Table 2.3. This method may be criticized because it is affected by the accuracy of the vital registration data, but it was the only available method and we must rely on it, particularly since we do not have specific information about net migration.

However, Table 2.6 and Figure 2.10 show that the rate of net migration during the Egyptian time was unsettled and fluctuating between plus 8350 (1956) and minus 15370 (1959). Emigration continued until 1955 at a very low rate. In fact, refugees with money or skills left the Strip, leaving behind the dispossessed villagers who had no alternative

FIG.2.10 GAZA STRIP: NET MIGRATION 1951-64; AND 1968-84.



but to stay. In 1952, 2000 labourers and teachers from the Strip were allowed to go to Saudi Arabia (Lesch, 1984). In 1956, the Strip gained 8350 persons which may be due to the return of some migrants, or to errors in the estimated population figures. In 1959, however, the area lost a large number of its population : 15 370 persons. Actually most of them were from the indigenous population (Table 2.3) and they went to the oil states for work. After the emigration continued at a very slow rate until 1962, and in the next two years the area gained 160 persons, which may be imputed to marriages to partners from Egypt or to estimation errors.

When the Israeli army occupied the Gaza Strip in June 1967, the Palestinian Arab population of the Strip decreased dramatically through increased emigration. Table 2.7 presents various estimates of the scale of population displacement out of the Gaza Strip. Despite the disparity of the various estimates, we can observe that the Strip lost between 50,000 and 70,000 persons by the end of 1967. "Most of the displaced persons moved eastward toward Amman, although smaller numbers found their way into Lebanon, Syria and Egypt" (Abu Lughod, 1973).

This displacement from the Gaza Strip continued on a large scale until July 1968, when the Government of Jordan refused entry to the East Bank to people who were leaving the Gaza Strip after the aforementioned date (UNRWA, 1972), and according to the Israeli figures, the Gaza Strip lost only 30,300 inhabitants during 1968 (Table 2.6).

Nevertheless, the Gaza Strip has been described as the region with the lowest population losses of all the territories occupied by the Israeli army (Table 2.8).

As illustrated in Table 2.8, Harris (1980) has estimated the Gaza Strip population in pre-war 1967 at about 400,000, and the proportion of losses at about 17.5%, whereas the author calculated that the Strip was populated by 441,100 persons, which means that the population losses reached 15.9%. Therefore the differentation was not significant.

However, Harris attributed the relatively low losses from the Gaza Strip population as compared with the remainder of the occupied regions, to the role of distance constraints: Gaza was furthest from any potential sanctuary. This justification is illogical, particularly if we know that

Table 2.7 Various Estimates of the Scale of the Population Displacement Out of the Gaza Strip as a Result of the War of June 1967

Source	Scale
UNRWA	50,000, Thereof: 38,500 refugees of 1948 war
Abu Lughod	50,000
Harris	70,000, loss June-December 1967
Central Bureau of Statistics	41,740* until the end of 1968

Source : UNRWA, 1972 and 1983b; Abu Lughod, 1973; Harris, 1980; and Central Bureau of Statistics, 1984a.

* About 2760 persons have been deducted to arrive at a figure for the Gaza Strip only, by excluding the North Sinai figure.

Table 2.8 West Bank, Golan, Gaza-Sinai: Out-Movements of Arab Residents, 1967

Area	Pre-war Population (1967 estimates)	Estimated Population loss June-Dec. 1967	Loss as a proportion of pre-war population
Gaza	400,000	70,000	17.5
Golan	100,000	93,000	93.0
Sinai	56,017	15,000	26.0
West Bank Highlands	758,484	175,000	23.0
West Bank Valley	84,779	75,000	28.0
Total	1,399,280	428,000	31.0

Source : Harris, 1980.

the Israeli authorities encouraged Gazan people to leave the area for Jordan and provided them with bus fares to Amman (Kanovsky, 1970). Furthermore, a more plausible explanation lies in the structure of the Strip's population, where refugees comprised about 70%. These people had suffered from the bitter experience of their first displacement in 1948. Therefore, they rejected emigration and preferred to remain in the Strip, despite the possibility of being killed or persecuted. The majority of those who left the Strip emigrated either to join the heads of their families abroad or had no previous experience of being refugees.

During 1969 and up to 1984, migration continued on a small scale; as figure 2.10 outlines net migration has levelled off, fluctuating between a net migration of plus 1590 (1973) and minus 5220 (1981). The cumulative magnitude of emigration since 1969 has totalled 50,030 persons.

In other words, the Gaza Strip has lost 80,330 persons during 1968-1984. This displacement has been caused by a variety of phenomena:

(a) the mass displacement after the 1967 war under dreadful pressure from the Israeli army;
(b) to join the heads of families in the Arab countries where they were working before the outbreak of war;
(c) emigration under the pressure of educational aims; the Israeli authorities provided students as well as all Gazan people with permission to leave for just one year, after which they must come back to renew their exit permits, but if they cannot do that and their permits expire they become migrants. Since the early 1980s these permits have become longer (three years);
(d) emigration to find work opportunities;
(e) escape from the hardships of living under occupation; and
(f) enforced exile from the area, intended to stamp out population resistance to the Israeli occupation.

Nevertheless, the Israeli authorities allowed a few people who had been displaced in 1967 or trapped out the area at the time of war to return again to the Strip, under the programme for family reunion and hardship cases. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, 158 persons returned to the Strip in 1967, 2032 in 1968 and 330 in the first three months of 1969 (United Nations, 1969). According to UNRWA (1974) "up to June 1973 about 6200 displaced refugees returned from East

Jordan to the Gaza Strip. In addition, about 1000 displaced persons returned from Egypt". However, in 1984, only 15 persons (Akhbar Ghazza, 1984) were permitted to return to the Strip under the programme of family reunion and hardship cases. From the aforementioned discussion we can explain the gain of the Gaza Strip population in 1973 (Fig. 2.10).

According to Godwin (1982), "the low rates of emigration from the Gaza Strip can be attributed to the problems of entrance into other Middle Eastern states and overseas countries for Gazans holding "Laissez passer" papers". However, although all Gazans have access to Egyptian travel documents, it has been difficult for Gazans to travel before and after 1967. This is because the Arab States have tried to discourage Palestinians from leaving their homeland, or they do not want to have large Palestinian communities on their soils. Another important factor is the role of the social structure of Gaza's people, the majority of whom are refugees and villagers who dislike migration. So, the Strip can be characterized as a conservative society which abhors migration and does not encourage its members to migrate.

2.6 Summary

Despite the 1967 population losses from the Gaza Strip, which have been estimated at 115,100 persons (between 1966 and 1968) from the calculated figure of 1966 recommended by the author, the population of the Strip increased by 5.14% per annum between 1948 and 1984. This is a high rate of growth which cannot be explained solely by high natural increase rates. A large proportion of this growth was caused by the inflow of Palestinian refugees into the Strip in 1948, aggravating the socio-economic situation of the indigenous population who were totally unready for, and unfit to cope with, this mass influx of refugees.

The analysis shows that from 1949 onward the population growth of the Gaza Strip was almost entirely due to the forces of natural increase, while migration only contributed with a negative role. However, emigration before 1967 was the direct consequence of the imbalance between labour supply and economic development, and of the huge increase of population as a result of the immigration from occupied Palestine which occurred after the 1948 catastrophe. But emigration from the Strip after the 1967 war predominantly due to the Israeli policy of pressuring people to leave the occupied territories.

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CHAPTER THREE
Population Distribution and High Density

It is the purpose of this chapter to provide a factual description of population distribution and density in the Gaza Strip. The object is to accommodate a basis and an introduction for the analysis of those causative factors which have brought about the detailed distribution and variation in density.

3.1 Evolution of Population Distribution, 1945-82

Before we start our discussion about the evolution of population distribution, it will be useful to provide a brief idea about the important factors which have had an impact on population distribution in the past and present. The climate and soil formerly had a very significant influence on the population distribution of the Strip, but later political factors were to become more powerful.

Climatologically, the Gaza Strip can be described as one of short warm, rainy, winters - when the coldest period of the year is January-February (12-14°C) and the annual average rate of rainfall is 300 mm (Meteorological section of Gaza, 1984) - and long, moderately-hot, dry summers, when the hottest month is August and the average of temperature reaches 26°C. Although the Strip has a limited area (364 sq. kms), rainfall is unevenly distributed: while the annual average remains below 200 mm at Rafah in the southern zone, the area located north of Gaza town received roughly 370 mm per annum (Fig. 3.1).

Soils can be characterized as sandy in the west (along the coast), alluvial in the east and sandy alluvial in the south. As a result of this soil distribution, the northern and central zones are more fertile than the southern zone (Fig. 3.1). Moreover, sandstone ridges can be observed hidden beneath the fertile soil in the eastern section of the Gaza Strip.

Owing to the aforementioned geographical conditions, the population has tended to concentrate in the agricultural lands in the northern zone, which was inhabited by 65.5% of the total population of Gaza area in 1945 (Table 3.1 and Fig. 3.2) which later formed the Gaza Strip. In contrast, in the semi arid central and southern zones most of the Strip's local



Source of data: Meteorological Section of Gaza, 1984
Directorate of Agriculture of Gaza, 1984

residents depended for their livelihood on working in the surrounding countryside of Palestine before 1948. After the Palestine disaster, the Gaza Strip received a huge influx of refugees who were distributed throughout the area. This displacement led to an increase in the amount of cultivated land by using the surplus labour force in the reclamation of the Strip's less fertile lands.

The effects of climate and soil on population concentration diminished after the war of 1948, when political factors began to assume the most important role in the distribution of population. The Gaza Strip population increased by 168.63% between 1945 and 1967 (Table 3.1). This abnormal increase has been attributed to the Palestinian displacement from occupied Palestine into the Strip in 1948 (see Chapter Two).

At the zonal level, the central and the southern zones populations increased during 1945-67 at very high rates of 315% and 179.73% respectively, while the northern zone increased by a lower rate of 139.2%.

This abnormal increase resulted in the overpopulation of the Strip's localities. For instance, Jubalya and Nazla villages together increased from 4850 persons in 1945 to 43,314 in 1967 (218.95%), Rafah increased from 2220 to 51,480 (314.37%) and Deir el Balah increased by 195.69%. At the same time, the Palestinian influx resulted in the appearance of new localities like Bureij, Mughazi and Nuseirat refugee camps in the central zone, while other refugees camps were joined to existing localities (Fig. 3.2 and Fig. 4.1).

In addition, the Palestinian displacement had a strong effect in changing the proportions of population distribution by zones, and localities. The population percentage in the northern zone declined from 65.5% in 1945 to 48.8% in 1967, while the central zone share increased substantially from 3.9% to 17.0% and the southern zone increased slightly from 30.6% to 34.2% (see Table 3.1). On the other hand, the proportion of the population living in Gaza city went down from 52.7% in 1945 to 33.6% in 1967, and Khan Yunis city's share decreased by 1.9% during the same period.

Between 1967 and 1982, the evolution of population distribution did not change much relative to the former period 1948-67, but was affected by two main factors: Firstly, emigration to Jordan, which started directly

Table 3.1 Evolution of Population Distribution in the Gaza Strip, by Locality, 1945-1982

Zones and Localities	1945		Census of 1967*			1982		% increase 1967-82
	Nos.	% of total pop.	Nos.	% of total pop.	% increase 1945-67	Nos.	% of total pop.	
Northern Zone	42,530	65.5	171,100	48.8	139.20	250,567	52.6	38.15
Gaza city and its camp	34,250	52.7	117,913	33.6	123.63	180,416	37.9	42.53
Beit Hanum	1,730	2.7	4,756	1.4	101.13	9,067	1.9	64.52
Beit Lahiya	1,700	2.6	5,117	1.5	110.19	11,172	2.3	78.08
Jabalya	3,520	5.4	43,314	12.3	218.95	49,912	10.5	14.18
Nazla	1,330	2.0						
Central zone	2,560	3.9	59,748	17.0	315.00	72,246	15.2	18.99
Deir el Balah and its camp	2,560	4.0	18,118	5.2	195.69	25,078	5.3	32.51
Nuseirat	-	-	20,221	5.7	-	22,434	4.7	10.39
Bureij	-	-	12,626	3.6	-	13,045	2.7	3.26
Mughazi	-	-	8,783	2.5	-	9,231	1.9	4.97
Zawaida	-	-	-	-	-	2,458	0.5	-
Southern zone	19,880	30.6	119,943	34.2	179.73	153,487	32.2	24.66
Khan Yunis city and its camp	11,220	17.3	52,789	15.0	154.86	73,630	15.5	33.27
Rafah city and its camp	2,220	3.4	51,480	14.7	314.37	58,819	12.3	13.33
Bani Suheila	3,220	5.0	7,561	2.2	85.36	8,854	1.8	15.79
Abasan el Kabira	2,230	3.4	3,730	1.1	84.88	6,034	1.3	48.10
Abasan el Saghira			1,481	0.4		3,301	0.7	80.15
Ikhza'a	990	1.5	1,534	0.5	43.79	2,849	0.6	61.91
Bayuk	-	-	1,368	0.3	-	-	-	-
Total	64,970	100.0	350,791	100.0	168.63	476,300	100.0	30.59

Source: Calculated from : Hadawi, 1970; Central Bureau of Statistics, 1967; and Directorate of Interior of Gaza, 1983.

* Excluding those living as nomads and in outside localities.



FIG. 3·2 DISTRIBUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN ARAB POPULATION IN THE GAZA STRIP, 1945, SEP. 1967, AND 1982

after the Israeli occupation of the Strip in 1967. Secondly, the Israeli-sponsored rehousing projects for Gazan refugees which were established near the Strip's cities and villages (see Fig. 4.1 and part three for details).

As a result of these factors, some localities increased at very low rates between 1967 and 1982: Bureij 3.26%, Mughazi 4.97%, Nuseirat 10.39% (all aforesaid localities are refugee camps) and Rafah city and its camp by 13.33% (see Table 3.1 and Fig. 3.3). However Beit Lahiya increased by 64.52% during the same time, following the establishment of one of the refugee dwelling projects in this village (Fig. 4.1) to which some of Jahalya's refugees were moved.

In contrast, the zonal distribution of population appeared to show an increase in the proportion of the inhabitants of the northern zone, from 48.8% of the total population in 1967 to 52.6% in 1982, while the other two zones decreased their share of the population (Table 3.1). This means that the population of the Gaza Strip is tending to settle in the northern zone, particularly in the main city of the Gaza Strip (Gaza) which was inhabited by 33.6% of the total population in 1967 and by 37.9% in 1982.

3.2 Population Distribution, 1978-82

Despite the fact that the Gaza Strip comprises a total of 364 sq. kms inhabited by 509,900 persons in 1984, the permitted residential area for its Palestinian inhabitants which lies under the authority of the municipalities and local villages is only 138.6 sq. kms or some 38.1% of the total area (Fig. 3.4 and Table 3.2).

However, the remaining 61.9% is largely uninhabited, and can be classified into two groups:
Firstly, about 120 sq. km are directly controlled by the Israeli military authorities and Israeli colonists, and have been used for Israeli colonial purposes; and
Secondly, the remainder is administered by the Israeli Directorate of Interior, although all of this part is owned by the Gazan people.

The salient phenomenon in the pattern of population distribution in the Strip is the heavy pressure upon the municipalities and local village



* Zawaida village was established on 16th, February. 1978.

Table 3.2 Changing Population Distribution of the Gaza Strip, 1978-1982

Zones and Localities	Area sq.km	1978**			1982			% pop. change
		Nos.	% of total pop.	Density per sq. km.	Nos.	% of total pop.	Density per sq. km.	
Northern zone	66.25	211,900	50.7	3198	250,567	52.6	3782	16.76
Gaza city and its camp	36.0	148,800	35.6	4181	180,416	37.9	5012	19.27
Beit Hanun	12.0	6,400	1.5	533	9,067	1.9	756	34.83
Beit Lahiya	7.25	7,100	1.7	979	11,172	2.3	1541	45.33
Jabalya-Nazla and Jabalya camp	11.00	49,600	11.9	4509	49,912	10.5	4537	0.63
Central zone	24.5	62,600	15.0	2555	72,246	15.2	2949	14.33
Deir el Balah and its camp	12.05	21,700	5.2	1800	25,078	5.3	2081	14.48
Nuseirat	1.00	19,400	4.6	19400	22,434	4.7	22434	14.53
Bureij	1.65	12,300	2.9	7454	13,045	2.7	7900	5.88
Mughazi	2.35	9,200	2.2	3915	9,231	1.9	3928	0.34
Zawaida	7.45	-	-	-	2,458	0.5	330	-
Southern zone	47.85	143,200	34.3	2993	153,487	32.2	3206	6.94
Khan Yunis city and its camp	16.45	66.400	15.9	4036	73,630	15.5	4476	10.33
Rafah city and its camp	15.2*	58,400	14.0	3842	58,819	12.3	3870	0.71
Bani Suheila	6.55	9,800	2.3	1496	8,854	1.8	1352	-10.15
Abasan el Kabira	4.2	4,800	1.2	1143	6,034	1.3	1337	22.88
Abasan el Saghira	1.25	1,900	0.5	1520	3,301	0.7	2641	55.24
Ikhza'a	4.2	1,900	0.5	452	2,849	0.6	678	40.51
Gaza Strip	138.6	417,700	100.0	3014	476,300	100.0	3437	13.13

Source : Directorate of Interior of Gaza 1979, 1980 and 1983

* The area of Rafah municipality decreased from 19.75 to 15.2 sq. km as a result of the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai in 1982.

** Excluding those living outside the administrative areas of the municipality and village councils.


0 Miles 5
0 2 4 6
Kilometres
N
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
EGYPT
AD
FIG·3·4 PATTERNS OF LAND ADMINISTRATION IN THE GAZA STRIP
Sub-division boundary
Under the control of the Directorate of the Interior and the Military Authorities.
Under the control of the Municipalities and the village councils.

administration areas. This pressure can be attributed to the rapid population growth and in addition to Israeli restrictions against the Palestinian residents, whereby the Israelis prevent the Gazans from constructing any housing outside the municipality and village boundaries.

From the above facts, we can understand the extensive urban sprawl around the municipalities which can be observed most distinctly in the Gaza-Beit Lahiya sector : here the urban and rural localities coalesce and nearly comprise one urban centre (see Fig. 3.2). In the near future, the same thing will happen to Deir el Balah-Nuseirat sector, and to Khan Yunis and its surrounding villages.

Figure 3.5 and Table 3.2 show that the Gaza Strip localities recorded different rates of population growth compared with the Strip average annual rate of 3.28% reported between 1978 and 1982. These localities can be classified according to their population growth into five groups:

1. A Very High Annual Population Growth (12%+)

In Abasan el Saghira village, the population increased by an annual rate of 13.81%. Some of this increase may have been caused by population mobility from the adjacent villages.

2. High Annual Population Growth (6-11.99%)

This group included Beit Lahiya (11.33%), Ikhza'a (10.13%) and Beit Hanun (8.71%), all of which are villages located at a distance from the main urban centres (see Fig. 4.1), so that they have low land prices which encourage the residents to buy small plots of land to set up their own dwellings.

3. Moderate Annual Growth (4-5.99%)

This group comprises Abasan el Kabira village which increased by 5.72% and Gaza town and its refugee camp which went up by 4.82%. Population increase here was caused by mobility towards Gaza town from the Strip's localities while in Abasan el Kabira the mobility was from the surrounding areas.


0 Miles 5
0 2 4 6 Kms.
Annual Population Growth Rate by Locality: 1978-82.
12%+
6·0 - 11·99
4·0 - 5.99
3·0 - 3.99
1·0 - 2.99
0 - 0·99
0 to -3
N
Mediterranean Sea
EGYPT
AD
FIG·3·5 POPULATION DISTRIBUTION BY LOCALITIES, 1978-82·
1982
1978
185 000 persons
120000
50000
10000
2000

4. Low Annual Growth (0-3.99%)

Nuseirat camp which increased by 3.63%, Deir el Balah and its refugee camp (3.62%), Khan Yunis city and its refugee camp (2.58%), Bureij camp (1.47%), Rafah city and its refugee camp (0.18%), Jabalya-Nazla and Jabalya camp (0.16%), and Mughazi camp (0.08%) fall into this group. Population growth in this group is strongly affected by movement of its population within the Strip's localities, particularly to the Israeli-sponsored rehousing projects for refugees, and toward Gaza City as well. This group includes six refugee camps from a total of eight in the Gaza Strip (see Fig. 4.1). Moreover, Rafah city lost a small proportion of its population, and 4.55 sq. kms (23%) of its municipal administrative area (Municipality of Rafah, 1985), as a consequence of Israeli withdrawal from the Egyptian Sinai in April 1982.

5. Decline (Zero to minus 3% per annum)

The only locality which recorded a decline in population was Bani Suheila village (minus 2.54%), caused by mobility towards the neighbouring villages and towns, particularly Abasan el Saghira and Khan Yunis, or by out-migration.

In summary eight localities experienced higher annual rates of population growth than the Strip average of 3.28%, while six localities experienced lower rates.

Figure 3.6 reveals that 40% of the 1982 population were living upon 22% of the inhabited area, 60% upon 39%, 80% upon 56%, and 90% upon 70% of the total inhabited area - not a markedly uneven distribution, as the Lorenz curve of population distribution demonstrates in Figure 3.6 and Appendix 1).

Moreover, the zonal population distribution is also very even in the Gaza Strip. In 1982 about 52.6% of the total population was living in the northern zone which comprises 47.8% of the inhabited area, while the southern zone comprises 34.5% of the total area and was populated by 32.2%. The two zones together constitute 84.8% of the inhabited area and they contained 82.3% of the total population (see Table 3.3). Similarly, the central zone was populated by 15.2% upon 17.7% of the inhabited area.



FIG·3·6 LORENZ CURVE OF POPULATION DENSITY IN THE GAZA STRIP, 1982

AD

Consequently, the zonal distribution of the Strip's population is more even than the distribution by localities (see Fig. 3.7 and Appendix 1).

The outstanding feature of population distribution in the Gaza Strip is that the inhabitants of Gaza city including Beach camp, numbering 180,416 in 1982, amount to about 37.9% of the total population while the two main cities (Gaza and Khan Yunis and their refugee camps) comprise approximately 53.3%. This fact clarifies the disparity between the population distribution by localities, as illustrated in the Lorenz curve, and the zonal distribution as demonstrated in Table 3.3 and Figure 3.7.

Moreover, the Gaza Strip population can be classified according to population groups into indigenous and refugee populations, of which the refugees make up an absolute majority. The 1967 census (Central Bureau of Statistics, 1967) reported their numbers at some 206,212 refugees - according to the Israeli definition - or 58.1% of the total population, while that proportion rose to constitute about 60.4% by the end of 1978 (Table 3.4). The aforesaid increase is due to the higher percentage of refugees to the total population, and probably to the higher birth rate of the refugees compared with the indigenous Palestinian of Gaza.

According to the 1967 census, the zonal distribution of population emphasized the prevalence of refugees in the central and the southern zones, where they comprised 76.6% and 60.6% respectively of those zones total populations. At the same time, the proportions of refugees and indigenous population in the northern zone are approximately equivalent. Significantly, Table 3.4 shows that the percentage of the refugees increased in all the zones of the Gaza Strip by 1978.

Moreover, it can be noted that 41.6% of the total refugees were concentrated in the northern zone in 1967; this percentage rose to 42.9% in 1978. While in 1967 the proportion of the indigenous population who were resident in the northern zone was 58.2% and this rose to 62.7% in 1978.

This concentration of the indigenous Gazans in the northern zone is strongly connected to the historical factors of their settlements, particularly before the Palestine disaster of 1948.

Table 3.3 Gaza Strip : Population Distribution and Density by Geographical Zones, 1982

Zone	Total population	% pop.	Area (sq.km)	% area	Density
Northern	250,567	52.6	66.25	47.8	3782
Central	72,246	15.2	24.50	17.7	2949
Southern	153,487	32.2	47.85	34.5	3206
Gaza Strip	476,300	100.0	138.6	100.0	3437

Source : Calculated from Table 3.2.

Table 3.4 Population Distribution in the Gaza Strip, by Population Groups and Geographical Zones, 1967-1978

Zone	Census of 1967				Estimates 1978			
	Refugees *	Indigenous	Total	% Refugees *	Refugees *	Indigenous	Total	% Refugees *
Northern	85,689	86,372	172,061	49.8	108,300	103,600	211,900	51.1
Central	47,284	14,425	61,709	76.6	51,200	11,400	62,600	81.8
Southern	73,239	47,665	120,904	60.6	92,900	50,300	143,200	64.9
Gaza Strip	206,212	148,462	354,674	58.1	252,400	165,300	417,700	60.4

Source : Calculated from: Central Bureau of Statistics, 1967; and Directorate of Interior of Gaza 1979.

* The figures of the refugee population and proportions are according to the Israeli definition of refugees.


0 Miles 5
0 2 4 6 Kilometres
N
NORTHERN ZONE
14%
59%
27%
CENTRAL ZONE
3%
25%
72%
Mediterranean Sea
13%
47%
40%
SOUTHERN ZONE
EGYPT
AD
FIG·3·7 GAZA STRIP POPULATION, BY GEOGRAPHICAL ZONES AND TYPES OF SETTLEMENTS, 1982
260 000 Persons
100 000
50 000
In Cities
In Camps
In Villages

As demonstrated in Figure 3.8, the proportions of refugees were different in the various localities of the Strip. They constituted the greatest majority in the camps, but were in much more varied proportions in the remaining localities. For instance, in Beit Lahiya village, the refugees comprised about 18% of the population in 1978, while in Rafah city their percentage reached 70%. Another important point which we can perceive from Figure 3.8 is the differential rate of change in locality size and proportion of refugees. Whereas most of the cities and villages reported a rapid increase in their size during the period of 1967-78, the refugee camps recorded either a negative growth rate, especially Rafah, Beach, and Deir el Balah camps, or a very slow growth rate. The cause of this sharp decline and decrease is attributed to the Israeli policy imposed against the refugee camps (see chapter 8).

The Gaza Strip is characterized by creed as an Islamic region, where out of 354, 674 persons registered in the 1967 census, 352,532 or 99.4% were Muslims, while only 2,305 were Christians and 1,424 either belonged to other religious, avowed no religion or did not give a clear answer. The majority of the Christians are concentrated in Gaza city, numbering 1,649: 71.5% of the total Gaza Strip Christian community (Central Bureau of Statistics, 1967).

3.3 A Very High Population Density

The concept of density has been a target of criticism by several scholars because it reflects a superficial representation of the real pressure of population upon the resource base. As Trewartha (1970) indicates, this simple ratio is unsatisfactory because it expresses a quantitative relationship between two elements which in themselves are highly inconstant. The numerator, or total population, represents men of greatly contrasting cultures and stages of economic development, whose demands upon the physical earth stand in great contrast. The denominator of the ratio, expressing units of area, fails to take into consideration the variable capacities of different environments for supporting human life and satisfying human wants.

Consequently, most researchers recommend the use of the physiological density rate, which has been calculated by dividing the total population by the arable area. Thus all land not capable for cultivation is

FIG·3·8 GAZA STRIP: THE POPULATION OF THE LOCALITIES, AND THE PROPORTION OF THE REFUGEES RESIDING WITHIN THEM, 1967 AND 1978



AD

eliminated from the denominator. This leads to a great difference between the general and physiological densities. The difference between the two formulae is extremely important, particularly in the cases of countries characterized by substantial dissimilarities in their physiographic structures. Most of the world's countries, including the Arab countries, are distinguished by a distinctive concentration of their population in certain areas, while the remaining areas are unsettled.

In the case of the Gaza Strip, the difference between the two previous formulae does not indicate an essential difference as found in the other Arab countries. This can be attributed to the limited area of the Strip (364 sq. kms) and to the non-existence of physiographic structural disparity: the Gaza Strip is a flat plain area, with its highest point Tal el Montar located east of Gaza city only 85 metres above sea level (Municipality of Gaza, 1972).

According to the Israeli census of September 1967, the general density of population in the Strip was 977 persons per sq. km; if only cultivated land is taken into consideration, the density was 1,328 per sq. km.

The general population density rose rapidly so that by 1982 it reached 1,312 per sq. km, while the physiological density was 2,268 per sq. km, or three persons per 1.3 dunum. The physiological density doubled between 1967-82, despite the out-migration which happened after the Israeli occupation of the Strip in 1967. This increase was attributed to rapid population growth, and on the other hand, to the decrease in the area of the cultivated land from 267 sq. kms in 1967 to 210 sq. kms in 1982. However, the density of inhabitable land reached 3,437 persons per sq. km in 1982 and 3,612 in July 1984.

So, all of the Strip localities recorded an increase in density during the period of 1967-82 (see Figures 3.9 and 3.10).

With such high densities, the Strip can be characterized as one of the most populous small areas in the world.

In 1982, the population density in the administrative areas of municipalities and village councils ranged from 2,949 persons per sq. km



FIG·3·9 POPULATION DENSITY IN THE GAZA STRIP, SEP. 1967


0 Miles 5
0 2 4 6
Kilometres
N
Mediterranean Sea
EGYPT
AD
FIG·3·10 POPULATION DENSITY
IN THE GAZA STRIP·1982
P. SQ. KM.
8000 and over
6000 - 7999
4000 - 5999
3000 - 3999
2000 - 2999
1000 - 1999
500 - 999
Under 500

in the central zone to 3,782 in the northern zone, which recorded a higher density than the average Strip density (see Table 3.3).

The population density in each locality is set out in Table 3.2, from which various conclusions can be drawn. Consequently, we can categorize the Strip's localities according to their 1982 densities into the following four groups:

Firstly, the very high density group, with 6,000 inhabitants and over per sq. km including Nuseirat and Bureij, where the density reaches 22,434 and 7,900 inhabitants per sq. km respectively. Both localities are refugee camps.

Secondly, the high density group includes five localities of above-average density ranging between 3,000 and 5,999 inhabitants per sq. km : the three main cities in the Strip - Gaza (5,012 persons per sq. km), Khan Yunis (4,476) and Rafah (3,870) - and Jabalya-Nazla and Mughazi with densities of 4,537 and 3,928 per sq. km respectively. The higher densities in this group also result from the concentration of the major refugee camps.

Thirdly, the moderate density group, with densities ranging between 1,000 and 2,999 inhabitants per sq. km includes Deir el Balah city (2,081) and four villages, Abasan el Saghira (2,641), Beit Lahiya (1,541), Abasan el Kabira (1,337), and Bani Suheila with (1,352) persons.

Fourthly, the low density group, with densities less than 1,000 persons per sq. km comprises localities found in all three zones of the Strip, represented by Beit Hanun in the northern zone (756 persons per sq. km), Ikhza'a in the southern zone (678) and Zawaida in the central zone (330), all distant from the main urban centres in the Strip (Gaza, Khan Yunis and Rafah) while the low density in the third village is also due to its new creation in 1978.

The population density in the refugee camps reflects the overcrowding of its residents. According to the UNRWA figures at 30 June 1985, there were 236,486 refugees living in the eight refugee camps in the Strip (UNRWA, 1985), the average density of which was 14,799 persons per sq. km, the lowest density being in Mughazi refugee camp (8,541 per sq. km) and

Table 3.5 : The Population Density of the Gaza Strip Refugee Camps, 30 June 1985

Camp	Area in Dunums when established by UNRWA	Present area in dunums 1985*	Pop.as at 30 June 1985 living in camps	Density per sq. km
Jabalya	1448	4000	51 225	12 806
Beach	747	2000	40 359	20 180
Bureij	478	1000	16 057	16 057
Nuseirat	588.7	1000	26 400	26 400
Mughazi	547.7	1230	10 506	8 541
Deir el Balah	131.6	750	9 854	13 139
Khan Yunis	564.0	3000	33 269	11 090
Rafah	1364	3000	48 816	16 272
Total	5869	15980	236 486	14 799

Source : UNRWA, 1983 and 1985.

* The present area of the camps were given by the village councils and municipalities.

the highest in the Nuseirat refugee camp (26,400) (see Table 3.5). So the density of population in the refugee camp is higher than any other locality in the Strip.

Another way of expressing the density of population is by a "density discrepancy index" (Abd El-Aal, 1977), this index being the ratio between the size of locality as a percentage of the total inhabited area and the proportion of the population it holds. A density discrepancy index was calculated for each locality (Table 3.6) and results vary considerably. Nuseirat camp for example was found to have a discrepancy index of 6.7 (0.7% of the inhabited area with 4.7% of the total population in 1982). By contrast, Beit Hanun and Zawaida, the two largest villages, afforded indices of 0.22 and 0.09 respectively. (Beit Hanun with 8.6% of the inhabited area by only 1.9% of the total population; analogous figures for Zawaida were 5.4% and 0.5%). Other localities characterized by a high density discrepancy index were, in descending order, Bureij, Gaza city and its camp, Jabalya-Nazla and its camp, Khan Yunis and its camp, Rafah city and Rafah camp and Mughazi (see Table 3.6).

3.4 Summary

From the previous discussion about population distribution and density, we can observe the following points: Firstly, the Gaza Strip is characterized as a region having a relatively even population distribution, particularly at a zonal level of analysis. Secondly, the influx of refugees to the Strip after the Palestine disaster led to the emergence of new settlements and expansion of all localities. Thirdly, the heavy pressure of population upon the municipal administrative areas has led to intermingling of urban and rural centres. Fourthly, the continuity of the population envelope, which stretches to every place, with gaps only due to the existence of Israeli colonies and agricultural lands. And finally, the Gaza Strip is distinguished by a very high population density, with disparities between the localities, being very high in the urban centres and refugee camps and much lower in the villages.

Table 3.6 Density Discrepancy Index of the Gaza Strip Localities, 1982

Locality	% of inhabited area (1)	% of total 1982 population (2)	Density discrepancy index ($^{2}/_{1}$)
Nuseirat	0.7	4.7	6.70
Bureij	1.2	2.7	2.25
Gaza city and Beach Camp	26.0	37.9	1.46
Jabalya-Nazla and Jabalya Camp	7.9	10.5	1.33
Khan Yunis city and Khan Yunis Camp	11.9	15.5	1.30
Mughazi	1.7	1.9	1.12
Rafah city and Rafah camp	10.9	12.3	1.13
Abasan el Saghira	0.9	0.7	0.77
Deir el Balah city and Deir el Balah Camp	8.7	5.3	0.61
Beit Lahiya	5.2	2.3	0.44
Abasan el Kabira	3.0	1.3	0.43
Bani Suheila	4.7	1.9	0.40
Beit Hanun	8.6	1.9	0.22
Ikhza'a	3.0	0.6	0.20
Zawaida	5.4	0.5	0.09

Source : Calculated from Table 3.2.

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CHAPTER FOUR
Patterns of Settlement

This chapter aims to look over the evolution of patterns of settlement in the Gaza Strip, to examine whether new types of settlements have occurred, and why.

In July 1984, the total Arab population of the Gaza Strip was 500,600 inhabitants (Akhbar Ghazza, 1984), distributed amongst 23 main settlements, 4 of which were towns, 11 villages and 8 refugee camps. In addition, there were some population localities not defined by municipal boundaries. A few of these localities have officially created local committees, which will be treated as villages; for instance, Khirbat el Adas and Musabah which are located around Rafah town.

The population of the Gaza Strip is concentrated in and around a series of 4 main towns, which form an almost straight line from north-east to south-west; Gaza in the northern zone, Deir el Balah in the central zone, and Khan Yunis and Rafah in the southern zone (Fig. 4.1). This longitudinal concentration of the Palestinian settlement clusters may be incorrectly attributed to the rectangular shape of the Strip; it existed before the creation of the Strip in 1948. "The longitudinal distribution was influenced by the passing of an ancient military highway through the Strip. Without doubt, the aforementioned historical highway was one of the most deep-rooted highways in the world. Pharoah Thutmoses III (1479-1436 BC) followed this highway with his army and recorded it upon the Amoun Temple in the ancient Egyptian city of Al Karnak. The ancient Egyptians called it the Houras highway" (Dahlan, 1981). In addition, Thutmoses III subjugated Gaza's Philistine king and used Gaza as his base of operations against Syria. Gaza became a tributary land to Assyria in 735 BC (UNRWA, 1972). Further, in the Arab era, caravans passed through the Gaza region towards Syria and Egypt from Arabia.

The continuation of settlement in the Strip can be determined by present day town and village names which are still close to their historical names, although phonetic changes have taken place. For instance, Rafah town was called Raffia by the Greeks and Rafah by the Arabs. "Gaza was a canaan city and one of the oldest cities in the world at 4000 years old" (ANERA, 1984), while Khan Yunis was built in 1387 AD by



FIG·4·1·LOCATION OF PALESTINIAN SETTLEMENTS AND ISRAELI COLONIES IN THE GAZA STRIP. 1985

- ARAB TOWNS
- ARAB VILLAGES
- REFUGEE CAMPS
- REHOUSING PROJECTS FOR REFUGEES
- SMALL ARAB LOCALITIES
- ISRAELI COLONIES
- ISRAELI COLONIES UNDER CONSTRUCTION
- ISRAELI COLONIES INSIDE THE GREEN LINE
- INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY
- GAZA STRIP BOUNDARY
- RAILWAY
- FIRST CLASS ROAD
- SECOND CLASS ROAD

Prince Yunis el Noruzi (one of the Egyptian Mamluk slave dynasty 1250-1517 AD) who built a caravanserai (a Khan or inn) which still stands despite the weathering of war and history (at the present there is just one wall). In addition, there are some localities whose names date back to the Arab era such as Bani Suheila, Abasan and Ikhza'a villages.

Like the people of many Arab countries, the people of Gaza Strip can be categorized into: (a) nomads, (b) village residents, (c) urban settlers, and (d) residents of refugee camps. The emergence of the refugee camps was a direct result of the massive population displacement from occupied Palestine in 1948. Also, as a result of the Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip in 1967, a new pattern of settlements made its appearance, which may be called Israeli colonies (Fig. 4.1).

4.1 Nomads

As reported in the census of September 1967, there were 1105 persons classified as nomads, who comprised about 0.3% of the total population of the Strip. This mode of settlement has nearly disappeared now, but no precise data are available. The census of 1967 also reported that there were 1778 persons (0.5% of the total population) living dispersed in small groups outside settlements with the characteristics of a locality (Central Bureau of Statistics, 1967). They were distributed throughout the whole Gaza Strip area.

4.2 Rural Settlements

According to the 1945 village statistics, there were only 9 villages in the area which later formed the Gaza Strip. The location of these villages can be characterized by:

(a) The concentration around both sides of the main road or railway connecting Palestine and Egypt;
(b) The cluster around two towns, Gaza in the north, and Khan Yunis in the south; and
(c) The clumping in and around the fertile lands and water supplies, which can be distinctly seen near Khan Yunis, with villages all located to the east of the town, while the western area has been left unsettled because of the presence of sand dunes.

The Gaza area was populated by 64,970 persons in 1945, of which 30% lived in the villages while 70% were concentrated in the two existing towns; Gaza with 34,250 persons, and Khan Yunis with 11,220. The nine villages can be categorized according to their population size into two main groups:

(a) villages with populations over 2000 inhabitants, including Jabalya, Bani Suheila, Deir el Balah, Abasan and Rafah; and
(b) villages with population less than 2000 persons, including Beit Hanun, Beit Lahiya, Nazla and Ikhza'a (Table 4.1).

As a result of the displacement from Palestine 1948, all Gaza's villages expanded and their populations rapidly increased. The Israeli census of 1967 classified Gaza's villages according to population size into two main groups (see Table 4.2):

(a) one large village with more than 5000 inhabitants: Bani Suheila; and
(b) thirteen small villages which were inhabited by less than 5000 inhabitants (Fig. 4.2). Consequently, the researcher has combined Jabalya and Nazla villages (excluding Jabalya refugee camp, but if we add the camp to the village it will become an urban settlement) to group (a), because it is administered by a village council up until the present (The Israeli definition of the concept of village is : a rural locality in which production, consumption, purchases and sales are generally on a private basis).

Despite the out-migration from the Strip after the 1967 war, all the Gaza Strip's village populations have been increasing, though by different rates and principally by natural increase (except for Bani Suheila which recorded a negative growth, the causes of which were discussed in Chapter Two). By 1978 there were four large villages populated by more than 5000 inhabitants and this figure rose to five by July 1984 (Table 4.1). In addition, during the Israeli period, there were some changes in the status of rural settlements, which led to the creation of new villages like Dahyna in 1977, Zawaida 1978 and Qarara 1984, which were established by the ordinance of the Israeli General Commander of Gaza. Moreover, some small villages merged together and were governed by one village council, like Saifa and Atatra which joined Beit Lahiya (see Figs. 4.2 and 4.3),

Table 4.1 The Growth of Rural Settlements in the Gaza Strip, 1945-July 1984

Rural Settlements	Number of Population			
	1945	Sept.1967	1978	July 1984
Beit Hanun	1,730	4,756	6,400	9,500
Beit Lahiya	1,700	5,117*	7,100	11,700
Jabalya (excl.Jabalya camp)	3,520	10,508	13,800	15,200
Nazla	1,330			
Zawaida	-	-	-	2,600
Deir el Balah	2,560	-	-	-
Bani Suheila	3,220	7,561	9,800	9,200
Abasan el Kabira	2,230	3,730	4,800	6,300
Abasan el Saghira		1,481	1,900	3,500
Ikhza'a	990	1,534	1,900	3,000
Qarara **	-	-	-	-
Bayuk	-	1,368	-	2,800
Rafah	2,220	-	-	-
Dahyna ***	-	-	-	-
Total	19,500	36,055	45,700	63,800

Source : Derived from Tables 3.1 and 3.2, Akhbar Ghazza, 1984.

* Including the residents of Saifa and Atatrah.

** Figures unavailable, Newly established village (1984).

*** Figures unavailable (except for 1979, 5200 as it appeared in the Report of the Directorate of Interior of Gaza, 1979). Number reduced after the overall Israeli withdrawal from Sinai (Egypt) in 1982 (Camp David Accords). After that time, there are no official figures for the inhabitants of Dahyna.

Table 4.2 Gaza Strip : Population of Rural Settlements According to the Israeli Census of September 1967

Village name	Number of population: Census of 1967
Large villages.	
Bani Suheila	7 561
Jabalya-Nazla (excluding Jabalya camp)	10 508
Small villages.	
Khrbat el Adas	1 922
Bayuk	1 368
Abasan el Kabira	3 730
Abasan el Saghira	1 481
Ikhza'a	1 534
Nuseirat (excl. the refugee camp)	2 583
Beit Hanun	4 756
Beit Lahiya	3 541
Atatrah	949
Saifa	627
Sheikh A'gelin and Sheikh Ahmed	316
Total	30 680

Source : Central Bureau of Statistics, 1967.

while Sheikh A'gelin and Sheikh Ahmed became the outskirts of Gaza town. Figure 4.3 shows the concentration of rural settlements in the southern and northern zones.


0 Miles 5
0 2 4 6
Kilometrs
N
Atatrah
Saifa
Beit Lahiya
Jabalya
& Nazla
Beit
Hanun
Sheikh Agelin &
Sheikh Ahmad
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
Nuseirat
Bani
Suheila
Abasan el Saghira
Bayuk
Abasan el Kabira
Ikhza'a
Kh. el Adas
EGYPT
AD
FIG·4·2 GAZA STRIP: SIZE OF RURAL LOCALITIES ACCORDING TO THE CENSUS OF SEP. 1967
11000 Persons.
5000
3000
500

FIG·4·3 GAZA STRIP: RURAL SETTLEMENTS GROWTH, 1945 - JULY 1984









4.3 Urban Settlements

The characteristics of urban centres differ sharply from those of villages in the Arab world and in developing countries as a whole. But due to the special characteristics of the Gaza Strip town and village structure, the gap between them is slightly less large; for instance we can find villages more modern in their planning than towns (e.g. the new village of Zawaida).

As reported in the Israeli census of September 1967, there were some settlements statistically and officially defined as "urban" which are, however, no more than fairly large villages. Deir el Balah, Rafah and Jabalya are functionally rural, not urban (excluding the inhabitants of their refugee camps). During the Egyptian period 1948-1967, the three localities were villages and the Egyptians left the refugee camps under the authority of UNRWA and separate from the municipalities and village councils administrative systems. After the Israeli occupation of the Strip (1967) the refugee camps were joined to the local council's authority and consequently their population status changed to urban. Rafah and Deir el Balah kept their definition as villages until they officially gained the status of towns in September 1972 and January 1973 respectively, but Jabalya is still administered by a village council.

It is not easy to draw the line between towns and villages, or between urban and rural communities, and the statistical approach is often unsatisfactory from a geographical point of view (Clarke, 1975). However, in this research we will depend on the Israeli definition of the urban localities*. So far, the Gaza Strip has four urban settlements with the status of towns ruled by municipal councils - Gaza, Khan Yunis, Rafah and Deir el Balah - whereas Jabalya, functionally still has the status of urban settlement, but is administered by a village council.

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* The definition of urban for non-Jewish localities is 5000-10,000 inhabitants, of whom less than half of the employed persons work in agriculture, or localities granted the status of town (Town: a locality with the status of a municipality). In contrast, the definition for Jewish localities is 2000-10,000 inhabitants of whom less than half of the employed persons work in agriculture.

An examination of Table 4.1 shows that statistically two villages (Jabalya-Nazla and Beit Lahiya) are eligable to have the status of towns. Nevertheless, they remain villages and are ruled by village councils. The Israeli authorities are unwilling to grant them the status of towns since the Israeli subsidies to the municipal councils are higher than those provided to the village ones.

Gaza Strip towns are primarily communities of traders, who have congregated around an outdoor market. The influx of Palestinian refugees led to the expansion of the Strip towns in particular and of the Gaza Strip localities as a whole. The political situation has affected both positively and negatively the development of Gaza's towns.

"During 1948-56, the Egyptians were primarily concerned about maintaining security and reducing the refugee burden. But during the second decade of Egyptian rule (1957-67), greater attention was paid to the economic problems and political needs of the residents in the Strip. The port at Gaza was improved and allowed to serve as a "free port" for the import of consumer and industrial goods. These were then transported - legally or illegally - across Sinai to the population centres of Egypt" (Lesch, 1984). As a consequence, Gaza's towns flourished from this commercial exchange, particularly Gaza town, with Egypt. In addition, the Egyptian government had provided financial assistance to the Strip which amounted to 3.183 million Egyptian pounds in the financial year 1965-66 (Madhlum, 1978).

In the Israeli period, trade activities have suffered from economic slowdown particularly since the early 1980s, because the Strip's economy is integrated within the Israeli economy which has been suffering from a yearly inflation rate close to 1000%, one of the world's highest (Middle East Research Institute, 1985).

Furthermore, Rafah town has suffered severely from the Israeli-Egyptian (Camp David) Accords which divided the town into two parts (see Plates 4.1 and 4.2), as a consequence of the re-establishment of the international borders in April 1982. Rafah had constituted the main market for the Egyptian Sinai bedouin villages which stretch between Rafah and Al-Arish city along the Sinai coast.

Plate 4.1 : The gate dividing the city of Rafah resulting from the Camp David Accords. Palestinians (left) waiting to greet relatives on the other side of the Rafah city divide.

Photo: The author

Plate 4.2 : Canada rehousing project. Since April 1982, its inhabitants (5,000 Palestinians) have been stranded on the Egyptian side and waiting, patiently, resettlement inside the Gaza Strip.

Photo : The author

4.3.1 Phases of Urban Settlement Growth

Without doubt, the greatest urban growth in the Gaza Strip has taken place since the Israeli-Arab war of 1948, due to the Palestinian exodus from occupied Palestine. Table 4.3 and Figure 4.4 clearly show this growth in spite of emigration from the Strip after the 1967 war (separate data on the Strip towns and the Strip localities as a whole during the Egyptian period, 1948-67 are not available).

Except for Gaza and Khan Yunis, which are the oldest towns in the Strip, the other three centres have developed into urban centres after the Israeli occupation of the Strip in 1967. Table 4.3 indicates that the number and size of the urban centres has increased dramatically since the 1948 war, when there were only two. This increased to five by 1967. All the three urban centres of Rafah, Jabalya and Deir el Balah, have been developed subsequent to the annexation of their refugee camps under their village councils. For instance, until the huge population influx, Rafah was no more than a border train station populated by 2220 inhabitants in 1945 and with 61,200 by July 1984. So it increased by 331.66% during this period.

In 1948 the two towns of Gaza and Khan Yunis occupied a more or less symmetrical position in relation to the groups of villages. Gaza constituted the focal point for connections to Jaffa and Beer Sheba, while Khan Yunis played a similar role in respect of north Sinai and Egypt (Efrat, 1977). In addition Gaza town was the district capital of the Gaza sub-district of Palestine. Beer sheba sub-district used Gaza port for exporting its production of grain. Gaza port continued to play the same role during the Egyptian period and in the first stage of the Israeli occupation period. However, the Israeli authorities closed it in January 1976 after two ships sank near the shore.

Up to 1967, Gaza and Khan Yunis were the only two administrative towns in the Strip, but after the Israeli occupation in 1967, Rafah and Deir el Balah villages were transformed into towns and consequently administrative centres in their areas. Deir el Balah became the administrative town for the central zone.

Table 4.3 The Growth of Urban Settlements in the Gaza Strip, 1945 - July 1984

Urban settlements (including refugee camps)	Number and percentage of urban population								Percentage of increase 1978-July 1984
	1945	%	Sept. 1967	%	1978	%	July 1984	%	
Gaza	34,250	75.3	118,588	41.6	148,800	43.15	188,700	46.55	23.76
Khan Yunis	11,220	24.7	52,789	18.5	66,400	19.25	76,900	19.00	14.68
Rafah*	-	-	51,734	18.2	58,400	16.90	61,200	15.10	04.68
Jabalya*	-	-	43,604	15.3	49,600	14.40	52,200	12.90	05.11
Deir el Balah*	-	-	18,118	6.4	21,700	6.30	26,200	6.45	18.84
Total	45,470	100	284,833	100	344,900	100	405,200	100	16.11

Source : Derived from Table 3.1, 3.2 and Akhbar Ghazza, 1984.

* These settlements have been classified as urban centres in the Israeli Census of the Gaza Strip in September, 1967.

FIG·4·4 THE EVOLUTION OF THE URBAN SETTLEMENTS IN THE GAZA STRIP, SEP·1967-JULY 1984



4.3.2 Urban Settlement Pattern

Table 4.3 and Figure 4.5 indicate that Gaza Strip urban settlements have maintained their size hierarchy from 1945 to July 1984 and may continue to do so in the future. In all four censuses and official estimations Gaza town was the largest, Khan Yunis the second largest, while Rafah, Jabalya and Deir el Balah were the third, fourth and fifth respectively.

As demonstrated in Figure 4.5, the population size of the first town was rather more than double that of the second from 1945 to July 1984. If we order all urban settlements in the Gaza Strip (July 1984) they look quite similar to Zipf's (Logarithmic) rule:

Rank	1	2	3	4	5
Gaza Strip	1	0.41	0.32	0.28	0.14
Zipf's rule (rank-size rule)	1	0.5	0.33	0.25	0.20

Khan Yunis and Deir el Balah are still small and dominated by the first city, while Jabalya is enlarged by its refugee camp (Jabalya village is inhabited by 15,200 and its camp by 37,000 according to the Israeli source). In addition Rafah town conforms approximately to the rank-size (Fig. 3.5).

As illustrated in Figure 4.4, the spacing of the towns is nearly regular, and the distance separating the first town (Gaza) from the second (Khan Yunis) does not exceed 25 kms while the third (Rafah) is only 35 kms and the fourth (Deir el Balah) 19 kms away. The fifth (Jabalya) is located near to the first and can nearly be described as a suburb of it. The minimum distance between one town and the next is 6 kms (that between Gaza and Jabalya). The maximum spacing is about 40 kms, between Jabalya and Rafah. These urban centres are linked with their villages and localities by a network of roads (Fig. 4.1).

The zonal distribution of the urban centres is demonstrated in Figure 4.4 where the northern zone has two urban centres (Gaza and Jabalya), the central zone has Deir el Balah and the southern zone has Khan Yunis and Rafah.

FIG:4·5· RANK-SIZE OF URBAN SETTLEMENTS IN THE GAZA STRIP, 1945-JULY 1984.



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4.3.3 Changes in Rural and Urban Population

It is now appropriate to discuss and to analyse the changing patterns of rural-urban population in the Gaza Strip. But before that, it will be useful to mention a few brief facts about the rural-urban population in the Gaza Sub-district of Palestine, which later shrank into the Gaza Strip.

The socio-economic and cultural background of the Gaza sub-district of Palestine gave it a distinctive rural pattern. The primary rural nucleus was a close collection of houses related by tradition, economic activities and socio-religious links. All such villages of Gaza sub-district were eradicated after the emergence of Israel in May 1948 which caused the exodus of their Palestinian inhabitants. Village links can be evidently noted in the refugee camps where UNRWA distributed clusters of shelters according to the refugees family ties (Hamouleh) and places of origin.

A study of village statistics in 1945 has revealed that the total population of Gaza sub-district of Palestine totalled 137,180; thereof 55,380 (40.4%) lived in the three urban centres: Gaza (34,250), Khan Yunis (11,220) and Majdal (9910) (Hadawi, 1970). But if the smaller area which later formed the present Gaza Strip is taken into consideration, the urban population formed 70% (Table 4.4).

Table 4.4 indicates that the growing tendency towards urban concentration is clearly evident from data on population distribution in 1945 and the subsequent censuses and official estimations. Only 28 years after the village statistics of 1945, the rural population amounted to 30% of the total population, while urban population accounted for 70%. This rapidly increased to 91.8% in the Israeli census of September 1967, caused by the new Israeli classification of settlements in the Strip after the 1967 occupation. Previously the Egyptians had reserved the status of settlements as they had been before 1948.

The percentage of urban population slightly decreased from 91.8% in 1967 to 91.5% in 1978, 89.9% in 1982 and fell to 89.3% by July 1984 (Table 4.4) which may be attributed to the out-migration from urban centres after the 1967 war, or to the removal of Palestinian refugees into Israeli

Table 4.4 Population in Urban and Rural Localities, 1945 - July 1984

Year	Urban Population		Rural Population		Total
	Size	%	Size	%	
1945	45,470	70.0	19,500	30.0	64,970
1967 (Sept.)	284,833	91.8	25,547	08.2	310,380 *
1978	344,900	91.5	31,900	08.5	376,800 *
1982	387,855	89.9	43,735	10.1	431,590 *
July 1984	405,200	89.3	48,600	10.7	453,800 *

Source : Calculated from Table 3.1, 3.2 and 4.2

* Excluding the residents of the three refugee camps of Nuseirat, Bureij and Mughazi since these are not technically urban or rural centres.

dwelling projects. Further, we can add the role of the Camp David Accords, whereby Rafah town divided into two parts, leaving Canada rehousing project for Gazan refugees (about 5000 persons in 1985) inside the Egyptian territory (see Plates 4.1 and 4.2. Also see Chapter Eight).

The rapid increase in the proportion of the urban population in the Strip as a whole was due to the political situation, which resulted in the shrinking of Gaza sub-district of Palestine into the Gaza Strip, and the mass exodus from Palestine as well.

In absolute terms, both population groups increased between 1945 and July 1984, the total population grew by 388,830 or 194.37%, but the rural population increased by 29,100 or 91.32% only. This decline in the proportion of rural population was due to the limited number of refugees who moved into the villages, and to the transformation of some villages into urban centres (Rafah, Deir el Balah and Jabalya). In addition, the total urban population increased by 359,730 or 218.73% in the aforementioned period (Table 4.3).

However, as far as the zonal distribution of rural-urban population is concerned (Figure 4.6 and Table 4.5), the total urban population in the northern zone increased by 206,650 persons or 195.07% between 1945 and July 1984. In the same period the southern zone grew by 126,880 persons or 251.0%, while the central zone grew by only 8,082 or 36.89% between September 1967 and July 1984 (it did not have any urban centres before 1967 and its urban population rate does not include the residents of the refugee camps of Nuseirat, Mughazi and Bureij who were situated in the central zone). In the same period, 1945-July 1984, the rural population increased by 94.0% in the northern zone, 105.21% in the southern zone while the central zone was affected by the transformation of settlements from rural to urban status and by the advent of a new village (Table 4.5).

Moreover, the zonal distribution of the rural population, changed comparatively more in 1967; the three zones showed sharp decreased in their proportions of rural population at different rates: in the northern zone it decreased from 19.5% to 5.7%, in the southern zone from 43.5% to 13%, and in the central zone from 100% to zero. After 1967 the proportion of rural population rose slightly in all zones reaching 15.2% in the

FIG·4·6 GAZA STRIP: CHANGING PATTERNS OF RURAL-URBAN POPULATION BY GEOGRAPHICAL ZONES, 1945 - JULY 1984



Table 4.5 Changing Rural-Urban Population by Zones, 1945 - July 1984

Year	Northern zone			Central zone			Southern zone		
	Rural	Urban	% rural	Rural	Urban	% rural	Rural	Urban	% rural
1945	8,280	34,250	19.5	2,560	-	100	8,660	11,220	43.5
1967 Sept.	9,873	162,192	05.7	-	18,118	-	15,674	104,523	13.0
1978	13,500	198,400	06.5	-	21,700	-	18,400	124,800	12.9
1982	20,239	230,328	08.0	2,458	25,078	8.9	21,038	132,449	13.7
July 1984	21,200	240,900	08.0	2,600	26,200	9.0	24,800	138,100	15.2

Source : Calculated from Table 3.1, 3.2 and 4.2

southern zone by July 1984, 9% in the central zone and 8% in the northern zone. This slight increase can be attributed to these causal factors:

(a) in the northern zone, to the existence of one of the refugee dwelling projects between Beit Lahiya and Jabalya villages (Fig. 4.1);
(b) in the central zone, to the new establishment of Zawaida village; and
(c) in the southern zone, to the loss of an estimated 5000 Palestinian refugee (1985) residents in Canada rehousing project and several hundred people living in the divided city of Rafah on the Egyptian side of the international border (see Plates 4.1 and 4.2).

It has been suggested the Gaza Strip will comprise a conurbation area in the near future. Consequently, we can summarise that nearly nine out of every ten people in the Gaza Strip now live in urban centres with an urbanization level of 89.9% (1982). This rate is one of the highest in the Middle East, comparable with other small countries: Israel (86.7% in 1980), UAE (80.9% in 1981) and Bahrein (80.7% in 1981) (United Nations, 1985).

4.3.4 City-Size in the Gaza Strip

By using the threshold of 10,000 persons as a lower limit of urban status according to the Israeli classification, roughly 81.0% of the total population of 500,600 persons in July 1984 were living in the five urban centres. This figure includes the three refugee camps of Nuseirat, Bureij and Mughazi, which were populated by 23,500, 13,700 and 9600 persons respectively (Akhbar Ghazza, 1984). Nearly 5.2% of the total population lived in one locality of 10,000 to 50,000 size, 38.1% in three localities of 50,000 to 100,000 and 37.7% in the Strip capital (Gaza town).

As manifested in Table 4.3, we can note the extraordinary growth of Gaza town compared to rest of the urban centres. Also, its proportion of the urban population has increased continuously from 41.6% in 1967 to 43.15% in 1978 and 46.55% in July 1984 (the Gaza town share of the urban population decreased from 75.3% in 1945 to 41.6% in September 1967 because of the transformation of new urban settlements).

Migration from all the Gaza Strip localities was the predominant factor in the rapid growth of Gaza town. In fact those migrants who moved to Gaza town were distinguished by being more educated people such as doctors, engineers, advocates and teachers or skilled workers seeking better living conditions and the opportunity to improve their social status. The concentration of Israeli governmental and other non governmental offices (e.g. UNRWA, Red Cross etc.) in Gaza town encouraged this population mobility towards the town.

4.4 Refugee Camps

4.4.1 Political and Historical Background

The UN General Assembly's partition resolution 181 (II) of Palestine on 29 November 1947 (see Appendix 2) recommended the establishment of two independent states, one for Palestinians and the second for Jews, while the holy city of Jerusalem would be left as an international zone ruled by a special international regime. The two states would be connected together by economic union and transit relation.

As a consequence, serious clashes erupted between the Palestinian Arab and Jewish communities in Palestine. As the fighting spread and intensified, some hundreds of thousands of frightened Palestinians were uprooted from their homes and took refuge in the neighbouring Arab countries, in addition to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. About 200,000 refugees were piled in on top of an indigenous population of around 80,000 in the Gaza Strip. The lucky refugees were able to find shelter of some kind. Some huddled into mosques, ancient ruins and former army barracks, a few found simple tents, and others erected make-shift shacks as best they could (Plate 4.3), many even lived in the open and suffered great hardship during the bitter winters of 1948-52.

The Egyptian government took de facto control of the Gaza Strip, after signing an armistice treaty with Israel in February 1949. By virtue of it, the borders between the Strip and the new state of Israel had been drawn. The erection of frontiers on the northern and eastern sides of the Strip, which cut off the area from its normal sources of supply and its normal markets has been described by one of the former UNRWA economic advisers as an economic disaster, and the influx of the refugees produced

an economic catastrophe (Baster, 1955). Also UNRWA itself recognized that the Strip was too small and too barren to provide a satisfactory livelihood even for the indigenous population. In addition the influx of refugees accelerated the dissimilarity between natural and human resources which is the source of poverty in the Strip.

Despite the dire living conditions of the refugees in the diaspora, they positively contributed to the development of the Strip's economic and agricultural infrastructure. This fact has been stressed by Baster (1954) when he reported that the refugees were more urbanized than any of the host populations, thus the more enterprising and better trained workers among them were soon established in regular employment or in farming or business, to the mutual advantage of themselves and their hosts. The occupational distribution of refugees who were arrivals to the Strip in 1949 can be extrapolated from a sample of 20,000 refugees: it was indicated that 18% were skilled and semi-skilled workers, 17% professionals, merchants and "landowners", and the rest labourers and unskilled workers (Baster, 1955).

However, the refugees' influx coincided with a fall in wage rates, for both skilled and unskilled. Skilled wages, previously in the region of 100 Egyptian piastres a day, fell down to 30 piastres a day. Also unskilled wages fell down from 30 piastres to less than 10 piastres a day. This sharp decline in wages led to out-migration especially of skilled workers and professionals such as doctors; on the other hand this assisted in the expansion of the cultivatable area from 136 sq. kms after 1948 (Baster, 1955) to 267 sq. kms in 1967.

As a result of the Palestinian catastrophe, the refugees overnight found themselves without sufficient food, medical care and shelter or many other necessities of life. Also they suffered from psychological confusion and agitation. Consequently different local and foreign relief and humanitarian agencies participated in providing sustenance for the refugees, in addition to a voluntary contribution from the host governments. For instance, "in Egypt a special committee, in which the Red Cross participated, raised large sums of money and provided medical and hospital services, as well as the cost of maintaining a camp for 8000 persons in the Strip" (Aubin, 1949). On the other hand some foreign relief agencies contributed food, tents, and medical supplies.

4.4.2 The Responsibilities of the UN for the Palestine Refugees

The United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund was considered the first international body that contributed money and dispatched some of its personnel in early August 1948. Following UNICEF action, Count Folk Bernadotte - the Swedish UN mediator on Palestine - established a disaster Relief Project under the control of a UN Director of Disaster Relief assisted by World Health Organization and other voluntary agencies. This relief project aimed to provide basic food and shelter. Bernadotte noted the inability of the Arab governments to care for the Palestinian refugees, and appealed to all nations for assistance for the refugees on humanitarian grounds. Their conditions were desperate and the UN mediator called for immediate action (UNRWA, 1983).

After the assassination of Count Bernadotte with Colonel Serot in the Jewish sector of the city of Jerusalem, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 212 (III), which established the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees, an organization designed to plan and implement a relief programme in conjunction with the International Committee of the Red Cross, the League of Red Cross Societies, and the American Friends Service Committee who undertook to carry out the distribution of relief supplies. The AFSC (Quakers) undertook its responsibility in the Gaza Strip only (Gama, 1972).

In December 1948, the General Assembly adopted resolution 194 (III), which created a United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine with the aim of creating contact between the disputing parties and "taking steps" to help them in reaching a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them, including the economic development of the area, repatriation and resettlement of the refugees, and the payment of compensation to those electing not to return as had been recommended in Bernadotte's report to the UN General Assembly. But in August 1949, it became evident to the UNCCP that Israel rejected the principle of repatriation in total, and compensation in part (UNRWA, 1983; Peretz, 1954).

In August 1949, the UNCCP established the United Nations Economic survey Mission - under the chairmanship of Mr. Gordon Clapp, formerly of the Tennessee Valley Authority - to examine the economic situation in the

countries affected by the Israeli-Arab war. After three months of exhaustive study in the field (until November 1949), it submitted an interim report to the UN General Assembly. The UNESM recommended the creation of a new agency, which would not only carry out relief on a diminishing scale, but would inaugurate a works programme in which able-bodied refugees could become self-supporting and at the same time create works of lasting benefit to the refugees and the countries concerned (UNRWA, 1951). It is clear that the UNESM wished to put an end to relief by creating projects that would employ the refugees and make them self-sufficient.

As a consequence of the UNESM recommendation, the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted resolution 302 (IV), on 8 December 1949, which established UNRWA for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, to carry out, in collaboration with local regimes, the direct relief services, social assistance, education, health care and works programme. This programme contracted by June 1982 except for education, very limited health care, social assistance and environmental sanitation.

UNRWA started its programme after taking over all operations from UNRPR on first of May 1950. Originally UNRWA was set up for only eighteen months with the idea that the Palestinian problem would be resolved in a matter of months. Following that, the mandate of UNRWA was extended fourteen times as a temporary agency, serving Palestinian refugees as they awaited a just settlement. The present mandate will expire on 30 June 1987.

4.4.3 The Role of UNRWA for the Gaza Strip Refugees

As a result of the enforced migration of refugees toward the Strip, temporary tent camps were established as soon as possible with the assistance of several voluntary relief agencies. When UNRWA took its responsibility for the Strip refugees, it initiated an intensive programme of accommodation to resettle the Palestinian refugees, in cooperation with the Egyptian government, particularly after the decisions of the Egyptian government not to accept refugees in their own land, and to prevent their movement unless they had received permission (Stevens, 1952). The Egyptian government (practised these decisions by) transfering six thousand Palestinians from the Qantara refugee camp - an Egyptian city

located east of the Suez Canal - into the Gaza Strip in September 1949 (Baster, 1955).

The refugee camps established by UNRWA were constructed generally near the existing Gaza's settlements. These camps were built on sand dunes, and on private lands provided by local people in exchange for the infrastructure after the repatriation of the Palestinian refugees. Moreover, Nuseirat, Bureij and Mughazi were set up in the former derelict camps of the mandatory British army.

At the time of their establishment, the refugee camps were built as a temporary measure, in a pattern of narrow intersecting streets, closely packed one-storey houses, covered by fragile cement tiles. These shelters were distributed according to the family size. Each six persons were provided with nine square metres of living space, without toilet, private water supply, electricity or kitchen facilities. However, the refugee camps were provided with communal water supplies and toilets (Plate 4.4), the communal toilets being removed in 1971-72, and the communal water supplies after 1976.

In 1952, there were nine camps of tents, but later - after the creation of the concrete housing units by UNRWA - their number contracted to eight following the consolidation of Zaitoun camp into the body of Gaza town. The fundamental point which can be noted from Table 4.6 is that in 1952 only 11.8% of refugees were settled in concrete barracks created by UNRWA, in contrast to 46.3% in tents and 41.9% in houses. The limited share of the barracks residents was due to the early stage of the programme of accommodation for refugees. Also we can note the higher percentage of tent residents in the Strip as a whole and in the southern zone in particular. In the southern zone they accounted for 58,734 or 63% of the total tent inhabitants, in contrast to 21% in the northern and 16% in the central zones respectively. The reason for that can be attributed to the influx of bedouins from Beer Sheba sub-district who camped in the southern zone (see Table 4.6 and Fig. 4.7).

Moreover, about 54.7% of the house dwellers were concentrated in the northern zone and especially in Gaza town, where most of them had enough money to rent or construct a private house, while the more unfortunate refugees - who did not have enough time to carry away their property at

Plate 4.3 : Palestinian refugees arriving in the Gaza Strip had only simple tents to shelter themselves and their meagre belongings after the 1948 Israeli-Arab war.

Source : UNRWA.



Plate 4.4 : In 1952, a large scale building programme for the replacement of tents with concrete houses was initiated by UNRWA, in cooperation with the Egyptian government. For example Beach camp shown above.

Source: UNRWA.



FIGURE 4·7 GAZA STRIP: PALESTINIAN REFUGEES BY MODE OF ACCOMMODATION AND GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS. FEB. 1952.

In Houses.

In Barracks.

In Tents.

34000 Refugees.
25000
20000

Table 4.6 Gaza Strip: Distribution of Palestinian Refugees According to Mode of Accommodation and Geographical Areas: February 1952

Area	No. of Camps	In houses	In Barracks	In tents	Total
Rimal	2	15,281	1,476	16,558	33,315
Zaitoun	1	30,869	-	3,015	33,884
Nuseirat	2	1,731	14,501	8,817	25,049
Deir el Balah	2	17,061	4,251	6,002	27,314
Khan Yunis	1	14,588	708	10,137	25,433
Khan Yunis Bedouins	-	-	-	32,308	32,308
Rafah	1	4,825	2,758	16,289	23,872
Total	9	84,355	23,694	93,126	201,175

Source : Stevens, 1952

the time of their displacement - waited to receive their shelters from UNRWA. In January 1955, the UNRWA programme of accommodation was substantially achieved when the last tents were replaced by concrete housing units.

4.4.4 The Distribution of Refugee Camps

The refugee samps which were constructed during 1952-55 constituted a significant part of the population settlement pattern of the Gaza Strip. Each camp covered a limited area and was overcrowded by enormous numbers of concrete huts.

By 30 June 1985, the eight camps in the Strip varied in population from Deir el Balah (9,854) to sprawling Jabalya (51,225) and Rafah (48,816), these last two camps being two of the largest refugee camps in UNRWA's area of operations.

The present distribution of the camps by geographical zones is illustrated in Figure 4.8, where there are four large camps, two in the northern zone - Jabalya and Gaza Beach, and two in the southern zone - Khan Yunis and Rafah. In addition, there are another four intermediate and small camps : Nuseirate, Bureij, Mughazi and Deir el Balah in the central zone. The large camps were built near the main towns to supply labourers for agricultural and service activities, while the second group were concentrated in the uninhabited area (abandoned army camps).

The factors of overpopulation, poor employment opportunities and the high proportion of refugees to the indigenous population resulted in a high proportion of the refugees living in the eight UNRWA camps. The camps accommodated a total of 236,468 on 30 June 1985 or 55.3% of the total refugee population (Tables 2.5 and 4.7).

4.4.5 The Camps' Population Growth

During the Egyptian period of administration of the Gaza Strip, the camps' population growth in general was recorded as continuously increasing. On 30 June 1961, the total population of the camps amounted to 155,592. This figure rose by 28.04% to reach 205,946 by the end of June 1967, or by 4.67% per annum. Table 4.7 and Figure 4.9 indicate that all of the Strip's camps recorded positive increase - with different rates - in their population with the slight exception of Rafah camp during June 1961-62. However, during the period June 1961-June 1967, four camps reported an annual rate of increase higher than the general annual average, Jabalya (6.13%), Khan Yunis (5.75%), Gaza Beach (5.05%) and Bureij (4.89%), while the other camps of Mughazi, Rafah, Nuseirat and Deir el Balah increased by lower rates of 3.77%, 3.59%, 3.56%, and 2.47% respectively.

During the Israeli occupation period, the camps' inhabitants declined below the figure of 205,946 recorded on 30 June 1967. The population fell to 193,895 by 30 June 1974 and did not rise above the 1967 figure until 30



FIG·4·8 DISTRIBUTION OF THE GAZA STRIP REFUGEES BY CAMPS, 30 JUNE 1985

Table 4.7 Gaza Strip : The Evolution of the Camp Refugees as Given by UNRWA Registration

Data : 30 June 1961 - 30 June 1984

Camp / Year	Jabalya	Gaza Beach	Nuseirat	Bureij	Deir el Balah	Mughazi	Khan Yunis	Rafah	Total
30.6.1961	28,669	24,721	16,152	11,142	6,710	7,964	21,250	38,984	155,592
30.6.1962	31,594	25,918	16,606	11,546	6,822	8,135	23,519	38,620	162,760
30.6.1964	37,147	28,874	18,314	13,404	7,203	8,666	27,177	43,057	183,842
30.6.1966	40,387	32,536	19,793	14,646	7,542	9,710	29,084	46,989	200,687
30.6.1967	41,417	33,468	19,993	14,944	7,783	9,985	30,002	48,354	205,946
31.12.1968	41,062	33,155	18,861	12,316	7,456	9,037	28,813	45,198	195,898
30.6.1970	42,447	35,862	19,035	12,035	7,573	8,805	28,829	44,333	198,919
30.6.1972	43,745	36,971	19,885	12,300	7,879	8,947	29,953	46,054	205,734
30.6.1974	40,179	34,551	19,877	11,783	7,910	8,288	29,295	42,012	193,895
30.6.1975	41,427	35,450	20,347	12,435	8,106	8,434	29,694	41,656	197,549
30.6.1976	43,258	36,192	20,610	12,783	8,251	8,559	30,141	40,957	200,751
30.6.1977	41,484	33,802	20,730	12,702	8,347	8,684	30,592	41,253	197,594
30.6.1978	42,263	32,949	21,226	12,957	8,569	8,826	30,195	42,065	199,050
30.6.1980	43,927	34,000	21,856	13,389	8,685	9,071	29,027	42,855	202,810
30.6.1982	44,946	34,971	22,927	14,065	8,949	9,338	29,726	43,740	208,662
30.6.1984	49,400	38,424	25,367	15,459	9,626	10,125	31,691	46,845	226,937
30.6.1985	51,225	40,359	26,400	16,057	9,854	10,506	33,269	48,816	236,486

Source : UNRWA, 1985

Note : Figures from 1968 onward include some refugees living in camps without being either officially registered with UNRWA or eligible for UNRWA assistance (about 2% of the total camp population).

FIG.4.9.GAZA STRIP:THE EVOLUTION OF THE REFUGEE CAMPS RESIDENTS WITHIN THE EIGHT CAMPS OF UNRWA ADMINISTRATION:30 JUNE 1961–30 JUNE 1985.



June 1982 (208,662) before increasing to 236,486 by 30 June 1985. This gives an annual average growth of only 0.77% between 1967 and 1985 (Table 4.7). During this period, four camps increased annually by a higher rate than the average - Nuseirat (1.54%), Deir el Balah (1.31%), Jabalya (1.18%) and Gaza Beach (1.04%). Khan Yunis, Bureij, Mughazi and Rafah increased only slightly by 0.57%, 0.40%, 0.28% and 0.05% respectively.

In fact, the camp population growth during the Israeli period increased very slightly in comparison with the Egyptian period, the causes of which were discussed in chapter two. Their numbers fluctuated from year to year during the Israeli period with decreases identified during three phases as shown in Figure 4.9.

The war of June 1967 initiated the first phase which resulted in out-migration from camps toward Jordan. The highest rates of decrease during the period of 30 June 1967 - 31 December 1968 were recorded in Bureij (-19.34%), Mughazi (-9.98%), Rafah (-6.75%), Nuseirat (-5.83%), Deir el Balah (-4.29%) and Khan Yunis (-4.04%), while the lowest were reported in Gaza Beach (-0.94%) and Jabalya (-0.86%). The UN Secretary-General U Thant's report (S/8124) of August 18, 1967, stated that the densely populated Gaza Strip had suffered considerably more civilian casualties and property damage than any other area (Khouri, 1968). For instance hundreds of shelters in Khan Yunis and Rafah refugee camps had been destroyed by the heavy bombardment from Israeli artillery and tanks, although later they were rebuilt.

The second phase took its effect in the second half of 1971 with its results appearing by 1972 (see Fig. 4.9). This phase was caused by the Israeli security roads plan which aimed to improve Israeli military control over the refugee camps by making them less congested, as the refugee camps represented the main bases of the underground Palestinian guerrillas (see chapter 8).

The third phase began in 1976 with distinctive effects, even though it started in some refugee camps at an earlier period. This phase was designed to resettle the camp refugees into the Israeli-sponsored rehousing projects (see chapters 8 and 9 for details). The effect of phase three had been negligible by 30 June 1982 when the sum of refugee camp inhabitants began to rise again.

Notwithstanding, the high natural increase in the Strip's refugee camps has compensated for the loss of their inhabitants by means of out-migration or resettlement in the Israeli-sponsored rehousing projects. As a consequence, the total housing stock in the camps has decreased since the resettled refugees must demolish their shelters as a pre-condition for a housing unit in these rehousing projects (see chapter 9).

However, the amount of usable space in the camps decreases as the population continues to increase (Table 4.7), since no new building is permitted either on the sites of demolished shelters or on derelict areas. As a consequence, the camp refugees began to add new rooms and other facilities to the courtyards of their shelters causing even more congestion. Today, the majority of camp inhabitants have replaced the tiled roofs of their shelters with asbestos to prevent the leakage of rain in spite of the dangers of asbestos to the occupant's health.

4.5 The Israeli Colonies

This study will focus on the Israeli colonies in the Gaza Strip which have made a significant impact on the Strip. It would be a legitimate question to ask why the word colony is used instead of settlement. Further to this, it is pertinent to ask when they were established, how many there are, what are their aims, and to what extent is their establishment politically-motivated and what impact they have had and will have on the Gaza Strip's demography. Indeed, these questions cannot easily be answered but an attempt will be made to analyse the colonies.

This framework of study constitutes the heart of political geography, but in the case of the Gaza Strip in particular and in Palestine as a whole, politics have been the primary and distinctive force playing an important role in the transformation of the demographic map of Palestine since the 1948 war and before.

"Colony" was the term used to define Jewish residential centres which were set up before the war of 1967 in the part of Palestine occupied after the war of 1948. After the war of 1967 which resulted in the full Israeli domination of the whole of Palestine, the Israelis have been very active in implanting their colonies upon the Palestinians' lands. The Israelis themselves have used the term settlement to describe these exclusively

Jewish residential centres which they have created on the occupied Palestinian lands. There are two reasons why the researcher has chosen the term "colonies". Firstly, from a linguistic viewpoint, settlement implies a certain legality which is refuted here. Secondly, Article 49 (6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention states that the occupying power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies (National Lawyers Guild, 1978). Consequently, the Israeli colonies in the Gaza Strip are illegal under international law.

4.5.1 Israeli Occupation from Conquest to Colony

The issue of the Jewish colonies in Palestine as a whole and in the occupied territories (The West Bank and the Gaza Strip) in particular does not form a new political problem, but they have constituted the focal point of the Israeli-Arab conflict over the past nine decades. Throughout all phases of the Israeli-Arab conflict, the Jewish colonies in Palestine have been both the tools and goals for the Israeli decision-makers who aim to create a Jewish society in Palestine, besides which they intend to exterminate the pre-existing Palestinian society. In 1948, the Zionists had partly reached their goal when they applied their ideology by creating their Jewish state in Palestine, and uprooted the Palestinians from their homeland.

The war which broke out in 1967 prepared the way for the advent of a new phase of Israeli colonization, when they had succeeded in taking over the area comprising the remaining parts of Palestine (The West Bank and Gaza Strip), the Israelis continued their policy of implanting more colonies in those territories. Following the war of october 1973, the Israelis focussed their efforts on confiscating more lands from the Palestinians. As a result an upsurge in the number of Jewish colonies and the number of their colonists was reported.

Consequently, the Israeli colonies in the occupied territories have recently become much more central to the whole Israeli-Arab conflict. Our purpose is to reveal whether the Israeli colonies in the Gaza Strip are similar to those created before the Palestinian catastrophe of 1948.

4.5.2 The Geographical Distribution of Israeli Colonies in the Gaza Strip in 1985

The distribution of Israeli colonies in the Gaza Strip is shown in Figure 4.1 where the southern zone is characterized by the intense concentration of colonies, and the northern and central zones contain smaller numbers. The clusters of Israeli colonies in the southern zone are due to:

(a) the widening of the Strip's area in the southern zone;
(b) from the strategic point of view, the Zionists aim to create a buffer zone close to the Egyptian border; and
(c) availability of the uninhabited sand dunes which were classified as "state land", helping the Jewish colonists to take it over and uproot the pre-existing sand dune forest and flatten it for their colonial projects.

The most evident observation which can be interpreted from Figure 4.1 is the distinctive selection of the Israeli colonies relative to the sites of the existing Palestinian settlements. These sites are characterized by the following important points:

(a) the colonies cover large areas, particularly in the areas not inhabited by the Palestinians, and lie a short distance from the most fertile agricultural lands;
(b) they are concentrated in the vicinity of the Palestinian settlements;
(c) the colonies occupy prominent sites in the Strip in order to overlook and control the main axes of roads;
(d) they are close to the international borderland and to the sea coast;
(e) they are located in the militarily strategic positions; and
(f) they are exploited agriculturally with a view to self-sufficiency in the future.

These factors are similar to those influencing colonial settlement before the Zionist take over of Palestine in 1948.

Consequently, the sites of Israeli colonies have been chosen to implement their tactical and strategic goals for full domination of the Gaza Strip land. Also the Israeli decision-makers want to achieve the final goal of demographic transformation in the Strip for their benefit.

4.5.3 The Strategy of the Israeli Colonies in the Gaza Strip

The Israeli colonial programme on the Palestinian lands has formed the vital basis of the Zionist movement over nine decades, since the First Zionist Congress which was held in Basle (Switzerland) in 1897, when the Zionists ultimately decided to set up a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine. Following that, the Zionist colonial programme has constituted one of the most important pillars in creating the Zionist project in Palestine; in fact it constitutes the pragmatic face of its implementation. This is not surprising, specifically, if we know that Zionism was described by Z. Jabotinsky in 1933 as "a colonial process, thereby it will grow and weaken with the issue of military power" (Abu Arafa, 1981).

The strategy of the Israeli colonies plan in Palestine (before the 1948 war) was characterized by two main factors which identify its strategic patterns and axes. These factors can be summarized as encirclement and containment (Tawfiq, 1977). But following the Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip and West Bank in 1967, the surveillance factor has also played a distinctive role.

4.5.3.1 The Surveillance Factor

Shortly after the Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip in 1967, the military operation of the Palestinian resistance movement against the Israeli troops expanded and intensified. Consequently, the Israelis established three para-military colonies in order to improve their military control over the Strip's indigenous settlements during 1970-72. They also wanted to follow and observe the mobility of Palestinians between their localities, specifically because the Strip had contained the primary bases of Palestinian guerrillas between 1967 and 1972.

The colonies were set up at strategic sites and close to the main traffic arteries. The purpose of these colonies was to separate the populated Palestinian settlements in the southern zone of the Strip from the central zone, and the central zone from the northern zone. Another aim was to cut them off from the bases of the Palestinian resistance movement.

Up to 1972, there were four Jewish colonies in the Strip: Nahal Nezarim (1972), Kefar Darom (1970), Nahal Morag (1972) and Erez (1969). The last colony is an uninhabited industrial village. The distance between these colonies was approximately 9 kms and they were spaced at more or less regular intervals between Gaza town and the refugee camps of the central zone (Nuseirat, Bureij and Mughazi), between the refugee camps of the central zone and Khan Yunis and Rafah in the northern zone (Fig. 4.1).

4.5.3.2 The Encirclement Factor

The Israeli authorities continued to implant more colonies in the Strip in order to achieve their second aim of full encirclement of the existing Palestinian localities. This aim can be easily noted from the statement of Yigal Allon, the architect of the Israeli colonies plan and the Deputy Prime Minister of Israel 1968-77, when he emphasized that the Israeli settlements are placed in strategically important areas along existing borderlines or in the vicinity of areas likely to become borderlines in the future (National Lawyers Guild, 1978). We can interpret from this statement that the Israeli colonies had been established to encircle and isolate the Palestinian communities.

As illustrated in Figure 4.1 and 4.10, we can observe six axes (belts) of encirclement inside the Strip which can be classified as follows:

(a) Nevets Sala-Nisanit, which encircles the Strip from the north side;
(b) Tal el Montar-Nezarim, which isolates Gaza town and its villages in the northern zone from the remaining Palestinian localities in the south;
(c) Kefar Darom-Qatif, which separates Deir el Balah and the refugee camps in central zone from the southern zone localities;
(d) Qatif-Nahal Morag, which isolates Khan Yunis and its villages from Deir el Balah in the north and Rafah in the south;
(e) Nahal Morag-Rafah Yam, which makes a large curve encircling Rafah town and its refugee camp; and
(f) Netzer Hazzani-Rafah Yam, which makes a longitudinal belt isolating the southern zone localities from the sea coast.


Kilometres
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MEDITERRANEAN SEA
GAZA
DEIR EL-BALAH
KHAN YUNIS
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EGYPT
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FIG·4·10 THE STRATEGY OF ISRAELI COLONIES IN THE GAZA STRIP
Axes of encirclement
Palestinian towns
Refugee camps
Palestinian villages
Israeli colonies in the Strip
Israeli colonies inside the Green Line

However, there is another belt which stretches along the Armistice line (Green Line) inside the border of pre-1967 occupied Palestine and faces towards the Strip border (Figs. 4.1 and 4.10). It was built in the early 1960's and expanded by the beginning of the 1970's, and was intended to constitute an advance line of colonies in the vicinity of the Strip border and to encircle the Strip as well.

The objectives of these southern axes are also to sever the Palestinian settlements from the Egyptian frontier and to create a buffer zone between them. In addition, they aim to encircle them by creating a cordon on the southern zone. The Israeli colony blocks which surround the main Palestinian towns in the Strip are intended to prevent the expansion of the Palestinian population and to ghettoize them psychologically (Fig. 4.10). Further, they aim to isolate the Arab population into little pockets surrounded by Jewish colonies. Consequently, the Israeli authorities have carved new highways in the sand dunes to connect their colonies to make for easier control and encirclement. They also plan the establishment of more colonies, specifically in the southern area of Rafah town toward the aim of full encirclement of the Palestinian community. "The political and strategic role of settlement in key areas in order to establish a permanent Jewish presence was a second stage in the early settlement process. It led to colonisation over a wider area owing to the need physically to control areas of land" (Newman, 1982).

4.5.3.3 The Containment and Judaization of the Strip

Containment and Judaization constitute the more serious process in the strategy of the Zionist colonial programme in Palestine and the occupied territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. From the Israeli viewpoint, the containment and Judaization of Palestinian land has been a central tenet and practice of the Zionist movement since the waves of Jewish immigration began in the early 20th century. The Zionists succeeded in achieving their ideology when they had created the state of Israel in 1948 with a majority of Jewish inhabitants. They uprooted the Palestinian people from their homeland forcing them to become refugees in several Arab countries. Following the Israeli occupation of the Strip in 1967 in addition to the West Bank, the Israelis started to impose their new colonial programme upon the rest of Palestine. By the end of 1985, the Israeli colonisation programme nearly fulfilled its surveillance and encirclement aims while still intending to reach the aim of Judaization.

In the Gaza Strip, the Israelis desire to implement the Judaization goal by two methods:

(a) The evacuation of the inhabitants of areas which have been encircled, or the dissolution and assimilation of them into Jewish society which would make the Strip a less densely populated region. The Israelis tried to do this in 1971 when they transferred several thousands into the Sinai and West Bank. But after the Israeli-Egyptian Camp David Accords all of them came back to the Strip except the Canada camp residents.
(b) The acceleration of the Israeli colonial programme in the Strip, whereby the Israelis have doubled their colonies and the numbers of colonists in a very short time. In addition, they confiscated more lands from Palestinian owners under several pretexts. Later we will evaluate the Israeli programme in the Strip and whether it will be able to achieve the Judaization goal or not.

The Israeli strategy of Judaization on the Strip can be observed from the statement of Mr. Yigal Allon who said that he would be very glad to see the southern zone of the Gaza Strip become an area pulsating with Jewish life (MERIP, 1977). However, Gush Emunim considers that the effective colonial movement in the occupied territories should not colonize the occupied Palestinian lands through building in areas where the Palestinians are thinnest, but by confronting and supplanting the Palestinians. In addition, the former military intelligence chief General Aharon Yariv, in a speech at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, warned recently that some people already hope to exploit a situaton of war to expel 7-800,000 Palestinian Arabs.....(National Lawyers Guild, 1978). Finally, we can conclude that the Israelis are still waiting to reach the Judaization goal of their strategy of colonization whenever the chances become as favourable as they were in 1948. Now, it is a legitimate question to ask whether the Israelis will implement this goal and when.

4.5.4 Phases in the Evolution of the Israeli Colonies in the Gaza Strip

To follow the evolution and growth of Israeli colonies in the Gaza Strip during the period of 1967-1985, it would be useful to study this phenomenon in two separate stages:

(a) The pre-June 1977 government (Labour)
(b) The June 1977-October 1984 government (Likud)

The aforesaid separation aims to identify the strategy of both Israeli governments twoard the colonization of the Gaza Strip. However, from October 1984, Israel has been governed by a coalition government made up from the Labour and Likud parties who alternate for the premiership during the four years period of government.

"The Israeli colony location and colony type are both seen to have influenced the Jewish colonization over the past 100 years in Palestine. The election of the Likud government in 1977 represented the culmination of a gradual process of change in the dominant ideology of Israeli society; this has resulted in a new set of priorities and relationships regarding the nature of colonies and colonization" (Newman, 1984).

However, the process of Israeli colonization in the Strip has been distinguished by a dramatic increase in the numbers of colonies and their areas, and a slight increase in the number of colonists from 1977 onward (Table 4.8).

4.5.4.1 The Colonies Established under Labour Rule until June 1977

Under the rule of the Labour government of 1967-June 1977, the Israeli colonial programme in the Strip was restricted to creating advance military positions. These positions aimed to support the presence of the Israeli military forces in the Strip, and to provide them with logistic assistance against Palestinian guerrilla attacks. These colonies (most of the Israeli colonies in the Palestinian occupied territories are established as military positions which later shift to civilian colonies) occupied the most desirable positions in the Strip from the Israeli strategic point of view. This can easily be noted from the name of these colonies, which were called Nahal.

Up to June 1977, the Israeli Labour government created five colonies, three of them Nahal colonies, one an industrial village, and the last the core of the Qatif bloc. Further, the public strategy of the Labour government was stressed by the Prime Minister of Israel Yitzhak Rabin in 1977, when he declared that the Israeli settlements increased Israel's

)le 4.8

The Israeli Colonies in the Gaza Strip, 1967 - 1985

Colony name	Date founded	Type	Colony movement	Area/ Dunum	Economic base
rez	1969	industrial village	-	800	Industry (Israeli repair workshops and factories, including two Gazan firms).
efar Darom	1970	Kibbutz	Hapoel Hamizrachi	400	The site is intended as a midrasha where Zionist seminars and training programmes for new colonies are held.
Nezarim	1972	Nahal (now Moshav)	Hapoel Hamizrachi	-	Agriculture
Morag	1972	Nahal	Hapoel Hamizrachi	1800	Agriculture
Qatif	1973	Moshav	Hapoel Hamizrachi	1500	Agriculture
Qatif (D)	-	Nahal	Hapoel Hamizrachi	-	A small jetty and tourist beach
Netzer Hazzani	1976	Moshav	Hapoel Hamizrachi	2000	Agriculture
Ganne Tal	1978	Moshav	Hapoel Hamizrachi	1200	Agriculture and tourism
Bedolah	1979	Moshav	Hapoel Hamizrachi	-	-
Gan or	1980	Moshav	Hapoel Hamizrachi	1000	Agriculture and tourist trade
Gadid	1982	Moshav	Hapoel Hamizrachi	1200	Agriculture and tourist trade
Nisanit	1982	Nahal	Hapoel Hamizrachi	1700	-
Tal el Montar	1982	Nahal	-	200	-
Eli Sinai	1982	-	Amana (Gush Emmunim)	800	Beach development for the tourist trade, fishing, light industry and agriculture
Neve Dqalim	1983	Urban centre	Hapoel Hamizrachi	600	Agriculture, tourist trade and administrative jobs in the Israeli governmental offices in the Gaza Strip
Rafah Yam	1984	-	Council of settlement	1000	Beach development for the tourist trade, fishing and light industry
Matsiba Atsmona	1984	Kibbutz	Amana (Gush Emmunim)	2000	Agriculture, electronic and software workshops and a plastics factory
Atsmona *	1984	-	-	-	-
Kefar Dayagim *	1984	fishing village	fishing	-	fishing industry
Nevets Sala *	1984	-	-	-	-

Source: Generally compiled from fieldwork in 1984 in addition to : Abu Arafa, 1981; Gaza Regional Council of settlement, 1983, and Lesch, 1985.

* Colonies under construction

security and provided a firm basis for defensible borders. Moreover, he outlined the government's settlement priorities: strengthening the "confrontation lines" along the borders of Arab countries (Lesch, 1977).

4.5.4.2 The Israeli Colonization Programme under Likud from June 1977 - October 1984

After the victory of the Likud coalition in the election of June 1977 which resulted in the reins of power being transferred to them, the features of the strategy of Israeli colonization were identified, and its secret goals were drawn. This strategy had been concealed under the security argument during the previous Labour government.

Under Likud rule, religio-historic factors initiated a stronger hold (see Plate 4.5), whereby they implanted several colonies close to Palestinian localities in the Gaza Strip. However, the Likud government itself decided that the West Bank and Gaza Strip are parts of the ancient homeland of the Jewish people, since both formed part of the land of biblical Israel. In addition, the government of Israel stressed that Jews had the right to establish a presence anywhere in "Eretz Ysrael" (Land of Israel). Begin himself described all of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as liberated not occupied territory (National Lawyers Guild, 1978 and Will, 1980). Consequently, that clearly meant that the Jewish people did have rights to settle anywhere in the occupied territories from the Likud point of view.

Furthermore, the Israeli government concentrated its attention on practising its overt ideology of full colonization upon the Strip as well as the West Bank. Ariel Sharon (the former minister of Agriculture and settlements) implemented an intensive plan of colonies in the southern zone of the Gaza Strip and in the Rafah salient. Up to 1979, the Israelis established 15 colonies inside the Egyptian land (Yamit bloc) and added some colonies to those already existing in the Strip.

"When the Egyptian-Israeli talks began, the Sinai colonies were placed "on hold", since Egypt expected to regain all her lost territories following the process of piecemeal Israeli withdrawal. The Israelis considered their presence in the Rafah salient absolutely essential in order to tighten the encirclement of Gaza and to ensure that the Strip

Plate 4.5 : Neve Dqalim colony: West of Khan Yunis - a colony of religious orientation (as are most of the colonies in the area) surrounded by barbed wire and guarded by soldiers. It is the aim of the government to encourage Jews to settle in these areas because of their religio-historic significance. Note the Hesder Yeshiva, a college where religious studies are combined with military training, built in the shape of the Star of David.

Photo: The author.

would never again have administrative or geographic links with Egypt" (Abu Lughod, 1982).

The steady intensification of the numbers of colonies in the Strip was reported between 1979 and 1985 when 14 colonies were set up and the existing ones were expanded. Moreover, the type of colonies had changed from Nahal positions to Moshavim and Kibbutzim in order to practise the Likud ideology of full and fast colonization of the Palestinians' land, and to achieve the Judaization goal later. The acceleration of the Israeli colonization process was due to two reasons.

Firstly, the Israeli-Egyptian Accords of Camp David, which had emphasized the full Israeli withdrawal from Sinai including the removal of their colonies, resulted in the collapse of the Israeli presence in the Rafah salient alongside the southern Gaza Strip borders. Consequently, the Israelis intensified their colonies between Khan Yunis and Rafah and the coast in order to compensate their loss in Sinai and to create a new buffer zone in the vicinity of the Egyptian border (see Fig. 4.1 and 4.10). Furthermore, the Gaza Regional Council of settlements (1983) proclaimed that many of the residents of the Gaza Strip colonies had lived in various cities and Moshavim in Sinai before the final withdrawal in 1982. Eli Sinai and Matsibh Atsmona are essentially transplanted communities whose residents were removed from Egyptian territory.

Secondly, the Palestinian autonomy proposal led to an acceleration in the process of colonization in the Strip and the West Bank, particularly when the Egyptians conceived a plan to implement the so-called Palestinian self-government proposal of the Camp David Accords in the Strip as an initial phase. The concept of self-government from the Israeli viewpoint does not mean an end of military occupation, but the municipal authorities would be given greater authority to run local affairs, while the Israeli army would retain jurisdication over security. Mr. Begin (The former Israeli Prime Minister) stressed that several times when he stated that the autonomy would apply only to people, not to water and land. The Israeli autonomy concept was completely rejected by the Egyptians who thought that self-government should lead to an independent state for the Palestinians later.

4.5.5 The Evaluation of the Israeli Colony Plan in the Gaza Strip

It is now appropriate to analyse and evaluate the Israeli colonization plan in the Gaza Strip and whether the implementation of the Israeli strategy of demographic transformation would be for their benefit. Further to thise, it is pertinent to relate it to a comparative study of the close colonization plan for the occupied West Bank.

"At the turn of the century, Jews made up less than 10% of the total population of Palestine, and owned less than 2% of the land. Year after year since then, these percentages have increased, so that by 1948, a Jewish state could be declared, and the indigenous Palestinians had been driven out" (Mattar, 1984). The Israeli occupation of the Palestinians' West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967 initiated the second phase of the Israeli process of colonization of the Palestinians' land. The aims of their colonization have remained the same: the creation of an exclusive Jewish presence in the Israeli-occupied Gaza Strip and the West Bank until those areas could be integrated into Israel. Consequently, we can note that the territorial conflict between the Palestinians and Jews in the occupied Palestinian territories is based on the demographic superiority of Palestinians in the two areas.

Table 4.9 summarizes the magnitude of the Jewish presence in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, as well as their estimated numbers up to the year 2000. The number of Jewish colonists in the Gaza Strip has increased during 1978-84 from 500 to 2000 or by 300%, while they increased from 7800 to 42,600 (446.2%) in the West Bank.

During the period 1982-84, a sharp increase in the colonists and colonies numbers was reported. In the West Bank, by the end of 1982 there were a total of 20,600 colonists, living in 71 colonies. This figure rose in 1983 to 27,500 colonists, living in 99 colonies, and went up to 42,600 living in 114 colonies in 1984. These increases mean an average annual growth rate of 53.4% and 30.3% in the numbers of colonists and colonies respectively. On the other hand, the Strip's colonies have increased from 15 in 1983 to 20 by 1984, or by 25%, but the number of colonists in 1983 is unavailable.

Table 4.9 The Percentages of Israeli Colonists Relative to the Palestinian Arabs of the West Bank and Gaza Strip 1978-84, Extrapolated by Estimate to 2000

Region / Year	The West Bank				Gaza Strip			
	Number of colonists	Number of Palestinian Arabs	Colonists % to the Palestinian Arabs	Number of colonies	Number of colonists	Number of Palestinian Arabs	Colonists % to the Palestinian Arabs	Number of colonies
1978	7,800	708,000	1.1	-	500	425,000	0.1	7
1979	-	718,600	-	-	1,000	437,900	0.23	-
1982	20,600	747,000	2.8	71	-	476,300	-	-
1983	27,500	767,300	3.6	99	-	493,700	-	15
1984	42,600	786,700	5.4	114	2,000	509,900	0.39	20
1990	100,000**	887,000	11.3	-	10,000	625,290*	1.6	-
2000	400,000**	1,083,400	36.9	-	20,000	878,500*	2.3	-

Sources: Israeli Colonists : Harris, 1980; Abu Lughod, 1982; Smith, 1985, The Jerusalem Post 1985; and Benvenisti, 1985
Palestinian Arabs : Table 2.3; Central Bureau of Statistics, 1985.

* The populations of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip have been estimated by projecting the annual rate of population growth of 2.0% and 3.4% respectively.

** These figures are released by the Department of Settlement in the World Zionist Organization.

Note: The Jewish colonists figures for the West Bank exclude the Jewish inhabitants of East Jerusalem. On the other hand, figures for the Palestinians of the West Bank exclude the Palestinian Arabs of the Annexed Arab East Jerusalem.

Despite the actual steady increase in the number of Israelis, their percentage share in the total population is still very limited and consequently the demographic transformation has not been achieved yet. In the West Bank the Israelis formed 1.1% of the total Arab population in 1978. This percentage rose to 2.8% in 1982, 3.6% in 1983 and reached 5.4% in 1984. In the meantime their percentage in the Gaza Strip went up slightly from 0.1% in 1978 to 0.23% in 1979 and reached 0.39% in 1984 (see Table 4.9). From these increases we can conclude that the percentage of Israelis among the total Arab population has increased in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, but at a greater rate in the West Bank than in the Strip.

Moreover, according to the Israeli colonial plan up to the year 2000, the percentage of Jews will rise markedly, particularly in the West Bank where their percentage should reach 11.3% in 1990 and 36.9% in the year 2000. On the other hand, in the Strip, it should grow from 0.39% in 1984 to 1.6% in 1990 and reach 2.3% in the year of 2000 (Table 4.9). From the aforementioned plan, we can easily interpret that the Israelis will continue to implant more colonies in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and expand the existing colonies by seizing more and more lands from the Palestinian owners. Up to 1984, about 50% of the total area of the West Bank was under the Israeli colonial process, but in the Gaza Strip some 30% of the total area was being colonized or confiscated.

The present and forthcoming Israeli colonial network in the West Bank reveals more successful than in the Gaza Strip (Table 4.9), which will result in the modification of the demographic composition for the Israeli's benefit. Success in the West Bank can be attributed to a variety of factors.

Firstly, the geographical setting of the West Bank constitutes a very strategic site which can threaten the security of the densely inhabited region in Israel - namely the coastal region stretching from Tel Aviv in the south to Haifa in the north. Therefore, the presence of the Jewish colonies in the West Bank is very important and vital for Israeli security. Also this presence will lead to the fragmentation of the demographic characteristics of the Palestinian population in the West Bank.

Secondly, the West Bank area comprises 5505 sq. kms, which would aid the colonists in creating and implementing their forthcoming colonial plan.

Thirdly, there is an abundance of permanent employment in the West Bank colonies, where the Israeli authorities have established some Jewish urban-industrial sites to secure continuous employment for the Israeli colonists (which has been considered the distinctive problem of the Gaza Strip colonies).

Fourthly, the geographical setting of the West Bank in the vicinity of the Israeli main administrative and industrial centres (West Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Haifa) was preferred by the Israeli colonists; 71.5% of the West Bank colonists live close to the Jerusalem and Tel Aviv areas (Benvenisti, 1985).

Finally, the most distinctive role in the colonization process in the West Bank was that the Jews considered it as part of the biblical land of Israel "Eretz Ysrael", hence the new Israeli names of Judea (the southern section of the West Bank) and Samaria (the northern section of the West Bank) instead of the current name of West Bank. The religio-historical effect can be observed from the percentage share of religious colonists among the entire population, as well as their percentage in the Jerusalem area. Benvenisti (1985) reported that 50% of the colonists in the West Bank were religious, 41% were living in close proximity to Jerusalem, and 25% of them were living in one colony, namely Ma'ale Adumim township east of Jerusalem.

The demographic conflict between the Palestinian Arabs and Jews in the Gaza Strip has a different basis, because there is no possibility of attaining a Jewish majority there. It is estimated by the World Zionist Organization that in 1990 the planned Jewish population of the Strip will be 10,000 and in the year 2000 it will be 20,000. Projections show that the Palestinian population, in contrast, will be 625,290 in 1990 and 878,500 in the year 2000 (Table 4.9). Thereby, the small Israeli minority would have to focus their attention on the control of the Palestinian majority. Consequently, the issue of colonies in the Strip is far more intricate than in the West Bank.

The Israeli colony plan in the Gaza Strip has faced several physical and human obstacles. The overpopulation problem has characterized the Strip as one of the most densely populated regions in the world, and the Strip has been distinguished by a very high rate of natural increase which has reached 3.41% per annum (1968-84). This means that by the year 2000, the number of Israeli colonists will never exceed more than the inhabitants of a small refugee camp or village.

Then there is the problem of limited area (364 sq. kms), a physical obstacle which has restricted the development of Israeli colonies. Furthermore, agricultural land is very limited (210 sq. kms) relative to the total population of Palestinians (509,900 persons in 1984), and most of the fertile and cultivable lands are already utilized by them.

Another major problem is that the only water resource in the Strip is groundwater, and underground flow is from the east. Their replenishment was estimated at 40 million cubic metres and 10-20 million cubic metres per year respectively, in addition to about 20-30 million cubic metres replenishment annually by the return flow from irrigation and cesspools. On the other hand, water consumption is estimated at 100 million cubic metres per year, of which 90% is used for irrigation. As a result of this imbalance between replenishment and consumption, the water table dropped by 0.5-2.5 metres between 1978 and 1982. So the salinity of the groundwater has risen and ranged from 600 to 1300 ppm chloride (Schwarz, 1982). We can conclude that the Strip is suffering from a current shortage in water supply, which will be aggravated in the future under the pressure of the local population growth, and additionally by the increase in the numbers of Israeli colonies which are located in the sand dunes and are based on agricultural production.

These colonies are located at a great distance from the main Israeli cities outside the Strip border. For instance, the distances between the Qatif bloc colonies and Tel Aviv and Jerusalem cities are about 100 kms and 110 kms respectively. In the meantime, the nearest city to them is Ashqelon which is located at a distance of 50 kms. Consequently, several families of Jewish colonists were eventually forced to leave their new accommodation in the Strip colonies and return to Israel in order to be closer to the main Israeli cities.

The economic base of the Israeli colonies is generally in agricultural production as well as in tourism (except for the uninhabited colony of Eerz). The agricultural production is based on vegetables (tomatoes, peppers, corn and aubergines) and flowers for export. This work covers only eight months of the year while the other four months will be considered as unemployment time. In addition, the colonies soil structure has to be completely transformed from the local soil of the sand dunes, leading to an increase in the cost of reclamation.

The Israeli authorities insist on solving these main problems to their own advantage, so since the Israeli occupation of the Strip in 1967, they have been trying to reduce the population density in the Gaza Strip. They have exerted some effort to lure the Palestinians to emigrate to Jordan and the West Bank. Moreover, in 1977 they forced some thousands to move to Al-Arish Town (in Sinai desert) by destroying their camp shelters in a so-called "thinning out" process (see Chapter 8). Remarkably, the magnitude of this mobility has not counteracted the annual rate of natural increase in the Strip.

Moreover, despite the severe shortage of water resources in the Gaza Strip [the present over-exploitation amounts to about 30-60 million cubic metres per year, caused by the lack of water replenishment and the increase in the evaporation rate, which has been estimated at between 1800-1900 mm per year. Consequently, the moisture balance of the soil is negative throughout the summer (Schwarz, 1982)], the Israelis have dug between 35 and 40 wells to irrigate their colonies' agricultural land and they also transfer some of the water to their colonies inside the Green line (Fig. 4.10). On the other hand, they are tightening control over Palestinian use of water, with intensified watersaving measures imposed against the Palestinian inhabitants. Palestinians are forbidden to increase the pumping capacity of their existing wells despite the increase in population numbers, and meters have been placed on Arab Palestinian wells to keep a daily check of their output. Consequently, all of these restrictions are imposed to save sufficient water for the Israeli colonies inside and outside the Strip. However, recently all of the Strip localities have been suffering from a chronic problem of water shortage for agriculture and domestic use (see Chapter 10).

The Israeli military authorities have confiscated the more fertile lands from their Palestinian owners to support their colonies, in order to

create a permanent agricultural base. In January 1985 for example the Israeli army confiscated about 350 dunums from the rich Gaza valley area close to Nezarim colony in order to expand its area (Al Fajr, 1985).

However, the Israelis also desire to create a permanent economic infrastructural basis to raise daily employment in their colonies and to prevent return migration to Israel. Therefore, in December 1985 the security forces began levelling some hundreds of dunums of land to the west of Khan Yunis refugee camp in order to establish a regional industrial centre there. They have built a storage area for vegetables cultivated in the Israeli colonies and an airstrip which, it is claimed, is to be used for their exportation. Hotels are also to be built on this land to encourage the tourist industry and a riding school has already been completed. In the meantime they have approved the establishment of Kefar Dayagim, a fishing village which is expected to be north of Gaza Beach camp.

From the previous discussion, it is evident that the Jewish presence in the Strip has been facing several obstacles, and the future magnitude of their colonists will be very limited relative to the Palestinian Arab population. But this presence is very important and vital from the Israeli political point of view. Roznbelt, the chief of the Gaza Regional council of Israel colonies, described the presence of Israeli colonies in the Strip as very important to set up a security buffer zone between the Strip and Egypt, and to prevent the possibility of the establishment of an independent state in the region (Davar, 1984).

Mattityahu Drobless, co-head of the WZO settlement department, has admitted it is really more a political settlement. In fact, all the colonies are political. They may have their economic bases in greenhouse agriculture and tourism, but they have not been conceived simply to boost Israel's poor economic performance. The cost - $2,000 to prepare one dunum of land for a colony - is prohibitive, but the political idea is to be absorbed into Israel. An autonomous Palestinian state is the last thing Israel intends to see here (Smith, 1985).

Furthermore, the Israelis insist on intensifying new colonies and expanding the existing ones which have swallowed up the surrounding land bit by bit. The recommended areas for the forthcoming colonial plan are:

east of Rafah City, Nezarim area, the coastal plain north of Gaza town and east of Bureij refugee camp. Moreover, the Israeli colonists have been touring Gaza town with the intention of building a Jewish residential area in the heart of the city as they have done in the heart of Hebron city in the West Bank.

Consequently, the demographic and territorial conflict between the Palestinian Arabs and the Jewish colonists will intensify in the future, when most of the natural resources (water and land) will be captured by the Israelis, while the Palestinians will suffer from very serious problems of accommodation, lack of water and land confiscation. These problems will threaten the continuous presence of Palestinian society in the Strip.

In summary, the Israeli plan in the Strip would not result in demographic transformation to their advantage by the year 2000, though they would be successful in the West Bank. Now, it would be a legitimate question to ask whether the Israeli authorities will have to recourse to expelling the Palestinians from the Strip and the West Bank as they did in 1948. This would not be surprising, since we know that there are some colonial movements and parties (Gush Emunim, Kach and Ha Tehiya) who irregularly hold demonstrations and appeal to the Israeli government to expel the Palestinians to Jordan. Here a new question has been raised: whether this will happen in the future : We will wait to know the answer.

4.6 Summary

The political situation which has taken place in the Gaza Strip since the wars of 1948 and 1967 has greatly affected all aspects of Gazan population structure as well as transforming the status of settlements. In fact, the 1948 displacement from occupied Palestine led to population expansion in the Strip localities, increasing the percentage of urban dwellers: the percentage rose from 70% in 1945 to about 90% in 1982, and reducing the proportion of rural population from 30% to 10% during the same period. Also, the 1948 displacement increased the population pressure on the poorest economic base of the Gaza Strip, adding eight refugee camps to the pre-existing Palestinian settlement.

Following the Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip in 1967, three villages have developed into urban centres, taking advantage of the new

Israeli definition of the concept of urban centre. In addition, some small localities have been transformed into villages and local committees by the Israeli authorities.

The inhabitants of the refugee camps increased by 4.67% per annum during June 1961 - June 1967 (The Strip was governed by the Egyptians) in contrast to 0.77% during June 1967 - June 1985 (The Israeli occupation period which continues so far). The decline during the Israeli period was due to the Israeli policy imposed against the refugee camps which aimed to evacuate the inhabitants from the camps (see part 3). Moreover, as a consequence of population growth, the living space in the refugee camps has decreased and the shelters have become more congested.

Up to 1985, the Israelis implanted 21 colonies, of which two sites are under construction, which embodied their previous strategy of full domination of the Palestinians' land. So, the process of their colonial plan in the Strip and the West Bank has remained closely similar to those which practised before the 1948 catastrophe, aiming to destroy the Palestinian character by a systematic policy of Judaization whereby the Israelis have succeeded in encircling the Strip with a series of Jewish colonies. In fact, the Israeli colonies in the Gaza Strip have assimilated all the lands, particularly the sand dunes, which could solve the housing problem of Gaza's people. Hence the Strip inhabitants will be forced to set up their new dwellings on the reduced agricultural land, which already has fallen over the years.

Finally, the comparative study of the Israeli colonial plan in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank allowed for a maximum contrast between the two Palestinian territories occupied by the Israeli army. In both territories, the strategy of the Israeli colonial plan is closely similar, where they aim to ensure Israeli Jewish predominance and hence sovereignty over the occupied territories. The Israeli government is striving to change the demographic balance to their advantage by transplating tens of thousands of Israeli Jews into the Strip and the West Bank. The Israelis roughly will reach this goal in the West Bank by the end of this century (see Table 4.9); but in the Strip their aim will be impossible to implement. This circumstance has forced the Gaza Regional Council of Settlement (1983) to make intensive advertising to encourage Jewish colonists to colonize the Gaza Strip, by describing the Strip as the "Hawaii of Israel".

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PART TWO
Survey of the Population Structure

Owing to a lack of new complete data covering the population structure of the Gaza Strip by a census, a sample survey was conducted by the researcher between October 1985 and January 1986 in order to cover the scope of the work. Six formats of questionnaire were utilised in the survey, four of them concerning the population structure while the other two dealt with refugee rehousing projects and the housing problem in the refugee camps. The results of the last two formats of questionnaire will be treated in part three.

In part two, the analysis of the population structure will be restricted to two main subjects. The first concerns the analysis of age-sex structure and factors operating on them, and will be discussed in chapter six and supported by two formats of questionnaire on population structure and fertility, mortality and family planning. The second subject concerns analysis of the employment composition, and will be analysed in chapter seven assisted, also, by two formats of questionnaire concerning Gazan workers in Israel, and Gazan employees in the Arab and non-Arab countries.

Theoretically, there are three major methods which can be utilised to elicit information from respondents: personal interviews, a postal questionnaire and a telephone survey (Nachmias, D. and Nachmias, C. 1981). In this study, personal interviews with heads of households and wives (wives were only interviewed in the fertility, mortality and family planning survey) have been used. In addition, postal questionnaires have been used in this study and restricted to one question concerning salaries of Gazan workers in the Arab countries, since there was no chance to have direct contact with them in the Strip, particularly when most of them were likely to be at their jobs at the time the survey was conducted. The survey procedure for each format of questionnaire is explained separately in chapter five.

CHAPTER FIVE
The Survey and Methods

"Carrying out research in the occupied territories has been likened to conducting an investigation, due to the population's extreme reluctance to disclose information that could be used against them. People in Gaza were suspicious, and material was collected only after a very slow courting of their trust. Some questions, especially those concerning salaries and employment inside Israel, could not always be broached since people feared the information would be reported to the Israeli Labour Office" (Rockwell, 1985).

In spite of the above-mentioned difficulties, most of the contacted respondents were willing to be interviewed. A few of them refused to be engaged in the survey. These difficulties have been successfully solved, partly because the research is one of the Strip's population which led to a full co-operation and welcome from the contacted respondents, and partly because the researcher had the benefit of his job as a lecturer of geography in the Islamic University of Gaza, where a number of students were enlisted to help in the survey process.

The 1985 survey was coincident with the new security crackdown imposed by the Israeli military authorities against the Strip population in August 1985, when the iron fist policy was re-introduced. This authorized the Israeli military governor to arrest anybody without trial (administrative detention) or to eject anybody outside the Gaza Strip. At the same time, the Israeli Army launched a bitter campaign against the Gazan people. Hirst (1985) reported that the Israeli army began its security crackdown in Gaza. In addition to their standard practice of thrusting people, hands up, against a wall with insults or forcing them face down on the asphalt, troops on stepped-up patrols have developed a technique which can be only intended to humiliate.

Owing to the above-mentioned difficulties which took place throughout the time of conducting the survey, the researcher decided to reduce travelling between the Strip's localities as much as possible to keep himself away from the military roadblocks, in order to prevent possible confiscation of questionnaires which may be considered by the Israelis as illegal work.

The university students' assistance in the questionning process led to a full co-operation from the interviewed respondents. Also some benefits resulted from their help in this study. First, the researcher's problem of travelling between the Strip's localities was reduced. Secondly, the respondents disclosed accurate answers, particularly when they were interviewed by persons well-known to them, which resulted in courting their trust. Thirdly, the survey was completed in a relatively short time, with the interviewing process and computer analysis of the collected data being accomplished in 4 months.

Prior to the administration of the survey, the interviewers were trained and given instruction by the author in order to achieve the desirable goals of the survey. The interviewers benefitted from the questionnaire layout which was determined by the need for speed of interviewing, for one item to lead logically to the next, and for easy filling in of questionnaires. Furthermore, three days before starting interviewing, a random cluster were selected for a sample study to examine the ability of respondents to answer the questions, and to provide more chance for the engaged students to build up practical experience on the nature of the survey.

Four formats of questionnaire were employed as the tool in this study, of which three were distributed across the Strip: a questionnaire on population structure, one dealing with Gazan workers in Israel, and one concerning Gazan employees in the Arab and non-Arab countries. In the aforesaid questionnaire, Gaza University students participated in interviewing respondents across the Strip, and each one of them had the three formats of questionnaire. On the other hand, the 4th format of questionnaire on fertility, mortality, and family planning was restricted to interviewing respondents from Khan Yunis area as a case study, and was managed by the researcher himself and six other persons from the Khan Yunis area.

Throughout the survey care was taken to ensure that the population sample was made up entirely of the Strip population, and results derived from it can be generalized and considered as the characteristics of the Strip's population as a whole.

The sample selection for all questionnaires was based on a random method, particularly when the residential areas had been chosen as a basis of this study. Then all the eligible surrounding respondents were taken as clusters and interviewed.

Details follow about the four questionnaires.

5.1 The Survey of Population Structure

The only data to hand concerning the Gazan population age structure is the Israeli census of September 1967 which was conducted by the Israeli army three months after the war of June 1967. The population age structure was divided into five age groups, and presented in absolute numbers for each locality. Since then, the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics has published an annual estimate covering the Strip's population age-sex structure as a whole, and the population has been divided into quinquennial age-sex groups.

Since there are no locality data for the Gazan population structure in general and population age-sex structure in particular, a sample survey has been carried out in 1985 with this object.

The purpose of the sample survey of population structure was to collect the necessary data concerning the population age-sex structure of the Strip's localities considering each one separately. It also aimed to examine possible spatial differences in the age-sex structure between the residents of cities, refugee camps, and villages. The survey focused particularly on measuring the impact of the 1967 war on the population age-sex structure in order to ascertain some of the consequences of emigration from the Strip.

This enabled a comparison to be made between the age-sex structure of the population in 1967 and in 1985, which helped in identifying the impact of the war, and in examining the role of natural increase in compensating for the loss in the Strip's population.

5.1.1 The Sample Coverage

The sample survey covers all those households selected from different quarters and blocks within the boundaries of 21 Gazan localities. These

localities can be classified as: 4 cities, 8 refugee camps, and 9 villages. The term "household" is used here to describe a person or group of people living in one house of which the members share their food and other like requirements. The members may consist of parents, grandfather, grandmother, children, married sons and their families, and any other relatives who are living with the family.

It was decided to take 1200 households from the Gaza Strip as a sample to examine the population structure in general and age-sex structure in particular. In the final form this covered 1149 households, encompassing 10,044 persons who represent about 2% of the Strip's total population (Table 5.1), and about 95.8% of the contacted households were successfully interviewed.

5.1.2 The Questionnaire

The questionnaire concentrated on the population structure, namely age, sex, marital status, occupation, employment, place of work, education level and literacy (see Appendix 3). These characteristics have been greatly affected by the abnormal population growth of the Gaza Strip since 1948 (see Chapter two).

The population growth of Gaza Strip was greatly affected by the influx of Palestinian refugees in the Strip in 1948 and by the displacement from the Strip after the 1967 war. There is no doubt that the political situation of the Gaza Strip, which has orientated population movements in the last forty years, had a great impact on population structure, particularly age-sex, occupation, employment and place of work. Therefore, it was obviously essential to deal with these characteristics.

On 10 October 1985, a pilot survey was conducted by the researcher himself to test the questionnaire. Ten households from Khan Yunis refugee camp were interviewed. The pilot led to one modification in the questionnaire. A new format of questionnaire concerning Gazan workers in the Arab and non-Arab countries was added to complete the gap of "place of work" question in the population structure questionnaire (Appendix 3). This addition was proved necessary by the fact that a significant part of

Table 5.1 Selected Clusters and Households in Each Locality for the 1985 Sample Survey of the Gaza Strip Population Structure

Locality	Sample Households	No. of People	No. of Clusters
Gazan cities:			
Gaza	135	1107	7
Khan Yunis	82	766	4
Deir el Balah	50	395	2
Rafah	60	575	3
Total	327	2843	16
Gazan Refugee Camps:			
Rafah	73	652	4
Khan Yunis	63	592	5
Deir el Balah	37	344	3
Mughazi	45	395	3
Bureij	51	404	2
Nuseirat	59	495	3
Beach	70	625	4
Jabalya	61	611	4
Total	459	4118	28
Gazan villages:			
Jabalya-Nazla	43	395	2
Beit Lahiya	45	329	2
Beit Hanun	58	504	3
Zawaida	52	410	2
Bani Suheila	43	351	2
Abasan el Kabira	24	232	2
Abasan el Saghira	28	246	2
Ikhza'a	30	247	1
Qarara	46	369	2
Total	363	3083	18
Gaza Strip as a whole	1149	10044	62

the Gazan labour force, specifically the more highly educated people, were employed in the Arab states.

5.1.3 Sample Selection

The most important criterion in sample choosing, in view of the purpose of the survey, was to achieve an equal representation of the population. Consequently, it was decided to select a reasonable sample entirely representing the Strip population, but which did not conflict with the savage political condition in the Strip, or with the researcher's financial problems. Hence, the sample has been selected randomly from 21 localities in order to gather reasonable statistics concerning the population structure of the Gaza Strip, and to provide credible results.

The Gaza Strip localities are divided into quarters in the cities, blocks in the refugee camps, and into streets in the villages. But due to the incomplete housing numbers, and to the bitter political situations of the Strip at the time of survey, it was thought very difficult to follow a systematic method in selecting the sample across the Strip.

The problem could not be circumvented because the political and financial constraints militated against it. The Israeli intelligence and army campaign against the residents, and the re-introduction of the law of emergency produced a tense atmosphere in all the Gaza Strip's localities. Consequently, although the campaign might have made the survey impossible, it appeared best to complete the main task as fast as possible. So the researcher used his extensive personal experience of the Gaza Strip as a resident to deal with the aforesaid difficulties.

Therefore, the sample was chosen at random in the first stage, particularly when the first households in each stratum had been selected from each locality, and interviewing began on the basis of questioning all the surrounding households as a cluster in the second stage. This was intended to produce a wide representation of the sample and aimed to minimize biasing errors as well.

Consequently, a relatively small sample was selected randomly across the Strip. 16 clusters were chosen from the Gazan cities, 28 clusters from refugee camps, and 18 clusters from Gazan villages, giving a total

of 62 clusters to give a good spatial spread and a reasonable representation of the Strip's population. Also, the number of selected clusters varied from 7 clusters covering 135 households in Gaza city to 1 cluster encompassing only 30 households in Ikhza'a village. Table 5.1 summarises the magnitude of household clusters, and the people included in the sample survey in each locality.

Overall co-operation from the sampled population was excellent, there being very few who refused to be engaged in the interviewing, and then they were followed by their neighbours. The fact that Gazan University students were actively involved in the survey clearly minimized the population's suspicions.

5.1.4 Interviewing

Since the volume of work needed more than one interviewer, the researcher received significant assistance from the students of geography in the Islamic University of Gaza, where numbers varied from four interviewers in Gaza city to one interviewer in Ikhza'a village.

The survey began on 15 October and continued until 30 November 1985. Interviews were conducted in the selected blocks and quarters on Friday and Saturday afternoons, and between 6 p.m. and 8 p.m. each evening in the other days, specifically, when household-heads were most likely to be at home. The interviewers (including the researcher) scattered into groups, each operating in a different locality, and within each locality, each interviewer operating in a different residential block. The questionnaire was addressed to the household-heads and answers were derived from what is written on their identity cards and from the household member's birth certificates. During the interview most of the contacted respondents were co-operative, and the questionnaires were checked by the researcher directly after interviewing.

Through the interviewing process, another pilot survey was conducted by the researcher to examine the questionnaires accuracy of completion. Between 6 and 10 households from 22 localities were interviewed. As a result, 51 questionnaires of the sample were suspected because they were incomplete or respondents gave inaccurate answers. Consequently, the total number of effective responses was 1,149 households.

5.2 The Survey of Fertility, Mortality and Family Planning

The principal objective of this survey which was conducted by the researcher in Khan Yunis area (Gaza Strip) between 25 October - 10 November 1985, was to analyse the effect of the three variables of fertility, mortality, and family planning on the population age structure, specifically their impact on the age group of young people (0-14), so that data derived from the survey appeared to be acceptable for the purpose of studying retrospective fertility and mortality ratios in general, and infant and childhood mortality in particular. Moreover, womens' attitude toward family planning was engaged as a new variable in this study in order to examine its impact on population age structure.

In a nutshell, widespread knowledge and use of contraception for the sake of achieving birth control or achieving birth spacing should have led to a reduction in the percentage of young people and vice versa. Consequently, four questions have been added to the questionnaire to elicit the fertility behaviour of Gazan couples and their attitude towards contraceptive use.

This framework can be considered as a new field for population geographers. Fuller (1984) underlined that the number of geographers engaged in family planning research are few in number and widely scattered. He asked for a greater recognition and support from the specialized organization of population studies in order to have a high quality of research and to have greater impact on the problem.

Khan Yunis area, the second largest population concentration in the Gaza Strip, was chosen as the survey site because it is characterized by the following points:

(a) It has the largest concentration of villages in the Gaza Strip - 5 villages out of the 9 villages of the Gaza Strip - which enabled a good representation of the Strip's rural society in the survey.
(b) the population characterized as average standard of living of the Gaza Strip as well as the socio-economic, political and religious conditions.
(c) The survey included some sensitive questions, especially the last 4 questions (Appendix 4) which were designed to discover women's attitude

toward knowledge and use of contraception, and required direct contact with females which contradicts with the traditions of Gazan society. Khan Yunis area provided a reasonable solution for this problem, because the researcher has extensive personal knowledge of the area as a resident in Khan Yunis refugee camp, and gained full co-operation from the wives contacted.

5.2.1 The Survey Coverage

The sample survey of fertility, mortality, and family planning covers all those married wives selected from different places within the boundaries of 7 localities in Khan Yunis area : 1 city, 1 refugee camp, and 5 villages (Table 5.2).

It covered 235 currently married women of child-bearing age, between 15 and 49 years old, who gave definite answers to the questionnaire. The spatial distribution of contacted women was 90 women from Khan Yunis city, 85 from Khan Yunis refugee camp, and 60 from Khan Yunis villages. The 235 married women have had 1,559 births throughout their marriage, of whom 1,372 children are still alive.

5.2.2 The Questionnaire

The questionnaire consisted of 17 questions aimed in broad terms to identify four objectives as follows:

1) questions designed to identify the fertility trends in Khan Yunis area during 1950-1985;
2) questions designed to identify the mortality rates in general and infant and childhood mortality rates in particular during the aforesaid period;
3) questions designed to investigate women's attitude toward family planning, the extent of their knowledge and use of contraception, the effect, if any, of contraception use on fertility; obstacles of using contraception; and to test their future attitudes toward contraceptive-use; and
4) questions designed to test the relationship between the educational level and residential place of husbands and wives with fertility, mortality, and use of contraception.

Table 5.2 Selected Clusters and Respondents of Currently Married Women by Population Community for the 1985 Sample Survey of Fertility, Mortality and Family Planning, Khan Yunis Area.

Locality	No. of respondents	% of total	No. of clusters
Khan Yunis city	90	38.3	7
Khan Yunis refugee camp	85	36.2	6
Khan Yunis villages:			
Bani Suheila	16	6.8	2
Abasan el Kabira	14	5.95	2
Abasan el Saghira	10	4.25	2
Ikhza'a	5	2.1	1
Qarara	15	6.4	2
Total of Khan Yunis villages	60	25.5	9
	235	100.0	22

5.2.3 Sample Selection

Khan Yunis area was recommended as the survey site because of its proximity to the researcher's accommodation in Khan Yunis refugee camp. Its population was estimated to about 103,000 as at June 30 1985. Roughly 47,000 (45.6%) lived in Khan Yunis city, 32,000 (31.1%) in Khan Yunis refugee camp, and 24,000 (23.3%) in the 5 Khan Yunis villages of Bani Suheila, Abasan el Kabira, Abasan el Saghira, Ikhza'a, and Qarara.

It was decided originally to take a large sample, but due to the limited financial facilities and political problems, the number of respondents was restricted to 235, sampled to represent the three Khan Yunis communities (city dwellers, refugees, villagers) according to their proportion of the total. Table 5.2 shows that 38.3% of the total contacted respondents were chosen from Khan Yunis city, 36.2% from Khan

Yunis refugee camp and 25.5% from Khan Yunis villages, so the representation is nearly similar to that of the communities' populations.

The sample selection was based on a random method, and the selected samples were interviewed individually. 7 clusters were chosen from Khan Yunis city, 6 clusters from Khan Yunis refugee camp, and 9 clusters from Khan Yunis villages, a total of 22 (Table 5.2). Throughout the sample selection, care was taken to ensure that the sample was representative entirely of Khan Yunis area wives and then Gaza Strip wives as a whole. On the other hand, sample selection from the three communities of Khan Yunis area should enable us to make a comparison between their observed results.

An individual questionnaire was addressed to each married woman 15-49 years who was interviewed. Also the duration of marriage of the selected women varied from less than 5 years to more than 30 years. At the Khan Yunis area level of analysis, 34 married women who had been married for more than 30 years were included in the survey, to find out what the completed fertility of Gazan women was.

5.2.4 Interviewing

Since the nature of the survey was very sensitive, requiring the interviewing of married women, the researcher was assisted by 6 interviewers from the Khan Yunis, 3 males and 3 females.

It was thought possible to carry out the survey in the morning or afternoon since women's involvement in non-domestic work was very low, but later this was ruled out because the traditions of Gazan Society forbid direct contact with females without the presence of their husbands or relatives. Consequently, interviews were carried out between 6 p.m. and 8 p.m. each evening, when husbands were likely to be at home. The 7 interviewers (including the researcher) split into three groups working in a different locality, each group including 2 interviewers, one male and one female, the first group operating in Khan Yunis refugee camp, the second in Khan Yunis city, and the third in Khan Yunis villages. The researcher's work was concentrated mainly on interviewing respondents from both Khan Yunis refugee camp and Khan Yunis city, and in supervising the

three groups of interviewers. Here, it is very important to mention that the interviewers operated in a different residential blocks within each locality.

The questionnaire was administered to the married wives, who answered solely on the basis of the situation throughout her period of marriage. One difficulty arose with regard to women's knowledge and use of contraception. A significant proportion of the contacted women were reluctant to answer these questions, partly because they considered them as a familial matter and that their attitudes should be kept confidential, and partly because the question had some political, religious and social overtones, and their answers might have disturbed their family life or caused problems with the Israeli occupying authority. But this problem was solved when a guarantee was given to the interviewed wives that their names and the numbers of their houses would not be reported.

In short, all of the contacted respondents were co-operative, and the questionnaires were filled in correctly and completely.

5.3 Survey of Gazan Workers in Israel

Owing to unavailability of data concerning conditions of work of Gazan workers in Israel, a personal survey was carried out between 15 October and 15 November 1985. It focused on identifying the main working sectors enlisting Gazan workers, and on naming and ranking the favourite places of work for them. In addition, the survey aimed to assess whether there was a relationship between the income value and the place of work.

The importance of the survey can be derived from the fact that a significant proportion of Gaza's labour force is working in Israel, and their numbers have been growing since the Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip in 1967. For instance, about 10% (5350 workers) of the total labour force of the Strip worked in Israel in 1970, while the proportion had gone up dramatically to 46.1% (40,200 workers) by the end of 1984. Since little is known about them, it is very important to deal with this subject in order to achieve the desired aims.

5.3.1 The Sample Coverage

Gazan workers in Israel have been taken as a case study in order to underline their work conditions in the Israeli economic sector. The sample includes those who were employed by the Labour Office (legal workers) as well as the illegal labourers. Hence, 300 workers were selected across the Gaza Strip: 120 from the northern zone, 70 from the central zone, and 110 from the southern zone.

5.3.2 The Questionnaire

The questionnaire concerning Gazan workers in Israel, which can be found in Appendix 5, consisted of 15 questions designed to obtain the necessary data on Gazan workers in Israel. In broad terms the questions are of four kinds:

(a) those designed to derive the characteristics of the Gazan workers in Israel, like their population status (refugee or indigenous), sex, marital status, age, and level of education;
(b) those designed to identify the major places and types of work for the Gazan workers in Israel and their worktrip destinations, so as to compute the daily worktrip distance from home to work;
(c) those designed to test the magnitude of legal and illegal workforce and to know why the illegal workers refused to be employed by the labour office; and
(d) those designed to obtain information about the net income and number of days worked per month.

5.3.3 Sample Selection

As mentioned before, the University students who assisted in questioning respondents across the Gaza Strip were provided with three formats of questionnaire concerning population structure, workers in Israel, and Gazan employees in the Arab and non-Arab countries. Instructions were given to them before the beginning of interviewing respondents to fill in the three formats of questionnaire when eligible respondents were found.

Consequently, the task began with the filling in of the questionnaire on population structure in the first stage. But when the contacted respondents were asked the question concerning their place of work (see Appendix 3) and they gave an answer indicating that they or their family members are working in Israel or in the Arab and non-Arab countries, then they were asked to answer questions on one of the other two formats of questionnaire. Hence, we can conclude that the sample was based on the random method which was explained before.

5.3.4 Interviewing

The questionnaire was administered to the Gazan workers, who answered solely on the basis of their work conditions in Israel. The sample covered both males and females who were working in Israel at the time of survey; 53 (17.7%) respondents out of the 300 sampled respondents were females.

250 respondents were interviewed in their houses by the university students and the researcher, across the Gaza Strip, while the remaining 50 respondents were selected randomly from the workers congregating in Al-Shuja'aya square of Gaza city (see Plate 7.1) and then interviewed by the researcher himself. The researcher made two separate visits to "Al-Shuja'aya" (some Israelis and Palestinians call the place an "Arab slave market") from dawn onwards in order to interview them. Meanwhile, it is very important to mention that the workers gave accurate answers for the questions including particularly those concerning income and the average number of days worked per month in Israel. This outcome was concluded when the questionnaire were checked by the researcher directly after interviewing, and results were compared with the researcher's experience of workers' in Israel.

Finally, during the interviews just 2 female respondents decided to give up the interview when they were asked about their monthly income, because they thought that the researcher was an Israeli Labour Office employee. They thought that this information would be reported to the office and that they would be enforced to pay the Value Added Tax (VAT). Hence these 2 respondents were replaced by another 2.

In conclusion, most of the selected sample were successfully interviewed, and the 300 questionnaires were filled in correctly and completely.

5.4 Survey on the Gazan Employees in the Arab and Non-Arab Countries

In the absence of any information about Gazan employees in the Arab and non-Arab countries, a pioneer survey was conducted by the researcher across the Gaza Strip. The prime purpose of the survey was to underline the main characteristics of those employees since their emigration was largely unplanned, unregulated and unexamined. Who are the migrant workers - where do they go, what do they earn, and what are the effects of migration on the Gaza Strip? The 1985 survey should answer these questions.

5.4.1 The Questionnaire

The questionnaire formulated 6 questions (Appendix 6) which can be categorized in three types:

(a) those to determine the characteristics of Gazan workers such as sex, marital status, and family size;
(b) those to identify the main activities in which they are employed; and
(c) those to identify their destinations.

In addition, there was another question concerning their earnings but this was not included in the questionnaire since it was completed by the workers' relatives. From Durham, several letters were mailed in order to collect answers from the workers themselves concerning their salaries, and this attempt has succeeded.

5.4.2 The Sample Coverage

The sample covers all those workers selected across the Gaza Strip. The term "worker" is recommended to be used here to describe a worker who was working in the Arab and non-Arab countries at the time of survey, including a single, married, divorced, or widowed person. The survey covered 550 respondents, of which 102 were single, 2 widowed, 1 divorced and 445 married.

5.4.3 Sample Selection

The same method of sample selection which was practised in the former surveys was used, then the sample was based on a random method. The questionnaire was distributed across the Gaza Strip, and results derived from it generalized to represent the Gaza Strip migrant workers. Meanwhile, it is very important to mention here that this format of questionnaire was distributed throughout Khan Yunis refugee camp and Al-Amal rehousing project when the survey of the housing problem in the refugee camps and refugee rehousing projects was conducted. Also, in many cases, 3 copies of the questionnaire were filled in by a household since 3 members of the household had been found working as migrant workers in the Arab and non-Arab countries. This situation led to the accomplishment of the work in a relatively short time.

To sum up, the sample covered 550 respondents across the Strip which suggests an excellent spatial spread and a good representation of the Strip's migrant workers.

5.4.4 Interviewing

The survey was started on 15 October and carried on until 20 November 1985. The questionnaire was administered to Gazan migrant workers and answers were collected from their relatives on behalf of them since the desired information can easily be answered. There was an individual questionnaire for each respondent, and the contacted respondents were successfully interviewed by the researcher and the university students. The same steps of interviewing which were followed in the former questionnaires have been practised here.

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CHAPTER SIX
Analysis of Age and Sex Structure of the Population

This chapter aims to play a role in expressing the general features of the age-sex structure of the population of the Gaza Strip, as well as analysing the age structure index and sex ratio. Further to this, it is very important to examine the impact of the 1967 war on the population age-sex structure, and to what extent the population phenomenon was influenced by the war. Moreover, it is essential to explore the probability of the existence of a significant relationship between the youthful structure of the population and socio-political factors. In fact, these issues cannot easily be analysed but an attempt will be made to deal with them.

6.1 Youthfulness of the Population

The population of the Gaza Strip, like most of the Arab and Moslem countries, is very young, and as may be known, the age structure of any population is the outcome of three basic variables, specifically fertility, mortality and migration. These three variables have played a significant role in shifting the age and sex structure of the Strip's population since 1967. Out-migration significantly influenced the population structure between 1967 and 1968, while fertility and mortality eventually contributed their significant effects later.

As demonstrated by the age and sex pyramids (Fig. 6.1), which reveal a broad base typifying the experience of most third-world, the population of the Gaza Strip is distinguished by a notable youthfulness. In 1985, 46.6% of the total sample population were under 15 years of age, and the percentage of adults (15-64) is 51.0%, while the aged (65+) accounted for only 2.4%. The comparable percentages at the 1967 Israeli census of the Gaza Strip were 50.6%, 44.6% and 4.8%, indicating a significant decline in the percentage of young people (less than 15 years) and the aged (65+) and a rise in the percentage of adults by 6.4% between 1967 and 1985, from 44.6% to 51.0% respectively (Table 6.1).

The shifting of the Gaza Strip age structure is attributed to out-migration from the Strip after the 1967 war. Nevertheless, both the 1967 census and 1985 sample survey revealed high percentages under 15


Cities
Refugee Camps
Villages
N
0
Miles
5
0
2
4
6
Kilometres
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
Jabalya Camp
Beit Lahiya
Jabalya – Nazla
Beach Camp
Gaza
Beit Hanun
Nuseirat Camp
Bureij Camp
Zawaida
Deir el Balah Camp
Deir el Balah
Mughazi Camp
Qarara
Khan Yunis Camp
Bani Suheila
Abasan el Saghira
Khan Yunis
Rafah Camp
Abasan el Kabira
Ikhza'a
Rafah
SINAI
(EGYPT)
AD
FIG·6·1 AGE PYRAMIDS OF THE GAZA STRIP POPULATION AS AT 1985*
Gaza Strip as a Whole
AGE
60
50
40
30
20
10
MALES
FEMALES
Percentage of Total Population
*1985 Survey Data.

Table 6.1 Age-Sex Composition of the Main Groups of the Population of the Gaza Strip in 1967 and 1985

The 1967 Census (1)

Locality	Age Group	Numbers			Percentage			Sex Ratio males per 1000 Females	Age Index
		Males	Females	Total	Males	Females	Total		
Cities	Less than 15	35497	32235	67732	25.7	23.4	49.1	1101	
	15 - 64	28766	35032	63798	20.8	25.4	46.2	821	
	65 and over	3529	2961	6490	2.6	2.1	4.7	1192	
	Total	67792	70228	138020	49.1	50.9	100.0	965	9.6
Refugee Camps	Less than 15	46138	42396	88534	26.9	24.8	51.7	1088	
	15 - 64	31278	43251	74529	18.3	25.3	43.6	723	
	65 and over	4140	3950	8090	2.4	2.3	4.7	1048	
	Total	81556	89597	171153	47.6	52.4	100.0	910	9.1
Villages	Less than 15	11117	10062	21179	26.7	24.1	50.8	1105	
	15 - 64	8053	10144	18197	19.3	24.4	43.7	794	
	65 and over	1251	1038	2289	3.0	2.5	5.5	1205	
	Total	20421	21244	41665	49.0	51.0	100.0	961	10.8
Gaza Strip	Less than 15	92752	84693	177445	26.4	24.2	50.6	1095	
as a whole	15 - 64	68097	88427	156524	19.4	25.2	44.6	770	
	65 and over	8920	7949	16869	2.5	2.3	4.8	1122	
	Grand Total	169769	181069	350838	48.3	51.7	100.0	938	9.5
1985 Sample Survey (2)									
Cities	Less than 15	634	635	1269	22.3	22.3	44.6	998	
	15 - 64	756	752	1508	26.6	26.5	53.1	1005	
	65 and over	31	35	66	1.1	1.2	2.3	886	
	Total	1421	1422	2843	50.0	50.0	100.0	999	5.2
Refugee Camps	Less than 15	1019	967	1986	24.7	23.5	48.2	1054	
	15 - 64	1012	1019	2031	24.6	24.7	49.3	993	
	65 and over	45	56	101	1.1	1.4	2.5	804	
	Total	2076	2042	4118	50.4	49.6	100.0	1017	5.1
Villages	Less than 15	697	727	1424	22.6	23.6	46.2	959	
	15 - 64	798	787	1585	25.9	25.5	51.4	1014	
	65 and over	34	40	74	1.1	1.3	2.4	850	
	Total	1529	1554	3083	49.6	50.4	100.0	984	5.2
Gaza Strip	Less than 15	2350	2329	4679	23.4	23.2	46.6	1009	
as a whole	15 - 64	2566	2558	5124	25.5	25.5	51.0	1003	
	65 and over	110	131	241	1.1	1.3	2.4	840	
	Grand Total	5026	5018	10044	50.04	49.96	100.0	1002	5.15

Sources : (1) Central Bureau of Statistics, 1967.
(2) The 1985 Sample Survey.

years of age, not only as a direct result of rapid population growth dominated by a high fertility, but also as the output of a rapid decline in mortality.

However, the 1985 figure of 46.6% of the total population being under 15 years of age is 1.1% lower than the official Israeli figure reported in 1984, and also 2.1% lower than the 1983 figure (Central Bureau of Statistics, 1984 and 1985). It appears that the percentage of young people is going down towards stability after the removal of the massive emigration factor. In addition, the percentage of aged people has been diminishing from 2.8% in 1983, to 2.7% in 1984, and to 2.4% in the 1985 survey. On the other hand, the percentage of adults has been increasing from 48.6% in 1983 to 49.6% in 1984, and to 51% in 1985 survey.

The 1985 age composition survey indicates that there were slight but significant variations between the refugee camp's inhabitants and the Strip's as a whole. The population of the refugee camps was significantly younger (48.2% under 15 years) than that of the Strip (46.6%), and slightly higher by 0.1% in elderly folk. This may reflect a higher birth rate in the refugee camps (see Table 6.2). On the other hand, the proportion of adult city dwellers was 53.1% and slightly above the Strip average (51.0%), while the percentage of aged and young people were lower by 0.1% and 2% than the Strip's average respectively (see Table 6.1). Also, the villages' population age structure and the Strip's as a whole indicate fairly similar results with a small variation of 0.4% lower than the average for young people and 0.4% higher in the adult people, while the percentages of aged were similar (Table 6.1).

A comparative study between the refugee camp inhabitants, city dwellers and village residents age structure in the 1967 census and the 1985 sample survey shows that the proportions of the young and aged people are decreasing in the three population groups, while the adult percentages are increasing (Table 6.1).

Furthermore, the youthfulness of the population can be noted from the higher percentage of the population being under 30 years of age, which amounted to 76.3% in the 1985 survey. This implies a population of high fecundity; 40.7% of the Strip's females are of child-bearing age 15-44

years (The percentage of females of child-bearing age was accounted as 36.1% in 1982, 39.6% in 1983, and 40.8% in 1984 according to the official figures).

From the above discussion, the age structure of the Gaza Strip population is very young, and it is now necessary to identify the reasons for this situation.

6.1.1 Changing Levels of Fertility and Mortality

Overall fertility rates of the Gaza Strip population are very high, and they have registered continuous increases from 42.0 per thousand in 1968, to 48.2 per thousand in 1978 (Table 2.6, Chapter two), to 48.3 per thousand in 1984. While the CDR dramatically declined from 19.5 per thousand to 11.2 per thousand, and closed at 8.0 per thousand for the same period respectively. These trends are confirmed by the data collected in the 1985 survey, which shows a very high child/woman ratio*. This ratio was calculated as 836 children per 1,000 women in the Gaza Strip as a whole. Furthermore, the survey concluded that the overall child/women ratios in the Strip's refugee camps, cities, and villages are all very high - 891, 744 and 857 respectively. Consequently, we can generalize that the overall fertility of the three aforesaid groups show no major differences.

Table 6.2 shows that the fertility (the number of live births per 1000 women) of Khan Yunis camp for each five-year cohort of marriage duration is greater than that of Khan Yunis city and Khan Yunis villages, particularly in the cohorts of 15 years and over. Furthermore, Gazan women have one of the highest average fertility rates in the world. Cumulative fertility of married women is 6.6 live births per woman by the time they have lived roughly one-third of their reproductive married lives. Completed fertility of older cohorts (30 years of marriage and over) is extremely high, where it reached about 10.5 live births per married woman (Table 6.2). This outcome has been supported by Friedlander, Eisenbach, and Goldscheider (1979) when they concluded that the completed fertility amounted to 9 to 10 births per married woman in the Administered Areas (The West Bank and the Gaza Strip).

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* Child/Woman Ratio = $\frac{\text{No. of children under 5 years}}{\text{No. of women 15-44 years}} \times 1000$

Table 6.2 Cumulative Fertility of Currently Married Women in Khan Yunis City, Khan Yunis Refugee Camp, Khan Yunis Villages, and Khan Yunis Area by Years of Marriage, 1985

Years of marriage	Live births per 1000 women			
	Khan Yunis City	Khan Yunis refugee camp	Khan Yunis villages	Khan Yunis area as a whole
5	38 (18) 2,111	37 (16) 2,312	43 (14) 3,071	118 (48) 2,458
5 - 9	85 (20) 4,250	45 (12) 3,750	65 (14) 4,643	195 (46) 4,239
10 - 14	105 (15) 7,000	135 (21) 6,428	42 (6) 7,000	282 (42) 6,714
15 - 19	57 (6) 9,500	76 (9) 8,444	73 (10) 7,300	206 (25) 8,240
20 - 24	84 (9) 9,333	58 (6) 9,667	45 (5) 9,000	187 (20) 9,350
25 - 29	75 (8) 9,375	125 (11) 11,136	13 (1) 13,000	213 (20) 10,650
30+	134 (14) 9,571	106 (10) 10,600	118 (10) 11,800	358 (34) 10,529
Total No. of births Total No. of women Overall mean	578 (90) 6,422	582 (85) 6,847	399 (60) 6,650	1559 (235) 6,634

Source : The 1985 Sample Survey

6.1.2 Decline of Infant and Childhood Mortality

Since the Israeli occupation of 1967, data on mortality levels for the Strip can be gathered from three sources : Israeli official statistics, UNRWA, and the Palestine Liberation Organization, each of which has its own version. If the publications of these sources are compared, contradictions in the results can be detected between them. Meanwhile "it should be stated that infant mortality figures that have been published by both Israeli and Palestinian sources represent only estimates of reality. The reason is simply that birth and death registration in the occupied territories is incomplete and defective. This fact is well known and accepted by those working within the military government's health apparatus and the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics" (Giacaman, 1983).

Based on the Israeli-published health statistics, infant mortality rates in the Gaza Strip dropped sharply from 67.1 per thousand in 1974 to 43.5 per thousand in 1982, and then reached 38.6 per thousand in 1983 (Ministry of Health of Israel, 1985). On the other hand, figures derived from surveys carried out by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics put IMRs in the Strip at higher levels, estimated to be 100 per thousand in the mid-seventies and recently re-estimated at around 70 per thousand for the early 1980s (Gabriel and Sabatello, 1986).

Taking UNRWA published figures into account (UNRWA provides free primary health care to the refugee population), IMRs in the refugee camps are higher than those reported by the Israeli Ministry of Health for the Strip as a whole. Based on reported deaths from Bureij refugee camp 1975-1984, Dr. Geniena - 1975-82 - concluded that IMRS were 92 per thousand in 1975, 88 per thousand in 1980, and 65 per thousand in 1982. Moreover, Dr. El-Alem's (UNRWA Field Preventive Medicine Officer) figures display IMRs of 50 per thousand in 1983, and 46 per thousand in 1984 for the same camp (El-Alem, 1986).

It can be concluded that the 1983 figure of 38.6 per thousand published by the Ministry of Health of Israeli is clearly lower than those calculated by Drs. Geniena, El-Alem and the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics. This difference may be attributed either to errors in calculating IMRS, or sampling biases, or to modification in the Israeli

Ministry of Health published figures since IMRS have been considered as an indicator of the standard of Health Services in the Strip.

In fact, there are no reliable figures on infant and childhood mortality in the Gaza Strip. However, in the early 1970s, IMRS in the Gaza Strip were about 130 per thousand. Furthermore, some child mortality measures for UNRWA refugee camps in the Gaza Strip revealed mortality rates of 98 per thousand in 1967-69 and 69 per thousand in 1970-72 (Hill, 1983).

To provide recent estimates of child mortality in the Gaza Strip, a sample survey was conducted in Khan Yunis area in 1985 and interviewing was restricted only to currently married women, aiming to match the method of estimating child mortality from data on children ever born and surviving, classified by marriage duration of mothers. It should be noted that data are often only tabulated for groups of marriage durations of 15-19 or 20-24 years and must span exactly five years. In this method data referring to an open-ended duration interval should not be used to estimate child mortality. Consequently, Khan Yunis area's data classified by duration of marriage can be seen in Table 6.3.

Table 6.3 Children Ever Born and Children Dead, and Marriage Duration of Mother : Khan Yunis Area, 1985

Marriage duration	Currently Married Women	Children Ever born	Children Dead
0 - 4	48	118	13
5 - 9	46	195	21
10 - 14	42	282	26
15 - 19	25	206	27
20 - 24	20	187	30
Total	181	988	117

Source : The 1985 Sample Survey.

In this study, "the Brass* technique of estimating child mortality from data on children ever born and children surviving classified by age of mother has been applied to estimate child mortality. According to the Brass technique, child mortality can be estimated from proportions dead D(i) among children ever born to women in successive five-year age groups. He developed a set of multipliers k(i) to convert observed values of D(i) into estimates q(x) (the probability of dying between birth and exact age x), the multipliers being selected according to the value of P_1/P_2 - a good indicator of fertility conditions at young ages - where P(i) is the average parity or average number of children ever born reported by women in an age group (i). Brass estimated the k(i) multipliers by using a third-degree polynomial of fixed shape but variable age location to represent fertility, the logit system generated by the general standard to provide the mortality element, and a growth rate of 2% per annum to generate a stable age distribution for females" (United Nations, 1983 - see footnote).

The estimated infant and childhood mortality rates together with their approximate reference dates (reference date estimates have been calculated by subtracting the t(x) given in column (8) from 1985.92, the average date of the survey) are given in Table 6.4. It is clear that the data appear to be of acceptable quality, where the average parities (column (3)) increase monotonically with duration of marriage. On the other hand, although the proportions of children dead in the duration group 10-14 are too low, which may be resulted from responses error, the general trend of D(i) increased with marital duration. This trend can be easily seen from column (10) where child mortality (5qo or the probability of dying between birth and exact age 5) has been improving slowly. Also, column (11) shows that infant mortality 1qo has been improving slowly in the 9 years preceding the 1985 survey. It is quite clear that the infant mortality figure of 58 per thousand for marriage duration group 10-14 years is spurious and biased downward by poor reporting by mothers coupled with the small sample size. In fact the infant mortality estimates in Table 6.4 display close results to those figures reported in the preceding pages and higher than those official figures published by the Israeli Ministry of Health.

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* For more details on computational procedure see : United Nations (1983) Indirect Techniques for Demographic Estimation, Manual 10, Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, Population Studies No. 81, New York, pp. 73-85.

Table 6.4

Infant and Childhood Mortality Levels Estimated from Proportions of Children Dead, Classified by Mothers' Marriage Duration: Khan Yunis Area, 1985

Marriage duration	Index (i) (1)	Average parity P (i) (2)	Proportion of children dead D (i) (3)	Multipliers * k (i) (4)	Age x (5)	Probabilities of dying ** q (x) (6)	Estimates of reference period before survey t (x) (7)		α(x) (8)	Child Mortality 5qo x 1000 (9)	Infant Mortality 1qo x 1000 (10)	Approximate reference date (11)
0 - 4	1	2.458	0.1102	1.055	2	0.1163	1.62		-0.2988	142	88.5	1984.3
5 - 9	2	4.239	0.1076	0.953	3	0.1026	4.34		-0.3588	113	69.6	1981.6
10 - 14	3	6.714	0.0922	1.028	5	0.0948	6.39		-0.5267	94.8	58	1979.5
15 - 19	4	8.240	0.1311	1.071	10	0.1404	7.68		-0.3562	128.4	80	1978.2
20 - 24	5	9.350	0.1604	1.031	15	0.1653	9.84		-0.2966	142.3	89	1976.1
$\frac{P1}{P2}$								0.5799				
$\frac{P2}{P3}$								0.6314				

* The multipliers have been calculated according to Trussell Variant, West mortality pattern

** The q(x) have been calculated assuming West Model. α for model standards with β = 1

Note: Values of 1qo and 5qo have been estimated by interpolation of the logit in the general standard life table, where logit 1 = -0.8670 and logit 5 = -0.6015. For more details of the logit system see : Brass, W. (1971). On the Scale of Mortality in Brass, W.(ed) Biological Aspects of Demography, Taylor and Francis Ltd., London, pp. 69-110.

In a nutshell, there is a slow but steady improvement in infant and childhood mortality over the 9 years before the 1985 survey (see Fig. 6.2), but the levels are still way above those for Palestinians now living in pre-1967 occupied Palestine. Hill (1983) concluded that infant mortality rates for non-Jews (Palestinians) living in Israel were about 39.5 per thousand in 1975 and 27.4 per thousand in 1978. These low levels may have resulted from their benefitting from the advanced health services provided to residents inside Israel itself.

Another indication of the inaccuracy of the Israeli published IMR of 38.2 per thousand for the Strip in 1983 is seen by comparing it with IMRs in other Arab states. For instance, oil-rich Qatar and UAE had IMRs in mid-1986 estimated to be 38 per thousand and 45 per thousand respectively, and the IMRs of other states in 1986 were in Saudi Arabia : 100 per thousand, Libya : 97 per thousand, Jordan : 63 per thousand and Egypt : 100 per thousand (Population Reference Bureau, 1986).

From the point of view of Gaza's people, health services in the Gaza Strip have deteriorated over the past 20 years of Israeli occupation which has left its impact on levels of mortality in the area. This conclusion can be extrapolated from figures published by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics on the numbers of beds in hospitals. While in 1974 the Gazan people had one hospital bed per 378 persons this ratio dropped to one bed per 560 persons in 1984. Despite the insufficiency of health services in the Strip, which have not begun to approach the standard in Israel itself and even in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, the Gaza Strip has experienced a continuous decline in infant and childhood mortality. This decline can be explained in a number of ways.

Firstly, the population of Gaza Strip has gained advantages from the slight improvement in the health services during the last 15 years, which has resulted from the increasing number of local doctors and nurses, hygiene awareness, and the establishment of infant and childhood health units in the government hospitals and UNRWA clinics. In addition, the Near East Council of Churches runs three mother and child health centres



FIG.6.2 INFANT AND CHILDHOOD MORTALITY RATES : KHAN YUNIS AREA, 1985

in Gaza town, while the Palestinian Red Crescent Society and some small foreign societies are supplementing their services to the people. This has led to a decrease in infant and childhood mortality despite the fact the government hospitals are characterized by a shortage of funds, overcrowding (two people in a bed is not unheard of), understaffing, outdated equipment and a shortage of specialized facilities (Locke and Stewart, 1985).

Secondly, there is increasing incidence of hospital births. The number of hospital deliveries has increased from 13.1% in 1968, to 20.5% in 1975, to 29.4% in 1980, and to 53.6% in 1984, since the Strip's women are following the modern trend of having their babies in hospitals. On the other hand, the training of UNRWA - supervised "dayahs" (traditional mid-wives) has improved and they are qualified by the UNRWA sponsored training courses, since home deliveries are still very common, estimated at 41% in the refugee camps.

Thirdly, the Gaza Strip's housing conditions have been improving over the last 15 years compared with its conditions in the 1950s and 1960s, particularly in the refugee camps and the villages since their connection with water supply and electricity in 1970s and 1980s. Furthermore, there is a modest improvement in the economic situation due to the remittances from Gaza's employees abroad to their relatives, which has led to the improvement in the nutrition state of Gazan people.

Finally, since the 1950s, the Gaza Strip population has had a free educational scheme offered by the Egyptian government and UNRWA (since 1967 the governmental schools have been directed by the Israeli occupation authorities). Consequently, a rapid decrease in illiteracy rates for the Strip's population as a whole and Gazan females in particular has been reported. From the 1985 survey of fertility, mortality, and family planning, it is seen that the percentage of illiterate married men and women decreased from 48.1% and 67.3% in 1960, to 30.7% and 44.7% in 1970, to 17% and 26.2% in 1980, and to 14% and 22.55% in 1985 respectively. On the other hand, the percentage of women in higher education increased from 3.6% in 1960, to 7.8% in 1970, to 12.6% in 1980, and to 15.75% in 1985. Furthermore, the 1985 survey of population structure indicated that 15%, 17.4%, 19.8% and 17.4% of the total population aged 12 years and over of Gazans cities, refugee camps, villages, and the Strip as a whole

respectively were illiterate. This trend of declining illiteracy has helped to reduce infant and childhood mortality during the past 35 years.

Numerous studies indicate that raising the average level of education for women could reduce IM substantially (Population Reports, 1985). The Gaza Strip experience is strongly supporting the aforesaid outcome, as a strong correlation was found between decreasing IMRs and declining female illiteracy. The correlation between the percentage of illiterate women aged 15-49 and the percentage of IMRs of married women for the same age group during 1950-1985 is positive and significant at the level of 5% ($r = 0.77$). Consequently, we may conclude that the formal education of girls corresponds strongly with the decline in the IMRs.

6.1.3 Attitudes toward Family Planning

In this discussion an attempt is made to examine the attitudes of Gaza women towards family planning, and its impact on fertility trends and then on population structure. For this aim, the researcher has employed a survey in order to collect enough information about it, since no data presently at hand would be sufficient to cover the scope of work. The researcher concentrates his attention on analysing the impact of three socio-economic factors determining fertility, namely level of educational attainment of parents, type of place of residence, and female employment. These three factors have attracted the most attention in the research carried out to date (Singh and Casterline, 1985).

6.1.3.1 Characteristics of the Sample Group

A summary description of the status of wives and husbands by selected demographic and socio-economic characteristics has been illustrated in Table 6.5. From this we can interpret that Gazan women marry at an early age which was extrapolated to be below 20 years in all Khan Yunis communities, with a high rate of reproduction resulting from a long period of fecundity. Also the average age difference between husbands and wives varied from 3.4 years in Khan Yunis villages to 3.7 years in Khan Yunis refugee camp. Furthermore, the women's participation in labour force is very low amounting to 15.3%, while the percentage of housewives is still high accounting for 84.7% in Khan Yunis area. In demographic terms, this high percentage of housewives promotes high fertility.

Table 6.5 Demographic and Socio-Economic Characteristics of the 1985 Sample for Khan Yunis Area, Khan Yunis City, Khan Yunis Refugee Camp, and Khan Yunis Villages

Characteristics	Locality			
	Khan Yunis City	Khan Yunis Refugee Camp	Khan Yunis Villages	Khan Yunis Area
Number in sample	90	85	60	235
Mean age of wives when married	19.2	19.3	19.9	19.5
Mean age of husbands when married	22.6	23.0	23.4	23.0
Mean duration of marriage	15.0	15.7	13.8	14.8
Mean number of children ever born per a woman	6.4	6.9	6.6	6.6
Mean number of living children per a woman	5.8	6.1	5.5	5.8
Mean number of children born to women aged 45-49 years and still alive	8.6	9.6	9.6	9.2
Per cent of women wholly occupied as housewives	83.3	82.3	90	84.7
Per cent of husbands with refugee status	15.6	100.0	28.3	49.4
Per cent of husbands with indigenous status	84.4	0.0	71.7	50.6

Source: The 1985 Sample Survey.

The 1985 survey shows that the average number of living children born to married women aged 45-49 years was 9.2 in Khan Yunis area as a whole. This figure is higher than those reported in the 1967 census for the indigenous and refugees married women in the same age group, where it amounted to 8.7 and 8.3 live childs per married woman respectively (Central Bureau of Statistics, 1968). This increase can be attributed to an increase in birth rates during the 1970s and 1980s which can be easily seen in Table 2.6.

The refugee and indigenous status of husbands constitutes 49.4% and 50.6% respectively in Khan Yunis area, while the refugee proportion varied widely from 100% in Khan Yunis camp to 15.6% in Khan Yunis villages.

Table 6.6 displays the educational level of the study group for Khan Yunis area and its communities. At Khan Yunis level of analysis, the difference between educational attainment of husbands and wives is pronounced. At the top of the education ladder, about 27.3% of husbands had attended higher institutes or universities, compared with 15.7% of wives. At the bottom, nearly 29.7% of husbands and 36.2% of the wives were illiterate or have had less than 6 years of schooling. Moreover, the education standard in Khan Yunis city is better than in both Khan Yunis camp and Khan Yunis villages, with higher percentages who had attended higher institutes and universities and lower percentages of illiterates (Table 6.6).

6.1.3.2 Women's Attitudes toward Contraception

"In developing countries a conscious decision by couples to control their fertility is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to limit fertility. The social, religious and even legal restriction on contraception, as well as ignorance of the existence of correct use of contraception methods, may prevent such decisions from being made effective" (Zurayk, 1979). In the Gaza Strip there is no anti-contraception legislation, but abortion is permitted only when pregnancy is a risk to the mother's health.

UNRWA is the only institution which delivers contraception services in the Gaza Strip. Its family planning programme was started in 1978, where contraception services were delivered to both refugees and

Table 6.6 Proportional Distribution of Husbands and Wives Level of Education among Khan Yunis Area and Khan Yunis Communities, 1985

Level of Education \ Community	Maximum years of Schooling	Khan Yunis City		Khan Yunis Camp		Khan Yunis Villages		Khan Yunis area	
		Husband	Wife	Husband	Wife	Husband	Wife	Husband	Wife
Illiterate *		12.2	13.3	16.5	27.1	13.3	30.0	14.0	22.6
Elementary	6	16.7	18.9	11.8	10.6	20.0	10.0	15.7	13.6
Preparatory	9	23.3	20.0	18.8	16.5	16.7	16.7	20.0	17.9
Secondary	12	21.1	27.8	20.0	34.1	30.0	28.3	23.0	30.2
Technical & teachers' institutes	14	2.2	7.8	17.6	9.4	5.0	10.0	8.5	8.9
University	16+	24.4	12.2	15.3	2.3	15.0	5.0	18.8	6.8
Total		99.99	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source : The 1985 Sample Survey.

* People who were unable to read newspapers and write simply were classified as illiterate.

indigenous people as an integral part of the MCH programme (UNRWA, 1985a and 1985b). On the other hand, family planning services are available from private physicians and chemists, as can be deduced from the UNRWA figure of current usage of family planning, which was only 1637 married women (15-49) in 1984, or less than 2% of the total married women of child-bearing age compared with 27.2% of married women who are contraception users in Khan Yunis area according to the 1985 survey.

"In most countries fertility and family planning surveys have found that the great majority of women know of at least one family planning method, usually a modern one. Women's knowledge of family planning is slightly influenced by age, very little influenced by parity, somewhat influenced by rural/urban residence, and greatly influenced by education" (Population Reports, 1985). The women in Khan Yunis area and Khan Yunis communities demonstrated a wider knowledge of contraception methods. As illustrated in Table 6.7, the differences are not great. Only 2.2% and 4.7% of the women of Khan Yunis city and Khan Yunis camp did not know about contraception compared with 20% of Khan Yunis villages women. At the other extreme, 97.8% of respondents in Khan Yunis city, 95.3% in Khan Yunis camp, and 80% in Khan Yunis villages had heard about contraceptive methods. In short, about one-quarter of Khan Yunis area women had heard of and used contraception while two-thirds of them had heard of and not used contraception (Table 6.7).

The correlation between the educational attainment of couples in general and wives in particular and the knowledge and practice of contraception is crucial. Table 6.8 indicates that the better educated wives are more knowledgeable about it and used contraceptive methods more than the less educated wives. For instance, we found that 72.3% of wives and 66.7% of husbands who had not heard about contraceptive methods were illiterate or had below 6 years of schooling, while the percentage of the higher educated wives and husbands were 11.1% and 5.6% respectively. In contrast, only 36.6% of wives and 26.8% of husbands who had heard about contraception but not used it were illiterate or had just 6 years of school enrolment or below. But the higher educated proportion amounted to 16.3% for wives and 27.4% for husbands in the aforesaid group. Furthermore, the education level of the respondent who had heard and used contraception was better than the previous two categories. Only 25% of

Table 6.7 Distribution of the Study Group by Knowledge and Practice of Contraceptive Method, and Wife's Occupational Status in Khan Yunis Area and Khan Yunis Communities, 1985

Knowledge and practice / Locality	Has not heard		Heard and not used		Heard and used		Wife's Occupational Status
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	% employed outside the home
Khan Yunis City	2	2.2	63	70	25	27.8	16.7
Khan Yunis camp	4	4.7	56	65.9	25	29.4	17.7
Khan Yunis villages	12	20.0	34	56.7	14	23.3	10.0
Khan Yunis Area	18	7.7	153	65.1	64	27.2	15.3

Source : The 1985 Sample Survey

Table 6.8 Knowledge and Use of Contraceptive Methods among Currently Married Women by Level of Education of Husbands and Wives in Khan Yunis Area, 1985

Level of Education / Knowledge and practice	Has not heard		Heard and not used		Heard and used	
	Husband	Wife	Husband	Wife	Husband	Wife
Illiterate	22.2	55.6	16.3	22.9	6.3	12.5
Elementary	44.5	16.7	10.5	13.7	20.3	12.5
Preparatory	11.1	0.0	21.6	17.7	18.7	23.4
Secondary	11.1	22.2	24.2	29.4	23.4	34.4
Technical & Teachers Institutes	0.0	5.6	9.1	8.5	9.4	10.9
University	11.1	0.0	18.3	7.8	21.9	6.3

Source : The 1985 Sample Survey

wives and 26.6% of husbands were illiterate or had 6 years of schooling or below, and the percentages of wives and husbands who were more highly educated were 17.7% and 31.3% respectively (Table 6.8).

The survey of married women of reproductive age (15-49) shows slight variations and low participation in the labour force by wives' place of residence, only 17.7%, 16.7%, and 10% of wives were employed from Khan Yunis camp, Khan Yunis city, Khan Yunis villages respectively (Table 6.7), but their participation amounts to just 15.3% at Khan Yunis area level of analysis. On the other hand, we found a positive relationship between wives' employment status and their knowledge and use of contraceptive methods in Khan Yunis area. For instance, 25% of wives who had heard of and used contraceptive methods were employed and only 13.1% had heard of contraceptives and did not use them. In general, we can elicit that the employed wives are more knowledgeable about contraception and practise contraception more than the unemployed wives.

6.1.3.3 Obstacles to Practising Contraception

It is obvious that the attitude of married women who had heard about contraceptive methods and not used them is attributed to the 7 main variables illustrated in Table 6.9. These variables indicate the impact of socio-economic, religious, and political factors upon a wife's decision to practise contraception.

The religious consideration is the strongest obstacle against practising contraception; 69.8%, 53.6%, 55.9% and 60.8% of the wives of Khan Yunis city, Khan Yunis camp, Khan Yunis villages, and Khan Yunis area stated that they disapproved because it is forbidden by Islam, though Islam as a religion is not against contraceptive practice for the sake of family spacing, but is against it if the aim is to achieve birth control.

The relationship between political reasons and women's reproduction is very important and gained a similar response from the Khan Yunis communities; 42.9%, 41.1% and 44.1% of the respondents of Khan Yunis city, Khan Yunis camp, and Khan Yunis villages thought that the Strip's population should be increased in order to compensate losing numbers because of the war, which should help them to continue their struggle against the Israeli occupiers until they obtain their rights as an

Table 6.9 Obstacles Against Practising Family Planning Among Currently Married Women in Khan Yunis Area and Khan Yunis Communities, 1985

Attitude to Contraception / Variables description	% heard and not used contraception			
	Khan Yunis city	Khan Yunis camp	Khan Yunis villages	Khan Yunis area
Islamic religion forbids	69.8	53.6	55.9	60.8
Political reasons	42.9	41.1	44.1	42.5
Harmful to health	34.9	19.6	47.1	32.0
Husband wants more children to improve his social standing	46.0	41.1	55.9	46.4
Wants more children to prevent husband from thinking about getting married again	11.1	10.7	26.5	14.4
Help in old age	39.7	35.7	32.4	36.6
Others	6.4	12.5	8.8	9.2

Source : The 1985 Sample Survey

independent Palestinian state. The Gaza Strip residents consider the demographic factor is one of the most important tools to achieve their national goals.

The socio-economic variables play a distinctive role in restricting contraceptive practice. These variables can be classified into three main categories: variables relating to the husband, variables relating to the wife, and variables relating to the couples (Figure 6.3). Husbands are unwilling to permit their wives to practise family planning, because they wish to improve their social standing in the Strip's society. This tenet is more common among the village inhabitants than in the cities and refugee camps; 55.9%, 46% and 41.1% of the respondents of Khan Yunis villages, Khan Yunis city, and Khan Yunis camp supported the aforementioned outcome. Also wives are willing to have more children to inhibit their husbands from thinking about getting married again, by increasing the economic burden on their husband; the survey results range from 26.5% in Khan Yunis villages, to 11.1% for Khan Yunis city, to 10.7% for Khan Yunis camp, and to 14.4% for Khan Yunis area. The high percentage for Khan Yunis villages is due to increasing evidence of polygyny in the area, though it is low in the city and even lower in the Khan Yunis camp.

Furthermore, the two classified variables of "help in old age" and "others" are relating to the attitude of couples. The survey shows that 39.7%, 35.7% and 32.4% of couples of Khan Yunis city, Khan Yunis camp, and Khan Yunis villages respectively expect to be supported by their sons in their old age. On the other hand, 6.4%, 12.5% and 8.8% of respondents of Khan Yunis city, Khan Yunis camp and Khan Yunis villages disapproved of the practice of family planning due to bashfulness of wives, lack of knowledge of a source or method of contraception, or considered it immoral. In addition sons are preferred to daughters which leads to higher fertility rates as well as discouraging women from using contraception.

Finally, the side effects of using contraception play a negative role; 32% of Khan Yunis area wives thought that contraception is harmful to health. 47% in Khan Yunis villages, 34.9% in Khan Yunis city, and 19.6% in Khan Yunis camp.

The previous discussion shows that fertility behaviour of Gazan couples is tended to have large families to small ones. In fact most of the Middle Eastern societies have the same tenet. Hill (1981) concluded that wives, especially the uneducated, probably feel pressurized by society into having large families both because this is the traditional social norm and because it provides some protection against early divorce. In addition, it may make good economic sense to have a large family in order to provide insurance destitution in the face of mishape, illnesses or retirement in countries where social security provisions are just beginning.

6.1.3.4 Reasons for Using Contraception

The survey shows that 64 respondents in Khan Yunis city, Khan Yunis camp, and Khan Yunis villages had heard about contraception and used it (Table 6.7). Family spacing, medical reasons, birth control and other factors were aims and reasons for the use of contraception.

As indicated in Table 6.10, family spacing and medical reasons accounted for 92%, 96%, 78.6% and 90.6% of the reasons given by respondents in Khan Yunis city, Khan Yunis camp, Khan Yunis villages and Khan Yunis area respectively for using contraception, while only 8%, 4%, 7.1% and 7.8% of respondents of the above areas used it for birth control purposes. In Khan Yunis villages 14.3% used it for unspecified reasons (Table 6.10).

Family spacing was favoured by people as it matches Islamic religion rules which recommend two year interval for child breast-feeding in accordance with Quranic verse: "And We have enjoined on man (To be good) to his parents: In travail upon travail Did his mother bear him, And in years twain Was his weaning: (hear The command), "Show gratitude To Me and to thy parents: To Me is (thy final) Goal (Holy Quran, sura Luqman, No. 31, verse14). Also the high occurrance of medical reasons in all Khan Yunis communities and particularly in Khan Yunis camp was associated with the high maternal health risks caused by increased numbers of pregnancies. Roughly 70% of the wives with medical reasons had undergone compulsory sterilization, which was mostly found in women aged 40 years and over.

It must be taken into consideration that the percentage of respondents who used contraception has no significant effect in reducing fertility trends in the area. For instance, 63.6% of Khan Yunis area respondents who used contraception with family spacing aim practised it after having 6 live births and over, while only 15.1% used it after having 2 live births.

The attitudes of Khan Yunis area couples toward the use of contraception have been classified and ordered in Figure 6.3, based on their influence upon the decisions of couples.

Table 6.10 Reasons for Using Contraceptive Methods among Currently Married Women in Khan Yunis Area and Khan Yunis Communities, 1985

Attitude to contraception / Variable description	% Heard and used contraception			
	Khan Yunis city	Khan Yunis camp	Khan Yunis villages	Khan Yunis area
Family spacing	60.0	36.0	42.9	46.9
Birth control	08.0	4.0	7.1	6.3
Medical reasons	32.0	60.0	35.7	43.7
Others	00.0	00.0	14.3	3.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source : The 1985 Sample Survey.

Figure 6.3 Schematic Diagram Displaying Khan Yunis Couples Attitudes and Knowledge for Practising Contraception



6.1.3.5 Women's Attitudes to Practising Contraception in the Future

On questioning about future attitudes for using contraception, 32.2%, 30.6%, 18.3% and 28.1% of respondents of Khan Yunis city, Khan Yunis camp, Khan Yunis villages and Khan Yunis area respectively will be using contraception in the future, while 41.1%, 49.4%, 56.7% and 48.1% of respondents in the above areas will not be using contraception at all. The remaining percentages of respondents were not sure whether they will or will not be using contraception in the future (Table 6.11).

From these observations, we conclude that there will be no change between the present percentage (27.2%) of current contraceptive users and the percentage (28.1%) of future ones at Khan Yunis area level of analysis.

Assuming these trends in family planning and fertility behaviour of the Gaza Strip population, the youthfulness of the population will persist at least into the near future. Should the Palestinian problem come to a settlement, and a local council be established to set up a population policy for the Palestinian society, population trends may come to change.

Table 6.11 Future Attitudes to Using Contraceptive Methods among Currently Married Women, Khan Yunis Area, 1985

Description / Community	Future attitudes to using contraception					
	Will use		Not sure		No	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Khan Yunis city	29	32.2	24	26.7	37	41.1
Khan Yunis camp	26	30.6	17	20.0	42	49.4
Khan Yunis villages	11	18.3	15	25.0	34	56.7
Khan Yunis area	66	28.1	56	23.8	113	48.1

Source : The 1985 Sample Survey.

6.2 Changing Age Structure and the Impact of the 1967 War

Following the 1967 war, a massive migration from the Gaza Strip was reported which led to distortion of the normal distribution of the age-sex structure of the population. The Gaza Strip migration was characterized by family movement as well as movement of selected individuals caused by the socio-political factors after the war. This matter has been discussed deeply in chapter two. Consequently, migration affected specific age groups of the population, particularly the young adult age group of 15-29 years (Figure 6.4 and Table 6.12).

The obvious feature is the continual decrease in the proportion of young people (0-14) between 1967 and 1980, while the proportion fluctuated from 46.1% in 1980 to 46.6% in 1985. In other words, the percentage of young people dropped by 4.1% during 1967 and 1985. This trend indicates that the young people's proportion is moving towards a more normal age-sex structure after the absence of migration role. In addition, the proportion of younger adults (15-29) is continuously increasing, from 21.4% in 1967 to 29.7% in the 1985 sample survey, while the percentage of aged people has continuously decreased from 4.8% in 1967, to 3.0% in 1974, to 2.8% in 1982, and 2.4% in 1985 (Table 6.12). However, the middle aged group (30-44) decreased from 14.2% to 11.5% during 1967 and 1985, while the older adults group (45-64), slightly increased from 8.9% to 9.8% in this period.

However, a radical change in the age-structure at a locality level of analysis has been reported, as set out in Table 6.13 and Figure 6.5 in which it may be interpreted that:

(a) the proportion of young people (0-14), aged (65+), and middle age adults (30-44) declined significantly in their proportions in all localities between 1967 and 1985; and
(b) the proportion of younger adults (15-29) increased dramatically in all localities. Consequently, we can observe that the age group (15-29) is the greatest group influenced by the 1967 emigration.

6.3 Differential Age Structure

Despite a high proportion of the sample population of the Gaza Strip being under 15 years of age, there are significant variations of



FIG·6·4 THE CHANGING PROPORTIONS OF FIVE AGE-GROUPS IN THE GAZA STRIP BETWEEN SEPTEMBER 1967 AND 1985

AD

Table 6.12 The Changing Percentages of Five Age-Groups in the Gaza Strip between September 1967 and the End of 1985

Age Group / Year	0-14	15-29	30-44	45-64	65+
Sept. 1967	50.6	21.4	14.2	8.9	4.8
1968	50.6	23.0	13.6	8.6	4.2
1969	49.9	23.9	13.6	8.6	4.0
1970	49.7	24.7	13.5	8.4	3.7
1971	49.5	25.6	13.3	8.3	3.3
1972	49.0	25.3	12.7	9.2	3.8
1973	48.7	26.5	12.5	8.9	3.4
1974	49.0	27.0	12.1	8.9	3.0
1975	49.6	25.8	12.7	9.1	2.8
1976	47.7	28.1	12.6	9.0	2.6
1977	47.4	27.9	11.4	9.9	3.4
1978	46.4	28.9	11.8	9.8	3.1
1979	46.5	29.0	12.0	9.8	2.7
1980	46.1	29.2	12.3	9.9	2.5
1981	46.6	28.9	12.5	9.7	2.3
1982	47.8	29.1	10.6	9.7	2.8
1983	48.7	28.0	11.0	9.6	2.7
1984	47.7	29.2	11.0	9.4	2.7
1985*	46.6	29.7	11.5	9.8	2.4

Source : Calculated from:

1. Central Bureau of Statistics, 1967
   Central Bureau of Statistics 1969-1985, Nos. 20-36.

*2. The 1985 Sample Survey

Table 6.13 The Changing Proportions of Five Age-groups in the Gaza Strip by Locality, 1967 and 1985

% Age group / Locality	Census of September 1967					The 1985 Sample Survey				
	0-14	15-29	30-44	45-64	65+	0-14	15-29	30-44	45-64	65+
Gaza City	48.7	23.2	14.4	9.1	4.6	41.7	32.4	13.1	11.0	1.8
Khan Yunis City	49.4	21.8	14.6	9.2	5.0	44.5	30.4	13.2	8.8	3.1
Deirel Balah "	50.0	21.8	13.7	9.4	5.1	47.4	28.1	13.4	8.6	2.5
Rafah "	52.4	20.5	14.4	8.1	4.6	48.7	31.6	10.3	7.3	2.1
Total of cities	49.1	22.6	14.5	9.1	4.7	44.6	31.1	12.6	9.3	2.4
Rafah Camp	52.5	21.0	13.6	8.8	4.1	47.5	31.9	9.8	9.5	1.2
Khan Yunis Camp	51.9	19.4	14.2	9.4	5.1	48.7	28.0	13.0	7.8	2.5
Deir el Balah "	50.0	21.8	13.7	9.4	5.1	48.2	26.5	12.8	10.2	2.3
Mughazi "	49.8	21.8	14.0	9.7	4.7	49.6	26.6	11.2	9.1	3.5
Bureij "	50.3	22.1	13.4	9.6	4.6	47.0	29.7	11.9	9.4	2.0
Museirat	50.2	21.3	14.0	9.7	4.8	48.1	29.7	11.9	8.3	2.0
Beach	53.1	20.1	13.6	8.4	4.8	47.4	29.6	10.2	10.1	2.7
Jabalya	51.9	20.2	14.4	8.6	4.9	49.4	30.3	7.5	9.3	3.5
Total of Camps	51.7	20.7	13.9	9.0	4.7	48.2	29.3	10.8	9.2	2.5
Jabalya-Nazal village	50.6	20.4	14.4	8.7	5.9	48.3	29.6	9.4	9.9	2.8
Beit Lahiya "	51.6	20.3	14.9	7.6	5.6	48.3	29.5	10.3	9.7	2.2
Beit Hanun "	53.9	20.3	14.3	7.4	4.1	43.8	30.4	11.5	12.5	1.8
Zawaida "	-	-	-	-	-	44.1	30.7	11.5	12.0	1.7
Bani Suheila "	52.9	19.6	13.5	8.3	5.7	47.0	27.4	12.8	10.8	2.0
Abasan el Kabira "	49.0	21.6	15.2	8.7	5.5	45.2	29.3	12.1	10.4	3.0
Abasan el Saghira "	50.3	20.0	13.8	9.0	6.9	45.1	29.7	12.6	10.6	2.0
Ikhza'a "	49.8	19.9	14.8	8.5	7.0	47.4	30.4	10.1	10.9	1.2
Qarara "	-	-	-	-	-	47.2	23.0	14.1	10.8	4.9
Total of villages	50.8	20.7	14.5	8.5	5.5	46.2	28.8	11.6	11.0	2.4
Gaza Strip as a whole	50.6	21.4	14.3	8.9	4.8	46.6	29.7	11.5	9.8	2.4

Source : Calculated from :

1. Central Bureau of Statistics, 1967
2. The 1985 Sample Survey.


Left Columns Represents the Census of September 1967.
Right Columns Represents the 1985 Sample Survey.
Jabalya Camp
Beit Lahiya
Beach Camp
Jabalya–Nazla
Beit Hanun
Nuseirat Camp
Gaza
Zawaida
Deir el Balah Camp
Bureij Camp
1985
Qarara
Mughazi Camp
Deir el Balah
Khan Yunis Camp
Bani Suheila
Abasan el Saghira
1985
Khan Yunis
Abasan el Kabira
Ikhza'a
Rafah Camp
EGYPT
(Sinai)
Rafah
AD
N
0 Miles 5
0 2 4 6
Kilometres
100 %
75
50
25
Cities
Refugee camps
Villages
Gaza Strip as a whole
FIG·6·5 RELATIVE SIZE OF FIVE AGE-GROUPS BY LOCALITY OF THE GAZA STRIP'S POPULATION · 1967 AND 1985
65 +
45 – 64
30 – 44
15 – 29
1 – 14

proportions between the Strip's communities and localities. Comparing the age structure of each community and locality to that of the Strip as a whole (Table 6.14), considerable differences are revealed in juvenility and child-woman ratio. While in the cities as a whole 44.6% of the total population are under 15 years, 48.7% and 47.4% of the total population of Rafah and Deir el Balah cities respectively are children, and only 41.7% and 44.5% in Gaza and Khan Yunis cities. A similar comparison between the four cities and the cities as a whole, with respect to the proportions of children under 5 years shows a range from 14.2% in Gaza to 18.6% in Rafah city. The highest child-woman ratios are 884 and 839 in Rafah and Deir el Balah respectively, and the lowest is reported in Gaza (621).

Considering the camps, 48.2% of their total population are under 15 years, ranging from 47% in Bureij to 49.6% in Mughazi. Similarly, the percentages of children under 5 years vary from 16.6% in Beach camp to 18.8% in both Nuseirat and Khan Yunis camps, the average for the camps being 17.6%. The highest child-woman ratios are 958, 941, 936 and 903 in Mughazi, Khan Yunis, Jabalya and Nuseirat respectively, while the lowest are found in Rafah (826) and Beach (846).

Moreover, analysis of villages by age structure shows that 48.2% of the total population of villages are less than 15 years of age, ranging from 48.3%, 47.4%, 42.2% and 47% of the total populations of both Jabalya-Nazla and Beit Lahiya, Ikhza'a, Qarara and Bani Suheila villages respectively to 43.8% and 44.1% in Beit Hanun and Zawaida. A similar comparison between each village and the villages as a whole, with particular reference to the proportions of children being under 5 years shows a range from 16% in Jabalya-Nazla to 19% in Abasan el Kabira. The highest child-woman ratios are 939,900, and 899 in Qarara, Jabalya-Nazla and Bani Suheila respectively, while the lowest are found in Zawaida (805), Ikhza'a (816), and Beit Hanun (819) (Table 6.14).

Meanwhile, wide variations between the age structures of the refugees, villagers, and city dwellers and the Strip as a whole have been noted. In 1985, 46.6% of the total population of the Strip were under 15 years, but 48.2% of the total camp population, and 44.6% and 46.2% in the cities and villages respectively. A comparison between the three communities and the Strip as a whole with respect to the proportions of children less than 5 years vary from 17.6% in the refugee camps to 16.1%

Table 6.14 Age-Sex Composition of the Three Main Age Groups of the Sample Population; Percentage Aged Less than 5 Years and Child/Woman Ratio in the Gaza Strip by Locality, 1985

Locality	Less than 15 years	Males per 1000 females	15-64	Males per 1000 females	65 and over	Males per 1000 females	Less than 5 years % of total population	Child/ woman ratio
Urban : Gaza	41.7	970	56.5	1013	1.8	818	14.2	621.0
Khan Yunis	44.5	971	52.4	1025	3.1	1182	16.6	784.0
Beir el Balah	47.4	1033	50.1	980	2.5	666	17.2	839.0
Rafah	48.7	1059	49.2	970	2.1	714	18.6	884.3
Total of cities	44.6	998	53.0	1005	2.4	886	16.1	744.0
Rafah Camp	47.5	1052	51.3	1024	1.2	600	16.7	826.0
Khan Yunis "	48.7	1057	48.8	993	2.5	875	18.8	941.0
Deir el Balah "	48.2	1024	49.5	910	2.3	600	18.3	887.0
Mughazi "	49.6	1020	46.9	989	3.5	1333	17.2	958.0
Bureij "	47.0	1088	51.0	1000	2.0	600	18.1	880.0
Nuseirat "	48.1	1106	49.9	976	2.0	667	18.8	903.0
Beach "	47.4	1027	49.9	1012	2.7	889	16.6	846.0
Jabalya "	49.4	1054	47.1	1000	3.5	750	16.9	936.0
Total of camps	48.2	1053	49.3	993	2.5	804	17.6	891.0
Jabalya-Nazla Village	48.3	872	48.9	1098	2.8	375	16.0	900.0
Beit Lahiya "	48.3	987	49.5	895	2.2	1333	18.2	882.0
Beit Hanun "	43.8	991	54.4	971	1.8	1250	17.1	819.0
Zawaida "	44.1	967	54.2	1114	1.7	750	16.1	805.0
Bani Suheila "	47.0	988	51.0	1011	2.0	1333	17.7	899.0
Abasan el Kabira "	45.2	1100	51.8	967	3.0	750	19.0	863.0
Abasan el Saghira"	45.1	914	52.9	970	2.0	1500	18.3	882.0
Ikhza'a "	47.4	950	48.6	1016	1.2	500	16.2	816.0
Qarara "	47.2	912	52.1	1058	4.9	800	16.8	939.0
Total of villages	46.2	959	51.4	1014	2.4	850	17.1	857.0
Gaza Strip	46.6	1009	51.0	1003	2.4	840	17.0	836.0

Source : The 1985 Sample Survey.

in the cities. The highest child-woman ratio is 891 in the refugee camps also, and the lowest is 744 in the cities.

The above figures suggest that the highest child-woman ratios tend to be found in the refugee camps and villages, which may be described as the most youthful, while the lowest rates are found in the Strip's cities (Table 6.14).

Finally, with respect to the aged population, Rafah camp, Ikhza'a village, Zawaida, Gaza, and Beit Hanun have accounted for the lowest percentages of the population over 65 years, while the highest percentage were found in Qarara and both Mughazi and Jabalya refugee camps (see Table 6.14), though obviously all percentages are low by world standards.

6.4 Age Index

Many age indices are possible to analyse the age structure of any population, but the age index* which has been selected to be used here relates to the two extreme age groups (elderly and children), by expressing the number of persons age 65 and over as a percentage of those aged 0-14. Thus a high index figure indicates an elderly population, with a large proportion of old people to children, and a low index, a youthful one, with a relatively small proportion of elderly people (Dewdney and Rhind, 1975). Hence, the Strip's age index has been calculated and gave a low index value particularly when compared with the age indices in the developed countries. For instance, the Great Britain and County Durham age indices were 55 and 49.2 respectively in 1975, while the age index of the Strip was 9.5 in 1967 and only 5.15 in 1985. Consequently, it can be concluded that the population of the Gaza Strip was youthful in 1967 and became more youthful by 1985 (See Table 6.1).

6.5 Changing Sex Balance

We aim here to examine the variation in the sex ratio between the Strip's communities (refugees, villagers, and city dwellers), as well as to explore the preponderant factors that have operated on them. Males

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* Age Index = $\frac{\text{Population aged 65 and over}}{\text{Population aged 0-14}} = 100$

slightly outnumber females in the age groups 35-65+ years. It is explicit from Table 6.1 that in 1967 Gaza Strip as a whole comprised a high perponderance of females, 938 males per 1000 females. On the other hand, there were substantial variations in the sex ratios between the Strips three communities and the Strip as a whole. The sex ratio of 910 in the refugee camps was lower than the Strip's ratio, while the sex ratios in the Strip's cities and villages were higher, 965 and 961 respectively. This outcome can be attributed to the possibility that the number of migrants from the refugee camps was higher than those from cities and villages, although the fact remains that the Gaza Strip lost a lower proportion of its total population compared with the other occupied regions (see Chapter Two).

Another feature concerning sex ratio is the sharp decline in the proportion of males in the age group 15-64, owing to the displacement from the Strip after 1967 war. 723 males per 1000 females was reported in the refugee camps, while the sex ratio amounted to 794, 821 and 770 in the Strip's villages, cities, and the Strip as a whole respectively (Table 6.1).

The 1985 survey shows a significant improvement in the sex ratio in all Gaza's communities and age groups. At the Strip level of analysis, both age groups 0-14 and 15-64 had a slight preponderance of males, amounting to 1009 and 1003 per 1000 females respectively, while the ratio in the Strip as a whole was nearly balanced (1002 males per 1000 females). Also, the same trend has been reported in the Strip's communities of refugees, villages, and city inhabitants.

Migration is sex-selective as well as age-selective, influencing one sex and specific age groups more than the others. The out-migration experience of the Gaza Strip supports this generalization, which is characterized by family displacement as well as selective individuals in the aftermath of the June 1967 war.

However, the variations of sex ratio do not operate regularly throughout the age structure, as mentioned above. Reflecting associated effects of variations in sex ratio on birth, which favour males, and the preponderance of male migrants, the sex ratio tends to be irregular among different age groups. Consequently, as indicated in Table 6.15, the high

proportion of females is clearly evidenced in the marked excess of females with regard to males in the ages of 20-44, 50-54, and 60-64 years of age, quinquennial sex ratios ranging from 469 to 881 males per 1000 females. This imbalance in the sex ratio was influenced by socio-political factors after the 1967 war, the majority of displaced Gazans who fled from the Strip emigrated, either to join the heads of their families abroad, or from the fear of occupier's tyranny, or were expelled by the Israeli occupying force (see Chapter Two).

Furthermore, the age groups of 20-29 years are the major age group affected by the 1967 war and by the subsequent political situation. This imbalance in male/female ratio was affected by severe Israeli repression in Gaza in the late 1960s and early seventies, when many of the refugees participated in PLO resistance activities. Death, deportation of segments of the Strip population, and imprisonment or deportation of Palestinian men was the Israeli reaction to these military resistances (Rockwell, 1985). It was only in the older age groups 55-59 and 65 and over that men outnumbered women (Table 6.15).

In contrast, the 1985 survey indicates a much more normal demographic situation, with males outnumbering females in all but one quinquennial age group up to 34, owing to a preponderance of male births over females births. On the other hand, females outnumber males in all age groups of 35 years and over (Table 6.16). This outcome is one direct result of the 1967 displacement from the Strip leading to females outnumbering males in the age groups 20-44 years and as a result of higher male mortality as well, and 18 years after the displacement its effect should appear in the age groups 35-64 years. But in 1985 there was a remarkable improvement in the sex ratio of Gaza Strip whereby the people had achieved a sex balance 18 years after the 1967 war.

In 1985, among the three broad age groups of the population, less than 15 years, 15-64, and 65 and over in each locality in the Strip, the sex ratio varies slightly. Male children outnumber female children in the eight refugee camps, probably because male births exceed female births, or female deaths exceed male deaths, while in the Strip's villages female children outnumber male children except in Abasan el Kabira. In addition, female children in Gaza and Khan Yunis cities outnumber male children while both Deir el Balah and Rafah the opposite occurs. In the age groups

Table 6.15 Age-Sex Composition of the Population of the Gaza Strip, September 1967

Age Groups	Number of inhabitants			Percentage			Sex Ratio males per 1000 females
	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females	Total	
0 - 4	36,796	33,430	70,226	10.4	9.4	19.8	1,100
5 - 9	29,421	27,318	56,739	8.3	7.7	16.0	1,077
10 - 14	27,298	24,579	51,877	7.7	7.0	14.7	1,111
15 - 19	17,914	17,610	35,524	5.1	5.0	10.1	1,017
20 - 24	9,161	14,440	23,601	2.6	4.1	6.7	634
25 - 29	5,350	11,418	16,768	1.5	3.2	4.7	469
30 - 34	7,703	10,361	18,064	2.2	2.9	5.1	743
35 - 39	6,688	10,533	17,221	1.9	3.0	4.9	635
40 - 44	6,620	8,322	14,942	1.9	2.3	4.2	795
45 - 49	4,591	4,592	9,183	1.3	1.3	2.6	1,000
50 - 54	3,828	5,215	9,043	1.1	1.5	2.6	734
55 - 59	2,772	2,152	4,924	0.8	0.6	1.4	1,288
60 - 64	3,982	4,520	8,502	1.1	1.3	2.4	881
65 and over	8,999	8,004	17,003	2.5	2.3	4.8	1,124
Total	171,123	182,494	353,617*	48.4	51.6	100	938

Source : Central Bureau of Statistics, 1969

* There were 2,644 persons classified as age group unknown

Table 6.16 Age-Sex Composition of the Sample Population of the Gaza Strip, 1985

Age Groups	Number of Inhabitants			Percentage			Sex Ratio Males per 1000 Females
	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females	Total	
0-4	859	852	1711	8.55	8.45	17.0	1008
5-9	795	803	1598	7.9	8.0	15.9	990
10-14	696	674	1370	6.95	6.7	13.65	1033
15-19	600	581	1181	6.0	5.8	11.8	1033
20-24	544	508	1052	5.42	5.05	10.47	1071
25-29	385	364	749	3.85	3.6	7.45	1058
30-34	263	248	511	2.6	2.5	5.1	1060
35-39	180	190	370	1.8	1.9	3.7	947
40-44	130	150	280	1.3	1.5	2.8	867
45-49	133	150	283	1.32	1.5	2.82	887
50-54	127	139	266	1.25	1.4	2.65	914
55-59	101	115	216	1.0	1.14	2.14	878
60-64	103	113	216	1.0	1.12	2.12	912
65 and over	110	131	241	1.1	1.3	2.4	840
Total	5026	5018	10044	50.04	49.96	100	1002

Source : The 1985 Sample Survey.

15-64 years, the males outnumber the females in two refugee camps, two cities and six villages, they are similar in both Bureij and Jabalya refugee camps, while in the remaining localities the females outnumber males (Table 6.14). This fluctuation in the sex ratio may be attributed to the emigration from the area and the variation in mortality rates of the two sexes.

Females over 65 years of age predominate in all Gaza Strip localities except Khan Yunis city, Mughazi refugee camp, and Beit Lahiya, Beit Hanun, Bani Suheila, and Abasan el Saghira villages. But in the Gazan three communities aged females predominate over aged males (Table 6.14). The highest sex ratio for the aged was found in Abasan el Saghira village (1500), while the lowest recorded was in Jabalya-Nazla village (375).

In conclusion, the Gaza Strip sex ratio has improved dramatically from 938 males per 1000 females in 1967 to 953 in 1970, 978 in 1975, 988 in 1980, 997 in 1984, and to 1002 in the 1985 sample survey.

6.6 Dependency Ratio

The Strip's dependency ratio is high, owing to the youthfulness of the population brought about by emigration after the 1967 war and the high fertility rate. This can be stressed from the fact that the Strip's population age group of 15-64 years constituted only 44.6% of the total population in 1967 and 51% in 1985 (Table 6.1).

Indeed, not all the population 15-64 years are economically active, especially among females. On the other hand, a considerable proportion of the population aged 15-19 and 65 years and over are economically active. In the next chapter this matter should be discussed.

The crude dependency ratio for each locality, community, and for the Strip as a whole is demonstrated in Table 6.17. In 1967 there were about 124 dependants for each 100 persons in the productive ages in the Strip as a whole, 113 of these were children and youths, and 11 were in the old age category. Simultaneously, both refugee camps and villages as a whole had an appreciably higher dependency load (130%, and 129% respectively) than either cities as a whole or the Strip's average (Table 6.17). Furthermore, the ratio varied from 114 in Gaza city to 142 in Bani Suheila village. The disparity of dependency ratios between the Strip's

Table 6.17 Crude Dependency Ratio* for the 1967 Population Census and the 1985 Sample Survey of the Gaza Strip, by Locality and Community

Community	(1) Dependency Ratio, 1967			(2) Dependency Ratio, 1985		
	Youth	Old Age	Total	Youth	Old Age	Total
Cities :						
Gaza	104	10	114	74	3	77
Khan Yunis	108	11	119	85	6	91
Deir el Balah	111	11	122	95	5	100
Rafah	122	11	133	99	4	103
Cities as a whole	106	10	116	84	5	89
Refugee camps:						
Rafah	121	9	130	93	2	95
Khan Yunis	121	12	133	100	5	105
Deir el Balah	111	11	122	97	5	102
Mughazi	109	10	119	106	8	114
Bureij	112	10	122	92	4	96
Nuseirat	112	11	123	96	4	100
Beach	126	11	137	95	5	100
Jabalya	120	11	131	105	7	112
Refugee camps as a whole	119	11	130	98	5	103
Villages:						
Jabalya-Nazla	116	14	130	99	6	105
Beit Lahiya	121	13	134	98	4	102
Beit Hanun	128	10	138	81	3	84
Zawaida	-	-	-	81	3	84
Bani Suheila	128	14	142	92	4	96
Abasan el Kabira	108	12	120	87	6	93
Abasan el Saghira	118	16	134	85	4	89
Ikza'a	115	16	131	98	3	101
Qarara	-	-	-	91	9	100
Villages as a whole	116	13	129	90	5	95
Gaza Strip	113	11	124	91	5	96

* Dependency Ratio = $\frac{\text{Population less than 15 + 65 and over}}{\text{Population 15 - 64}} \times 100$

Source : (1) Calculated from : Central Bureau of Statistics, 1967

(2) The 1985 Sample Survey

localities and communities resulted from differences of out-migration rates in 1967. Relating to the percentage of old-age dependency, the populations of both Abasan el Saghira and Ikhza'a villages had the heaviest load (16%), while the lowest was found in Rafah refugee camp (9%), but this has resulted from the 1967 displacement which led to high dependency in the Gaza Strip as a whole.

On the contrary, the 1985 survey reflects a lower dependency ratio than that reported in 1967, after the reduction of the impact of out-migration. In the Strip as a whole, there were about 96 dependants for every 100 persons in the productive ages, 91 of these are under 15 years, and only 5 are 65 or more years of age. Moreover, the less youthful localities Gaza city, Zawaida and Beit Hanun villages, and Khan Yunis city, have a significantly lower dependency load than the more youthful localities, Mughazi and Jabalya camps. The ratio ranges from 77 in Gaza city to 114 in Mughazi refugee camp, and is strongly connected with the youth proportion of the dependency ratio.

Moreover, in Gaza city and both Beit Hanun and Zawaida villages the youth dependency percentage of their entire dependency ratios are only 74 and 81 respectively, while in Mughazi and Jabalya camps the youth dependency percentages are 106 and 105 respectively. In conclusion, in both 1967 and 1985, the productive populations in the refugee camps are forced to hold up a heavier burden of dependant youth than in the cities, villages, and in the Strip as a whole (Table 6.17).

Relating to the percentage of old-age dependency, the population of Qarara village has the heaviest load, more than four and a half times the proportion of the old-age dependency in Rafah camp. But the most important observation of old-age dependency is the similarity between the Strip's three communities and the Strip as a whole, all four old-age dependency ratios amounting to 5 (Table 6.17), although there are significant variations of the localities level of analysis. The same trend can be noted in old-age dependency ratio in 1967 with higher results than observed in 1985, and is attributed to the effect of out-migration.

Compared with the ratio of 124 for the 1967 census, the dependency ratio for the population of Gaza Strip had fallen dramatically to 115 in 1970, to 114 in 1975, to 102 in 1984 and to 96 dependants for 100 persons in the productive ages in 1985.

In conclusion, the dependency ratio for the population of Gaza Strip indicates that a heavy load of dependency has to be carried by the economically active population, since the Strip is characterized by a high fertility rate.

6.7 Summary

The discussion concerning the age-sex structure and the dependency ratio of the population of the Gaza Strip asserts its youthfulness. The massive emigration caused by the 1967 war greatly distorted the age-sex structure of the population. But later the high natural increase balanced out the effect of the out-migration as indicated by the population pyramids in Figure 6.1.

The high fertility rate, continuous decline in mortality rates in general and infant and childhood mortality rates in particular, and the limited practice of family planning in order to reduce the fertility trends substantially are all factors which have led to the general youthfulness of the population. However, the age structure's spatial distribution reveals some difference between the Gaza Strip communities. These can be generalized as follows:

Firstly, lower fertility rates, lower percentages of children, lower infant and childhood mortality rates, lower impact of out-migration on sex ratio balance resulting from the 1967 war, and higher dependency ratios are the characteristics of the population of the Gaza Strip cities.

Secondly, the population of both refugee camps and Gazan villages are loaded by a heavy burden of children, owing to high fertility rates and are distinguished by a remarkable youthfulness.

Thirdly, although 27.2% of Khan Yunis area wives used contraception, we found that the family planning programmes did not have any significant effect upon fertility trends. Socio-economic, socio-religious, and socio-political factors are obstacles in the way of family planning. Consequently, the fertility transition in the Gaza Strip has not even begun, despite the long-term changes in standards of education, health awareness and living conditions.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

Analysis of the Employment Composition of the Gaza Strip Population

The crude dependency indicator mentioned earlier in chapter six reveals a very high rate of dependency in the Gaza Strip. In 1984, this ratio was estimated at 102 dependents for every 100 persons in the productive age groups. If only the active population groups are taken into account, the real dependency ratio* would be as high as 479 dependents for every 100 active persons.

Consequently, this study aims to investigate in depth the economically active population and the effects of the youthfulness of the population on the labour force. In addition, it will focus on underlining the characteristics of Gaza's labour force after the Israeli occupation of the Strip in 1967, as well as the degree of labour absorption in various branches of economic activity. Furthermore, two pilot studies will focus on analysing the work conditions of Gazan workers in Israel and in the Arab and non-Arab countries.

7.1 Characteristics of the Gazan Labour Force

"The total population of any community reveals little about the available labour force. A better indicator is the proportion of the population over 14 years of age, which includes all potential workers in the economy. The rate of female participation in the labour force also affects the overall labour force participation rate" (UNECWA, 1981). Hence, Table 7.1 displays the Strip's total population aged 14 years and over and its distribution by sex, labour force participation rate, participation of males and females in the labour force, and employment and unemployment rates over the period 1968-84.

As concluded in chapter 6, the 1967 emigration distorted the demographic composition of the population of the Gaza Strip since large numbers of adult males, mostly young, emigrated to Jordan and then, part of them, to the Arab states. Consequently, females have outnumbered males

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* Real Dependency Ratio = $\frac{\text{Population not in the labour force}}{\text{Population in the labour force}} \times 100$

Table 7.1 Population Aged 14 and Over, by Labour Force Characteristics and Sex in the Gaza Strip, 1968-1984*

Year	Population aged 14 +			Not in labour force			In labour force					% labour force out of population aged 14+	% labour force out of total population	% females in labour force of females aged 14+	% employed persons of labour force
	Total (000's)	Male %	Female %	Total (000's)	Male %	Female %	Total (000's)	Male %	Female %	Employed (000's)	Unemployed (000's)				
1968	165.6	43.8	56.2	117.0	25.5	74.5	48.6	87.7	12.3	40.4	8.2	29.3	15.1	6.4	83.1
1969	170.0	45.4	54.6	120.7	25.0	75.0	49.3	91.2	8.8	45.0	4.3	29.9	16.0	5.0	91.3
1970	178.5	45.9	54.1	121.9	24.9	75.1	56.6	91.3	8.7	53.2	3.4	31.7	16.7	5.1	94.0
1971	182.2	46.0	54.0	126.1	25.5	74.5	56.1	79.4	20.6	54.2	1.9	30.8	16.3	13.7	96.6
1972	186.6	45.9	54.1	127.8	24.1	75.9	58.8	93.3	6.7	57.9	0.9	31.5	16.7	3.9	98.4
1973	191.9	46.3	53.7	129.3	23.6	76.4	62.6	93.4	6.6	62.2	0.4	32.6	17.1	4.0	99.4
1974	199.8	46.8	53.2	132.6	23.4	76.6	67.2	92.8	7.2	66.7	0.5	33.6	17.8	4.7	99.3
1975	205.9	46.6	53.4	139.4	24.4	75.6	66.5	93.1	6.9	66.2	0.3	32.3	17.1	4.2	99.6
1976	212.3	46.8	53.2	142.3	24.0	76.0	70.0	93.2	6.8	69.8	0.2	33.0	17.5	4.2	99.7
1977	219.9	47.1	52.9	148.9	25.0	75.0	71.0	93.4	6.6	70.9	0.1	32.3	17.1	4.0	99.9
1978	229.8	47.4	52.6	155.5	25.1	74.9	74.3	93.9	6.1	73.9	0.4	32.3	17.5	3.7	99.5
1979	239.4	47.6	52.4	160.8	24.7	75.3	78.6	94.4	5.6	78.4	0.2	32.8	18.0	3.5	99.7
1980	239.0	47.7	52.3	159.0	24.8	75.2	80.0	93.2	6.8	79.6	0.4	33.5	17.8	4.3	99.5
1981	243.4	47.8	52.2	161.8	24.5	75.5	81.6	94.1	5.9	81.3	0.3	33.5	17.7	3.8	99.6
1982	246.4	48.1	51.9	164.0	24.5	75.5	82.4	94.9	5.1	82.0	0.4	33.4	17.3	3.3	99.5
1983	261.6	48.1	51.9	175.8	25.6	74.4	85.8	94.1	5.9	85.3	0.5	32.8	17.4	3.7	99.4
1984	264.9	48.1	51.9	176.9	24.8	75.2	88.0	94.8	5.2	87.2	0.8	33.2	17.3	3.3	99.1

Source : Calculated by the researcher from : Central Bureau of Statistics, 1974; 1979; 1983 and 1985.[a]

* The labour force of North Sinai has been deducted (see Chapters one and two).

since the postwar period; females comprised 56.2% of the total population aged 14 years and over in 1968 while their percentage dropped to 51.9% in 1984.

The labour force in the Gaza Strip constitutes a small proportion of the total population, amounting to only 15.1% of the total population in 1968, rising slowly to 18% in 1979, while the 1985 survey revealed a higher proportion of labour force in the total population amounting to 20.2%. Nevertheless, the labour force size in the Strip is very small. The low percentage can be attributed to the fact that 46.6% of the total population were under 15 years of age in1985, and that only a small proportion of Gazan females participate in the labour force (Table 7.1). Moreover, the 1985 survey shows that 79.8% of the total population were classified as economically inactive. Table 7.6 indicates that 42.1% of the total population were students, 19.4% were housewives, and 18.3% were old people, children less than 6 years of age or handicapped.

The Gaza Strip labour as a percentage of the total population aged 14 years and over has remained constant at around one-third, while figures derived from the 1985 survey give a labour force percentage of 35.7%.

The Strip's total population aged 14 years and over has increased from 165,600 in 1968 to 264,900 in 1984 with an annual rate of increase of 3.7%. In contrast, the labour force has increased by a higher percentage, amounting to 5.1% per annum during the same period, with the size of workforce growing rapidly from 48,600 to 88,000 (see Table 7.1). The expansion of the labour pool in the Strip has resulted from increasing Israeli demand for cheap labour from the occupied territories. The highest level of increase in the size of labour force was registered during the period 1968-74, when it increased by 6.4% per annum, coinciding with the Israeli period of economic boom. When the Israeli economy slowed down, the size of the workforce in the Strip slightly decreased, significantly, in 1975. But later it resumed its growth in the following years and it grew by 3% per annum during the decade 1974-84.

In the occupied territories, the female participation rate in the labour force is very low, particularly when compared with the average, 32%, in developed countries. Women constitute about 10% of the total labour force in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (UNECWA, 1981). In the

meantime, the 1985 survey shows that 6.6% of Gazan's female were economically active. This figure nearly matches the average female workforce participation rate in the Arab World which was estimated at 8% (Omran, 1984). Further to this, it is pertinent to compare the Strip's female participation rate in the workforce with those of Palestinian women outside the occupied territories. Accurate and usable statistics concerning Palestinian women's participation in the workforce are virtually non-existent. The most complete data to hand is yielded by Sirhan (1975), based on an unpublished 1971 Lebanese survey. He concluded that only 3.2% of Palestinian women were economically active. Later, Sirhan's figures were revised by Arafat (1984) in order to obtain a closer approximation to the UN definition of labour force. Hence the revised figure picked up to 5%. Consequently, it can be concluded that overall Palestinian female participation in the labour force is very low in the occupied territories as well as outside occupied Palestine.

As illustrated in Table 7.1, the Strip's female participation in the workforce evidently declined from 6.4% of the total female population aged 14 years and over in 1968 to 3.3% in 1984. Comparable figure derived from the 1985 survey shows that 6.3% of females aged 14 years and over were in the labour force. Furthermore, the female proportion of the total labour force also dropped from 12.3% to 5.2% during the aforesaid period.

Considering the labour force in absolute numbers, the female labour force dropped from about 6,000 in 1968 to some 4,600 in 1984, or decreased by 1.5% per annum. This decrease has coincided with a rapid increase in the number of females aged 14 years and more, when their numbers have jumped from 93,000 to 137,600 in the same period.

Gharaibeh (1985) attributed the lower participation of Gazan females in the labour force to the fact that most males who lose their jobs in Israel try to find alternative employment in the Strip rather than emigrate, reducing opportunities open to women and the need for their labour. Moreover, the traditional constraints have been playing a negative role in pushing Gaza's women away from the labour pool. Rockwell (1985) stated that in the Gaza Strip, families tend to hide or deny the fact that female members work, since that will bring social stigmas to the family, particularly if they work in Israel. Reluctance for women to work outside the home stems from the patriarchal family structure, where men

have traditionally been responsible for all their female dependants.

Another significant factor concerning the low participation of working women can be considered, that the Israeli figure could be an underestimate since it derives from surveys conducted regularly each quarter year since 1968. Roughly 1,400 households in the Gaza Strip are investigated (Central Bureau of Statistics, 1985b). The households contacted may be giving inaccurate answers particularly regarding female work status because they fear that this will be reported to the Tax Office and then they will be forced to pay income tax. Furthermore, this conclusion can be taken from a study carried out for UNECWA (1981) showing a female participation rate of 13.4% in the manufacturing sector, and from the 1985 sample survey which displayed figures higher than those of the Israeli official statistics of female participation in the workforce.

Since work ability is affected by age, Table 7.2 illustrates the rate of male participation in the labour force by different age groups in the Gaza Strip over the period 1968-84. It can be seen that the proportion of economically active males 14 years and over has gradually increased from 58.8% in 1968 to 65.5% in 1984. In comparison, the 1985 survey shows that 68.1% of males aged 14 years and over were classified as economically active. The lowest index of participation in the labour force can be found in the age groups 14-17 and 65 years and over, while the highest index is found in the 25-54 age groups. Meanwhile, a significant increase has been noted in the age group 25-34 from 89% in 1968 to a peak of 97% in 1973, but this dropped sharply to 80.8% by 1984, because of emigration toward the Arab oil-rich countries as a consequence of the Israeli economic recession. At the same time, it can be noted that the participation of the 14-17 age group grew substantially from 21.1% in 1968 to the highest level of 30.2% in 1981 and then decreased to 26.8% in 1984. The increase can be explained by the fact that many potential secondary school students were dropping out of school and entering the labour market, particularly when the Israeli economy boomed in the early 1970s, but when the Israeli economy slowed down into a recession and the unemployment trends grew, the participation rate of this age group eventually decreased.

It should be noted that the proportion of males in the labour force aged 14 years and more as given in Table 7.2 does not include those who

Table 7.2 Males Aged 14 and Over, by Labour Force Characteristics and Age Group in the Gaza Strip 1968-84

Year	14+ total 000's	% in labour force	% of the age group in the labour force						
			14-17	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+
1968	72.4	58.8	21.1	63.7	89.0	84.7	76.1	54.8	23.4
1969	76.5	61.9	23.3	59.9	93.3	90.8	84.5	57.3	30.0
1970	82.0	63.0	20.3	64.2	93.9	93.2	86.8	61.4	34.8
1971	84.0	61.8	15.6	60.5	94.6	91.7	86.7	76.6	31.0
1972	85.7	64.0	20.8	67.5	96.5	93.0	85.3	62.4	24.0
1973	88.9	65.7	22.6	68.6	97.0	95.8	88.0	63.9	27.8
1974	93.6	66.6	25.6	67.7	95.4	95.9	88.0	64.9	28.9
1975	96.0	64.6	24.0	64.7	87.9	95.0	87.7	66.1	30.6
1976	99.4	65.6	27.0	65.2	85.2	94.7	89.3	74.2	33.3
1977	103.6	64.0	26.8	60.5	83.2	93.7	91.8	76.5	36.9
1978	108.9	64.1	28.0	62.0	82.3	94.2	91.1	77.8	34.8
1979	114.0	65.1	29.1	66.9	81.8	94.7	91.7	74.3	29.8
1980	114.1	65.5	27.3	65.5	82.5	93.7	93.4	77.8	32.1
1981	116.6	66.0	30.2	64.8	81.1	92.8	91.2	76.3	28.0
1982	118.4	66.0	30.1	64.4	79.8	93.5	91.7	72.8	28.3
1983	125.7	64.2	27.6	61.2	79.1	93.8	91.9	73.9	31.3
1984	127.3	65.5	26.8	62.6	80.8	91.5	91.8	70.6	34.8

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, 1970, 1977 and 1985[a]

Note : The workforce of North Sinai has been deducted (see Chapters one and two).

went to work abroad, but if their proportions are added, the rate of labour participation among them will rise to 70.2% and 69.4% in 1982 and 1983 respectively (Central Bureau of Statistics, 1985b).

7.2 Employment

Following the 1967 war the Gaza Strip labour force significantly increased by 81% from 48600 to 88000 during the period 1968-84. Simultaneously, the total employment rose substantially by 115.8% from 40400 to 87200 as a direct outcome of the expansion of employment in Israel (see Table 7.1). Hence, it can be interpreted that the employed persons have increased by a higher percentage than those who classified as economically active during that period. Obviously, the higher growth of employed persons has resulted from the continuous decrease in unemployment. Between 1968 and 1984, unemployment substantially decreased by about 90.2% of the original number of unemployed. The credibility of these official figures on unemployment will be treated later.

In 1965, the total employment in the Gaza Strip was estimated at 63,000 (Ben Shahar et al, 1971). From this figure, we can conclude that the total employment in the Gaza Strip up to 1973 was below the 1965 figure (see Table 7.1). This decline mainly resulted from the Strip's loss of population after the 1967 war as well as from increasing unemployment levels caused by the war. Metzger, Orth and Sterzing (1983) and Locke and Stewart (1985) concluded that the immediate consequence of the 1967 war was a drastic deterioration in employment. The jobs in the service sector of the UN forces and the Egyptian army were gone. Trade, smuggling and tourism with Egypt cameto an end, the port was closed, and the fishing and construction industries were almost completely shut down.

As a result of the Israeli occupation, re-structuring of the Gaza Strip's workforce happened primarily at the expense of agricultural employment, which dropped in both proportional and absolute terms. In 1965, agriculture accounted for one-third of the labour force in the Gaza Strip, whereas services and construction engaged over 60% of the total workforce. Industrial employment was negligible (Gharaibeh, 1985). This distribution by sectoral employment was altered after 1967 when work in Israel was granted to Gazan workers in 1968.

Table 7.3 Percentage Distribution of Employed Persons by Economic Branch in the Gaza Strip 1968-84

Economic Branch	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
Total in thousands	40.4	48.0	53.2	54.2	57.9	62.2	66.7	66.2	69.8	70.9	73.9	78.4	79.6	81.3	82.0	85.3	87.2
Percentage																	
Agriculture, forestry & fishing	25.6	33.1	32.7	33.8	30.5	29.4	27.7	24.0	24.0	23.4	21.9	20.4	18.5	17.3	17.7	18.0	18.1
Industry (Mining & manufacturing)	16.2	12.5	11.8	11.9	13.1	13.0	13.0	14.2	15.3	15.0	17.3	19.8	19.5	17.2	15.9	17.1	17.6
Construction (Building & Public works)	9.9	9.6	12.4	9.2	12.8	16.9	19.3	22.1	21.6	20.8	21.4	23.0	23.1	26.5	27.2	26.1	25.5
Commerce - Restaurants and hotels	18.9	18.1	16.2	16.2	14.2	13.8	13.5	14.0	13.9	13.6	13.5	12.5	14.0	14.2	13.7	13.6	14.4
Transport - Storage & communication	7.9	7.2	6.0	7.0	7.1	7.2	7.4	7.3	6.3	6.9	6.8	6.4	6.6	6.2	6.2	5.9	5.9
Public & community services	14.6	14.0	15.3	15.9	16.4	14.9	13.7	13.2	13.9	14.7	13.5	12.1	13.0	12.8	13.5	13.1	12.8
Others*	6.7	5.5	5.6	6.0	5.9	4.8	5.4	5.2	5.0	5.6	5.6	5.8	5.3	5.2	5.8	6.2	5.7

Source : Central Bureau of Statistics, 1971, 1974, 1979, 1983, 1984 and 1985 [a]

* Electricity and water, finance and business, personnel and other services.

Table 7.3 demonstrates the proportional distribution of the Gaza Strip workforce by employment sectors. Up to 1978, agriculture was a leading sector of employment in the Strip, although its proportion had already declined over the decade 1968-78. Since then its share has continued to decline which resulted in it losing its predominant position as the biggest employer sector. At the same time, its relative importance has steadily contracted to some 18.1% of total employment by 1984.

Decreasing agricultural employment is a worldwide phenomenon associated positively with improvement in agricultural technology and negatively with rural-urban migration. "In the Gaza Strip 40% of the cultivated land is under irrigation. New technology, improved methods of irrigation and other practises help to increase labour productivity and thus release workers from this sector" (UNECWA, 1981). Another significant factor is that the Strip's cultivated land was reduced by some 25% during 1967-84, preventing any opportunity of absorbing additional workers in this sector in the future.

On the other hand, constructions share of total employment increased substantially by about 15.6% during 1968-84, and in the economy as a whole it jumped to some 25.5% in 1984 (Table 7.3). This upswing resulted from expansion in the construction sector within the Israeli economy which provided opportunities for hiring workers from the overcrowded Gaza Strip. Apparently, many agricultural workers found employment on construction sites in Israel, particularly since a high proportion of agricultural workers were only employed seasonally for picking fruit and vegetables. Hence construction was the convenient employment sector which was able to absorb unskilled and semi-skilled workers.

With regard to the industry, mining and manufacturing sectors, employment in the Strip fluctuated from 16.2% in 1968 to 17.6% in 1984. Simultaneously, the service sector become less important than it was before the 1967 war, employing approximately 48% of the employed workforce in 1968 and only 38.8% by 1984 (see Table 7.3).

7.3 Locational Distribution of Employed Labour Force

Since the Gaza Strip has been characterised by an excess in manpower and a poor economic infrastructure which could not absorb the potential

labour force, a high proportion of its labour force are forced to migrate to the oil-rich states for professional and white-collar employment, or to commute to Israel for daily-paid unskilled and semi-skilled jobs. In the light of the 1985 survey, 52.3% of the Gaza Strip's workforce were employed domestically, 41.2% in Israel, and only 6.5% in the Arab and non-Arab countries (Table 7.4). If the workers who were working both in the Gaza Strip and in Israel are taken into account, the percentage of those working in Israel will rise to 44.1%.

Initially, it is useful to deal with each group of workers separately according to their place of work, in order to bring to light their relative size, their importance to the Strip's economy, and their conditions of work.

7.3.1 Employment in the Gaza Strip

Since 1967, patterns of employment in the Gaza Strip have changed substantially as a consequence of the shifts in the economy. The Gaza

Table 7.4 Gaza Strip: Distribution of Labour Force According to Place of Work, 1985

Place of work	Employed persons				Total of employment	
	Male	% Male	Female	% female	Total of male and female	% of all employed
In the Gaza Strip	797	85.6	134	14.4	931	52.3
In Israel	712	97.0	22	3.0	734	41.2
In the Arab and Non-Arab countries	103	88.8	13	11.2	116	6.5
Total	1612	90.5	169	9.5	1781	100.0

Source : The 1985 Sample Survey

Strip became attached to the high-income, capital intensive, industrial society of Israel, which was in direct contrast to its own low-income, labour surplus economy. Hence, additional people, mainly men, have been drawn into wage labour, on either a permanent or a temporary basis to meet the Israeli demand for cheap workers, so work in Israel has been granted to the Gazan inhabitants. This phenomenon has led to a re-structuring of the sectoral employment pattern in the Gaza Strip itself.

Apparently, the number of workers employed domestically has shrunk slightly from about 47950 in 1970 to 47000 in 1984, a decline of a mere 2%. As regards other sectoral employment, the picture has dramatically altered since 1970. Agriculture shows the greatest decrease, by nearly half of its workforce, while employment in industry has gradually increased by 5% during 1970-84. The Strip's industrial sector, however, mainly depends on craft industries, small factories such as plastics, paper, and non-metal production and textile workshops. Construction enlisted about 4100 workers in 1970 (8.5% of total employment), but this dwindled significantly in the early and mid- 1970s, then later regained its 1970 level by 1981 (Table 7.5). Meanwhile, the proportion of the Service sector (classified in Table 7.5, as 'others') increased from 47.8% in 1970 to 57.9% in 1984.

The sectoral distribution of employment within the Gaza Strip shows that service is a leading economical sector. Services absorbed about three-fifths of the Strip's locally employed workers in 1984 (Fig. 7.1). In a nutshell, significant restructuring of the Gaza Strip workforce has occurred. A situation in the Gaza Strip has developed where unemployed and underemployed labourers have been absorbed into wage labour. Such an alteration manifested itself in the emergence of a sizeable wage labour proletariat in the Israeli construction and agricultural sectors (see Table 7.5). This was at the expense of the agricultural sector in the Strip where employment declined from 31.6% in 1970 to 16.5% in 1984.

Based on the 1985 survey results, the rate of employed women within the Gaza Strip was 14.4% of the total employed workers, and higher than the Strip's total employed women's rate of 6.6% by 7.8%. The high rate of locally employed women matches Gazan society's traditions, which reveal an extreme reluctance for women to work outside the home. Only in cases of hardship they will seek service work locally.


FIG. 7.1. CHANGING PROPORTIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF GAZAŚ WORKFORCE BY ECONOMIC SECTORS
IN THE GAZA STRIP AND IN ISRAEL OVER THE PERIOD 1970-84.
IN ISRAEL
OTHER BRANCHES
CONSTRUCTION
INDUSTRY
AGRICULTURE
IN THE GAZA STRIP
100 %
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
AD

Table 7.5 Proportional Distribution of Labour Force by Economic Sector in the Gaza Strip and in Israel 1970-1984*

Year	In the Gaza Strip						In Israel						Grand total (000's)
	Agriculture	Industry	Construction	Other	Total		Agriculture	Industry	Construction	Other	Total		
					000's	% of total labour force					000's	% of total labour force	
1970	31.6	12.1	8.5	47.8	47.95	90.0	40.7	8.5	47.4	3.4	5.350	10.0	53.3
1971	31.1	12.2	4.6	52.1	46.75	86.3	51.2	8.5	37.8	2.5	7.450	13.7	54.2
1972	24.8	12.6	4.1	58.5	41.87	72.4	45.0	14.7	36.0	4.3	15.93	27.6	57.8
1973	25.7	12.7	3.9	57.7	41.60	66.8	37.0	13.6	43.2	6.2	20.70	33.2	62.3
1974	24.8	12.2	4.1	58.9	42.67	64.0	32.7	14.8	46.4	6.1	24.03	36.0	66.7
1975	26.3	12.0	5.1	56.6	42.67	64.3	18.5	18.1	53.3	10.1	23.73	35.7	66.4
1976	26.5	13.5	4.6	55.4	44.30	63.5	19.6	18.5	51.8	10.1	25.50	36.5	69.8
1977	25.1	12.5	6.7	55.7	45.45	64.3	20.4	19.6	46.5	13.5	25.25	35.7	70.7
1978	21.1	15.4	7.0	56.5	44.80	60.8	23.2	20.4	44.3	12.1	28.90	39.2	73.7
1979	21.1	18.2	7.0	53.7	44.80	60.0	20.1	21.6	44.3	14.0	33.80	40.0	78.6
1980	18.8	18.6	7.3	55.3	45.60	57.3	18.3	20.9	44.0	16.8	34.00	42.7	79.6
1981	18.0	16.5	8.4	57.1	45.90	56.5	16.2	18.4	49.5	15.9	35.40	43.5	81.3
1982	17.9	14.8	8.5	58.8	46.10	56.1	16.9	17.4	51.2	14.5	36.10	43.9	82.2
1983	19.2	15.2	8.2	57.4	45.60	53.5	16.7	19.1	46.9	17.3	39.70	46.5	85.3
1984	16.5	17.1	8.5	57.9	47.00	53.9	19.6	18.1	45.1	17.2	40.20	46.1	87.2

Source : Calculated by the researcher from : Central Bureau of Statistics, 1979 and 1985a.

* The workforce of North Sinai has been deducted and then has been rounded to the nearest ten using the same methodology as explained in Chapter one and chapter two (Table 2.3).

7.3.2 Employment in Israel

After the 1967 war, some major economic decisions were taken by Israel to promote selectively economic links between the occupied territories and Israel. One of the most significant links was the use of migrant labour from the territories to fuel the Israeli economy during its 1970's boom. Van Arkadie (1977) has pinpointed that in 1968 Israeli Labour Exchange Offices were set up in the territories, issuing labour cards to permit Palestinians from the territories to work in Israel, commuting daily from their normal places of residence. Israeli businesses were granted permission to place subcontracting work (primarily for textiles) with firms and individuals in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Since 1968 workers from the Gaza Strip have been recruited through Labour Exchanges operated in the area by the Israeli Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs to meet an Israeli need for unskilled day labourers.

From 1968 to 1971, the number of Gazan workers in Israel was small, estimated at some 3,000 workers in 1968 and 7,450 in 1971. Then their number grew dramatically till 1974, benefitting from Israeli economic prosperity.

Up to 1971 employment in Israel accounted for a modest portion of total employment of the Strip's inhabitants, only 13.7%. One year later, the workforce size increased sharply by about 114%. This high increase resulted from the fact that the PLO military resistance had tried actively to prevent Gazans commuting to work in Israel between 1968 and 1971, but when the military resistance was defeated in 1972, the migrant workers grew dramatically, rising to some 40,200 by 1984, when 46.1% of the Gazan workforce were employed in Israel (Table 7.5).

Indeed, throughout the period 1970-84 the Strip's workforce labouring in Israel increased by about 650%, with an annual rate of increase of 46.5%. Nevertheless, the Israeli economic recessions which took place after the 1973 war and the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon had a limited impact upon the level of the Gaza Strip workers. A slight reduction of 300 workers occurred between 1974 and 1975. By 1976, however, significant improvements in employment had been reported and the total increased each year up to 1983 when it dwindled again by 500 workers in 1984 (Table 7.5).

In fact, the actual numbers of Gazan workers in Israel have always been significantly higher than those published at any given time, because many thousand workers commute illegally and have never been reflected in official estimates; many employees and employers prefer to bypass official placement to evade taxes and other wage deductions. Despite the difficulties in knowing how many people are working illegally in Israel, "Palestinians estimate that the number is about 40,000. A considerable number are under 17 and cannot work legally" (Locke & Stewart, 1985).

Although the Israeli agricultural sector was a considerable employer of the first labour migrants from the Strip in the early 1970s (51.2% of the total workforce in 1971 were agriculturally employed), since then the sector share has declined, notably to 19.6% by 1984, being replaced in importance by growth in construction, industry and the services sectors (see Table 7.5 and Figure 7.1).

The most conspicuous feature of Gazan commuter-migrant labour force is the large number of workers recruited in construction. Since the early 1970s construction has absorbed almost half the workers from the Gaza Strip, with its proportion only decreasing slightly during 1970-80 and in the last two years (Table 7.5). The high concentration of Gaza workers in the Israeli construction sector can be attributed to the higher wages which can be earned, compared with other economic sectors (see Table 7.8) and to its flexibility of absorbing both unskilled and semi-skilled workers.

However, the proportions of migrant workers employed in industry and other sectors (services) have substantially increased. Industry has risen by 9.6% between 1970 and 1984, whereas service sectors have revealed a high proportional increase of some 14% during the same period.

Graham-Brown (1984a) concludes that a noticeable percentage shift from agriculture to industry and services has occurred during the past 14 years. Industry now makes up 18.1% of employment from the Gaza Strip, although these may not be the true proportions: more of the unofficial workers are probably in agriculture and construction than in industry, which may lower the real proportion of workers in the latter sector.

The relative importance of the Strip labour in the total Israeli workforce has not been great. In 1983, Gazan workers in Israel

represented some 3.5% of Israel's total employed workforce. However, the concentration of Gaza's labour in the construction and agricultural sectors has been very significant; roughly 25% and 12% of those involved in construction and agriculture in the Israeli economy in 1983 were from the Gaza Strip.

In a nutshell, the previous indicators all suggest that Gazan workers have played an important role in the expansion of the Israeli economy since the occupation of 1967. The workers numbers are not so great that withdrawal of this labour could be expected to cause economic collapse, but for the particular sectors that have become highly dependent on this labour force, its absence would indicate difficulties and the need for a notable reallocation of the Israeli labour force.

So far, Palestinian workers from the Strip are employed to do work which Jewish workers will not do because of the low pay and low status, putting labour mobility in Israel at one of the lowest levels in the world. This can be illustrated by the fact that in December 1984, 3800 Israelis refused jobs typically done by Palestinians, because the pay was too little above that of unemployment benefit, which migrant workers are not entitled to receive (ILO, 1985).

According to the 1985 survey, only 3% out of the total Gazan employed workers in Israel were women (Table 7.4). The negligible proportion of employed women inside Israel reflects Gazan society's viewpoint toward this complicated subject. "For Palestinians, the issue of female employment becomes particularly sensitive, since the community perceives wage labour as an affront to a tradition already threatened by Israeli society and, especially if the women work inside the Green Line (Armistice Line), as the end of men's ability to control their lives under occupation (Rockwell, 1985). We shall return to this subject later on.

Finally, "there can be no question that this phenomenon (work in Israel) has reduced unemployment among the unskilled and semi-skilled, helped increase adult male participation in the active labour force, and provided a major source of income to residents of the territories" (Van Arkadie, 1977). In contrast, local economic activity has failed to expand due to very low levels of investment. Therefore, the number of locally employed people slightly dropped from 47,950 in 1970 to 47,000 in 1984

(Table 7.5). Hence, many skilled and highly educated people have emigrated to the oil-producing countries.

The work conditions of Gazan workers in Israel will be taken as a case study in order to present a complete picture.

7.3.3 Employment in the Arab and Non-Arab Countries

The 1985 sample survey of population structure shows that 116 persons out of the 1781 were employed in Arab and non-Arab countries. The majority were male, female participation constituting only 11.2% of the total employed people (Table 7.4). Since no data to hand can be sufficient to deal with this subject, a fieldwork survey has been conducted. Consequently, the question of labour migration from the Strip towards the Arab and non-Arab countries will be analysed at length later.

7.4 Occupation

In the light of what has been derived from the 1985 sample survey, the occupational status of the economically active population in the Gaza Strip for those aged 14 years and over can be found in Table 7.6. Roughly 48.4% of the workforce were classified as construction workers. Teaching and medical occupations (physicians, chemists and nurses) absorb about 17.4% of the active population. At the same time, merchants, sales workers and public and community services account for a modest percentage of 11.4%. Of particular interest is that less than 1% of the workforce are manufacturing workers, which indicates that the Gaza Strip has suffered severely from a shortage of this vital economic sector.

The occupational status of the economically active population in the Strip has been affected by the poor economic infrastructure of the area, the acute surplus in the labour force, work in Israel, and women's participation in the labour force. As a consequence, about half of the Gazan workforce were forced to search for any type of work they could find in Israel; construction is a leading employing sector of these migrant workers. As regards women's participation in the workforce, some variation in occupation between males and females can be found. Restricted by society's tradition, there are few sources of employment for professional women outside of teaching, textiles, and to some extent

Table 7.6 Occupation of the Economically Active* Population in the Gaza Strip, 1985

Types of Employment**	No.	%
Medical professions	61	3.0
Teaching	292	14.4
Agricultural workers	85	4.2
Public and community services	128	6.3
Construction (building and public works)	982	48.4
Professional and technical workers	124	6.1
Merchants and sales workers	103	5.1
Manufacturing workers	18	0.9
Unemployed graduates of university and teachers institute	83	4.1
Other professions	152	7.5
Total	2028	100.0

Source : The 1985 Sample Survey.

* The definition of economically active population here describes the working-age population including males and females either employed or unemployed.

** There were 8016 (79.8%) persons out of 10044 classified as inactive, namely, 1952 (19.4%) housewives, 4226 (42.1%) students, and (18.3%) old people, children under 6 years and handicapped.

health care. The Gazan female occupational status will be dealt with at length later.

7.5 Unemployment

The accuracy of unemployment figures concerning the Gazan workforce in particular and the occupied territories workforce in general confuse most specialized organizations and individuals who are interested in this subject. The Israeli authorities have confirmed that unemployment in the Gaza Strip has been diminished since work in Israel has been permitted to the Gazan people. In addition they stated that unemployment during the Egyptian administrative period of the Strip was very high, estimated at 43% for the Strip as a whole and 70% for those receiving welfare (refugees) (Ministry of Health of Israel, 1985). Therefore, our attention will focus on analysing the unemployment in the Strip during the Egyptian and Israeli occupation periods.

The only data to hand concerning the unemployment during the Egyptian period (1948-67) was gathered by Khlousi (1967). He concluded that unemployment was at 35.5% and 83% for the indigenous and refugee populations in 1960 respectively, making an average of about 60% for the Strip as a whole. But on the eve of the 1967 war, unemployment was estimated at 44% (Van Arkadie, 1977). However, unemployment figures during the Egyptian period must be used with some reservation particularly when compared with those figures reported during the Israeli occupation period.

Indeed, the high unemployment rates during the Egyptian period can be attributed to several reasons. Firstly, cut off from its hinterland, lacking natural resources except underground water supplies, with huge concentration of refugees in camps, severe shortages of capital, and a severely limited land area, the Gaza Strip was not able to offer full employment to its workforce. Secondly, the Egyptian rule of the Gaza Strip coincided with a period of slow economic growth in Egypt itself (Sandler and Frisch, 1982), which actually left its impact on the labour force market of the Gaza Strip. Thirdly, the unemployment rate was greatly influenced by the huge concentration of Palestinian refugees who were hoping to return to their homeland rather than seek work at that time.

In the postwar period, employment of Gazan inhabitants in Israel was permitted in 1968 and since then employment has risen steadily, while unemployment decreased dramatically and has been virtually eliminated. Based on Israeli statistics, unemployment in the Strip fell from 8200 (about 17%) in 1968 to only 800 (0.9%) in 1984 (Table 7.1).

The above-mentioned conclusion contradicted what was reported by Kanovsky (1970) about the employment situation in the Strip in the early stage of the occupation. He stated that 19,000 job seekers were registered in the eight employment offices operating in the Strip in 1969, while jobs were provided for only 8000 many on a part-time basis.

The credibility of official figures regarding unemployment in the Strip must be examined since many thousands of Gazan workers are not counted in the official statistics as unemployed. On the other hand, there were several thousands working in Israel illegally, who were also not included in the unemployment figures. This can be simply noted from the Israeli definition of unemployed people, as well as from their method of yielding data about employment in the occupied territories.

Since August 1968, the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics has conducted regular surveys concerning employment in the occupied territories. It is based on a sample drawn according to principles and definitions which are similar to those applied in the Labour Force Survey in Israel. Prior to 1973, the sample included about 4500 families which were surveyed every quarter year. But in 1974 the sample was enlarged to about 6500 families in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (Central Bureau of Statistics, 1984). Simultaneously, the Israeli definition of unemployed persons include: "all those who had not worked at all during the determinant week (even for a single hour), and actively sought work during that week (the time of conducting the survey), by registration at the Labour Exchange of Employment Service or at any other labour exchange, by a personal or written application (Central Bureau of Statistics, 1984, 1985b).

Consequently, the Israeli definition of unemployment is suitable for use in Israel itself, because all of its workforce are registered with the Employment Service, but in the case of the Gaza Strip this definition is not capable of being accurate as a high proportion of the Strip's labour

force have been illegally employed in Israel. Some 30% of those working in Israel had not been registered with the Employment Service according to the Israeli official estimation (Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs of Israel, 1985).

At the same time, figures obtained from the 1985 survey of Gazan workers in Israel show that about two-thirds of Gaza's workers commuted to work in Israel illegally, resulting from the growth of unemployment trends in Israel itself which was estimated at 6% in 1984. According to the Israeli statistics, since 1973 the unemployment figures had been found to be below 1% (see Table 7.1). Consequently, it can be concluded that the lower unemployment rates of the Gaza Strip than those reported in Israel itself are attributable to the inadequacy of adopting the Israeli definition of unemployment in the Gaza Strip. Hence, the unemployment figures which have been published by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics are incomplete and defective.

In the light of the 1985 survey, 12.2% of the Gazan workforce were reported as unemployed, indicating a higher rate than that concluded by the Israeli official figures. On the other hand, some Palestinian sources in the occupied territories gave an estimate of an unemployment level of 34% to 40% in early 1985 (ILO, 1985), while in May 1986 unemployment was estimated at 50% (Condie, 1986). Indeed unemployment has grown, and it has resulted from a continuing fall in employment in Israel, particularly when the Israeli economy cooled after the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. No doubt unemployment in the Gaza Strip has been dramatically reduced until 1982, but since then it has grown to its highest level in 1986 and may now be higher than that reported in the 1985 survey.

Another severe problem facing the Gaza Strip workforce is the high unemployment level for university graduates. Out of the 247 unemployed persons found in the 1985 survey, 83 (33.6%) of them were classified as unemployed graduates of university and teachers institute. Furthermore, the total of unemployed graduates was reported at about 3629 persons (Al Bayader Assiyasi, 1985). But if the graduates of the Islamic University of Gaza had been added, the number would rise to about 4800 in 1985.

The problem of unemployed Gazan graduates can be attributed to two main causes:

Firstly, the Israeli occupation of the Strip represents the main cause of the problem. The Israeli authorities never attempted to introduce any solution, their first consideration being security. Hence, they impose many restrictions, particularly against young adults, preventing them from travelling abroad even to seek jobs. Moreover, so far the Islamic University of Gaza has not yet been recognized by the Israel authorities as a university, which has led to the closure of any available opportunities of work for hiring its graduates locally, either in the government directed institutions or in UNRWA-administered establishments.

In view of the aforesaid difficulties and the unavailability of opportunities of domestic employment, the only accessible job prospects are for those who can travel abroad in order to be chosen by one of the Arab employment missions in Jordan and sometimes in Egypt. Persons who want to travel must obtain special permits, issued by the Israeli authorities. They provide all Gazan with exit permits valid for up to three years which entitle the holders to come back to the Strip at any time. But those who are aged less than 26 years and who wish to return to the Strip must spend at least six months outside the Strip beginning from their departure date, before they will be allowed to come back. At the same time, both the Jordanian and Egyptian authorities refuse to grant access into Jordan and Egypt for young adults holding those permits. In the light of these difficulties, graduates have no other alternatives except waiting until they reach the age of 26 years and over, when they are able to travel freely as long as they have no political problems with the Israeli occupation authorities.

Secondly, despite the fact that the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia have traditionally been enthusiastic employers of highly skilled Palestinians (see Table 7.13), recently they do not want a large Palestinian working population in their homelands; partly, for their own internal security reasons, and partly as a response to the PLO's request to limit job opportunities in order to prevent a mass exodus from the occupied territories. In addition, the Gulf states as well as Saudi Arabia prefer to hire Palestinians from the West Bank who have Jordanian passports rather than hire those from the stateless Gaza Strip. Palestinians from the Strip travel on an Israeli Laissez-passer to non-Arab countries, and on an Egyptian Laissez-passer to the Arab states. Arab states'

recognition of the Egyptian laissez-passer depends on the political atmosphere between the Palestinians and the Arab states.

Consequently, it can be concluded that the problem of graduate unemployment constitutes a serious problem in the Strip since the universities continue to be flooded with students, and available jobs for Gazan graduates in the Strip are quite limited. So far, all the Israelis have to offer for Gazan graduates is employment in Israel at unskilled and semi-skilled daily jobs, while it now appears that there will not be enough work in the immediate future. It is not surprising that many highly qualified graduates, such as lawyers, engineers and teachers, are amongst the groups of workers gathered to be picked over by potential employers. They are looking for labouring jobs on building sites or in the fields or as waiters (Condie, 1986).

Many scholars attribute the unemployment problem to the role of the Israeli occupation and they suggest solutions lie in the elimination of the Israeli occupation and the establishment of the independent Palestinian state (Al Fajr, 1986). Finally, it can be realized that the problem is a direct result of the absence of a national authority that can plan and guide.

7.6 Gazan Workers in Israel : A Case Study of Their Conditions of Work

This study will focus on analysing the work conditions of the Strip's workers in Israel. The importance of this subject can be ascertained from the fact that work in Israel has attracted about half of the Gaza Strip labour force. This phenomenon is the most obvious cause and consequence of integration into the Israeli economy. As little is known about these workers and their conditions of work, a sample survey was employed in order to gather the required data, and to pinpoint the main characteristics of those workers.

Initially, when the Gaza Strip was occupied by Israel in June 1967, there was a reservoir of unemployed and underemployed labour in the Strip as a whole and in the Strip's refugee camps in particular. In such conditions, people would be willing to take any type of work which was offered.

Indeed, until July 1968, Gazan workers were not permitted to seek work in Israel as the authorities feared that such employment would aggravate employment problems in Israel. For instance, in 1967 and 1968, Israel unemployment levels amounted to about 11% and 7.7% of the total civilian labour force respectively. But when the Israeli economy enjoyed its period of sustained growth during 1968-73, producing after 1969 a tight labour market, the Israeli employment picture changed and labourers from the Gaza Strip were allowed to commute in increasing numbers for employment inside Israel. At that time, "the Histadrut (Israel Trades Union Federation) raised objections to this flow of cheap labour, but dropped this opposition when it became clear that these workers were mostly doing jobs their members would rather not do" (Graham-Brown, 1984a).

The pattern of migration to work in Israel essentially led to absorption of the unemployed and underemployed males of the Gaza Strip into the Israeli workforce and to the subordination of the Strip economy. But it is appropriate to mention here that the decision to allow Gazan workers to work inside Israel was issued to maintain a significant political aim, particularly when the Israeli leaders realized that economic activity would help distract refugee attention from the resistance struggle (Mandell, 1985).

7.6.1 Characteristics of the Sample Group

Table 7.7, which illustrates the main features of the Gazan workforce in Israel by sex and socio-economic characteristics, shows that women make up about 17.7% of the total. In this study, women's participation in the workforce indicates a higher share than that was reported earlier in this chapter, but this was a consequence of the enlargement of the sample of females, which was made in order to have reliable data when comparing female conditons of work with those of male workers. The key aim of this study is to investigate the conditions of work of Gazan females in Israel, rather than to identify their proportion in the labour force.

Considering the workforce by sex, the proportion of female labourers varied widely according to their place of residence within the Strip. About 60.4% of the total female workforce were coming from the southern zone, while both northern and central zones contributed 37.7% and 1.9%

respectively (Table 7.7). In contrast, the proportion of male labourers reveals a homogenous distribution by geographical zones, two-fifths of the total male labourers in Israel came from the northern zone.

Viewed from another angle, the refugee and indigenous status of commuter-migrant workers were contrasted greatly, roughly 78.7% of the overall workforce being refugees while the indigenous workers constituted only 21.3%. Classification of the labour force according to sex reveals that some 88.7% of the total females workforce were classified as refugees, while the remaining proportion were reported as indigenous. In contrast, male workers with refugee status constituted about three-quarters of the Strip workforce in Israel (Table 7.7).

Analysis of the labour force by marital status shows that 62.7% of the workers are married, 26.7% single, while those widowed or divorced constituted only 10.6%. The picture shows large variation between male and female workers, and between females working in the Gaza Strip and those working inside Israel. For example, 97.1% of the total male workers were married or single, and only 2.9% were widowed or divorced, while only 39.6% of the total working females were married, 13.2% single and 47.2% were widowed or divorced (Table 7.7). On the other hand, the marital status of female workers working in Israel is extremely different from those working in the Gaza Strip. Rockwell (1985) concluding that the majority of female workers inside the Gaza Strip were single, and there were very few widowed and divorced women working. But she noted that married women rarely work: out of a sample of 156 working Palestinian women, she found only one woman was married.

The low proportion of single females in the commuter labour force can be explained by the extreme traditions of society which are reluctant for single females to work in particular, and are against women's labour in general. Hence most working women work out of dire necessity. Mandell (1985) classified those women working in Israel as divorced and widowed women, those whose husbands or fathers were working abroad at the time of the 1967 war, and were not included in the 1967 census which determined residence status, and those whose husabands were in prison.

The above-mentioned conclusion can be emphasised by analysing the mean age of female workers in Israel, which amounted to 43.2 years against

Table 7.7 The Main Characteristics of the Gaza Strip Workers Commuting to Work Inside Israel by Sex According to the 1985 Survey

Characteristic	Male		Female		Both sexes	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Number of cases	247	82.3	53	17.7	300	100
Residency place in the Strip:						
From the northern zone	100	40.5	20	37.7	120	40
From the central zone	69	27.9	1	1.9	70	23.3
From the southern zone	78	31.6	32	60.4	110	36.7
Workers with refugee status:	189	76.5	47	88.7	236	78.7
Workers with indigenous status:	58	23.5	6	11.3	64	21.3
Marital status:						
Single	73	29.5	7	13.2	80	26.7
Married	167	67.6	21	39.6	188	62.7
Widowed	4	1.6	19	35.9	23	7.6
Divorced	3	1.2	6	11.2	9	3.0
Level of Education:						
Illiterate	24	9.7	41	77.4	65	21.7
Elementary	58	23.5	8	15.1	66	22.0
Preparatory	75	30.4	4	7.5	79	26.3
Secondary	64	25.9	-	-	64	21.3
Technical & teachers institutes	20	8.1	-	-	20	6.7
University	6	2.4	-	-	6	2.0

Source : The 1985 Sample Survey.

an average of 29.7 years of males. In addition, about 73.6% of the total females were over 40 years of age and 30% over 50 years of age. In comparison, about 15.7% and 9.7% of males were over 40 and 50 years of age respectively.

The difference between school enrolment of males and females is conspicuous (see Table 7.7). At the top of the educational ladder, some 10.5% of male workers had obtained certificates from higher institutes or universities, compared with zero for female workers. At the bottom, 77.4% of female workers were illiterate compared with only 9.7% of males. On the other hand, the two sexes combined revealed that only 21.7% of the labour force were illiterate and 70% have had less than 9 years of school enrolment. To sum up, the education level of male workers is dramatically better than that of female workers.

7.6.2 Employment by Economic Sector

Based on the 1985 survey, the distribution of Gazan migrant workers in Israel by economic sector has been illustrated in Table 7.8 and Figure 7.2. Construction and agriculture still constitute the largest employment sectors, absorbing roughly 52.7% of the total workforce employed in Israel. These figures indicate a higher share by about 9.1% than those of the official statistics reported in 1984 (see Table 7.3). This increase in the share of construction and agriculture may not have resulted from a changing of the employment composition between 1984 and 1985, but as a direct consequence of studying the workforce as a whole, including those working illegally in Israel (unofficial workers); particularly since most of the unofficial workers are employed in agriculture and construction rather than in the other economic activities.

Industry accounted for about 16.7% of total employment in 1985 compared with 17.6% in 1984, whereas the remaining economic sectors combined absorbed some 30.6%, which shows a drop of 8.2% from what was reported in 1984 (see Table 7.3).

Initially, it is interesting to analyse the economic activity of the Gazan workforce working in Israel according to their places of work, aiming to pinpoint the major employment sectors in each place, and to conclude whether a relationship exists between the value of income, place

Table 7.8 Distribution of Gazan Workers in Israel by Economic Activity, Place of Work, Monthly Income by Place of Work and Type of Economic Activity, Average Daily Wage, and Average Number of Days Worked per Month of the 1985 Sample Survey

Place of work	Total		Type of work							Monthly income in US$ by place of work	Average number of of days worked per month	Average daily wage in US$
	In absolute numbers	%	Construction (Building & Public works)	Industry (Mining & manufacturing)	Restaurants, cafes, hotels & shops	Agricultural	Transport, storage & communication	Public & community services	Other activity			
Number in Sample	300	-	84	50	28	74	27	27	10	-	-	-
Percentage	-	100	28.0	16.7	9.3	24.7	9.0	9.0	3.3	-	-	-
Monthly income in US$ by type of economic activity	-	-	207.0	204.0	186	136.5	164.8	189	193.5	181.3	21.9	8.3
Place of Work:												
Tel Aviv, Yafo & Petah Tiqwa	83	27.7	34.9	16.9	18.1	4.8	7.2	15.7	2.4	212	23.0	9.2
Ashqelon & Qiryat Gat area	43	14.3	14.0	25.6	2.3	37.2	7.0	9.3	4.6	161	22.0	7.3
Rishon Le Ziyyon, Rehovot & Yavne	36	12.0	36.1	11.1	8.3	16.7	13.9	11.1	2.8	202	21.7	9.3
Ashdod	33	11.0	33.3	12.1	9.1	33.3	9.1	3.0	-	171	20.9	8.2
Besor area	21	7.0	-	28.6	-	42.9	28.5	-	-	107	21.3	5.0
Netivot & Beer Sheva region	19	6.3	15.8	26.3	-	52.6	5.3	-	-	165	19.4	8.5
Kefar Sava, Netanya & Hadera	16	5.3	43.8	6.3	6.3	18.8	-	6.3	18.8	187	23.8	7.9
Qiryat Malakhi area	16	5.3	6.25	12.5	6.25	62.5	12.5	-	-	173	22.3	7.8
Ramla and Lod area	13	4.3	30.8	7.7	30.8	23.1	-	7.7	-	169	23.9	7.1
Other Places	20	6.7	50.0	10.0	-	10.0	5.0	15.0	10.0	181	20.8	8.7

Source : The 1985 Sample Survey.



FIG. 7.2. DISTRIBUTION OF GAZAN WORKERS IN ISRAEL BY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AND PLACE OF WORK, 1985.

of work, and type of economic activity. Also it is important to deal with the employment structure alongside the sex composition of the workforce, in order to explore the main employment sectors dominated by each sex.

Analysis of employment structure by place of work shows that more than one-third of Gazan workers in Kefar Sava, Netanya and Hadera, Rishon Le Ziyyon, Rehovot and Yavne, Tel Aviv, Yafo and Petah Tiqwa, Ashdod, and places classified as others were employed in construction; while in the remaining places of work the share of construction ranged from zero in Besor area to 30.8% in Ramla and Lod area (Table 7.8).

Although agriculture is the second largest employment sector, its relative share varies greatly from one place of work to another. In five areas more than one-third of the employed workforce were engaged in agricultural jobs. In constrast the remaining areas of employment indicate percentages lower than the Strip's average of 24.7% of those working in Israel.

Moreover, industry's share ranges from 6.3% in Kefar Sava, Netanya and Hadera to a peak of 28.6% in Besor area (an area where industry is entirely agricultural manufacturing). These figures display a narrower deviation from the overall share of employment in industry than in either construction or agriculture.

In the meantime, the share of workers employed in restaurants, cafes, hotels and shops indicate a high concentration in both Ramla and Lod area, and Tel Aviv, Yafo and Petah Tiqwa, while the shares in the remaining places are lower than the general average of 9.3% for Gazan workers as a whole (Table 7.8).

The composition of labour employed within a given place of work has provided differeing pictures. Although construction is a leading sector of employment in each of Tel Aviv, Yafo and Petah Tiqwa, Rishon Le Ziyyou, Rehovot and Yavne, Kefar Sava, Netanya and Hadera, Ramla and Lod area, and other places, agriculture is found to be the largest employer in Ashqelon and Qiryat Gat area, Besor area, Netivot and Beer Sheva region, and Qiryat Malakhi. At the same time, Ashdod reveals a balanced share between construction and agricultural employment (see Fig. 7.2 and Table 7.8).

Since construction and agriculture have constituted the largest employment sectors for Gazan migrant workers in Israel, a comparison has been made in order to identify the relationship between them, as a strong negative correlation was found between constructional and agricultural employment. The correlation between the percentage of Gaza workers employed in construction and percentage of those engaged in agriculture within each place of work is negative and significant at the level of 5% ($r = -0.84$). Hence it may be concluded that employment in construction corresponds negatively with employment in agriculture (see Fig. 7.3).

A breakdown of the workforce by gender reveals that only three economic sectors were engaged by females. 79.2% of Gazan females working in Israel were employed in agriculture, 15.1% in transport, storage and communication, and some 5.7% in public and community services. In contrast, only 13.0%, 7.7% and 9.7% of Gaza's males were employed in these three economic sectors (see Table 7.9). In essence, Table 7.9 shows that Gazan male workers tend to be recruited in construction and industry, while female workers prefer working in agriculture.

To sum up, we can conclude that most jobs held by Gazan workers in Israel were classified as unskilled and semi-skilled jobs. Graham-Brown (1984a) noted that in December 1981, out of a total of 3,873 positions filled by workers from the occupied territories, 3,299 (85%) were for unskilled workers.

7.6.3. Worktravel and Wages

An overview of the major commuting linkages between the Gaza Strip and the Israeli labour markets is portrayed in Figure 7.2, where the principal worktravel destinations as well as the dominant centres of employment can be explicitly identified. More than a quarter of the total Gazan migrant workers in Israel commuted to work in Tel Aviv, Yafo and Petah Tiqwa alone. In contrast, Ashqelon and Qiryat Gat area and Rishon Le Ziyyon, Rehovot and Yavne combined, absorbed about another quarter, Ashdod employed about 11%, while the remaining destinations offered jobs for about one-third out of the total Gazan workers employed in Israel (see Table 7.8).

FIG·7·3·THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PERCENTAGE OF GAZA'S WORKERS EMPLOYED IN CONSTRUCTION AND AGRICULTURE ACCORDING TO THEIR PLACES OF WORK IN ISRAEL



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Table 7.9 Classification of Gazan Workers in Israel by Economic Sector and Sex of the 1985 Sample Survey

Type of Work	Male		Female	
	No.	%	No.	%
Construction (building and public works)	84	34.0	-	0.0
Industry (mining and manufacturing)	50	20.2	-	0.0
Restaurants, cafes, hotels and shops	28	11.3	-	0.0
Agriculture	32	13.0	42	79.2
Transport, storage and communication	19	7.7	8	15.1
Public and community services	24	9.7	3	5.7
Other activities	10	4.1	-	0.0
Total	247	100.0	53	100.0

Source : The 1985 Sample Survey.

Based on the 1985 Survey, about 52.7% of workers living in the Gaza Strip had return journeys to work of over 140 km, some 32% had to travel for more than 180 km, while 13.7% had a worktrip of over 200 km. In other words, the average daily return work-trip for the Gazan workers in Israel was about 148.8 km. The distance was 155.8 km for male workers and about 116.2 km for females, the lower figure for female workers resulting from their concentration in agricultural jobs close to the Gaza Strip (see Figure 7.2).

Moreover, in theory, employment declines substantially with increasing distance from a given point. The experience of the Gaza Strip reflects evidence against this conclusion. For instant, despite the fact that the average daily return trip to work in Tel Aviv, Yafo and Petah Tiqwa is 197.6 km, more than a quarter of Gaza's workers were employed there (Table 7.8). Hence it is crucial to identify the relationship between wages, which may be orientating labour force movements, and places of work as well as types of economic activity.

It is frequently observed that earnings of Gazan workers employed in Israel differ greatly by place of work, employment sector, and sex. The 1985 survey shows that the average daily pay for day labourers in Israel was about $8.3. The highest daily salaries were paid in Rishon Le Ziyyon, Rehovot and Yavne, and Tel Aviv, Yafo and Petah Tiqwa, amounting to $9.3 and $9.2 respectively, while the lowest was $5 in Besor area (Table 7.8).

Classification of wages by sex shows that the average wage for a female labourer was about 43% lower than that earned by a male worker. Based on the 1985 survey, the average monthly wages paid to Gazan workers (both sexes) were $181.3, $196.5 ($ 6.55 per day) for a male labourer, and only $110.7 ($3.69 per day) for a female worker.

Considering wages by sectors of employment, the highest monthly earnings were gained from working in construction and industry, giving an average monthly income of $207 ($6.9 per day), and $204 ($6.8 per day) respectively. Simultaneously the lowest was $136.5 ($4.55 per day) earned from labouring in agriculture. This explains the high concentration of Gazan workers in the construction sector compared with other economic sectors.

Roughly, similar results have been achieved by Roy (1986) for the Gaza Strip. According to her figures, in 1984, Gazan workers received an average daily wage of $5.71, or $171.0 a month. At the same time, the highest daily salaries were paid in construction ($6.25) and industry $5.9) and the lowest in agriculture ($4.2).

Although the average wages derived from the 1985 survey are considerably higher than those calculated by Roy, the earnings orders by economic sector coincide between the two studies. However, it must be taken into consideration that the variation in wages may have resulted from rising wages during 1984-85, or to more accurate answers being given to the researcher by the contacted respondents.

Comparing the relative wages of Gazan workers in Israel with those working in the Strip is crucial. Statistics published by the Israeli Ministry of Labour confirm that there has been a levelling out of the gap between the average daily wage paid to workers from the occupied territories on the spot and in Israel. During the first nine months of

1985, this wage was 20% higher in the Gaza Strip than in Israel (ILO, 1986).

Alongside the sectoral employment, Zakai (1986) concludes that in the construction sector the relative wages as a percentage were 313 in 1970 for those working in Israel and declined sharply to 108 by 1984, while wages amounted to 214, 283, and 168 in 1970, and decreased to 111, 130, and 63 in 1984 in the sectors of agriculture, industry, and other industries respectively. However, the narrowing gap between wages paid in Israel and inside the Gaza Strip has resulted from decreasing wages in Israel rather than an increase in the Gaza Strip. As a consequence of the economic slow down in Israel and the rising unemployment ratio, Gazan workers in Israel accept less payment in order to secure their livelihoods.

Roy (1986) rejected the Israeli claim that the daily wages for workers inside the Gaza Strip are higher than those paid to their counterparts in Israel, and she described the Israeli statistics as misleading. She introduced evidence that the proportion of Gaza's locally employed labour force working in agriculture received about $3.8 per day in 1984, significantly lower than the daily salaries paid to those employed in Israel.

Wages paid to Gazan workers in Israel are notably lower than those paid to their Israeli counterparts, despite claims to the contrary issued in the 1985 annual report of the Israeli Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. They claimed that one of the major goals guiding Israeli governmental policy with regard to the employment of workers from the occupied territories in Israel is the equality of wages, social benefits and working conditions. Van Arkadie (1977) concluded that the average wage for a labourer from the occupied territories stood at 50% of that received by an Israeli worker in 1972. But if the cost of transportation is added, the real wage drops to about 20-30% of those wages received by the Israeli workers.

There is no doubt that earnings from working in Israel have largely contributed to the increase in the gross national products of the Strip since 1967. External payments, of which salaries earned in Israel are a large part, grew from only 2% of GNP in 1968, to about 31% in 1973 and to 45% in 1983 (Roy, 1986).

Another factor which may be considered to have affected the variations in the actual daily wages between places of work is the average number of days worked per month. Although the highest monthly salary is earned from working in Tel Aviv, Yafa and Petah Tiqwa, the highest daily wage is paid in Rishon Le Ziyyon, Rehovot and Yavne (see Table 7.8).

Analysis of monthly worked days by place of work shows that the highest number of days worked per months was in Ramla and Lod area, and Kefar Sava, Netanya and Hadera, amounting to an average monthly employed days of 23.9 and 23.8 respectively. The lowest was 19.4 days worked in Netivot and Beer Sheva region. Although the average monthly worked days was 21.9, about 18.7% of Gazan workers worked less than 20 days a month, and only 6% had worked below 15 days.

The average working days for a female worker was 20.1 a month, but about 45.2% of females worked less than 20 days a month, and some 9.4% below 15 days. In contrast, the average working days for a male worker was 22.3 per month. At the same time, 12.9% of males worked less than 20 days, and only 7.2% worked below 15 days a month.

7.6.4 Conditions of Work and Welfare Benefits

Obviously, analysing the conditions of work of Gazan commuter-workers in Israel represents the most important aspect of this study. Its relative significance can be derived from the fact that very little is known about them and their daily suffering, which can introduce the whole problem of the teeming Gaza Strip.

Officially, employment in Israel provided to Gazan workers must be organized and supervised by the Israeli employment offices, which were established in the Strip after the 1967 war. A worker who wishes to seek employment in Israel is required to register with one of these employment offices in his area of residency. Israeli firms report their needs for labourers to an employment office; after the worker in question has been checked by Israeli security, the employment office issues a work certificate indicating that he has gone through legal channels in obtaining his specific job. "These work certificates are issued for a period of 4 months, after which they must be renewed. However, since 1981, tenured workers in industry need renew them only every 6 months" (Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs of Israel, 1985).

Despite the above-mentioned regulations, a high proportion of Gazan workers have always commuted to work in Israel illegally (also known to the Israelis as irregular workers, or workers in irregular employment). Unfortunately, there are no accurate figures for the numbers of those workers employed in Israel without permits. Hence, there are numerous estimates, some of them from Israeli sources, amounting to one-third of the workers from the occupied territories employed in Israel and about 50% in the building sector. Moreover, General Abraham Ben Yamin, the Israeli civil administration commander of the Gaza Strip in a televized broadcast on 27 December 1984 estimated the number of illegal workers from the Strip to be about 20,000, or some 50% of the total Gazan workforce employed in Israel (Akhbar Ghazza, 1985). In addition, the Central Employment Office in Gaza indicates that over 40% of workers from the Gaza Strip work in Israel illegally (ILO, 1986).

In the light of the 1985 survey, about 37.3% of Gazan workers were employed in Israel legally. Analysing the data by sex, the percentage of male workers employed legally in Israel was higher than females, amounting to 43.4% and 9.4% respectively. On the other hand, the percentage of Gazan workers commuting to work illegally was 62.7%. Classification by sex shows 90.6% and 56.7% of female and male workers were employed illegally.

The percentage of illegal workers derived from the 1985 Survey is considerably higher than that estimated by Israeli sources. This can be justified by the fact that the 1985 survey was carried out during the season of picking citrus and vegetables; as a consequence the percentage of irregular workers may have risen. But no doubt the difficult economic situation in Israel and increasing unemployment ratios have forced job-seekers to turn away from official recruitment channels despite allegations to the contrary raised by the Israeli authorities and Histadrut.

However, Gazan illegal workers who prefer to be employed in Israel unofficially have been questioned. Four main reasons have been given as causes of rejecting recruitment through the labour office.

Firstly, out of the 188 illegal workers (140 males and 48 females) identified in this study, about 83% of them refused to be recruited

through official channels because they thought that they could earn more privately. The same reasons were given by both male and female workers, amounting to 82.85% and 83.3% respectively. In fact, wages paid to illegal workers are higher than those paid to their legal counterparts, amounting in many cases to 200% or more. If the cost of transportation is deducted, the real wage decreases substantially, particularly as the day's work is not secure. On the contrary, legal workers were provided with transportation funded entirely or partly by their employers.

Based on the 1985 survey, the net income per month for legal workers was $199.1, compared with $170.7 for their illegal counterparts. Simultaneously, the average days worked per month were 23.7 for legal workers and about 21.9 for illegal ones, giving actual daily wages of $8.4 and $8.2 for the legal and illegal workers respectively. This trend ensures that the legal workers have more secure jobs than those illegally employed.

Secondly, roughly 59% of the illegal workers disapproved of legal work in order to avoid a high deduction of taxes from their wages; 60.4% and 58.6% of female and male workers respectively gave this reason for working illegally.

Significantly, Gazan legal workers are required to pay up to 30% of their earnings for taxes, namely national insurance, trade union fees, social security, income tax, and medical insurance. But workers who have earnings below minimum wages are required to pay about 11% of their wages for social benefits. According to the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs of Israel, Gazan workers who work in Israel pay tax at the same level as Israeli workers. Despite this they do not receive the same benefits, especially with respect to pensions, sick leave, widows pensions, unemployment benefit, and disability pensions.

Although Gaza's workers pay these taxes, they are not eligible to receive the benefits offered under the schemes they are charged for, or else they have a low probability of claiming them. At the same time, the Histadrut union refuses to admit Gazan workers as members and deducts about 1% of their wages in payment for services which the union does not provide (Roy, 1986).

Similarly, despite the fact that Gazan workers pay national insurance which amounts to some 6% of their wages, they are not eligible to receive the relevant benefits. The 1985 report published by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs of Israel indicates that workers from the occupied territories receive all social benefits paid to their Israeli counterparts, with the exception of national insurance benefits which, according to the report, carry a legal requirement of residence in Israel.

Moreover, the report claims that health services provided to Gazan legal workers are financed in part by a small additional deduction from the worker's paycheque, while the Israeli government provides the remainder of the budget needed for this purpose. However, this claim is somewhat misleading since legal workers contributions were equivalent to about 82% of the premiums of private health insurance. For instance, in July 1986, the monthly fee for private health insurance was about $20, while the health services deduction from the legal workers paycheque amounted to some $16.4.

Thirdly, owing to the long return work-trip of Gazan workers in Israel, which was described earlier, about 22.3% of the illegal workers refused to be officially recruited, as they were not willing to work throughout the year. Nearly similar answers were given by male and female workers, accounting for 23.6% and 18.75% respectively.

Frequently, many Gazan workers (legal and illegal workers) travel for as much as 5 hours a day. They commute to work at about 4 a.m. and return back between 6 and 7 p.m. (Plates 7.1 and 7.2). In such conditions of work, they are not willing to be hired on a regular basis as the Israeli firms require. This group of illegal workers includes those who want to be hired temporarily, such as farm owners during specified periods when they are not busy with their crops, school and university students during their vacations, and some Gazan employees seeking extra work during their holidays.

Lastly, about 41.5% of the irregular workers preferred to be hired illegally but they did not provide specific reasons why. At the same time, this absence of reason was given by about 42.1% and 39.6% of male and female illegal workers respectively.

Plate 7.1 : Shuja'aya square : Workers congregate near Gaza town's central post office from dawn onwards.

Photo : The author.

Plate 7.2 : Gazan workers, gathering ready to travel to work in Israel and clearly showing boys aged under 16, therefore working illegally (The legal age for working in Israel being 17).

Photo : The author.

Indeed amongst this group of irregular workers are girls and boys below the minimum legal age of work. Actually, workers from the Gaza Strip under the age of 17 are not issued with work certificates for employment in Israel, while in the Strip the minimum legal working age is 14 according to a special ordinance issued in 1978 by the Israeli occupational authorities.

Roy (1986) concluded that amongst the illegal workers employed in Israel are children aged between 8-15 years. This outcome can be clearly interpreted from Plate 7.2. The 1985 survey shows that about 1.3% of Gazan workers were under 15, and some 6% under 17 years of age. Moreover, the ILO asked the Israeli authorities to take particular care in order to control the clandestine employment of Gazan young people who are under the statutory minimum age, as this can easily give rise to abuse (ILO, 1986). It is regrettable that the Israeli authorities have been unwilling to curb the "irregular labour" phenomenon or to reduce it substantially, as they are not able to offer full employment to those workers, particularly since their economy slowed down into recession.

The economic load of Gazan migrant workers is increased by the cost of transportation into Israel which is liable to eat up a major part of a daily wage, averaging between 30% and 60% of the salary according to the mode of transportation. Hence Gazan workers travel to work on different bases.

Based on Israeli estimates, about 80% of the occupied territories' workers are commuters who return home daily. In contrast, the 1985 survey shows that some 72.3% of workers from the Gaza Strip commuted daily between their homes and their places of work in Israel, 19% make their return trip weekly, and about 8.7% make it less often. However, if the analysis is carried out by sex, the picture is considerably altered. The survey shows that 92.5% and 69% of female and male workers commuted on a daily basis, 3.75% and 23.3% weekly, and only 3.75% and 9.1% less often.

Yet, staying overnight in Israel is prohibited for both legal and illegal workers between midnight and 4 a.m. A worker who wants to stay overnight has to be supplied with a lodging permit issued by the Israeli authorities after a request from his employer. But only a restricted number of these permits is granted to workers in special circumstances.

In the light of the 1985 survey, out of the 83 workers (79 males and 4 females) who commuted weekly or less between the Strip and Israel, only 25 workers (30.1%), all of them males, had lodging permits. In contrast the remainder (54 males and 4 females) were accommodated in Israel without permits.

As a consequence, workers are forced to commute long hours or, under risk of punishment, illegally remain inside Israel. Lesch (1985) stated that employers and workers collude in circumventing the law so that the worker will not have to spend several hours every day commuting. Farmers let labourers sleep in huts, abandoned buses, or even in the open under the orange trees. In town, workers jam into hostels, sleep on construction sites, or spread out on the floor in restaurants. There have been cases of disasters when workers locked into factories at night were unable to escape when fires broke out. In 1976 three workers from Gaza were burned to death when a fire swept through a factory.

7.7 Gazan Employees Abroad: A Case Study

For a long time, people form Gaza have moved to work abroad, especially to the oil-rich Arab states. But their movements intensified and expanded after the economic boom in the oil producers' states following the dramatic 1974 increase in oil prices. "The vast increase in oil-revenues led to a huge explosion in the demand for foreign labour in the Gulf. The Gulf states designed programmes to provide their countries with a modern economic infrastructure. Inevitably such developments were also accompanied by a big expansion of government administration. All this could be managed only by importing a foreign workforce (Owen, 1985).

Although, the number of Gazan workers in the Arab oil states relative to the total number of foreign workers is small, their number and particularly their remittances to the Gazan economy is crucial, as will be mentioned later on. Hence, this phenomenon of labour migration from the Gaza Strip should be subject to deep analysis, particularly since it has not been studied within this framework before. The analysis will focus on answering the main questions underlined earlier in chapter five. The data presented here are drawn from a 1985 survey conducted by the researcher among a random sample of 550 migrant workers.

As no official or personal estimations concerning the number of Gaza's workers have been made by the Israelis or by Palestinians, the researcher has been obliged to make an attempt to achieve some reasonable estimates.

Based on the 1985 survey of population structure, about 6.5% of Gaza's active population were employed abroad. At the same time, workers employed in the Gaza Strip and in Israel combined totalled about 91,000. Hence, if the proportion of 6.5% is adopted to represent those workers employed abroad, and then added to the whole Gazan labour force, the estimated number for those employed abroad will reach about 6,300 migrant workers. Consequently, it can be suggested that the number of migrant workers at the end of 1985 was within the range of 5000-10,000.

Obviously, one important difference between Palestinian and other Arab workers in the oil-rich Arab countries lies in the pattern of their recruitment. Workers from the labour-exporting Arab countries can be employed in the labour-importing states either through official channels or by private recruiting agencies and labour contractors. On the other hand, Palestinians, including Gazans of course, must be recruited through official channels only, in order to be under the control of the Arab countries. For instance, Owen (1985) shows that in one Jordanian sample, about 60% of the migrants had a job arranged for them before they left Jordan. Whereas in another sample for the Egyptians, about half of them found employment in Kuwait through their relatives. In contrast, the stateless Gazans are forbidden to have access to the Arab states in order to seek work unless they have a valid contract of work issued by one of the employment missions in Jordan or Egypt.

Indeed, most Arab governments share a fear of the Palestinians : highly educated, highly needed, yet highly dangerous since their bitter experience from 1948 onwards has radicalized their political views (Minority Rights Group, 1984).

7.7.1 Characteristics of the Sample Group

In the findings of the 1985 survey, most of the Gazan migrant workers employed abroad were males. Out of the 550 workers sampled, 489 (88.9%) were males, while females accounted for only 61 or 11.1% of the sample.

It is important to report here that only 4 (0.73%) workers, all of them males, of the sample were employed in non-Arab countries.

Considering the migrant workers by their marital status shows that about 18.55% were single, 80.9% married, and only 0.55% widowed or divorced. Furthermore, only a small proportion of the married migrant workers travelled and lived abroad without their families. Amongst the 445 married workers, 63 (14.3%) travelled alone because they probably wanted to save a higher proportion of their earnings or because they emigrated for a short term.

Moreover, the average family size of Gazan migrant workers was 3.8, indicating a smaller family size compared with those families living within the Gaza Strip (see Chapter 6). Initially, about 29.1% of the married migrant workers had families consisting of less than 3 members, 39.7% between 3 and 4, 21.0% between 5 and 6, and only 10.1% had 7 members or more in their families.

Significantly, it may be necessary to report here that the sample interviewed was restricted to those migrant workers with identity papers as permanent residents of the Gaza Strip, whereas those who left the area before the 1967 war or displaced after the war were excluded as they are considered by the Israeli authorities as emigrants.

7.7.2 Employment and Occupation

The main destinations of Gazan migrant workers abroad have been illustrated in Table 7.10 and Figure 7.4. In the light of the 1985 survey, about half of the Gazan migrants were employed in Saudi Arabia alone, while only 2.5% were in both North and Southe Yemen. Together the four Gulf states mentioned in this study absorbed about three-quarters of Gazan migrants while the remaining countries absorbed only one-quarter.

Analysis of sex showed Saudi Arabia alone has absorbed about two-thirds Gazan female employees, whereas the Gulf states combined attracted about 83.6% of female workers. In contrast, roughly 73% of male migrants from the Strip were recruited in the four Gulf states, and some 45.8% of them were employed in Saudi Arabia alone (see Table 7.11). Obviously, Saudi Arabia represents the main recruitment country for Gazan migrants either males or females.

Table 7.10 Proportional Distribution of Gazan Migrant Workers in the Arab and Non-Arab Countries by Type of Work, 1985

Country	Type of work					Total	
	Teaching	Medical Profession	Engineering	Workers	Other activities *	No.	%
Number in sample	256	66	78	33	117	550	-
Percentage	46.5	12.0	14.2	6.0	21.3	-	100
Saudi Arabia	50.2	11.8	11.0	7.6	19.4	263	47.8
U.A.E.	34.0	13.2	19.8	5.5	27.5	91	16.6
Libya	55.2	1.5	22.4	3.0	17.9	67	12.2
Algeria	59.4	25.0	9.3	-	6.3	32	5.8
Kuwait	51.7	17.2	6.9	-	24.2	29	5.3
Qatar	40.0	8.0	16.0	-	36.0	25	4.5
North & South Yemen	57.1	14.3	14.3	-	14.3	14	2.5
Other countries	13.8	17.2	17.2	20.7	31.1	29	5.3

Source: The 1985 Sample Survey.

* Including accountants, businessmen, managers, governmental employees etc.



FIG. 7.4. DESTINATIONS OF GAZAN EMPLOYEES IN THE ARAB AND NON-ARAB COUNTRIES BY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, 1985.

Classification of migrants by occupation shows that approximately half of Gaza's migrants were engaged in teaching, about a quarter in medical and engineering jobs, and only some 6% as skilled or semi-skilled workers (Table 7.10). Simultaneously, a breakdown of the migrant workers by gender shows that only three occupations involved females, led by teaching in which more than 90% were employed. In contrast, only 40% of the male sample were in teaching. At the same time, the medical and engineering professions combined employed more than a quarter of employed male workers (Table 7.12). The concentration of Gazan females in particular in the teaching sector reflects the culture of Gaza Strip society, particularly since the most likely job for women is teaching.

The importance of teaching as the largest employer of Gazan migrants is shown in Table 7.10. In all labour-importing states, except UAE, Qatar, and those classified as other countries, over 50% of Gazan migrants were recruited in teaching. Employment in medical occupations varied from 25% in Algeria to 1.5% in Libya, and in engineering work form 22.4% in Libya to 6.9% in Kuwait. One significant observation revealed from Table 7.10 is that about 94% of Gaza's migrant workers do white-collar work, whereas only 6% of them were engaged in blue-collar work. Initially, it can be identified that highly educated people constitute the main proportion of Gazan migrant workers abroad.

Apparently, the concentration of Gazan migrants in the Gulf states may be attributed to the high wages paid there. In addition, these countries practise a free economic policy which permits the migrant workers to transfer out as much as they can save from their salaries. On the contrary, in 1984, only 60% and 40% of salaries paid to the foreign workers in Libya and Algeria respectively were permitted to be taken out of these countries. Hence, a high proportion of Gazan workers in Libya, Algeria, as well as in North and South Yemen, resigned from their jobs when they had the chance to move into the Gulf states.

Workers emigration has no negative impact on the Strip economy since the Strip has suffered from a severe problem of unemployment for university graduates. One minor effect is that in many cases, the better experienced people resigned from their jobs and emigrated, which by one means or another affected the services sectors in the Strip.

7.11 Distribution of Gazan Migrant Workers in the Arab and Non-Arab Countries by Sex, 1985

Gender / Destination	Male		Female	
	No.	%	No.	%
Saudi Arabia	224	45.8	39	64
U.A.E.	81	16.6	10	16.4
Libya	62	12.7	5	8.2
Algeria	30	6.1	2	3.3
Kuwait	28	5.7	1	1.6
Qatar	24	4.9	1	1.6
North and South Yemen	13	2.7	1	1.6
Other Countries	27	5.5	2	3.3
Total	489	100.0	61	100.0

Source : The 1985 Sample Survey.

7.12 Distribution of Gaza's Migrant Workers by Sex and Type of Economic Activity, 1985

Gender / Type of Work	Male		Female	
	No.	%	No.	%
Teaching	200	40.9	56	91.8
Medical Profession	62	12.7	4	6.6
Engineers	78	15.95	-	-
Workers	33	6.75	-	-
Other Activities	116	23.7	1	1.6
Total	489	100	61	100.0

Source : The 1985 Sample Survey.

7.7.3 Wages and Remittances

As demonstrated in Table 7.13, the average monthly salaries paid to Gazan migrant workers varied from one type of economic activity to another, and from one country to another. The 1986 survey of income displays that the average monthly salary was $1012. The highest monthly salaries were paid in UAE ($1395), Qater ($1284) and Saudi Arabia ($985), and the lowest in North and South Yemen ($464).

Viewed from another point, variations in monthly wages by type of economic activity are significant. The highest monthly wages are earned in the medical and engineering professions, amounted to $1480 and $1185 respectively, while the lowest were paid to workers (skilled and semi-skilled) and teachers, $548 and $890 respectively. Simultaneously, the same results can be concluded if the analysis is done separately within each country, except in North and South Yemen (see Table 7.13). Earnings from teaching there were $480 per month compared with $450 for medical and engineering professions. This phenomenon can be explained by the fact that wages paid to workers who have an external contract are higher than those paid to employees who have an internal contract of work.

Significantly, earnings form abroad constitute a vital source of funds for the Gazan economy. For instance, remittances from relatives working abroad accounted for a third of the gross domestic product of the Gaza Strip in 1980 (Lesch, 1985). Furthermore, the overall monthly income calculated for the 1985 sampled migrant workers (excluding workers classified under the category of other countries) amounted to about $527,277. Considering the poor infrastructure of the Gaza Strip economy, this sum will have contributed substantially to its prosperity.

It should be noted that the intention to return among Gazan migrants makes them more inclined to save and send a higher proportion of their earnings to their relatives in the Gaza Strip. Also, it is important to report that remittances have found their way to all Gazan societies including urban, rural and refugee people, since migrnat workers have migrated from all of them.

Most of the money which is brought into the Strip is either hoarded or spent on education, on building a house, or on consumer durables. So far, building houses and apartments seems to be the most common use of remittances.

Table 7.13 Average Monthly Wages in US$ Paid to Gazan Migrant Workers in the Arab Countries by Type of Economic Activity *

Type of economic activity \ Destination	Saudi Arabia	U.A.E.	Libya	Algeria	Kuwait	Qatar	North and South Yemen	Average monthly income by type of economic activity in US$
Teaching	900	1300	700	580	800	1250	480	890
Medical Profession	1500	1900	1250	1200	1200	1600	450	1480
Engineers	1100	1600	900	1200	1100	1400	450	1185
Workers	550	500	600	-	-	-	-	548
Other activities	1000	1300	700	800	900	1200	430	1032
Average monthly income per worker in US$	985	1395	751	807	914	1284	464	1012

Source: Mailing Survey Conducted during 1986.

* Wages given here are based on the official salaries paid to the migrant workers from their employers excluding any other sources of income such as earnings from overtime work.

As a consequence of the Iraq-Iran war placing the whole of the Gulf in jeopardy and of the recent deterioration in oil prices, government expenditure has been sharply reduced and projects frozen or stopped. Consequently, thousands of migrant workers have been sacked. At the same time, most of the oil-rich states in general and the Gulf states in particular have introduced systematic efforts to reduce the numbers of foreign labourers in their countries as much as possible. Hence, if Gazan migrant workers in the Gulf States are sacked, it represents a disaster for the Gazan people and Gaza's fragile economy. "For Palestinians, including Gazans of course, the Gulf states represented the chance of a new start, and for prosperity and the opportunity to sustain relatives still in Palestine through remittances of their salaries (Minority Rights Group, 1984).

Moreover, the average monthly salaries of those workers employed abroad were about six times those of workers employed inside Israel, amounting to $1012 against $181.3.

To sum up, earnings from work in Israel are more likely to be spent on day-to-day needs and on consumer goods, while those remitted from abroad are employed in improving living conditions of Gaza's people. Graham-Brown (1984a) pinpointed this clearly when she concluded that whatever the conscious manupulative aims of the Israeli authorities in the occupied territories, the social changes they have made in this way are minor compared with those that have resulted from economic factors, most importantly those brought about by migrant labour and remittances, coming both from workers inside Israel and from emigrants abroad.

7.8 Summary

The analysis of employment structure shows that the Gaza Strip is distinguished by a very low labour participation rate, resulting from the large proportion of young people in the population, the high rate of school attendance, and the low labour participation rate among Gazan women. The cultural constraints are the major obstacles parlyzing women's employment.

As a consequence of the Israeli occupation, restructuring of the Gaza Strip labour force occurred primarily since work in Israel was permitted

to Gaza's people. Prior to 1967, all the Gazan workforce were employed domestically except a very small fraction employed in the Gulf states, estimated to be below 1%. In contrast, by 1985, over half of Gaza's workforce were employed in jobs either in Israel or in the Arab and non-Arab states, and earnings from these jobs have improved substantially the conditions of life of the Gazan people.

Apparently, the Gaza Strip constitutes a large labour camp, fuelling the Israeli economy with a reservoir of cheap unskilled and semi-skilled labourers, doing manual jobs usually rejected by their Israeli counterparts.

Furthermore, the study reveals that the occupational structure of the Gazan labour force is widely varied according to their place of work. In the Strip, services were the largest employment branch for them, construction for those employed in Israel, and teaching in the Arab and non-Arab countries. Additionally, most of the Gazan migrants abroad were employed in the Gulf states, in service jobs, and they were highly educated, whereas the less educated workers were employed locally or inside Israel.

Significantly, over half the Gazans employed in Israel were clandestine workers and this made it easy for them to be exploited by their employers. Consequently, they are subject to unequal treatment with their legal counterparts. Moreover, the Israeli published figures of unemployment in the Gaza Strip are misguided and the real figures are considerably higher than the official figures. The study indicates that in the last three years unemployment has risen in the Strip for both educated and less educated people.

Finally, Gazan migrant workers in Israel had worse conditions of work, a very long return trip, low salaries, fewer chances of promotion, less job security, and inferior trade union protection than their Israeli counterparts.

In a nutshell, it adds up to a picture of heavy dependence upon migratory labour in Israel and in the Arab countries, which means that the Gazan employment structure and economy are extremely fragile and reliant upon external economic conditions.

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Part Three

The Israeli Occupation Authorities and the Gaza Strip Population

When the Israelis occupied the Gaza Strip in June 1967, they were resisted by the Palestinian guerrillas who had established their bases, primarily, in the overcrowded refugee camps. As a consequence, several measures were taken by the Israelis against the Strip's population in general and the inhabitants of the refugee camps in particular, aiming partly to crush the Palestinian resistance movement, either by using their military forces or by removing the refugee population from their camps, and partly to achieve specific political goals of solving the problem of Palestinian refugees through resettlement in the Israeli-sponsored rehousing projects.

Hence, in part three, an attempt will be made to analyse the impact of Israeli policy upon the population of the Gaza Strip; the socio-economic and socio-political situations and conditions under which Gazans have been living; the systematic Israeli efforts towards altering the status of the population and settlement patterns of the Strip; and the response of Gazan people towards these policies. The study will rely on available documents collected mainly from the UNRWA Office of Gaza, but most essentially on two pilot surveys carried out by the researcher in 1985, in order to assist him in understanding the mobility of the overcrowded population and Israeli policy as well. The first survey concerns the Israeli-sponsored rehousing projects for Palestinian refugees, while the second concerns the housing problem in the refugee camps and Israeli policy toward them.

CHAPTER EIGHT

The Effect of Israeli Policy upon the Residents of the Gaza Strip

As indicated in Table 8.1, about 21,043 rooms, of which about half were built by UNRWA, housing nearly 9,319 families consisting of 57,123 persons, have been demolished in the Gaza Strip refugee camps since the Israeli occupation of June 1967. The demolitions have been carried out under Israeli schemes aiming to eradicate the Strip's refugee camps as a reminder of the Palestine disaster. On the other hand, the inhabitants of Gazan cities and villages suffer from the same measures which have been practised against the inhabitants of the refugee camps, with the exceptions only of those demolitions which happened in the 1971 road-widening and thinning-out plans, and refugee rehousing projects. But unfortunately data are unavailable for the Gaza Strip as a whole.

Analysis by camp demonstrates that Rafah, Beach, Jabalya, and Khan Yunis camps were the worst affected camps by the Israeli schemes of systematic demolitions (see Figure 8.1), about 90% of the demolished rooms and affected persons being reported in those four camps (Table 8.1).

Indeed, the demolitions of shelters have been carried out in the Gaza Strip on several grounds. Consequently, chapter eight aims to bring to light these measures which may help in understanding the population dynamics and the political situation in the teeming Gaza Strip. But it seems relevant to report here that about 1,020 rooms accommodating 485 families of 3,435 persons had been destroyed in the eight refugee camps in the Gaza Strip as a result of the 1967 war (Table 8.2).

So far, the Israeli authorities have rejected all UNRWA's requests to pay compensation for the demolition of rooms built, or assisted by the UNRWA, despite the fact that the demolished rooms were UNRWA's property. Consequently, a distinction between rooms has been made in Tables 8.1 and 8.2, in order to display the number of UNRWA built-rooms and those built privately.

8.1 Security Roads Plan 1971.

In 1971, an unusual military campaign was begun by the Israeli authorities against the population of Gazan refugee camps, as a result



FIG·8·1·PERSONS AFFECTED BY ISRAELI DEMOLITION SCHEMES IN THE GAZA STRIP REFUGEE CAMPS BETWEEN JUNE 1967 AND 30 NOVEMBER 1985

Table 8.1 Demolished Shelters by Camp in the Gaza Strip, June 1967 - 30 November 1985

Camp / Affected rooms, families and persons	Rooms built by: UNRWA built	UNRWA assisted	Ex-Army barracks	Private	Total of rooms	Total of families	Total of persons
Jabalya	2,883	385	-	2,036	5,304	2,052	12,773
Beach	2,028	635	-	2,055	4,718	2,420	14,757
Bureij	392	92	93	252	829	342	2,152
Nuseirat	415	115	38	421	989	459	2,741
Mughazi	124	45	16	117	302	102	661
Deir el Balah	22	-	-	48	70	28	168
Khan Yunis	1,602	117	-	1,148	2,867	1,396	8,198
Rafah	2,923	260	-	2,781	5,964	2,520	15,673
Total	10,389	1,649	147	8,858	21,043	9,319	57,123

Source: UNRWA Accommodation Office of Gaza, 1985

Table 8.2 Classification of Demolished Shelters in the Gazan Refugee Camps by Cause of Demolition between June 1967 and 30 November 1985

No. of affected rooms, families and persons / Cause of Demolition	Rooms built by: UNRWA built	UNRWA assisted	Ex-army barracks	Private	Total of rooms	Total of families	Total of persons
Demolished by the 1967 war	668	17	46	289	1,020	485	3,435
The 1971 demolition (July-August thinning-out plan)	3,659	812	-	3,258	7,729	2,554	15,855
Punitive cases	353	51	33	205	642	248	1,659
Contravention	-	-	-	87	87	47	291
The 1971 road widening excluding the 1971 thinning-out demolition	1,510	338	68	1,149	3,065	1,387	8,212
Town planning	489	37	-	534	1,060	497	2,609
Voluntary	3,430	385	-	2,732	6,547	3,802	23,157
Border line	280	9	-	604	893	299	1,905
Total	10,389	1,649	147	8,858	21,043	9,319	57,123

Source : UNRWA Accommodation Office of Gaza, 1985

of an increase in military resistance operations against the occupier's troops. Hence, "the Israelis' issued an order declaring all camps to be closed areas, entry into and exit out of which would be regulated" (United Nations, 1971). At the same time, in an attempt to overthrow the Gazan resistance, the Israeli government in Tel Aviv decided to thin out the population of the congested refugee camps (Brilliant, 1971). The plan was carried out under the supervision of Ariel Sharon (the Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Command at that time), who ordered the army to plough 50 m wide roads through the camps to facilitate army patrols in their suppression of military resistance.

An analysis of the 1971 demolition shows that shelters of 2,554 families, comprising about 15,855 persons, were destroyed (Table 8.2). The demolitions were carried out in the three refugee camps of Jabalya, Beach, and Rafah under the July-August thinning-out plan. About 45.5% of the affected persons were from Jabalya, 30.5% from Beach, and 24% from Rafah.

UNRWA claimed compensation for the demolitions from the Israeli authorities, who later replied to the effect that it was for them to determine what actions were warranted by security requirements and military operations (United Nations, 1972).

It is relevant to mention here that the demolitions were carried out at short notice before new shelters could be built. But the Israelis claimed that demolition was an immediate necessity to stamp out the military resistance. As alternatives, the Israeli authorities offered the refugees the choice of moving to Al-Arish in north Sinai (outside the Gaza Strip), where the Israeli government would issue them houses of Egyptians who had fled in 1967; or to go to the West Bank; or to find their own lodging in the Gaza Strip (Metzger, Orth and Sterzing, 1983).

The UNRWA records indicate that some 400 registered refugee families were displaced to Al-Arish in Sinai. About 130 families went back to the Strip soon after the initial move, 120 more have returned over the years and the remaining families vacated their accommodation and came back to the Strip in 1979, after the returning of Al-Arish city to Egypt according to the Camp David peace treaty (United Nations, 1979). In addition, some hundred families were resettled in the West Bank. UNRWA (1985) has shown that 4,616 registered refugees were living in the West Bank as at 30 June

1985. The remaining families were housed in vacant UNRWA shelters or with their relatives in the Gaza Strip. Moreover, about 500 of these displaced families were shunted over the Egyptian border to Canada Camp (see Figure 4.1).

Initially, in December 1971, the United Nations General Assembly called upon Israel to desist from further destruction of refugee shelters and from further removal of refugees from their present places of residence, and to take immediate and effective steps for the return of the refugees concerned to the camps from which they were removed and to provide adequate shelters for their accommodation (United Nations, 1972). But Israel refused to return the displaced people, or to provide them with accommodation or compensation.

Simultaneously, another security roads plan was taking place in all the Gazan refugee camps, except Deir el Balah, under the distinction of road widening. The plan was carried out jointly by the Israeli military authorities and UNRWA. Under this scheme shelters accommodating 1,387 families, comprising 8,212 people, were destroyed (see Table 8.2). Approximately 32.1% of the affected people were from Nuseirat camp, 25.1% from Khan Yunis, 18.2% from Bureij, 17% from Rafah, and only 7.6% from the remaining camps of Mughazi, Beach, and Jabalya.

To accommodate these homeless people, construction programmes were set up by UNRWA in Nuseirat, Bureij, Mughazi and Khan Yunis refugee camps. These programmes were carried out against reimbursement by the Israeli authorities to replace only shelters removed by road widening in the camps for security purposes. At the same time, the homeless refugees of Khan Yunis and Rafah were given the option of purchasing housing in new housing projects constructed by the military authorities in the vicinity of the two camps. But those who were unwilling or unable to do so were offered the vacant Agency (UNRWA) shelters in their respective camps of other refugees who had opted for the new housing (United Nations, 1973). The so-called governmental rehousing projects are Shuqari in Khan Yunis and Canada in Rafah (see Figure 4.1).

It is important to report that a certain compensation was paid to the homeless refugees by the Israeli authorities for the destruction of privately built rooms and additions only, while those demolished rooms

which were built by the UNRWA have not been compensated yet.

To sum up, the 1971 security roads plan resulted in evacuating about 3,941 families, amounting to some 24,067 persons. They represented about 12% of the total refugees living in camps in 1971.

8.2 Collective Punishment

"The demolition of houses is a punitive measure actively applied inside the Gaza Strip. According to this measure, the homes of security offenders are either destroyed or sealed, leaving the families of those individuals with nowhere to live and with no right of compensation (Roy, 1986). Up to November 1985, 642 rooms, housing 248 families of 1,659 members in the Gazan refugee camps, have been blown up by the Israeli authorities as punitive measures (Table 8.2). In the Strip as a whole, some 1,259 houses were demolished as deterrent or punitive actions (see Plates 8.1 and 8.2). In many cases these destructions also caused damage to adjacent shelters, which could be rebuilt only at the expense of their residents with no right to claim compensation.

From the Israeli viewpoint, the demolition of Gazan shelters as a punitive measure is legal action, and they referred, in this context, to Regulation 191 of the Mandatory Defence (Emergency) Regulations of 1945. The aforesaid regulations permit an Israeli commander to order the demolition or sealing up of a building if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the building has been fired from or where an inhabitant has committed or abetted the commission of a violent act prohibited under the Defence Regulations. In addition, Regulation 119(1) permits the destruction of buildings not used to commit acts prohibited by the Regulations; the building only has to be located in the same general area where a prohibited act has been committed (National Lawyers Guild, 1978).

Moreover, in a 1968 radio interview, General Shlomo Gazit, the military administrator of the occupied territories, threw light on Israel's demolition programme when he said : the act of blowing up houses is essentially.... a deterrent action, a punishment which is supposed to deter others (National Lawyers Guild, 1978). As a consequent of the refugee camps being UNRWA property, UNWRA have strongly protested against the demolitions because collective punishment is meted out regardless of

Plate 8.1 : Shelter blown up in Jabalya refugee camp (1982). A Palestinian family living in this makeshift shelter of precariously stacked concrete blocks, sheeting and corrugated iron after the demolition of their home, under Israeli punitive and deterrent action.

Photo : The author

Plate 8.2 : Shelter blown up in Bureij refugee camp (1985). Demolished under Israeli punitive and deterrent action.

Photo : The author

blame, so that innocent as well as the assumed guilty individuals are made to suffer (UNRWA, 1984).

Furthermore, whatever the precise extent of collective punishment or demolition of shelters carried out in the Gaza Strip, they appeared to be contrary to the provisions of Articles 33 and 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, which Israel ratified, with regard to protection of civilian persons in time of war. Article 33 states that "No protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has not personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measure of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited." On the other hand, Article 53 reads: "Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations (National Lawyers Guild, 1978).

8.3 Contravention and Town Planning Demolition

An analysis of demolitions indicates that the shelters of 47 refugee families (291 persons) were destroyed as being built illegally. Additionally, some hundred refugee families were threatened by the Israelis that their shelters would be demolished. The Israeli authorities claimed that the constructions were built outside the boundaries of the camps, on state-owned land. For instance, in July 1983, 35 shelters at the northern edge of Beach camp were bulldozed to rubble by the Israeli army leaving their inhabitants homeless (Locke and Stewart, 1985 and United Nations, 1984). So far 28 families are living in temporary shelters they have built in boundary walls of corrugated iron. They built their houses on the same site, while the remaining families moved into shelters of nearby relatives, or left the site.

Obviously, the demolitions have been carried out in order to encourage the refugees to move into the Israeli-sponsored rehousing projects. At the same time, the Israeli authorities reject this allegation, and claim that resettlement of refugees in the dwelling projects is based on voluntary movement. This matter will be analysed in Chapter nine.

Similarly, town planning is reported to have been responsible for destroying some 1,060 rooms, accommodating 497 families of 2,609 people. The affected people have been compensated for privately built-rooms and they have been allowed to move into the rehousing projects.

8.4 The Refugee Dwelling Projects (Rehousing Projects)

8.4.1 Historical Background

The initial idea of resettlement of Gazan refugees originated in 1951 when the Egyptian Government agreed to resettle some 50,000 refugees in Al-Arish area (Sinai), according to the Baroukh project. But this so-called project was completely rejected by the Higher Arab Committee, which, instead, insisted on continuing efforts to repatriate the Palestinian refugees in their homeland (Salman, 1980).

Moreover, in an attempt to reduce the concentration of Palestinian refugees in the Gaza Strip, a new plan was made jointly by UNRWA and the Government of Egypt in October 1953 to irrigate 52,000 acres in the Sinai Peninsula east of the Suez Canal. The project aimed to resettle some 50,000 to 60,000 refugees from the Gaza Strip over five years, which represented about 25% of the Strip's refugee population. The project was to be financed chiefly from a fund of $30 million set aside by UNRWA specifically for Gaza refugees (Baster, 1954). Accordingly, Gazan refugees rejected the resettlement project, when mass demonstrations and violence broke out across the Strip, arguing that the Egyptian government and UNRWA should cease to implement such a project, and they affirmed that the only acceptable solution for their problem was to assist them to return to their homeland. Consequently, in 1955 the project was aborted when the Egyptian government cancelled the plan according to the Palestinian refugees desire.

Furthermore, in 1965-66, a small resettlement camp (the Swedish village) was set up at the southwestern edge of the Gaza Strip, close to the Mediterranean coast (see Figure 4.1). The project was funded by the Swedish Minister of Social Welfare Mrs. Lindstrom, where 60 four-room shelters were constructed, without a sewage disposal system, electricity or water supply.

8.4.2. The Israeli-Sponsored Rehousing Projects

"The visible reminder which the eight refugee camps provide of the dispossession of 1948 constitutes a thorny problem for the Israelis. As a focal point of Palestinian identity and militant resistance, the camps, as perceived by the Israelis, require constant army surveillance. Faced with this hostile and resentful population herded together, the Israelis have sought to break up their concentration, and in so doing to sever the refugees' link with their homeland and their desire to return to it. Yet in purely practical terms the rehousing of the refugees is an enormous task" (Locke and Stewart, 1985). It is perhaps important to report that worldwide, the effect of political factors upon population distribution grows in influence at all levels through their direct and indirect effects upon population growth and movement (Clarke, 1985).

As mentioned earlier, the Israeli resettlement policies were first enacted in the early 1970's, particularly when the Israeli security roads plan took place. Obviously, in 1969, two resettlement plans were recommended for the Israeli-decision makers, aiming to make the refugee camps less congested. The first was planed in Rehovot Institute (Rehovot Plan) which aimed to mobilize groups of the inhabitants of Gazan refugee camps to the West Bank. The second plan (Weitz Plan) was designed by R. Weitz, Head of the Department of Settlement in the Jewish Agency, to resettle some 50,000 refugees at Al-Arish in Sinai (Abu Arafa, 1981). But the aforesaid plans have not been implemented yet. From 1973 on, attempts to rehouse Gazan refugees resulted in a series of government-sponsored rehousing projects nearby which continue to be in effect today, with perceptible intensification during 1975-80.

To be eligible for a housing unit in the rehousing projects, refugees must demolish their camp shelters. Hence the Israeli authorities want to break up the camps, which are so densely populated that they are difficult to patrol and control "The new projects are built with security in mind - easy to control. They have not been designed with residents' needs in mind, but as a long-term solution to Israel's problems with the camps" (Cossali and Robson, 1986).

Indeed, a similar policy was practised against the Algerian people by the French colonial authorities. During the Algerian war of independence,

1954-61, the French army undertook a massive policy of regroupment in order both to protect and to prevent the rural population from actively assisting the guerrillas" (Sutton, 1978).

During the Egyptian administrative period of 1948-67, the Gazan municipalities and village councils were legally under the authority of the Egyptian administration, which supervised and financed the councils' services and activities. At the same time, UNRWA was granted full responsibility by the Egyptian administration over the refugee camps, which were left separate from the municipalities and village councils' administrative systems. Hence, to implement the Israeli rehousing policy (officially known as refugee rehabilitation projects) and to circumvent legal requirements, in 1972, the Israeli military authorities extended the town limits of Gaza, Deir el Balah, Khan Yunis and Rafah to include their adjacent refugee camps. The aforesaid step permitted the Israeli authorities, directly or indirectly, to have special responsibility over the camps; through their responsibility over the municipal councils. This assisted the Israeli authorities in passing any legislation over the refugee camps through the municipalities (e.g. see Appendix 12).

The Israeli resettlement scheme was a target of dispute in the United Nations General Assembly in November 1976, when an overwhelming vote called on Israel to halt refugee resettlement efforts in the Gaza Strip, and to permit the evacuated refugees to return to their former camps as soon as possible (Gross, 1976 and Farrell, 1976). So far the Israeli authorities have turned down all requests to desist from such evacuations.

The latest scheme was unveiled by ex-minister Mordechai Ben Porat in November 1983, a refugee rehousing programme costing $1.5 billion to resettle the Gaza Strip and the West Bank Camps population over a five-year period. Ben Porat admitted he would like to get the money from the United States (Viorst, 1984). So far, no formal proposal has been presented. It is relevant to report that the plan has not been abandoned but put on the shelf, waiting an improvement in the Israeli economic situation.

8.4.3 Aims of the Resettlement Projects

Frequently, the Israelis claim that the government-sponsored resettlement schemes are fully humanitarian and voluntary, striving to

provide decent and comfortable housing in nearby areas, to replace the dingy shanty-towns in which Gazan refugees have been confined since the 1948 displacement. In his plan, Ben Porat contends that his proposal is humanitarian, not coercive and has no political motives (Viorst, 1984).

Obviously, there is ample evidence to the contrary. Table 8.2 indicates that 3802 families of 23,157 persons have moved to the rehousing projects voluntarily. In comparison, Table 8.3 gives the cumulative number of those families who have been rehoused in these projects as 6004, amounting to 37,023 persons, including of course Canada camp inhabitants. This means that only 63% of the resettled people have moved voluntarily, while the remaining share have moved compulsorily. Accordingly, this act of forcible transfers of Gaza camp refugees violates Article 49 (6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention which reads: "Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territories of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive" (National Lawyers Guild, 1978).

Gazan refugees have continually stressed that the resettlement scheme is a part of the Israeli plan to rid the Gaza Strip of refugee camps. This allegation can be supported by several statements made by Israeli officials. In June 1973, Defence Minister Moshe Dayan brought to light the aim of the alternative housing policy when he said : "as long as the refugees remain in their camps ..... their children will say they come from Jaffa or Haifa, if they move out of the camps, the hope is they will feel an attachment to their new land (National Lawyers Guild, 1978).

Furthermore, in a televised interview with General Abraham Ben Yamin (the Israeli commander of the Strip's civil administration), he brought to light the aim of their resettlement scheme. He said that the main problem concentrates in Jabalya refugee camp, which according to his viewpoint represents the focal point of violence and security disturbances. He added that his aim is to evacuate between 600 to 800 families during 1986 (Akhbar Ghazza, 1985).

8.4.4 Geographical Distribution of the Resettlement Projects

Initially, to implement the Israeli policy of thinning the refugee camps, there are eight rehousing projects, excluding Canada camp, in the

Table 8.3 Cumulative Numbers of Housing Units Allocated in the Israeli-Sponsored Rehousing Projects, Numbers of families and Their Members who Moved from the Camps to be Rehoused in the Rehousing Projects between 1971 and 30 November 1985, and the Projects' Total Population as at the End of 1985

Rehousing project location	Cumulative No. of houses, families and persons (1971 - 30 November 1985)				Rehousing projects total population, end of 1985*	
	No. of houses	No. of families	No. of persons	% of persons	No.	%
Jabalya	476	725	4,654	14.4	5,550	12.3
Gaza	1,498	1,783	11,049	34.1	16,450	36.4
Khan Yunis	1,121	1,219	7,360	22.7	9,750	21.6
Rafah**	1,357	1,488	9,337	28.8	13,450	29.7
Total	4,452	5,215	32,400	100.0	45,200	100.0

Source : Calculated from Appendix 8.

* Data were gathered from the municipalities of Gaza, Khan Yunis, and Rafah, and Beit Lahiya village council.

** Excluding Canada rehousing project, located on the Egyptian side of the international border line. The project comprises 488 housing units, inhabited by 789 families of 4,623 persons (Appendix 1). The population of Canada camp are waiting to be resettled in Tal El Sultan project in Rafah (Fig. 4.1).

Strip now twinning camps and projects. For instance, Jabalya camp is to be absorbed by Beit Lahiya project, Beach camp by Sheikh Radwan, Khan Yunis camp by Al-Amal and Rafah camp by Tal el Sultan and Brazil projects (see Fig. 4.1). So far, the Israeli authorities still offer vacant plots of land in these projects which would be expanded in the future. In the remaining three projects there is no room for absorbing extra refugee families.

As demonstrated in Table 8.3, the rehousing projects are located in the northern zone (in Jabalya and Gaza), and in the southern zone (Khan Yunis and Rafah). Up to November 1985, the cumulative number of resettled refugees shows that 48.5% were rehoused in the northern zone projects, and 51.5% in the southern zone. Moreover, an estimation given by the municipalities and village councils shows that some 45,200 persons were living in the eight rehousing projects by the end of 1985.

8.4.5 The Influence of Resettlement Policy upon the Camps

The impact of the Israeli evacuation policy of Gazan refugees from their camps can be interpreted from Table 8.4 and Figure 8.2. Between June 1974 and June 1985, the total refugee population increased from 322,133 refugees to 427,892, by an annual growth rate of 2.58%. In contrast, camp and non-camp refugees increased by 1.81% and 3.64% per annum respectively during the same period. This means that the camp population reported a lower rate of growth : 0.77% lower than the refugees average as a whole. In contrast, the non-camp refugees increased by 1.06% more than the total refugee average growth rate.

Furthermore, the proportion of refugees living in camps dropped from 60.2% in June 1974 to some 55.3% in June 1985. Apparently, this trend can be seen in Beach, Khan Yunis, Jabalya and Rafah refugee camps (see Table 8.4). The aforesaid camps, the largest refugee camps in the Gaza Strip, have been the main target of the Israeli evacuation policy from 1971 onwards, as they are located adjacent to the rehousing projects (see Fig. 4.1). At the same time, the remaining four refugee camps are clearly less affected by the Israeli resettlement projects.

Table 8.4 Size and Proportion of Camp and Non-Camp Refugees in the Gaza Strip as at 30 June 1974 and 30 June 1985

Area	Camp	30 June 1974			30 June 1985		
		In camps	Not in camps	% in camps	In camps	Not in camps	% in camps
Jabalya	Jabalya	40,179	8,972	81.8	51,225	17,039	75.0
Gaza Town		-	43,504	0.0	-	56,166	0.0
Rimal	Beach	34,551	12,129	74.0	40,359	24,997	61.8
Nuseirat	Nuseirat	19,877			26,400		
			6,947	82.0		8,012	84.1
	Bureij	11,783			16,057		
Deir el Balah	Deir el Balah	7,910			9,854		
			13,532	54.5		17,251	54.1
	Mughazi	8,288			10,506		
Khan Yunis	Khan Yunis	29,295	26,747	52.3	33,269	41,954	44.2
Rafah	Rafah	42,012	16,407	71.9	48,816	25,987	65.3
Total		193,895	128,238	60.2	236,486	191,406	55.3

Source: UNRWA, 1974 and 1985.





FIG·8·2· SIZE AND PROPORTION OF CAMP AND NON-CAMP REFUGEE POPULATIONS OF THE GAZA STRIP AS AT 30 JUNE 1974 AND 30 JUNE 1985·

8.5 Camp David Accords and the Palestinians

From the viewpoint of the Israeli and Egyptian governments, the Camp David Accords has officially terminated the hostility between the two countries, and introduced a peaceful settlement of their long warfare. In contrast, the Palestinians considered the Accords an additional source of suffering. This is not surprising if we know that one of its impacts on the population of the Gaza Strip led to the destruction of hundreds of shelters in Rafah refugee camp and made their inhabitants homeless.

Obviously, as a consequence of the re-establishment of the border between Egypt and the Israeli-occupied Gaza Strip in 1982, shelters accommodating about 299 families of 1905 people in Rafah camp were swept away (Table 8.2). Also, several houses and orchards in Rafah town were bulldozed too, under the pretext of establishing a security zone (see Plates 4.1 and 4.2). The homeless people were given less than a week to evacuate their shelters by the Israeli military governor of Rafah, who offered them compensation or forced eviction. As the destruction carried on, the homeless moved to the nearby Tal el Sultan project (Fig. 4.1) where a relocation camp was being built. Some families squatted on their bare plots, some had salvaged bricks and rebuilt their homes, other had lean - to shacks or tents and some sat, uncovered, under the sun (Al Fajr, 1982a and 1982b).

Moreover, a special problem has arisen in Canada camp, an Israeli-sponsored rehousing project. Since April 1982, its people have been stranded on the Egyptian side and cut off from their work and relatives in the Strip (see Plate 4.2). The Egyptian government expects them to be rehoused into Gaza, as they are not Egyptian citizens. Since then, the Israeli government has delayed achieving an arrangement on resettlement terms and refused to permit the inhabitants to cross back into the Strip to continue their employment and schooling.

Finally, after four years of negotiations, a relocation agreement was signed in April 1986 between Israel and Egypt. Relocation of Canada camp inhabitants is to take place gradually. The families will build houses on plots of land set aside at Tal el Sultan project in Rafah. To compensate the inhabitants, Egypt is offering cash grants to each family, amounting to US $8000. At the same time, Israel is to provide a similar value in

kind through the provision of land, municipal services, community facilities and subsidised construction materials (Al Fajr, 1986 and UNRWA, 1986). This would be the second displacement of Canada camp refugees since the Israeli occupation of June 1967.

8.6 Summary

Obviously, the policy of removing people from their camps to place them in alternative accommodation has continued on several grounds. Between 1971 and November 1985, the Israelis have succeeded in evacuating some 57,123 refugees from their camps, equalling about 25% of the recent total camps population. Morover, the motives of systematic destruction of refugee shelters have altered over the years. In 1971, the destruction was carried out in order to achieve some security goals, while later on, it happened to implement purely political motives towards dealing with the refugee problem, particularly since the Israelis think that better living standards can divert the Palestinian refugees from their nationalist goals. On the other hand, if the Israeli authorities complete their refugee resettlement operations, they will be able to claim in the international arena that there is no longer a refugee problem in the area. More information about the Israeli rehousing projects will be discussed in the next two chapters.

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CHAPTER NINE

Survey of Al-Amal Dwelling Project (Khan Yunis)

9.1 Survey and Methods

The prime purpose of this survey, which was conducted by the author in Al-Amal dwelling project between 10 November and 1 December 1985, was to gather relevant data on the Israeli-sponsored rehousing plan. The importance of this fieldwork stems from the fact that no specific data are available. The survey findings help in exploring the undisclosed goals of the Israeli resettlement policy, and in identifying the impact of resettlement policy upon the refugee population in general and upon camp inhabitants in particular.

Al-Amal dwelling project, the third largest rehousing project for the resettlement of camp refugees in the Gaza Strip, is located adjacent to Khan Yunis refugee camp (see Fig. 9.1). The project covers an area of about 1150 dunums (1.15 sq. kms), and was populated by some 8500 inhabitants as at the end of 1985, making a population density of over 7390 persons per sq. km.

The project is divided into 4 residential quarters, embracing some 1000 dwellings in all. It also includes a governmental school, a clinic, a mosque, a kindergarten and a small central market (see Fig. 9.1).

Al-Amal dwelling project was chosen as the sample survey spot because it is adjacent to the researcher's accommodation in Khan Yunis camp; in addition, the survey includes several sensitive questions particularly those concerning household income, as well as the policy of the resettlement scheme. These questions required the contacted respondents to co-operate positively with the interviewer in order to achieve reasonable outcomes. Hence, Al-Amal project was recommended to be the survey site, since the author has extensive personal knowledge of its inhabitants, and the procedures for obtaining accommodation in it.

9.1.1 The Sample Coverage

The sample survey includes all those households selected from various residential blocks of Al-Amal dwelling project in Khan Yunis. 150

FIG·9·1· AL-AMAL DWELLING PROJECT ADJACENT TO KHAN YUNIS REFUGEE CAMP. ITSELF DIVIDED INTO 15 RESIDENTIAL BLOCKS·



households were taken as a sample in this study, encompassing 1687 persons. The sample represented 15% of the stock of accommodation in the project, and some 19.85% of the population living in it. So that the sample appeared to be a good representation of the inhabitants of Al-Amal rehousing project.

9.1.2 The Questionnaire

The questionnaire comprised 37 questions (Appendix 7) which may be classified as:

a) questions employed to set up a profile of the socio-economic characteristics of the dwellers of the Israeli-sponsored rehousing project;
b) questions designed to pinpoint the previous places of residence of Gazan refugees before moving to the rehousing project;
c) questions designed to identify the procedures for getting a house built or a plot of land in the rehousing project; such procedures can be used as a base for exploring the goals of the Israeli rehousing projects;
d) questions outlined to identify possible improvements in the housing conditions of the projects' inhabitants, and whether any such improvements happened as a consequence of Israeli assistance or resulted only from the inhabitants own efforts; and
e) questions designed to examine the Israeli rehousing policy as a whole and the response of the project's inhabitants to it.

9.1.3 The Sample Selection

To ensure a wide representation of Al-Amal's population, 150 households were sampled by a systematic method, and the eligible respondents were questioned individually. The author divided the project into 16 clusters and thus the interviewing process was carried out by questioning one household out of seven. Also, it is perhaps important to say that the number of contacted respondents varied from 5 to 15 in each cluster according to the proportion of the total.

9.1.4 Interviewing

Since the subject of refugee resettlement was sensitive and confidential, it needed more care to be taken during the question ing process, so as to collect accurate and reasonable data, therefore the author restricted the number of interviewers to three persons only, including of course the author. Hence, interviews were conducted between 5 p.m. and 11 p.m. each evening, and began earlier on Fridays and Saturdays, particularly to ensure that the heads of households were at home at the time of survey. It must be taken into account that each interviewer operated in different residential blocks as allocated to them by the author.

The questionnaire was addressed to the heads of households, who answered solely on the basis of their previous housing conditions, when they lived outside the dwelling project, as well as their recent conditions. Although some 82% of the population of Al-Amal resettled in the dwelling project seven years ago, their memories concerning their previous camp life remained vivid and responses to all questions were excellent.

Obviously, when the people surveyed were asked to answer the last 11 questions (Appendix 7), a basic problem occurred, as a group of respondents refused to answer them. These questions included the value of their monthly income, number of contributors to the household monthly income, aims of the Israeli-sponsored resettlement scheme, and their attitudes toward this scheme. Hence, from the inhabitants viewpoint, answers for these questions might have caused problems with the Israeli authorities, particularly if their names were reported. But when a guarantee was provided to the contacted households that their names and the numbers of their houses would not be registered, the problem was successfully cleared up. Nevertheless, 3 respondents refused to co-operate with the interviewers. Consequently they were replaced by their neighbours.

Although there were few failures to respond, considerable inaccuracy had been noted. A group of Al-Amal residents seemed to interpret income value questions as having some vague relation to future tax payment, and hence tended to underestimate their income. Fortunately, their estimates

can be checked against the detailed property characteristics (house size, number of storeys, apartments and rooms), a check which indicates, for instance, that 3 cases with houses of 3 storeys gave average income values of $617 per month, which would appear to be a gross underestimate in view of their exceptional housing condition (see Plate 9.1).

In a nutshell, most of the sampled population were co-operatively interviewed, and the 150 questionnaires were answered correctly and completely.

9.2 Sample Analysis

9.2.1 Characteristics of the Sampled Population

Tables 9.1 and 9.2 provide a detailed record of the socio-economic characteristics of the population of Al-Amal dwelling project. Table 9.1 indicates that 32% of the heads of households were highly educated, and had graduated from higher institutes or universities, compared with 20.7% who were found illiterate.

The occupational status of the sample revealed that 3.4% of household-heads practised medical jobs. UNRWA and government school teachers combined represented 23.5%. Classification of schools teachers by their employers aims to display the large gap between their households' monthly earnings, which will be seen later on. Moreover, merchants, shopowners and transport and service workers account for a modest proportion of 13.8%, while both technical workshops and industry and manufacturing occupations absorb 9.6%. Simultaneously, construction workers make up 26.9%, and occupations classified as not mentioned above constitute 22.8%.

Classification of the household-heads by employment status reveals that 83.4% were employed, either on a self-employed basis or by other institutions and individuals, 3.3% were retired and 13.3% were unemployed. This unemployment rate is comparable with the Gaza Strip unemployment rate of 12.2%, which was concluded earlier in chapter seven.

Furthermore, 99.3% of the surveyed population were refugees, compared with only 0.7% indigenous folk. The negligible proportion of indigenous

Table 9.1 Socio-Economic Characteristics of the 1985 Sample for the Population of Al-Amal Dwelling Project in Khan Yunis

Characteristics	Household-heads	
	No.	%
Number of Cases	150	100
Level of education of household-heads		
Illiterate	31	20.7
Elementary	26	17.3
Preparatory	19	12.7
Secondary	26	17.3
Technical and teachers institutes	23	15.3
University	25	16.7
Occupation*		% of workers
Doctor or nurse	5	3.4
UNRWA school teacher	23	15.9
Governmental school teacher	11	7.6
Merchant and shopowner	17	11.7
Transport and service worker	3	2.1
Technical workshops	8	5.5
Construction worker	39	26.9
Industry and manufacturing	6	4.1
Not mentioned above	33	22.8
Employment status		
Employed	112	74.7
Unemployed	20	13.3
Retired	5	3.3
Self-employed	13	8.7
Status of inhabitants		
Refugee	149	99.3
Indigenous	1	00.7

Source : The 1985 Sample Survey

* There were 5 cases classified as retired

Table 9.2 Al-Amal Dwelling Project : Household Monthly Income by the Occupation of Household-Head, 1985

Occupation of household-heads	Average monthly income in US$ per household
Doctor, chemistand nurse*	510.0
UNRWA school teacher	698.0
Governmental school teacher	377.3
Merchant and shopowner	397.0
Transport and service worker	450.0
Technical workshops	287.5
Construction worker	321.8
Industry and manufacturing	400.0
Not mentioned above	401.5
Retired**	650.0
Average of the total	430.7

Source : The 1985 Sample Survey

* Average monthly income of households with doctor (physician) as household-heads were $850, $350 for chemist, and $250 for nurse.

** Income earned by other household members (i.e. not the head) who were working inside the Strip, Israel, or abroad.

people is attributable to the fact that the resettlement scheme is designed for rehousing camp refugees only.

The principal areas of employment for Al-Amal inhabitants were located inside the Gaza Strip; work in the Strip absorbed 62% of the heads of the surveyed households. In contrast, work in Israel and abroad had attracted 29.3% and 2.7% respectively. The remaining 6% were classified as retired and aged heads of households. Also the survey shows that 41.9% of the locally employed heads of households were involved in white collar jobs in medicine and teaching. On the other hand, out of the 44 household-heads who were employed in Israel, 33 (75%) were recruited in the construction sector.

Viewed from another point, the average monthly income per household was $430.7. The highest monthly earnings were paid to household-heads who were physicians or UNRWA school teachers, amounting to $850 and $698 respectively, while the lowest paid were in technical workshop occupations (see Table 9.2).

9.2.2 Origins of Households before Moving into the Resettlement Project

In view of the 1985 survey, 119 households (79.3%) of the sample had moved into Al-Amal dwelling project from the adjacent Khan Yunis camp, 5 (3.3%) from Khan Yunis city and 26 (17.3%) from the Egyptian city of Al-Arish.

At Khan Yunis camp level of analysis, there has been a very marked spatial differentiation in the extent of household losses according to block of residence (see Figure 9.2). The survey shows that the highest rates of movement were reported in blocks G, F and H, amounting to 38.7%, 14.3% and 10.9% respectively, while the lowest were 0.8% in each of block D and J.

Significantly, 69.2% out of the 26 resettled households from Al-Arish had been previously driven out by the Israeli authorities from Jabalya camp, 15.4% from Beach camp, and 15.4% from Nuseirat, Deir el Balah, Khan Yunis, and Rafah camps combined (see Figure 9.3).

FIG·9·2· PROPORTIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF KHAN YUNIS CAMP REFUGEES RESETTLED IN AL-AMAL DWELLING PROJECT ACCORDING TO THEIR PREVIOUS CAMP BLOCK OF RESIDENCE



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The rate of movement into the project has varied greatly: approximately 82% of the sampled households were rehoused in Al-Amal project during 1976-79, 10.7% in 1980-81, and only 7.3% between 1982 and 1985 (see Figure 9.4). This decline of movement may be attributed either to the economic difficulties in the Strip, resulting from increasing unemployment rates and economic depression; or to the shortage of vacant plots of land, which could be used in expanding the resettlement project. Indeed all the surrounding lands have been sealed up and have been granted to neighbouring Israeli colonies for their future expansion.

9.2.3 Resettlement Procedures

In their efforts to raze Gazan camps, the Israeli authorities push the inhabitants of refugee camps to move into the Israeli-called refugee rehabilitation projects. Indeed, "Israel has experienced good national planning programmes of settlement, aiming to implement population dispersal and integration. It has also described how housing policy has been formulated within a framework of new-town development to promote both goals" (Vliet, 1985). Consequently, the Israelis put their experience into practice so as to disperse the refugee camps, and to reallocate their refugees in new resettlement projects.

Resettlement schemes began in 1974 and refugee movements were taking place in late 1975 and in the beginning of 1976. In 1976, after sewerage, water and electricity had been brought to the Sheikh Radwan project in Gaza city (see Figure 4.1), 16 housing units of two storeys were constructed (see Appendix 8). These model homes were shown to journalists and refugees to raise interest in the project, but no more houses were built on this model (Locke and Stewart, 1985).

To be eligible for accommodation in one of the rehousing projects, refugees must have shelters inside the refugee camps, which will have to be destroyed as a pre-condition for their new houses. After that the refugee is required to hand an application form to the Refugee Rehabilitation Branch in his area of living, requesting a housing unit after completing the necessary requirements (Appendix 9). So, a housing unit can be allocated accordingly (Appendix 10).



FIG·9·3· PROPORTIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF RESETTLED REFUGEES IN AL-AMAL PROJECT, WHO WERE EVACUATED FROM AL-ARISH CITY IN 1982, ACCORDING TO THEIR PREVIOUS REFUGEE CAMP IN THE GAZA STRIP.



FIG·9·4 CHANGING RATES OF MOVEMENTS INTO AL-AMAL REHOUSING PROJECT, 1976-85.

The registration fee for providing the infrastructure for each housing unit was $100, accepted on condition that the camp shelter would be destroyed within 12 months of the agreement (Locke and Stewart, 1985). The Israeli authorities require such demolition under claims that materials from demolished houses can be used by the refugees in new construction, and congestion in the camps is also relieved. The UNRWA opposes such demolitions and believes they add to the acute housing crisis in the Gaza Strip, as the rooms thus demolished are not available to rehouse other poor families living in overcrowded conditions (United Nations, 1985).

In the early stage of the resettlement scheme, two-room houses built on 250 sq. m plots were offered on 99 year leases, and each housing unit was sold for about $4000 (Farrell, 1976 and Locke and Stewart, 1985). But in 1978, the policy changed, and refugees were offered 125 sq. m plots on which they could build their homes. It seems that the refugees who are able financially to assume all the costs of construction are given the opportunity of having vacant tracts of land in the rehousing projects. On the other hand, the Israeli authorities supply certain loan schemes to refugees to assist or supplement the cost of construction. The refugees in question must sign bills of exchange, in the presence of two witnesses, on the value of the postponable loan; which should be cancelled after 10 years (see Appendix 11) after repaying the postponable loan with an interest rate of 4% per year.

Obviously, out of the 150 surveyed housholds of Al-Amal dwelling project, 73.3% had demolished their camp shelters as quid pro quo for a new housing unit in the project (see Plate 9.2). Also, to ensure that such demolitions would actually happen, the Israelis require refugees to sign bills of exchange concerning the compensation value of the demolished camp shelters, which could be cancelled when the camp shelters are destroyed (see Appendix 11).

Indeed, the demolished camp shelters are assessed by the Israeli authorities and refugees are given the assessed value which usually comprises a very small percentage of the cost of a new housing unit (Roy, 1986). Based on the 1985 survey, 142 (94.7%) households admitted receiving compensation from the Israeli authorities on the value of their previous shelters. At the same time, shelters of 5 (3.3%) households were

Plate 9.1 : Al-Amal rehousing project : Wealthy inhabitants (either self-financing or financed by remittances from relatives abroad) look down from their multi-storey residences which they have rebuilt themselves, on to the two-roomed dwellings of the less well-off.

Photo : The author

Plate 9.2 : Shelters in Beach camp demolished by their inhabitants as quid pro quo for a new housing unit in the Israeli-sponsored rehousing projects. Rebuilding or extensions upon the demolished sites, which would solve cramped housing conditions for the neighbouring residents, are prohibited under Israeli regulations. Ruins and rubble add to the decay and infestation in the camp.

Photo : The author

demolished in Khan Yunis camp, and they were offered alternative accommodation in Al-Amal project without compensation, because they were built illegally. The remaining 3 (2%) households were living in rented accommodation.

Moreover, 73.9% of the compensated households had had compensation below 5% of the value of their previous shelters, 12.7% of households between 5% and 10%, and 13.4% of households between 10% and 30%. In terms of money, 93.7% of compensated households confirmed having compensation below $500, 4.9% between $500 and $1000, and only 1.4% between $1500 and $2000.

The 1985 survey shows that 5.3% of households moved into Al-Amal project after buying camp shelters from refugees and then destroying them. The Israeli officials confirmed this fact, as in 1976 Major Cheshin said "we find out that refugees who long ago left the camps are buying rooms in shelters inside the camps just to be eligible for the new projects" (Farrell, 1976). This statement reveals the real goals of the resettlement projects, which aim to raze the camps in Gaza rather than improving the housing conditions of the Gazan refugees.

However, 17.3% of households received their housing units directly from the Refugee Rehabilitation Branch, and they did not destroy shelters in the refugee camps. This category includes the rehoused refugees from Al-Arish city who had squatted in Al-Amal project, and had constructed houses similar to those already existing in the refugee camps. But it is relevant to report here that the camp shelters of these families in their various original camps were removed in the 1971 Israeli roads plan demolitions, which were analysed in chapter eight.

Moreover, of the households surveyed in 1985, 2% were living in accommodation rented from the owner. Additionally, 2% were living in housing units which they had bought from the owner. In fact buying or selling houses in the resettlement projects is prohibited according to the conditions of the contract of tenancy. Item 21(A) of the contract provides the landlord (the Israeli authorities) the right of regaining the housing unit from the tenant if he does not begin and complete the construction in the given time, or if he transfers his right in the land to any other person without having previous permission from the landlord.

The 1985 survey reports that 70.7% of the sample received built houses, and 29.3% vacant plots of land. Together the 150 households involved in the sample had obtained a total of 187 housing units, of which 76.7% households had had one housing unit. In constrast, 22% had received two housing units and only 1.3% had had three housing units. Also, alongside the changing policy of resettlement, 112 (74.7%) households had received housing units with an area of 250 sq. m, contrasted with 38 (25.3%) households receiving 125 sq. m housing units.

9.2.4 Housing Conditions

This section aims to throw light on analysing the previous and present housing conditions of the dwellers of Al-Amal resettlement project, as well as to identify whether there has been any significant improvement in housing standards. Indeed, "the average numbers of persons per room, sometimes termed room densities, are useful indices of density of occupation as well as housing conditions. Unfortunately, they ignore the sizes of rooms, an important factor when one considers that rooms are often smallest where room densities are highest, as in tenements" (Clarke, 1975). So, during the preparation of the questionnaire, care was taken to consider the above points.

As demonstrated in Table 9.3, the housing conditions of Al-Amal dwellers have greatly improved in terms of housing quality and housing density. Before they moved into Al-Amal, 44% of households surveyed lived in dwellings of two rooms or less, whereas after the move only 8.6% lived in such circumstances. Similarly, the percentage of households living in dwellings of five rooms and over increased from 5.4% to 42.7% after resettlement. Also, the survey reveals that 10.7% of resettled households lived in dwellings of eight rooms and over compared with zero in the previous accommodation. Furthermore, previously 18% of households had lived in one-room dwellings but after resettlement this percentage dropped to zero. It can be calculated from Tables 9.3 and 9.5 that the average number of rooms per dwelling increased from 2.7 rooms in the former dwellings to 4.72 rooms in the rehousing project.

Put a different way, housing density decreased by one person per room from 3.38 persons per room in the former dwellings to 2.39 in Al-Amal rehousing project (see Table 9.3).

Table 9.3 Housing Density by Number of Rooms in Previous and Al-Amal Dwellings

Number of rooms in dwelling	Previous dwellings				Present dwelling (Al-Amal Project, 1985)			
	Frequency		Total No. of Inhabitants	Density of persons per room	Frequency		Total No. of Inhabitants	Density of persons per room
	No.	%			No.	%		
One	27	18	142	5.26	-	-	-	-
Two	39	26	344	4.41	13	8.6	94	3.62
Three	49	32.6	454	3.04	31	20.7	285	3.06
Four	27	18.0	315	2.92	42	28.0	407	2.42
Five	4	2.7	60	3.00	27	18.0	326	2.41
Six and over	4	2.7	51	2.13	37	24.7	580	2.02
Total	150	100.0	1366	3.38	150	100.0	1692	2.39

Source : The 1985 Sample Survey

Note: The average number of persons per room (room density) is obtained by multiplying each room category by its corresponding frequencies and dividing the aggregate number of persons in each room category by the aggregate number of rooms in the same category.

Overcrowding has been defined in different ways. For example, in relation to the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Abu Kishk (1980) and Abu Kishk and Ghurani (1980) mention that experts on housing agree that families who live in houses with an average of three or more individuals per room are suffering from inadequate housing. But in the case of western societies the index of overcrowding is lower - for instance, in the 1961 census of Britain, the average density of 1.5 persons per room was accepted as the lower level of overcrowding in England, Wales and Scotland (Clarke, 1975) - and in developing societies it would be higher.

As illustrated in Table 9.3, the previous and current accommodation of Al-Amal population has been classified according to the number of rooms in each dwelling and then housing density has been calculated accordingly. So, it becomes clear that overcrowding has substantially decreased for most of Al-Amal households. For instance, approximately 29.3% of the households surveyed were living in rooms with more than three persons as against 79.3% in the former dwellings. Only 24.7% of resettled households were accommodated in housing densities above Al-Amal's average density. However, it becomes evident that the reduction in room occupancy ratios has occurred in all groups of dwellings, with the exception of the three-room dwellings category where the ratio remains constant (see Table 9.3).

Housing density was calculated for all the surveyed households and showed a significant reduction in overcrowding (Table 9.4). The median housing density has declined from 3.26 persons per room in the former dwellings to 2.42 in the recent ones. Also, the percentage of households living in a room density below two persons per room has increased from 14.67% in the former dwellings to 21.34% in the present ones. But the most dramatic improvement in housing density has occurred in the category of 2.0 - 2.99 persons per room, where the proportion has increased from 20.67% to 47.33% to the benefit of Al-Amal households. The percentage of households living in overcrowded conditions, three persons per room or more, has more than halved from 64.66% in the former dwellings to 31.33% in the current ones.

The 1985 sample survey reveals that the total area of inhabited rooms is 8,906 sq. m with a population of 1692 persons, giving an occupancy ratio of 5.26 sq. m per person (Tables 9.3 and 9.5).

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Table 9.4 Households, by Housing Density in the Previous and Present Dwellings of the Inhabitants of Al-Amal Rehousing Project

Persons per room	Previous dwellings	Present dwellings (1985)
less than 1	0.67	0.67
1.0 - 1.99	14.00	20.67
2.0 - 2.99	20.67	47.33
3.0 - 3.99	22.00	22.67
4+	42.66	8.66
Median housing density	3.26	2.42

Source : The 1985 Sample Survey

Table 9.5 Sizes of Rooms in the Present Dwellings of Al-Amal Rehousing Project, 1985

Area of room (sq.m)	Frequency	No. of rooms	Total area (sq.m)
9.0	5	15	135
10.5	48	206	2163
12.0	64	296	3552
16.0	33	191	3056
Total	150	708	8906

Source : The 1985 Sample Survey.

There are significant changes in the number of families per household. Table 9.6 demonstrates that the percentage of one-family households remained constant. In contrast, the proportion of two-family households dropped from 35.3% in the former dwellings to 26% in the present ones. But the most evident increase has been in three- and four-family households; from 12% in the previous dwellings to 22.66% in Al-Amal resettlement project. This increase in the number of families per household matches Gazan tradition where it is preferred that all family members are accommodated in one dwelling if possible. As a consequence, the average size of household has increased from 9.1 persons in the former dwellings to 11.28 in the recent ones.

Table 9.6 Number of Families in the Previous and Present Households of the Inhabitants of Al-Amal Rehousing Project

Number of families in household	Previous dwelling		Present dwelling (1985)	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
One	79	52.7	77	51.33
Two	53	35.3	39	26.00
Three	14	9.3	23	15.33
Four	4	2.7	11	7.33
Total	150	100.0	150	99.99

Source : The 1985 Sample Survey.

From the above analysis, it can be concluded that in general it was people who were living in overcrowded conditions who moved into Al-Amal resettlement project. This is not surprising when we consider that the

housing for those refugees who are still living in Khan Yunis camp is less overcrowded. Based on the 1985 survey of the housing problem in Khan Yunis camp, several indices concerning housing conditions were derived, showing indices of 2.83 persons per room, 4.27 sq. m per person, 3.6 rooms per dwelling, and 1.78 families per household (see Chapter 10).

Obviously, no significant improvements should be deduced from the above, as long as the economic and political situation, family size and traditions of Gazans remain as they are. Indeed, the Strip's society prefers large to small families (see Chapter 6).

Another issue of resettlement is that, due to the acute economic difficulties in the Gaza Strip and the high cost of resettlement and construction, only very rich people and those people who receive remittances from relatives abroad are able to move into the resettlement project and construct a house of reasonable quality. Obviously, worldwide, remittances have had a major impact on changing the socio-economic structure of receiving societies. Through remittances personal and household income levels can be raised, even if income differentials between individuals and households are exaggerated, often increasing social differentation between families receiving remittance payments and those not. Remittances can, therefore, increase or accentuate inequalities within countries (Curson, 1981).

There is no doubt that the people who moved into Al-Amal rehousing project have better economic conditions than those who are living in the refugee camps. Out of the 150 households surveyed, 56.7% had one contributor to household income, 28.7% had two contributors, and 14.6% had three contributors or more. Furthermore, 41 households declared having 54 members contributing to household income from abroad through remittances. Of these households, 31 (75.6%) had one member, 8 (19.5%) had two members, and only 2 (4.9%) had between three and four members. The contributors were classified according to their kinship to the head of the household: 46.3% sons and daughters, 41.5% brothers and sisters, 7.3% father, and 4.9% other relatives. In essence, households with remittances from relatives abroad are living, in better housing conditions and lower levels of overcrowding (see Plate 9.1).

Many people moved into Al-Amal into two-room houses built by the Israeli authorities. These houses were so shoddy that few survived the first winter; most leaked and some developed major faults which necessitated complete rebuilding. A few residents were able to rebuild their houses from scratch, others had to make do with patchy repairs and prepare them for the next winter (Locke and Stewart, 1985). The two-room houses were inadequate for living as they had no basic facilities such as halls, kitchens and walls around the yard, but they provided the inhabitants with good opportunities for future expansion and improvement.

Out of the 150 households sampled in 1985, 144 (96%) said they had made alterations to their houses in the project. This figure can be broken down into three categories: 68 (47.2%) households who added rooms, halls and kitchens to their housing units, 33 (22.2%) households who demolished their houses and rebuilt them from scratch on multi-storey styles, and 44 (30.6%) households classified as "others" in the questionnaire, who built their houses directly from the ground since they received vacant plots of land from the Israeli authorities.

Analysis of vertical expansion of the 76 rebuilt houses (including 32 rebuilt houses and 44 plots of land) indicates that 51 (67.1%) houses consisted of one storey, 22 (28.95%) of two stories and 3 (3.95%) of three stories. Of these houses, 48 (63.2%) had one apartment, 20 (26.3%) had two apartments, and only 8 (10.5%) had between three to six apartments.

9.3 The Policy and Response

To help attract the camp refugees into the resettlement projects, the Israeli authorities publicized that these projects would be served with an underground sewage disposal system, uninterrupted supply of electricity and water, street lights, schools, health centres and other amenities including shopping areas (Ministry of Health of Israel, 1985). At the same time, UNRWA, which owns and administers the camps, acknowledges that the accommodation provided in the resettlement projects is superior to the shelters in which the refugees are living, and therefore supports voluntary moves (UNRWA, 1984). So, assurances have repeatedly been given by the Israeli authorities to UNRWA that no refugee family would be forced to move compulsorily, and that no family's shelter in the refugee camps should be destroyed. But on the contrary, a significant proportion of resettled refugees were motivated to move by fear or pressure.

Turning back to 1976, when the first stage of construction (two-room built houses) in Al-Amal rehousing project was completed, the Israeli authorities had failed to convince the inhabitants of Khan Yunis camp to move into the project voluntarily. This failure resulted from popular campaigns still in practice today, which are mounted to emphasise the political implications of the resettlement schemes across the Strip (Cossali and Robson, 1986). Consequently, the Israeli authorities interpreted that the whole resettlement plan would be in danger if the refugees did not move into them. So, various types of pressure are applied to get refugees to agree to evacuate their camps and to be rehoused in Al-Amal project. For instance, the 1985 survey shows that 5 shelters in Khan Yunis camp were demolished by the Israelis to force their inhabitants to move into the project.

In the light of the 1985 survey, 69.3% of the household surveyed moved into Al-Amal voluntarily, including of course those households who were living in rented houses (2%) or in housing bought from the owner (2%). In contrast, 30.7% of resettled households admitted forcible resettlement. But it is relevant to report here that most of the surveyed households who moved voluntarily confirmed indirect coercion to move. Yet, having lived in the refugee camps since the 1950's, receiving few hours of water per day and an unpredictable supply of electricity, enduring an acute problem of living space with no extensions to camp houses allowed (see Appendix 12), it must have been difficult for the financially eligible refugees to oppose moving into the rehousing projects.

However, in order to expand Al-Amal rehousing project, the Israeli authorities are seeking additional land from Khan Yunis camp for that purpose. So, the project aims to encroach upon the adjacent blocks G, O and F (see Fig. 9.2), and their inhabitants are being pressured into moving into the rehousing project by the Israeli authorities. Inded, 20% of the compulsorily resettled refugees come from block G alone. In January 1984, 230 shelter from blocks G and O adjoining Al-Amal project were visited by representatives of the Refugee Rahabilitation Branch and the inhabitants were told that their homes were to be demolished (UNRWA, 1984). But no destruction has yet taken place.

Similarly, some 50 families living on the northern edge of Jabalya camp (in blocks X and S) adjacent to Beit Lahiya resettlement project were

threatened by the Israelis that their shelters would be demolished because they allegedly had been built illegally. In fact, 14 private rooms were demolished, and a number of boundary walls and grounds were bulldozed. This created apprehension, and several families took their cases to the Israeli High Court of Justice for injunctions to stop such destruction (Kana'na and Al-Madani, 1985 and United Nations, 1985).

Moreover, to force Jabalya's refugees to accept resettlement into the Beit Lahiya project, the foundations of refugee shelters have been eroded by Israeli bulldozers which would eventually lead to the shelters' collapse (see Plate 9.3). Rebuilding of collapsed shelters is prohibited unless a rebuilding permit has been obtained. And, of course, there is always great difficulty in obtaining a building permit. In addition, to punish the majority of Jabalya camp inhabitants who did not take up the offer to resettle, the underground sewage system of Beit Lahiya project was allowed to flood the alleys of Jabalya camp adding more foul odour and disease to the infamous Abu Rashed pool (see Plate 10.2). Huge spots of smelly black waste are seen all over the camp, formed by leaking sewage pipes and unmaintained pits that were part of the rehousing project of Beit Lahiya (Al Fajr, 1986).

Alongside responses to the resettlement policy, 36% of the households surveyed in Al-Amal project were satisfied with their housing conditions and they had advised other inhabitants of refugee camps to move into the Israeli-sponsored rehousing project if they are able to finance themseles. Some of them explained their stand as political and described it as a necessary movement in the land conflict between the Palestinians and the Jewish colonists. They believed that if the Palestinians refuse to be resettled in vacant land, it will be used for the expansion of Israeli colonies instead. Moreover, 34% supported such movement on condition that the housing quality and municipal services were improved. However 15.3% advised the camp refugees to cling to their camp shelters and to resist resettlement, while 14.7% revealed stronger reasons for staying in the refugee camps.

Analysis of the services provided to the inhabitants shows that 98.7% of the project inhabitants had severe shortages of water supply, affecting not only Al-Amal residents but also the whole population of Khan Yunis. This problem will be analysed at length in the next chapter. Also, 95.3%

affirmed that they received poor sanitation service from Khan Yunis municipality, which takes responsiblity for Al-Amal project, and 38% were living in bad housing conditions and overcrowding. Amongst this category were those refugees who were resettled in the project from the Egyptian city of Al-Arish. Furthermore, 73.3% of the inhabitants had other problems mainly connected with the interruption of electricity supply.

Furthermore, sewage disposal is considered a chronic problem confronting not only Al-Amal dwellers but also the whole population of the Gaza Strip. All Al-Amal inhabitants are suffering from an acute problem of disposing of their household waste water. Indeed, when the Israeli authorities constructed the resettlement project, an underground sewage disposal network was set up, but since then it has not been in use. It is planned to connect the Al-Amal sewage system with the sewage network of Khan Yunis city, so wastes could be collected at the recommended site of the sewage treatment units.

However, after a plan had been completed by Khan Yunis municipality for connecting Khan Yunis city and its refugee camp to a new sewage network, work began in 1977 to install the sewage pipes and establish the central sewage pumping station. The central sewage pumping station was completed in 1978 and pipes were added in 1980 to carry the sewage to the site of the treatment units which, it was recommended, should be 1½ km north of Al-Amal resettlement project. However, the neighbouring Jewish colonies refused to allow the establishment of the treatment units on the recommended site despite the Israeli authorities' permit. At the moment the project has been frozen since no site can be agreed on, despite having cost about $3 million, and the whole city including Al-Amal resettlement project is left without an underground sewage system.

As alternatives, Al-Amal inhabitants like the majority of Gazan people, have used cesspits for household sewage disposal and waste water. But long intervals between collections have often caused overflows into the open, resulting in a detestable smell which is exaggerated during the hot summer months.

This situation refutes the Israeli claims that the resettlement projects have been provided with modern sewage disposal systems, since we know that the underground sewage networks of Beit Lahiya and Tal el Sultan

(Rafah) rehousing projects flood into open pools, which add to the frustration of an ugly life in the overcrowded Gaza Strip (see Plates 9.4 and 10.2).

Viewed from another point, the conditions which are provided in the tenancy contract raise continuous disputes about the issue of refugee resettlement, and about ownership of the new houses in these projects. So, to deal with this subject, special care was paid to find clues which could help in understanding the whole matter of the resettlement scheme.

Upon agreeing to resettle, the refugees are told to sign a multi-page document drafted in Hebrew, which most cannot read. As far as the refugees are concerned, they believe that this document may include clauses by which they give up every claim they have to their belongings or their right to reside in Palestine (Al Fajr, 1986). But documents available to the author contradict this. A total of 31 pages of contracts are required to be signed, including a quadruple seven-page contract written in Hebrew with a translation in Arabic, before receiving a new housing unit in the resettlement projects. However, nothing in these contracts concerns the resettled refugees' properties in Palestine, but they concentrate on organiz ing the relationship between the tenant and the landlord.

The 1985 survey indicates that 144 (96%) of the sampled households had signed contracts with the Israeli authorities when they received their accommodation in Al-Amal project, while 6 (4%) households had no contracts as they were living in rented houses or they had bought them from the owner (the former owner had signed a contract with the Israeli authorities). So, to know the dwellers acknowledgement of the conditions of this contract, 41.7% of resettled refugees with contracts responded positively to our question and they affirmed that they knew what was written in the contract, while the remaining 58.3% revealed ignorance of its conditions.

Out of the 60 households who knew what their contracts included, 13.3% confirmed that their refugee identity was confiscated since they had moved out from the refugee camp. Yet, "UNRWA has not been allowed to instal any of its services in the project so refugees are increasingly dependent on the government. They (the resettled refugees) are still

Plate 9.3 : Beit Lahiya rehousing project encroaching on the adjacent Jabalya camp whose residents are being pressured into moving into the rehousing project by Israeli bulldozers removing the sand and thus eroding the foundation of the shelters. Rebuilding of collapsed camp shelters is closely regulated.

Photo : The author

Plate 9.4 : Household sewage water is collected (from Tal el Sultan resettlement project in Rafah) by an underground sewage disposal system to the treatment unit, which is overflowing making an open pool of sewage 50 metres south of the resettlement project.

Photo : The author

eligible for UNRWA schools and clinics, but often their distance precludes their using them. Separating the refugees from UNRWA is one aspect of the general strategy of removing their refugee identity and breaking their connection with the past" (Locke and Stewart, 1985). So, 25% had interpreted that the contract rescinded their rights to live in the refugee camp, or to rebuild their demolished camp shelter. These answers were derived from their response to the variable classified in the questionnaire as "others" (Appendix 7).

Furthermore, all of the aforesaid households confirmed that the land of their houses is leased from the Israeli authorities for 99 years. In fact, no specific period of tenancy is mentioned in the contract except the term of "an agreement of development and long tenancy", which could be specified according to the landlord's desire.

There can be no doubt that the conditions of the contract are outlined completely for the landlord's (the Israeli authorities') benefit, not for the tenant. For instance item 17 of the contract reads: "the tenant declares that he is in full cognizance that the presence of natural resources such as : petrol, gas, water sources, coal mines or all kinds of minerals, and marble or stones or sands or "Karkar" quarries or any other sorts of minerals and antiquities should be the property of the landlord and not the tenant's according to the conditions of the contract. Moreover, the tenant promises to grant the landlord the permit, according to the conditions decided by the landlord, to exploit or mine the natural resources and explore the antiquities from the ground; in addition, the landlord or anybody deputized by him has the right to enter the property at any time he sees fit in order to implement the aforementioned actions". Bearing in mind that the resettlement project is built on sands, the Israeli authorities can apply the aforesaid condition at any time and if the tenants refuse, they could be evicted from their houses legally.

Viewed from another legal angle, one condition of the contract overrides the tenant's right of protection from the landlord, according to item 23 which reads: "the law of tenants protection or any other legislations which could lead to protect the tenancy is invalid on this contract according to the rules of ordinance No. 253 (Gaza Strip and North Sinai) issued in 5729-1969, concerning the invalidity of the legislation of tenants protection in specific cases".

Indeed, the Gaza Strip is under the legal jurisdiction of the Israeli military and the management of daily affairs rests with the area military commander. So, since the occupation began, the area commanders of both territories (The West Bank and the Gaza Strip) have issued over 1200 orders which govern all aspects of life in Gaza and the West Bank including legal, civil and political rights, land and water rights, licensing, taxation, services, security and social welfare (Roy, 1986).

Despite the above-mentioned condition, and just in case of any dispute arising between the tenant and the landlord, Israeli legislations and jurisdiction are valid on the contract as appears in item 24 (A) which reads: "The legislations of the State of Israel are valid on this contract and the jurisdication court of Beer Sheva is the only court specializing in dealing with what is related to or results from this contract". But it is relevant to report here that the period of tenancy can be reduced and the validity of the contract can be cancelled, according to an authorisation which is given to the military area commander as mentioned in item 24 (B) which reads: "the aforesaid text in paragraph (A) does not detract from the tenant's duty in undergoing every text from the legislations of security, nor does that paragraph detract from the authority of the area commander in publishing instructions concerning the validity of the contracts and every thing regarding the rights or duties of the contractors".

In practical legal terms, the contract is written in Hebrew despite its translation into Arabic, and few people know how the contract could be revoked in the future. Yet, item 25 confirms this conclusion which reads: "this contract has been written in the Hebrew language and the Hebrew text is the obligatory text, but its translation into Arabic language has just appeared for parties' convenience".

Moreover, very few people know the conditions of their contract, and in what language it had been written. Based on the 1985 survey, only 3 (2%) households knew that their contracts, from the legal viewpoint, are written in Hebrew in spite of the Arabic translation. In contrast, 55 (36.7%) respondents confirmed it was written in the Hebrew language, 18 (12%) the Arabic language, and 71 (47.3%) respondents were confused by the Arabic translation of the contract and they responded that the contract is written in Hebrew and Arabic, and both texts are obligatory for the

contractors from the legal point of view. The remaining 2% were living in rented houses and they had no idea about the conditions of the contract.

To sum up, we can conclude that the resettled refugees have revealed wide ignorance about the conditions of their contracts, and on what kind of documents they added their signatures. Yet, having lived in overcrowded conditions and fear and pressure, the refugees have no other alternatives except to accept such reallocation and resettlement.

9.4 Summary

The Israeli-sponsored resettlement programme has provided those refugees who were eligible for it and financially fit, an opportunity to set up a higher standard of accommodation than generally exists inside the refugee camps. The analysis shows that most resettled refugees were highly educated people or wealthy, and a significant proportion have received remittances from relatives working abroad which helped them in building their most comfortable accommodation.

Indeed, housing conditions and room occupancy ratios have shown significant improvement compared with the former accommodation as well as with the present housing conditions inside Khan Yunis camp. But it must be noted that the project residents are still living in overcrowded conditions with bad services despite the Israeli refutation in this matter. The inhabitants of Al-Amal project have confirmed suffering from severe shortage of water supply, interruptions of electricity, sewage disposal problems, bad sanitation and relatively bad housing.

The Israeli allegation that the resettlement schemes have no political goals and are fully humanitarian and voluntary has been refuted. About one-third of the surveyed households have been resettled forcibly. Indeed, the Israeli authorities aim in the short run to make the refugee camps less congested, while their aim in the long run is to integrate the camp refugees with the indigenous population in order to break their connection with the past. Yet, the refugee camps have become considerably thinner and political implications more overt.

The resettlement contract has been written for the benefit of the Israeli authorities giving them the power to override it at any time. On

the other hand, the tenant has no right to initiate court proceedings against them, particularly if the rescinding decision has been carried out on "security grounds".

From the refugees' viewpoint, the Israeli authorities are an unreliable source to trust before signing a series of documents in Hebrew which can hardly be understood. As a consequence, suspicion of the population about the Israeli-sponsored resettlement has been increased, and reluctance of the population towards the resettlement policy has been widely intensified.

Although the resettlement programme has resulted in improving the housing position for a small minority in terms of densities, it has led to ghettoizing the majority of the camp refugees who are financially unfit to leave or unwilling to do so. Even inside the resettlement project, a significant proportion of the dwellers have been ghettoized in their new accommodation, and this can reflect the economic and social distinctions between the project inhabitants. Indeed, the 1985 survey shows that more than one-third of the Al-Amal resettled population were living in unsatisfactory housing conditions and most of this group were resettled forcibly either from Khan Yunis camp or from the Egyptian city of Al-Arish.

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CHAPTER TEN
Housing Survey of Khan Yunis Refugee Camp

10.1 Survey and Methods

Since there are no available data concerning housing conditions in the Gaza Strip refugee camps in particular, a sample survey has been conducted in Khan Yunis camp by the author between 3 and 15 December 1985. The survey aimed to examine the housing situation in the camp, and to analyse the population's responses to the Israeli resettlement policy in the Strip. However, question number 11 has been inserted here for use in drawing overall conclusions for the thesis, particularly when the issue of Gazan refugee camps is analysed. In fact, results derived from the survey can be generalized to represent the housing conditions in the Strip refugee camps as a whole.

Khan Yunis refugee camp, the fourth biggest camp in the Strip, recommended itself as the survey site partly because the researcher has extensive experience about the camp inhabitants as a resident, and partly because the camp has introduced a homogeneous socio-economic structure.

The population of Khan Yunis camp as at 30 June 1985 was 33,269 refugees, comprising 6,645 families (UNRWA, 1985). They were living on an estimated area of 3,000 dunums (3 sq. km), giving a population density of 11,090 persons per sq. km which reflects a very high degree of overcrowding. Furthermore, the camp has been divided alphabetically by the UNRWA into 15 residential blocks (Figure 9.1), comprising tightly packed clusters of huts, with narrow networks of alleys. In general each hut accommodates one household and has from one room to more than seven rooms. Most of these rooms were built by the refugees as their family size grew over the years, and the two-room shelters built by UNRWA in the early 1950s are no longer sufficient for accommodating most families.

10.1.1 The Sample Coverage

The sample includes all those households chosen from the 15 residential blocks in Khan Yunis camp : 220 households accommodating 391 families of 2,245 persons have been successfully interviewed as the tool

of this study. This sample represented about 6.75% of the camp population and some 5.9% of the camp total number of families.

10.1.2 The Questionnaire

The questionnaire was designed with 13 questions attempting to pinpoint the housing problem and its causes in the refugee camps (Appendix 13). In general the questions are of five kinds :

a) questions designed to estimate the proportion of private and UNRWA-built shelters in the camp;
b) questions aimed at obtaining information about the magnitude of the housing problem in the refugee camp;
c) questions designed to derive the attitude of the camp's population toward the Israeli-sponsored dwelling projects;
d) questions designed to discover the acceptable solution for settling the Palestinian problem in general and the refugee problem in particular; and
e) questions designed to acquire specific data about the conditions of living in the refugee camps, and the main basic problems facing the refugees.

10.1.3 Sample Selection

The same procedures which were mentioned earlier in Chapter five have been followed in interviewing respondents in order to obtain the necessary data on the housing problem and life conditions in the refugee camps. Consequently, it can be concluded that the sample was based on a random method.

Therefore, a reasonable sample was taken from all blocks in the camp; 44 clusters were selected from the camp, and each cluster included 5 households, giving a total of 220 households. Also the number of sampled clusters varied from 8 clusters covering 40 households in block G to 1 cluster encompassing just 5 households in block O.

Throughout the sample selection, caution was taken to ensure that the sampled population was made up entirely of the refugees of Khan Yunis camp. As a consequence, the results should enable us to make conclusions

about the housing situation in the Gaza Strip refugee camps as a whole.

10.1.4 Interviewing

The same steps of questioning which were followed in chapter five have been practised here. As a result, the questionnaire was addressed to the head of household who responded with full awareness and patience to the questions involved in the survey.

The interviewing process was carried out in Khan Yunis camp between 5 p.m. and 9 p.m. each evening. Eight interviewers participated (including the author) in the task, consisting of 4 groups and each one operating in a different residential block. Throughout the interviewing process, the sampled population revealed excellent co-operation, and response to the questionnaire filling-in was 100%.

10.2 Housing Conditions in the Gaza Strip and Refugee Camps

As indicated in Table 10.1, housing has improved since 1972 with regard to number of rooms. The percentage of Gazan households living in dwellings of two rooms or less declined from 68.5% in 1972 to 50.3% in 1984. In the same period, the percentage living in dwellings of four rooms or more increased from 12% to 27%. Similarly, the percentage of camp households living in two rooms or less decreased from 63% in 1972 to 56.5% in 1982. At the same time, the percentage of camp households with four rooms or more increased from 13.9% to 16.9% (Table 10.2). This shows that the increase in dwelling size has occurred more slowly in the camps than in the Strip as a whole.

However, the above should not be taken as an indicator of an improvement in housing conditions unless there has also been a significant reduction in room density. Table 10.3 shows that overcrowding decreased in the Gaza Strip as a whole. In 1972, 52.1% were living in a room density of three persons or more compared with 37.8% in 1984. However, there has been no such improvement in the refugee camps, where 45.8% of households were living in three rooms or more in 1972, as against 42.2% in 1982 (see Table 10.4). At the same time, the proportion of Gazan households living in a room density of less than two persons increased from 22.4% in 1972 to 31.9% in 1984, while in the refugee camps the

Table 10.1 Gaza Strip : Proportional Distribution of Households by Size of Dwelling, 1972 - 1984

Rooms in dwelling	1972	1975	1980	1982	1984
One	25.0	17.1	16.4	17.3	19.6
Two	43.5	38.3	36.6	31.2	30.7
Three	19.5	22.6	23.4	25.2	22.7
Four	8.4	14.0	15.0	17.2	17.8
Five and more	3.6	8.0	8.6	9.1	9.2

Source : Central Bureau of Statistics, 1973, 76, 83 and 1985.

Table 10.2 Proportional Distribution of Households by Size of Dwelling in the Gazan Refugee Camps, 1972-1982 and in Khan Yunis Refugee Camp, 1985

Rooms in dwelling	1972	1975	1978	1982	1985*
One	18.8	19.6	19.2	23.6	4.1
Two	44.2	38.8	32.9	32.9	14.6
Three	23.1	24.5	27.2	26.6	31.8
Four	9.6	11.4	13.0	12.0	26.8
Five and more	4.3	5.7	7.7	4.9	22.7

Source : Central Bureau of Statistics , 1973, 76, 79 and 1983

* Percentages derived from the 1985 Sample Survey

Table 10.3 Gaza Strip : Households, by Housing Density, 1972-1984

Persons per room	1972	1975	1980	1982	1984
Less than 1	3.8	3.9	3.4	4.6	6.3
1.0 - 1.99	18.6	19.9	22.3	24.1	25.6
2.0 - 2.99	25.5	28.7	30.9	32.3	30.3
3.0 - 3.99	25.4	21.9	21.6	19.4	19.6
4+	26.7	25.6	21.8	19.6	18.2
Median housing density	3.0	2.9	2.8	2.6	2.5

Source : Central Bureau of Statistics, 1973, 76, 83 and 1985.

Table 10.4 Households, by Housing Density in Gaza's Refugee Camps, 1972-1982, and in Khan Yunis Refugee Camp, 1985

Persons per room	1972	1975	1978	1982	1985*
Less than 1	3.8	3.3	4.2	3.7	1.8
1.0 - 1.99	20.8	18.7	20.9	22.6	13.2
2.0 - 2.99	29.6	30.2	31.7	31.5	38.6
3.0 - 3.99	24.8	22.7	22.0	21.9	29.1
4+	21.0	25.1	21.2	20.3	17.3
Median housing density	2.9	2.9	2.8	2.7	2.65

Source : Central Bureau of Statistics, 1973, 76, 79, and 1983

* Percentages derived from the 1985 Sample Survey

proportion crept from 24.6% in 1972 to 26.3% in 1982.

In a nutshell, housing conditions have improved but to a lesser degree in the refugee camps than in the Gaza Strip as a whole. This disparity is a reflection of Israeli policy towards the refugee camps, which will be examined latter.

10.3 Khan Yunis Camp: A Study in Housing Conditions

Officially all shelters in Khan Yunis camp, as in all Gaza's camps, were built by UNRWA. However, with the growing population, some refugees constructed their own shelters inside the camp boundaries. The 1985 survey of Khan Yunis camp reveals that 199 (90.45%) households were living in UNRWA-built shelters, while 21 (9.55%) households were living in shelters they had built themselves. These later shelters were all built before the 1967 occupation.

Table 10.2 illustrates that shelters, in terms of their number of rooms, in Khan Yunis camp are better than in all the Gaza Strip refugee camps taken together. Based on the 1985 survey, approximately 18.7% of households sampled in Khan Yunis camp were living in shelters of two rooms or less as against 56.5% for the Strip's camps as a whole, reported in 1982. At the same time, 49.5% of all the sampled households were living in shelters of four rooms or more compared with only 16.9% in all Gaza's camps. Furthermore, the average numbers of rooms per shelter is 3.6 (calculated from Table 10.6). This figure is higher than the figure of 2.7 rooms which was reported in the former dwellings of the resettled refugees of Al-Amal (see Chapter 9).

Although the refugees of Khan Yunis camp are living in larger shelters compared with Gazan camps as a whole, overcrowding in the camp is higher than that reported for all the Gazan camps in 1982. Table 10.4 demonstrates that 15% of the households surveyed in Khan Yunis camp were living in a room density of two persons or less compared with 26.3% in all the Gazan camps in 1982. Also, 46.4% of Khan Yunis camp households were living with three persons per room or more, as against 42.2% in Gazan camps as a whole in 1982. In general, 50% of Khan Yunis camp residents live in shelters where the occupancy ratio is over the median value of 2.65 persons per room. But it must be noted that housing density in Khan

Yunis camp is moderate compared with some other camps. For instance in Jabalya camp an average of six persons living in each room was reported (Al Fajr, 1985).

The disparity in shelter size between Khan Yunis camp and the Strip's camp as a whole can be attributed to the fact that refugee households living in small shelters moved into Al-Amal project, while those living in large shelters remained in the camp (e.g. see Chapter 9). Furthermore, to accommodate a growing population, additional rooms were built by refugees inside the yards of their shelters.

A breakdown of dwellings by number of rooms has been illustrated in Table 10.5 and housing density has been separately computed for each category. A negative relationship between housing density and the number of rooms in each dwelling has been clearly noted. For example, overcrowding is found in dwellings consisting of two rooms or less while in the remaining categories of dwellings people live in less overcrowded conditions. However, the average housing density in Khan Yunis camp is 2.83 persons per room.

Viewed from another point, the total area of the inhabited rooms in the sample is 9584.5 sq. m. and they have a population of 2,245 persons, giving a housing density of 4.27 sq. m per person (calculated from Tables 10.5 and 10.6).

As a consequence of the economic and political situation in the Gaza Strip, several families are crammed into one dwelling. Table 10.7 summarizes that 47.7% of housholds surveyed in Khan Yunis camp consisted of one family, 30.3% two families, 14.5% three families, and 7.7% four families or more. Also, the analysis shows that Khan Yunis families and households are distinguished, as in all Gaza's localities, as being large; the average number of persons per family was 5.6, and 10.2 persons per household. Similar results were discovered earlier in chapter 9 for the Al-Amal rehousing project.

The previous discussion reveals that housing is a major problem confronting the camp refugees since there has been no real planning to take account of natural increase upon the number of refugees. Yet, the shelters which were erected by UNRWA in the early 1950s to accommodate

Table 10.5 Housing Density of Khan Yunis Refugee Camp by Number of Rooms in Dwellings, 1985

Rooms in dwelling	Household		Total of inhabit-ants	Density : persons per room
	No.	%		
One	9	4.1	50	5.56
Two	32	14.5	230	3.59
Three	70	31.8	616	2.93
Four	59	26.8	611	2.59
Five	29	13.2	386	2.66
Six	17	7.7	283	2.77
Seven and more	4	1.8	69	2.46
Total	220	100.0	2,245	2.83

Source : The 1985 Sample Survey.

Table 10.6 Sizes of Rooms in Dwellings of Khan Yunis Refugee Camp, 1985

Area of room (sq.m)	Frequency	No. of rooms	Area (m^2)
9	53	171	1539.0
10.5	58	215	2257.5
12.0	52	185	2220.0
16.0	57	223	3568.0
Total	220	794	9584.5

Source : The 1985 Sample Survey.

Table 10.7 Number of Families in Households of Khan Yunis Refugee Camp, 1985

No. of families in household	Frequency	(%)
One	105	47.7
Two	66	30.3
Three	32	14.5
Four	17	7.7
Total	220	100.0

Source : The 1985 Sample Survey.

refugees temporarily continue to serve the new generations (see Plate 10.1). So most of the refugees shelters are now crammed with three generations, making life unbearable.

10.4 Khan Yunis Camp : A Study of Public Services

Indeed, all services provided in the Gaza Strip in general and the refugee camps in particular are inadequate. The 1985 Survey concentrated in quantifying this problem in the refugee camp of Khan Yunis.

10.4.1 Sewage Problem

Based on the 1985 survey, 96.8% of the all sampled households in Khan Yunis camp were suffering from an acute problem of sewage disposal, while the remaining proportion were satisfied with using cesspits as a resolution of the problem. Indeed, cesspits and septic tanks have been utilized as a temporary solution to the sewage disposal problem not only in Khan Yunis camp but in all Gazan localities, but inadequate collections

have led to the discharge of raw sewage onto the roads and public areas, creating a sanitary nuisance and posing a very severe hazard to public health.

Sewage disposal is considered the biggest problem confronting the infrastructure in the Gaza Strip. So far only Gaza, Jabalya and Rafah provide sewerage service for 50%, 30%, and 10% of their populations respectively. The remaining proportions utilize cesspits (Roy, 1986). Unfortunately, sewage from Jabalya and Rafah finally discharges into large open pools either inside the refugee camps (see Plate 10.2) or a few metres away from them (see Plate 9.4).

The situation in the refugee camps is worse than in the Strip's localities. Waste water is disposed of into open alleys between shelters, causing a major health hazard (see Plates 10.3 a and b). To reduce the effect of the problem, in 1983 open concrete channels and drains for waste water were built in some parts of the camps by the refugees, either at their own expense or with materials and technical supervision provided by UNRWA (see Plates 10.3 a and b). So far, no additional channels are allowed to be built by the Israeli authorities. For instance, after the construction of open drains had been carried out in blocks A and B in Khan Yunis camp (see Figure 9.1), the Israelis ordered UNRWA to stop such construction in the remaining residential blocks of the camp.

Predictably, any efforts to improve the conditions of life in the camps are met by Israeli objections. In 1980, plans by the Community Development Foundation, an American aid agency, to build sewers in Rafah camp were rejected by the Israelis (Locke and Stewart, 1985).

Obviously, the open sewage channels which lie parallel to the refugee shelters and roads are a source of disease and insects. Also, flooding of the sewage drains often forms pools inside the camps or near to them. For instance, in Jabalya a large pool has been formed (Abu Rashed pool) over many years, which has become a significant mark of the camp (see Plate 10.2). However, in winter, it becomes larger as the rain discharges into it, making it a danger threatening the surrounding neighbourhood. So far, nothing has been done to drain it. Also, in Rafah camp, joint work between UNRWA and the municipality of Rafah was carried out to drain a similar pool but it continues to exist (Al Fajr, 1985 and WHO, 1984).

Plate 10.1 : Deir el Balah: Three generations are now crammed into a camp shelter, causing severe overcrowding. The corrugated iron extension in the foreground is used as a kitchen and was added to the shelter to free space for sleeping. Such extensions are common in all Gazan refugee camps.

Photo: The author

Plate 10.2 : Jabalya refugee camp: Sewage runs in open drains between shelters and finally collects in a large open pool at a low point in the camp (Abu Rashed pool). Here it is joined by the underground sewage of Beit Lahiya resettlement project which floods the camp adding more foul odour and disease. The photo was taken in the summer, when the pool is at its lowest level.

Photo: The author

a



b

Plates 10.3 : Bureij refugee camp : Waste water (left) running in the open alleys between shelters, attracting insects and disease. In some parts of the camps, open channels for waste water (right) have been constructed by the refugees, either at their own expense or with materials provided by UNRWA. However, recently construction of new channels has been forbidden.

Photo: The author

10.4.2 Limited Water Supply

When the refugee shelters were erected by UNRWA in the 1950s, public water taps were provided in different residential blocks (see Plate 4.2). Camp inhabitants drew water from these points and carried it in containers to their homes. But in the 1970's and 1980's the majority of Gaza's refugee camps were connected either to the municipal and village council water system or to "Mekorot", the Israeli National Water Company, which has drilled tens of wells along the coast of the Gaza Strip. However, most of the camp refugees complain that the water supply is inadequate and still runs for only a short time daily.

The 1985 sample survey reveals that 77.7% of households surveyed in Khan Yunis refugee camp were suffering from a severe shortage of water supply. The problem is aggravated in the summer months when most families in the camp are supplied with water for less than 2 hours a day. All households indicated a shortage of water supply during the summer months, 40.35% in autumn, 40.35% in spring, and 21.1% in winter.

Groundwater is the only water source in the Gaza Strip and it is accessed by drilling wells down to the water table. So far, there are six water wells in Khan Yunis used as a source of domestic water supply to the city, refugee camp and Al-Amal rehousing project. One of the wells is owned and operated 8 hours a day by UNRWA, while the remaining five are owned and operated by the municipality of Khan Yunis 16 hours a day except one (the eastern well) which is operated 8 hours a day as its water salinity is too high.

Water salinity ranges in most wells between 100 and 400 mg chlorides per litre while in the eastern well it is considerably higher and exceeds 600 mg. chlorides per litre (Tushia, 1974). The quality of drinking water in Khan Yunis is not up to the standards recommended by the World Health Organization which sets a permissible limit of 200 mg. chlorides per litre and an excessive limit of 600 mg. chlorides per litre (Todd, 1970). Unable to cope satisfactorily with the demand for water, Khan Yunis municipality is forced to use the eastern well and gets round the salinity problem by mixing water from this well with water from the other four wells owned by the municipality.

In the early 1970's the average daily water consumption was estimated at 85-100 litres per capita for city-dwellers and about 30 litres per capita in the refugee camp. The total volume of water consumer amounted to 4000 cubic metres a day, giving a daily water consumption of 71.43 litres per capita (Tushia, 1974). By comparison, in 1985 the water capacity amounted to about 5,780 cubic metres a day and, with the loss ratio of 5%, the actual capacity was 5,491 cubic metres a day (Water Department of Khan Yunis Municipality, 1986), giving a daily water consumption of 67 litres per capita. Hence, it can be concluded that per capita domestic water consumption in 1985 was less than in the 1970's. The per capita domestic water consumption in the Gaza Strip is about one-third of that in the Iraqi cities where consumption amounted to 200 litres in 1978 (Al-Bahrani, 1980).

The low water consumption in Khan Yunis is attributable to Israeli water policy for the Gaza Strip. No new wells can be drilled without prior permission, which has not been forthcoming to the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. For instance Khan Yunis municipality has frequently unsuccessfully requested permission to drill new wells to meet the demand for water. The Israelis even refused to allow the municipality to use its own well, drilled before the 1967 occupation, since the well is situated 200 metres away from wells under Mekorot's franchise. Use of the municipality well would decrease the amount of water available to Israeli colonies connected to the Mekorot wells.

The high salinity of water and the inadequate water supplies are not only problems in Khan Yunis but also problems in the Gaza Strip as a whole. The WHO (1984) reported that the salinity of water and the insufficient water supplies in Gaza Strip are worrying the municipalities, which would like to use their own budget to dig wells but are refused permission to do so by the Israeli authorities.

The restrictions on water consumption applied to Palestinians do not apply to the Israeli settlements inside the Strip, where 35-40 new wells have been drilled in recent years (Roy, 1986). Similarly water consumption by Israeli colonists far exceeds that of Gazans. In 1984 colonists living inside the Gaza Strip consumed between 14,218 - 28,436 cubic metres of water per capita a year compared with only 200 cubic metres per capita a year for Palestinians. These figures refer to all

water consumption, not only domestic but also agricultural, industrial etc. as well (Kana'na and Al-Madani, 1985).

The water problem in Khan Yunis will grow worse unless new wells are drilled. According to a study prepared for the municipality of Khan Yunis, the expected domestic water consumption will be 12,000 cubic metres per day on a peak day in 1990 (Tushia, 1974).

10.4.3 Inadequate Electricity

Electricity, which is bought from the Israeli Regional Company, is insufficient. Camp refugees complain that they have been supplied by an interrupted and weak supply of electricity. In fact, about 78.2% of the households sampled in Khan Yunis camp said that they have received inadequate electricity. The reasons, according to employees in the Department of Electricity in Khan Yunis municipality, are the high number of consumers, the weakness of the transformers and some faults in the electricity network itself.

However, insufficient supply of electricity is a distinguishing problem of the refugee camps, since the situation in other types of localities is much better. In 1981, 83.9% of refugee shelters had access to some form of electricity (Roy, 1986).

10.4.4 The Problem of Rats

The spread of rats constitutes a thorny problem for the Gazan population as a whole and the residents of refugee camps in particular. Since the early 1980s, an annual campaign has been carried out in the city of Gaza and Beach camp by the municipality of Gaza and UNRWA. UNRWA contributed with cash to purchase rodenticides. The campaign shows encouraging results which should support the extension of the programme to cover the entire Gaza Strip (UNRWA, 1985). So far, no further programmes have been implemented.

The 1985 survey indicates that 96.8% of all sampled households in Khan Yunis camp were infested with the widespread rat population. No doubt bad sanitary conditions and bad housing in the camp have exacerbated the problem. The corrugated iron extensions to the refugee shelters

produce a suitable environment for rat propagation (see Plate 10.1). Also, another situation must be considered; when some refugees demolish their camp shelters as quid pro quo for resettlement in the rehousing projects, huge stacks of rubble are left on the ground where rats can build their nests and thrive (see Plate 9.2). This situation makes life for the camp refugees even more miserable. However, neither the Israeli authorities nor the UNRWA, nor the municipalities have made real efforts to cope satisfactorily with the problem despite the population's concern.

10.4.5 Other Problems

There are several problems facing the inhabitants of refugee camps, but the biggest and most serious one is the lack of environmental sanitation. Yet, since the establishment of the refugee camps, UNRWA has been responsible for providing camp refugees with adequate environmental sanitation. This includes water supply (about 20 litres per capita a day), garbage collection, insect and rodent control and waste disposal (UNRWA, 1983a and 1986). As concluded earlier, most camp inhabitants now have access to some water supply either from the municipalities and local councils or from Mekorot. For instance, in 1982 about 40% and 80% of the inhabitants of Bureij and Nuseirat refugee camps respectively were supplied with water from Mekorot (UNRWA, 1983a).

The sanitary conditions in the camps are appalling. Refuse collection does not keep pace with what is thrown away so that there are always piles of rubbish festering in the street (Locke and Stewart, 1985). The 1985 sample survey emphasized the above conclusion, where 82.7% of the households surveyed in Khan Yunis camp said that the sanitation service provided by UNRWA is inadequate. However, in terms of figures, the sanitary situation in Khan Yunis camp is better than the other camps. For instance, in 1985, the camp refugees as a whole had one sanitation worker for some 970 inhabitants compared with about 890 per a worker in Khan Yunis camp. Taking into consideration the miserable environmental situation in the Strip, the numbers of these workers are insufficient and must be increased to achieve a satisfactory sanitary situation. UNRWA officials in Gaza recognize this fact, but they attribute the problem to financial constraints.

As the problem has been aggravated, the refugees have participated by taking an interest in the improvement of their own environmental health conditions in camps and are cooperating, as best they can, in the implementation of aided self-help programmes (UNRWA, 1985). In the refugee camps, popular committees have formed, mounting publicity campaigns to raise refugees interest to clean up their camps through joint work. But these committees no longer exist, since their work is forbidden by the Israeli authorities claiming that they have political motives.

Obviously, garbage collection in the camps remains old-fashioned and present methods of collection leave much to be desired. However financial restrictions continue to discourage the introduction of modern machinery and methods (UNRWA, 1983b). So, the UNRWA plans to gradually replace all its slow-moving tractor-trailer units with more efficient equipment because the disposal places are now further from the camps (United Nations, 1985 and UNRWA, 1985).

It must be noted that the problem of bad sanitation is not restricted to the refugee camps but it has become a serious problem in the Gaza Strip as a whole. It is not surprising to know that the WHO sent a short-term consultant to review the sanitation programme in the Gaza Strip, and his findings and recommendations for upgrading the services are under consideration (United Nations, 1985).

Indeed, life in the refugee camps is difficult since most of the roads are unpaved, the majority of shelters are not fit for human habitation, and rain pools are everywhere. Sometimes heavy rains cause serious damage to the refugee shelters. For example, in December 1985, serious damage happened to some 30 shelters in Khan Yunis camp as a consequence of heavy rains. In addition tens of shelters flooded in the low-lying parts of the camp. No significant efforts have been made to solve this chronic problem in the camps.

In conclusion, the inadequacy of services which are provided to the camp refugees has been aggravated because the Israelis have prevented UNRWA from carrying out new construction or repairs in the refugee camps. This prevention has arisen by invoking local legislation of 1960, related to the clearance of construction projects (see Appendix 12). The UNRWA has argued that this legislation is not applicable to it, a position

explicitly confirmed by the government of Egypt, which introduced it. Also this legislation acts contrary to the undertakings of the Israeli government under the Michelmore-Comay Agreement of 1967. So far the question of principle has not been resolved and Israeli interference in UNRWA activities has continued (United Nations, 1983 and 1984).

10.5 Refugee Attitudes toward Resettlement

As shown in Table 10.8, only 26.4% of households sampled wished to move into the Israeli-sponsored resettlement projects, 65.5% rejected the idea and 8.2% were not sure. There is a correlation between room density and response to resettlement. People who approved of resettlement live in overcrowded situations while those who rejected resettlement live in less overcrowded situations (Table 10.8).

Different reasons were given for approving of resettlement. Table 10.9 shows that 86.2% of households sampled who approved of resettlement said it would solve their housing problem, because they lived in overcrowded conditions of a room density of 3.26 persons. These conditions have arisen because the camp population has expanded without a corresponding expansion of accommodation. The housing problem was exacerbated after December 1982 when the Israelis issued an order stating : "it is forbidden to construct any buildings or constructions, and to add to or extend the existing shelters, or to demolish the existing shelters so as to set up a new one, or to make any other construction in the refugee camps area without obtaining a permit from the Director of Welfare Affairs and Refugees or from his authorized deputy (see Appendix 12). However the Israelis rarely grant permits for new construction or even renovation, but under pressure of necessity people dare to make repairs to old shelters or try to make changes without a permit (Al Fajr, 1985a). This is one form of pressure which the Israeli authorities use to try to force camp refugees to move into the resettlement projects.

In fact 43.1% of households surveyed gave pressure from the Israeli authorities as a reason for approving resettlement. It is not surprising, since the above-mentioned order issued by the Israeli Director of Welfare Affairs and Refugees prohibits selling, buying, renting, mortgaging, renovating, rebuilding, or transferring shelters in refugee camps, or moving without prior permission from one camp to another. The order

Table 10.8 Khan Yunis Camp : Refugees Reaction to the Question : "Do You Want to Move into the Resettlement Project?"

Response	No. of cases	%	Total of inhabit-ants	No.of rooms in dwell-ing	Room density
Yes	58	26.4	686	210	3.26
No	144	65.5	1381	519	2.66
Not sure	18	8.2	180	65	2.77

Source : The 1985 Sample Survey.

continues : "whoever may violate these orders is required to remove the building at his own expense, otherwise the building is taken from him, or he will pay a fine in cash or be imprisoned, or he may be subject to both penalities. Besides, the building should be removed at the expense of the violators (see Appendix 12).

Indeed, the Egyptian ordinance No.4 of 1960 prohibits construction inside the camp without a permit from the authorities and makes unlicensed construction an offence punishable by a fine or prison term. It also permits the authorities to demolish unlicensed structures in certain circumstances (Al Fajr, 1985b). The ordinance was issued to regulate the unplanned expansion of the camps, but restricted demolition of expansions and houses to cases in which buildings endangered the safety or routine operation in the camps. The Egyptians never interfered in camp affairs unless a request was made by UNRWA to deal with such infractions. Consequently, "up to 1967, the Egyptian authorities did not demolish a single illegally built house and made do with levying fines" (Al Fajr, 1985b).

Unlike the Egyptian orders, the Israeli orders of 1982 are of a punitive and repressive nature within an overall political aim (Locke and Stewart, 1985). Yet the Israelis have issued the orders without consulting UNRWA, and recently they have had effective control of the refugee camps.

Obviously, 31.0% of the households sampled who supported the idea of resettlement did so because they expected to receive better facilities and services than those provided to camp inhabitants. However, most of the Al-Amal project inhabitants revealed dissatisfaction with the services which they receive (see Chapter 9), although they are considerably better than those in the refugee camps.

Furthermore, 48.3% households who approved resettlement did so because they thought they would gain the right to future expansion of their houses. Indeed, the Israeli authorities allow the residents of the rehousing projects to expand their houses and to build them in multi-storey building styles after a proper permit is obtained. This situation will help the project inhabitants to solve their housing problems in the future. In contrast, the camp refugees are not allowed to do so, and a building permit is rarely granted. In addition, 5.2% households who favoured resettlement did not give any specific reasons (Table 10.9).

Viewed from another angle, 144 of households surveyed refused resettlement in the Israeli-sponsored rehousing schemes, but these households were living in less overcrowded housing conditions, with a room density of 2.66 persons (Table 10.8). Several reasons were identified for disapproving of resettlement : 41% of the households sampled did so because they were financially unable to cover the cost of construction and 26.4% because of the insufficiency of Israeli compensations for their demolished camp shelters. Indeed, a conclusion was reached in chapter 9 showing that the assessed values of the demolished shelters in the camps comprise a very small proportion of their real values.

The major reason for opposing the issue of resettlement is that most camp refugees are worried about losing their refugee identity if they move out of the camps, and hence their right of repatriation will vanish.

Indeed 79.2% of households sampled who rejected resettlement supported the above conclusion, revealing their determination to live in the camps in order to preserve their refugee identity and to keep their problem alive. However, this viewpoint was rejected by the former UNRWA Director in Gaza, Peter Hawkins, who commented : "the Israelis are offering them (refugees) decent standards of accommodation here in Gaza.

Table 10.9 Attitudes of Khan Yunis Camp Refugees toward Resettlement in the Israeli-Sponsored Rehousing Projects

A) In favour of the resettlement scheme

Reason for approval	Frequency	%
Solve the housing problem	50	86.2
Pressure from Israeli authorities	25	43.1
Better facilities and services	18	31.0
Gaining right to future expansion of the house	28	48.3
Other reasons	3	5.2

B) Not in favour of the resettlement scheme

Reason of disapproval	Frequency	%
Financial problems	59	41.0
Preserve refugee identity	114	79.2
Insufficient governmental compensation	38	26.4
Other reasons	11	7.6

Source : The 1985 Sample Survey

Accepting would enable them to get out of the camps, with all the psychological implications of camp life. But they are all worried what it will do to their Palestinian identity. In my judgment it will do nothing" (Viorst, 1984). Logically, this comment is unacceptable as it conflicts with several statements made by Israeli officials, revealing the real aims of the resettlement projects for camp refugees (see for example chapter 8). Indeed, there is no doubt that the Palestinian identity of the camp refugees is the main target of the Israeli-designed resettlement policy. By destroying the camps the moral motive for repatriating the Palestinian refugees will be removed.

Obviously, 7.6% of households surveyed who rejected resettlement in the Israeli-sponsored projects did not reveal reasons for their attitudes.

Dealing with the issue of resettlement from another point, 215 (97.7%) of the households questioned in this study refused to be resettled in the West Bank dwelling projects if they were implemented. In contrast, only 5 (2.3%) households responded in favour of the plan. In fact, the issue of resettling Gazan refugees in the West Bank is not new and it returns to the early stage of the Israeli occupation of the Strip in 1967 (see chapter 8). But when the Ben Porat plan was unveiled in 1983, the file of resettlement was reopened, and Gaza refugees expected rehousing in the Jericho refugee camps (see Figure 1.1), which were evacuated when the majority of their inhabitants fled to Jordan during the 1967 war.

Quantifying the refugees' desire to replace their camp shelters with multi-storey buildings shows that 46.8% of households sampled wished to have a proper permit to do so, 42.3% rejected the idea and 10.9% were not sure. Most of those households which rejected the idea were either living in small shelters or in the long run they would be financially unable to rebuild their shelters. However, no building permits can be granted to camp refugees.

10.6 Summary

Obviously, the Gazan population in general and the camp refugees in particular have suffered severely from a housing dilemma of great magnitude. Approximately half of the population are living in overcrowded conditions with a room density of three persons or more. In fact, the

housing crisis is exacerbated, particularly in the refugee camps as additional construction or expansions are not permitted, resulting from new restrictions issued by the Israeli occupation authorities. As a consequence, camp refugees are not allowed even to renovate their shelters, and even UNRWA is prevented from carrying out new construction in the camps, or from repairing the existing ones.

There is no doubt that overcrowding has some social impact on the camp inhabitants, since three generations are now crammed into a shelter. This situation introduces social conflict between the new generation who desire to develop their conditions of life, and the old generation who want to cling to social traditions and to possess authority over all household members.

The previous analysis shows that camp refugees are living in an unhealthy environment - water shortage, non-existence of sewage disposal systems, inadequate supply of electricity, bad sanitation and the spread of rats are major characteristics of life inside the refugee camps. UNRWA, as an administrative body for the refugee camps, is unable to provide adequate services partly because of its financial crisis and partly because of Israeli interferences with its activities.

The Israeli policy toward the camps aims to aggravate the housing crisis and to make worse the environmental health situation in the refugee camps. By increasing the housing crisis, resistance to the Israeli resettlement policy will be reduced and refugees will be willing to accept the Israeli rehousing plan. So far, the camp refugees have rejected co-operation with the Israelis.

However, if family size remains at its present levels and social traditions continue to require the accommodation of all household members in one dwelling, in the absence of a national government to plan and guide, the housing dilemma will grow.

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CHAPTER ELEVEN
Conclusion

11.1 Future Prospects for the Gaza Strip Population

Historically, the Gaza Strip is a new territorial unit which emerged in 1948, when the Israelis occupied Palestine and uprooted its Palestinian population from their homeland. Consequently, from 1948 onward, the characteristics of Gaza's population have been dramatically affected by military and political aspects of the Israeli-Arab conflict. These effects can be directly related to the population growth, population distribution, patterns of settlement, migration, population structure, refugee resettlement, housing conditions and public services.

The 1948 and 1967 wars substantially re-orientated the population dynamics of the Gaza Strip. Although the Gaza Strip experienced heavy population gains as a result of the influx of refugees into it in 1948, the area reported massive population losses as the result of the 1967 war (see Chapter Two). As a consequence of the 1967 out-migration, the normal age-sex structure of the population was distorted and a heavy economic burden was added upon the economically active population, since population losses were concentrated predominantly in the male age-groups of 20-44 years. However, as the Gaza Strip is characterized by high rates of natural increase, averaging 34.1% during 1968-84, the age-sex structure of the Gazan population had balanced out by 1985.

This study reveals that the Strip is distinguished by high fertility (CBR of 48.3 per thousand in 1984) and low mortality (CDR of 8 per thousand in 1984), raising the rate of natural increase in the area. It is worth noting here that there were no indications that a transition toward lower rates of natural increase is in progress in the Strip. At the same time, the significant findings of the thesis indicate that fertility remains high and subject to annual fluctuations from which a possible decline is hard to predict. However, the outstanding demographic success in the Gaza Strip is the radical reduction in mortality in general and infant and childhood mortality in particular.

From 1968 onward, the Strip has experienced lower rates of out-migration, because several social, psychological and political factors

have paralyzed such migration. The population's determination to challenge the Israeli threat of annexing their lands, the population status of Gazans as stateless people lacking passports, the travelling restrictions imposed upon the population by the Israelis and the decline in the economy of the oil-rich Arab states are major reasons reducing the level of out-migration from the Strip. So, it is predicted that the decline in emigration, coupled with the fact that over 68% of the Gazan population are less than 24 years old, may increase future fertility rates.

In a wider view, the population/area relationship indicates that the Strip has severely suffered from heavy population concentration upon its limited area of 364 sq. kms, giving a population density of 1,450 persons per sq. km in 1985. As a consequence, the Strip is ranked as the third most densely populated entity in the world after Hong Kong and Singapore, but it is distinguished from them by its very poor economic infrastructure.

Considering the latest population growth of 3.4% (1982-84) as an average annual rate of increase, the population of the Gaza Strip will double after about 20 years and their numbers will exceed one million people by 2005. Consequently, the current poor socio-economic standards of Gazan people will be exacerbated; keeping the present miserable standards of living would require a doubling in the existing infrastructure at all levels.

This pessimistic picture shows that the population growth of the Gaza Strip must be reduced in order to cope satisfactorily with the overpopulation problem. But a fundamental question must be asked : how can the high population growth be reduced?

In examining the demographic transition of small countries, Clarke (1982) concluded that "demographic transition takes place in association with a number of social and economic changes and there can be little doubt that population size of a country is no more than a contributory factor." Theoretically, it is expected that any socio-economic development in the Strip could correspond positively with a reduction in fertility rates, but in the case of Gaza Strip political and religious factors have greater influences upon orientating fertility behaviour of the Gazan people.

Moreover, although it is widely acknowledged that illiteracy in general and illiteracy of women in particular correspond positively with high fertility, the experience of the Gaza Strip conflicts with this rule. The illiteracy for both sexes amounted to only 17.4% of the total sampled population aged 12 years and over (derived from the 1985 survey of population structure), one of the lowest rates in the Middle East. Graham-Brown (1984) concluded that the overall enrolment of female students in the Gaza Strip is surprisingly better than in the West Bank. She attributed that to the insecurities of camp life where education seems to be more desirable for both boys and girls than in the rural areas of the West Bank. So why are the fertility rates in the Strip still high?

The 1985 survey concluded that fertility behaviour among Gaza's couples is a reflection of groups of complex socio-economic, political and religious factors, paralyzing any future reduction in fertility rates and opposing any efforts of widening plans for family planning. Indeed, family planning in the Strip is a new idea and overall contraceptive practice among married women in all reproductive ages is very low. The majority of contraceptive users are not interested in reducing their reproductivity substantially. Obviously, Gazan people perceive that high fertility is an important source of human fuel for continuing their national struggle toward an independent Palestinian state. So an earlier recommendation of using contraception in order to reduce fertility rates would be understood as a conspiracy against their national interests.

Although there is no indication of willingness toward fertility reduction in the foreseeable future, the major findings are very useful for anyone who wants to adopt a population policy for the Gaza Strip in the future.

In a nutshell, the high fertility rates coupled with low mortality rates have affected the population structure of the Gaza Strip. The main findings of the 1985 survey reveal that the Gazan population in general and camp inhabitants in particular were very young, as 46.6% and 48.2% of their respective residents were below 15 years of age. Population juvenility coupled with very low participation rate in the labour force have increased the economic burden upon the economically active population.

With regard to the employment structure of the Gaza Strip population, the study shows that overall participation rates in the labour force are very low (see Chapter 7). At the same time, Gaza's labour force was fragmented into three groups according to their place of work. The first are employed locally, the second commute to work inside Israel, while the third are employed abroad mainly in the Arab states. Over 50% of the Gaza labour force were employed either in Israel or abroad, indicating a fragile economy reliant upon migratory labour. However, this situation has sustained the Strip's poor economy through remittances.

Viewed from another point, the Israeli employment policy, which permits Gazans to seek work in Israel either legally or illegally, has resulted in significant changes in the composition and distribution of the Gazan workforce by economic activity. Taking the limited employment opportunities available locally into account and the non-competitive wages offered inside Israel, large numbers of Gazan workers are recruited to do unskilled and semi-skilled work in Israel, in jobs which Israelis are unwilling to do (see Chapter 7).

The study indicates that Israel has succeeded in fuelling itself with a large labour force (46.1% of Gazan workforce in 1984) who were employed on a day-to-day basis. So they are the first to be fired when there are slowdowns. An Israeli journalist emphasized that, "an Arab worker is extremely movable, one can fire him at any moment and transfer him from one place to another; he does not strike and he has no "claims" as the Israeli worker has. In short, in any economic respects, the workers from the territories are a treasure for the Israeli economy" (National Lawyers Guild, 1978).

Measuring the unemployment rates of the Gazan workforce indicates that the Israeli definition is defective at best and misleading at worst. The official figures gave unemployment rates below 1% during 1973-84, while the 1985 survey of population structure revealed an unemployment rate of 12.2%. Similarly, the 1985 survey of Al-Amal dwelling project indicated that 13.3% of the active household-heads were unemployed. Moreover, the tough policy imposed against the Gazan people by the Israelis has pressured university graduates, who are unable to find employment in the Strip or unable to travel abroad, into working in Israel as unskilled labourers.

However, work in Israel and abroad has absorbed a large proportion of the Gazan labour force, reducing substantially the dilemma of unemployment in an area which suffers from overpopulation and a poor infrastructure base. Today, concern is increased as most of the Arab states have introduced programmes to reduce the value of non-national labour on their soils. So, if Gazan migrant workers (between 20,000 and 40,000 including their families) are fired from their jobs and come back, the employment situation in the Strip will deteriorate and the housing problem will be inflamed.

Although Gazans have benefited from work in Israel, significant social problems have occurred which threaten Gazan society. The first problem is that work in Israel encourages teenage males to drop out of school to work in Israel under the pressure of needs. "In 1981, UNRWA records show that 4,000 (5%) out of some 80,000 students in both cycles (elementary and preparatory) dropped out and 1982 was not much better" (Graham-Brown, 1984). So, if this drain continues, illiteracy will grow. The second problem is that Gazan workers who travel to work daily, or those who travel weekly have not enough time to look after their children and to strengthen their social ties with relatives. This situation might be weakening family ties and creating unpleasant family atmospheres.

In this study particular attention is concentrated on analysing the housing conditions in the Strip. The findings summarize that the high growth rate of the Gazan population, the poor economic infrastructure, the huge concentration of Palestinian refugees, the limited area available for housing, the absence of a national authority to guide and plan and the severe restrictions of Israeli policy against the Gazan people have introduced an enormous housing shortage in the Strip. it is concluded that approximately 40% of the Gazan population as a whole and about 50% of the inhabitants of refugee camps were living in overcrowded housing conditions with a room density of three persons or more.

Moreover, the basic human needs of public services are insufficient and even non-existent. Limited water supply, non-existence of sewage disposal systems, weak and interrupted electric supply, bad sanitation and widespread rat infestation are the main elements of life in the Gaza Strip. It is worth reporting here that the Israeli policy in the Strip

has aggravated the above problems, aiming to force people to emigrate under the bitter conditions of life.

Finally, analysis of the Gazan population by their status shows that more than 70% of them, including their descendants of course, are registered refugees with UNRWA. Additionally, about 48% of Gaza's population are still living in refugee camps, while the remaining percentage are living either in cities, villages or small localities.

11.2 Changes in the Settlement Patterns

Prior to 1948, the settlement geography of the area which later became the Gaza Strip experienced two types of settlement, namely towns and villages. As a consequence of the first Israeli-Arab war of 1948, a huge influx of Palestinian refugees huddled into the Strip and nearly quadrupled the population. So a new type of settlement emerged when eight refugee camps were constructed by UNRWA, replacing the pre-existing nine tent camps. When the Strip was occupied by the Israelis after the third Israeli-Arab war of 1967, Israeli colonies and refugee rehousing projects were added to the existing ones.

Dahlan (1988) has identified that the transformation of Gaza's geography of settlement is the outcome of both war and politics which continue to be in effect today. Indeed, the Israelis are actively working to change the human landscape in the Gaza Strip by planting more Israeli colonies and destroying the existing Palestinian refugee camps.

Provided that the Israeli occupation continues, the camps will remain a target of systematic Israeli destruction, aiming in the end to replace the camps with Israeli-sponsored resettlement projects. There is no doubt that the Israelis hate to see the refugee camps on the Gaza Strip map of settlement because they embarrass them. So it is predicted that the settlement geography of the Gaza Strip will remain changeable.

Moreover, radical changes in the status of settlements have occurred since the Israeli occupation of 1967. Some villages have developed into urban centres, raising their numbers from two to five and expanding their limits to include the adjacent refugee camps. Furthermore, some small localities have been officially transformed into villages or local

committees, providing their inhabitants with basic public services as independent bodies.

Alterations in the status of settlement, expansion of settlements as a consequence of the influx of Palestinian refugees, the legalized attachment of refugee camps to their adjoining urban centres, and the high natural increase have resulted in changing the ratio of urbanization in the Gaza Strip from 70% in 1945 to about 90% in July 1984, giving the Strip one of the highest urbanization ratios in the Middle East.

11.3 Prospects for the Palestinian Refugee Camps

As long as the Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip remains, their plans to destroy the refugee camps will continue, aiming in the long term to raze the refugee camps and relocate their inhabitants elsewhere. Indeed, since the 1970s, the Israeli-sponsored resettlement scheme has been continuing, motivated no doubt with full political awareness of the implications concerning the problem of Palestine refugees. They hope to complete their plan within a few years.

By razing Gazan refugee camps, the Israelis will achieve four fundamental goals:

Firstly, the symbolism of the refugee camps as a witness to the Palestinian exile will disappear. Indeed, the international community, particularly before 1974, has always been inclined to regard the Palestinian dilemma as a refugee problem rather than a national one. So, if the refugee camps are erased and their inhabitants resettled, Israel will be able to claim that the problem has been solved, and it will be entitled to request the Arab states who host Palestinian refugees that they do the same and integrate the Palestinians into their societies.

For a long time, Israel has claimed that the refugees are maintained in camps to embarrass it. It has also brought about an ambivalent assimilation policy. In fact, Zionism calls on Jews not to be assimilated in their host-societies, yet it requires that the Palestinians be absorbed in theirs (Barakat, 1973).

Secondly, the new situation would qualify Israel to prevent UNRWA from providing services in the Strip. In fact, UNRWA was set up as a temporary relief agency to rehabilitate the Palestinian refugees as long as their problem existed. From the outset, UNRWA gradually altered from a short-term emergency relief body to an agency with quasi-governmental responsibility. Its mandate is regularly renewed by the UN General Assembly since there are no signs of an end of the Palestinian problem.

For refugees, UNRWA represents an ambiguous symbol. It enshrines the refugee status of Palestinians in the face of the constant attempts of the Israelis to deny it. For instance, in 1969 the former Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir made her famous remark saying there is no such thing as a "Palestinian people" (Forsythe, 1983 and Flapan, 1985).

Furthermore, the existence of UNRWA is an embarrassment to the Israelis. They hate that word "refugee" because people ask, "a refugee from where?" They also hate seeing the UNRWA report being discussed in the UN General Assembly and UNRWA's mandate being extended year by year (Cossali and Robson, 1986).

Thirdly, the refugees' connection with the past can be destroyed by demolishing their camps. Obviously, when the refugee camps were established, refugees from the same village, city and tribe stuck together so that even today the camps have strong and distinguished village, city and tribal identities, maintaining, through oral history, the refugees' desire to return to their homeland. In fact, refugees in Gaza, as elsewhere, are attached to their homes in occupied Palestine rather than to their present homes in the Gaza Strip.

The above conclusion shocked the Israeli soldiers who overran some refugee camps in the 1967 war. Amos Elon (an Israeli writer) reported: "Many Israeli soldiers were surprised, and some were deeply disturbed, to discover among the refugees a form of "Arab Zionism". The living memory of a lost homeland, to which they were passionately attached as the Jews had remained attached to Zion in the lands of their dispersion ... . Upon entering a refugee camp one young soldier discovered that the inmates were still organized into and dwelled as small clans or neighbourhood units according to the village, town, and even the street they had lived in prior to their dispersion in 1948" (Barakat, 1973).

Finally, by removing the camps, particularly those situated on the coast (see Plate 11.1), the Israelis will be able, in the long run, to develop the area for Israeli tourism. In addition, the new situation will sustain the colonists' willingness to inhabit the Gaza Strip since the squalid camps will no longer exist.

However, it is appropriate to ask whether the Palestinian refugees welcome the Israeli resettlement scheme? The 1985 survey of the housing problem in Khan Yunis camp shows that about a quarter of the households sampled were in favour of the scheme. Nevertheless, when Ben-Porat unveiled his plan in 1983 to resettle all camp refugees, the Palestinian opposed his plan overwhelmingly.

"An opponent to the Ben-Porat plan accused Israel of trying to create "Bantustans", referring to the South African entities for preserving apartheid. Another opponent said on Israel radio, "the Israelis think that the camps are what is left of the Palestinian problem, and if they destroy them the problem will be forgotten," and he continued, "but even if they move us to palaces, the real historical, political, national problems will remain" (Viorst, 1984). Also, there was an international reaction to the Ben-Porat plan displayed in the UN General Assembly resolution which called on Israel to abandon any plans to destroy the camps. The resolution charged "that measures to resettle Palestine refugees in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip away from their homes and property from which they were displaced constitutes a violation of their inalienable right of return" (Viorst, 1984).

Given the Palestinian people's 39-years of exile, they are continuously opposing any attempt at resettlement outside their homeland even if it would be to their immediate benefit. They are also steadfastly resisting integration within their host-Arab societies and even within the indigenous Palestinian population of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The refugees do believe that such resettlement or integration may jeopardize their right to return. Consequently, one may ask why the Palestinian refugees resist absorption and resettlement into the Arab states. The answer is simply, because their problem is not an economic one, but is one of social, cultural, political and national uprootedness.

So, a fundamental question can be asked : what kind of solutions do the Palestinian refugees seek? For the refugees, their repatriation is clearly the ideal solution. The 1985 survey of the housing problem in Khan Yunis camp reveals that 209 (95%) of the households surveyed emphasised their demand for a return to their homes in Palestine. Nonetheless, 9 (5%) households accepted resettlement in the Israeli-sponsored dwelling projects on condition that financial compensation on the value of their properties in Palestine should be paid.

The above demand for repatriation has been a fixed position of the Palestinian refugees over the years. All previous surveys have discovered such deep feelings and a desire for return. "In 1949, S.C. Thicknesse surveyed resettlement possibilities among the Palestinian refugees and came to the conclusion that "quite unquestionably the wish of the great mass of the refugees is to return to their old homes". Similarly, Mezerik discovered that "the refugees have a strong desire to return to their old homes. They regard Palestine as their homeland and refuse to accept anything other than repatriation as a solution" (Barakat, 1973). Furthermore, in a survey conducted by the Israelis for the Shiloah Centre of Tel Aviv University in Jalazun camp near Ramallah on the West Bank (see Fig. 1.1), 88.7% of the sample demanded repatriation as a solution to their problem (Shamir, 1974).

11.4 Territorial and Demographic Conflict

The previous analysis of the Israeli colonial strategy in the Strip and the West Bank indicates that the traditional processes of colonization which were practised elsewhere before the creation of Israel in 1948 have been applied here. Most of the Israeli colonies in the Strip reveal a strong paramilitary, political and religious orientation (see Plate 4.5) and are ideologically constructed to create a permanent Jewish presence in the Gaza Strip.

From the outset, the role of colonization as a means of ensuring control has been an inherent part of Zionist policy and its implementation over the past 100 years (Newman, 1985). This is, indeed, the major factor which guides the Israeli decision-makers in establishing territorial control and sovereignty over Palestine through acquisition of the Palestinian lands and changing the human and physical landscape by

allowing the Israelis to reside in any new occupied lands, either Palestinian lands (the Gaza Strip and the West Bank) or other Arab lands (the Syrian Golan Heights and Sinai before its return to Egyptian sovereignty in 1982).

Up to 1978, the Strip had low priority in the Israeli colonial campaign. Only six colonies had been established since the 1967 occupation. As a consequence of the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement which promised the removal of all Israeli colonies from Sinai, thus terminating the buffer zone surrounding the Strip, a new policy was adopted to intensify the colonial process in the Strip instead. So, by the end of 1985, the number of Israeli colonies grew to 21 of which 2 sites are now under construction (see Fig. 4.1).

It is worth noting that all the Israeli colonies in the Strip severely lack the economic ability to survive and have no stable population. As a consequence they rely on financial assistance and governmental subsidies which have been invested for purely political and ideological reasons. For instance, since the economic infrastructure of these colonies is based mainly on agriculture, in order to support them economically, "the Israeli vegetable marketing board, Agrexco, stopped marketing Arab-produced vegetables from the occupied territories and concentrated on those produced by Israeli settlements only" (Roy, 1986).

Demographically, can Israel achieve a population majority in the Strip? The analysis reveals that there is no possibility of reaching this majority at all (see Chapter 4). In 1985, the demographic balance between the Gazan population and the Israeli colonists was incomparable; the total population of the Israeli colonies was about 2150, ranging from 30-350 persons in each colony (Roy, 1986), while the Gazan population was 525,500 (Central Bureau of Statistics, 1986), giving the Israeli colonists 0.41% of the Gazan population.

Territorially, the Israeli position is much better, because more than one-third of Gaza's total area is now under Israeli control. Roy (1986) reported that in 1985, the Israeli government claimed possession of 100,000 dunums of land in the Strip. Of this number, 20,000 dunums were leased to the Jewish Agency and an additional 7,000 were leased to Hof Gaza, a regional settlement council. At the same time, the existing

Israeli colonies occupy a known figure of 22,250 dunums. This means that by 1985, there were 122,250 (122.25 sq. kms) dunums out of the total Gaza's area of 364 sq. kms controlled either by the Israeli occupation authorities or by the Israeli colonists.

From 1967 onward, the Israeli colonial policy of creeping annexation has been practised in the occupied territories through creating permanent "facts". Indeed, "the Israeli government statements make it clear that the government views the settlements as creating the basis for eventual annexation of the West Bank and Gaza into Israel" (National Lawyers Guild, 1978). It is relevant to point out that the Israeli dream of occupying the Strip is not new. In March 1955, David Ben Gurion, the first Prime Minister of Israel, urged the Israeli cabinet to attack and occupy the Gaza Strip (Lesch, 1984a). Obviously, when Israel occupied the Strip in 1967, it declared that the Strip was never part of Egypt and will never again be returned to Egyptian control. "In 1971, the former Israeli Information Minister Israel Galili said that the Gaza region definitely will remain under Israeli sovereignty and will never be separated from the State of Israel (National Lawyers Guild, 1978). Indeed, this position was put into practice when Egypt regained Sinai in 1982 and left the Strip under Israeli occupation.

When Israel captured the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in 1967, Israeli officials declared that Israel would annex both territories and they described them as lands liberated from Egypt and Jordan. In July 1980, in an official statement, Israel annexed Arab East Jerusalem (with a population of 134, 200 persons in 1985), while in December 1981 it annexed the Syrian Golan Heights (with a population of 13,700 persons in 1985). The populations of the two annexed territories were granted Israeli citizenship and Israeli law has since applied to them.

The historical and religious importance of Jerusalem and the strategic importance of the Golan Heights encouraged Israel to annex these territories. Therefore, a fundamental question must be asked: Is Israel capable of annexing the Gaza Strip and the West Bank to its territory? The answer is no, simply because the annexed population, as a consequence, would be eligible for Israeli citizenship, and this would lead to a radical change in the demographic structure of Israel.

Based on the 1985 population statistics published by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics in 1986, the total population of Israel was 4,266,200 persons of which 749,000 persons were classified as non-Jews. The non-Jewish population comprised 13,700 Syrians and 735,300 Palestinians residing in what is called Israel including those living in annexed Arab East Jerusalem. At the same time, the total populations of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were 813,400 and 525,500 respectively. So, if Israel annexed both territories, the total Palestinian population under its control would be 2,074,200 persons as against 3,530,900 Israeli Jews. In other words, Israel would find some 37% of its total population were Palestinians with a higher rate of natural increase. Hence, the Jewish character of the state would be changed and its political future would not be clear.

Israel looks to this problem seriously. In May, 1986, the Israeli Cabinet held a two-hour debate concerned with the demographic problem. They discussed a report prepared by Professor Reberto Bachi of the Hebrew University and an established specialist on the Israeli demographic issue. The report came to the conclusion that by the end of this century the Arab population will grow to 3.1 million (43%) persons compared with 4.1 million Israeli Jews. Hence, the Israeli Communications Minister Amnon Rubenstein argued for reaching a broad political compromise and ruled out any idea of annexing the occupied territories. In contrast, Shimon Peres (the former Prime Minister and currently the Foreign Minister), asked Israeli women to consider it their national duty to have 4 children or more (Murray, 1986).

In fact, Peres' appeal was an echo of David Ben-Gurion's sentiments which were voiced more than 40 years ago, when he called on Jewish parents to fulfil their demographic duty toward the nation and regarded the issue as one of the highest importance. He argued that the ideal number of children should be 3 to 4 and even more (Friedlander, 1974).

The overpopulation in the Gaza Strip represents a thorny problem to the Israelis. "Amos Elon calls his people "blind in Gaza"; he chides them for being blind to the poverty, density and explosiveness there, and blind to the implication of retaining it within the borders of Israel, where it is fast becoming "the Soweto of Israel". He continues, this will have a profound effect on the prospects for peace and risks of war

throughout the Middle East" (Lesch, 1984b). This demographic factor had encouraged a Palestinian scholar from the West Bank University of Bir Zeit to argue in favour of the acquisition of Israeli citizenship as a means of attaining a Palestinian democratic and secular state" (Murray, 1986). But Israel is aware to this situation.

There is no doubt that Israel desires to annex the Strip and the West Bank but the problem is how the demographic dilemma can be solved? From the Israeli point of view, out-migration from the occupied territories toward Jordan might take place. For instance, in 1973, the former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was quoted as saying: "Israel hopes that a natural migration toward Jordan must take place within the next 10 years .... The problem of the refugees in the Gaza Strip should not be solved in Gaza or in Al-Arish but rather chiefly in East Jordan" (Metzger, Orth and Sterzing, 1983). Furthermore, the Israelis believe that the Palestinian population in the occupied territories must somehow be reduced, and it has been alleged that the former Defense Minister Ariel Sharon hopes to evict all Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza and drive them into Jordan (Chomsky, 1983).

In fact, Israel is incapable of annexing the occupied territories for reasons already discussed, nor is it capable of evicting all the Palestinians so as to keep the land alone. So, Israel has adopted a tough policy in the occupied territories and it has increased the colonization drive, in order to pressure the population to emigrate and to weaken their optimism for a future independent state.

One important aspect of the territorial and resources conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis in Gaza can be deduced from the significant location of the Israeli colonies in the Strip. The majority of these colonies are situated along the coast, where the groundwater basins are likely to be found, giving these colonies full control over Gazan water resources. Although Gazans have long suffered from shortages of water supply and are not allowed to dig additional new wells, these colonies have been permitted to dig several wells in the past few years.

Moreover, it is clear that the Israeli colonies in the Strip have been designed to surround the existing Palestinian settlements, and to ghettoize Gaza's population. In addition, they isolate the Palestinian

settlements from each other and make it more difficult to build a Palestinian state in the future (Dahlan, 1988).

Aiming to aggravate the housing problem in order to pressure the residents to emigrate, the policy of destroying Gazan dwellings is going on. For instance, in January 1987, sixty families living in Block 67 south of Khan Yunis city were informed by the Israeli authorities that their dwellings will be destroyed, as they were built illegally. These dwellings were constructed in the early 1970s and the families in question possess legal documentation pertinent to their ownership of the lands. The area where these houses are situated will be annexed to the Jewish colonies of Atsmona and Nahal Morag (Al Fajr, 1987). Similar problems are reported north of Beit Lahiya village where hundreds of dwellings are threatened with demolition for the expansion of the Israeli colonies of Nisanit and Eli-Sinai (see Fig. 4.1).

Furthermore, in 1982, the Israeli authorities tried to demolish the Swedish village (see Figure 4.1) and to settle its inhabitants into Tal el Sultan project. The Israelis want to rid the coast of any presence of Arab localities in order to develop these areas into tourist centres for the Israeli colonies. Consequently, the inhabitants appealed to the Swedish Embassy to interfere and stop such demolitions, since the Swedish had sponsored the village. So, the Swedish Embassy appealed to the Israeli High Court and obtained an injunction to stop such demolition. But Israel continues to pressure the inhabitants to move out, as no piped water and electricity are allowed to be delivered to them. Indeed, the future of the coastal Arab localities is uncertain (See Figure 4.1 and Plate 11.1).

Given the 39 years of bitter suffering in exile, the Palestinians cling to their lands and realize that their only challenge to the Israeli threat is by remaining in the Gaza Strip (and the West Bank). Significantly, they are aware that they must not be drawn into the trap of seeking refuge for the second or third time. Externally, the Arab countries realize the importance of the demographic factor in the Israeli-Arab conflict. So, "in the Ninth Summit Conference held in Baghdad in 1978, an Arab institution (The Joint Jordanian-Palestinian Committee) was created to support the steadfastness of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and to preserve the national identify of the Arab



Plate 11.1 : Deir el Balah refugee camp situated on the shore. The Israeli authorities issued an order preventing any new building within 500 m of the sea, which will bring about the removal of all such coastal localities in the future.

Photo: The author

Palestinian people in all its political, economic, cultural, psychological and ideological aspects. As a consequence financial assistance was provided to eligible institutions in the occupied territories (Kossaifi, 1985).

In summary, Jewish demographic superiority in the Strip cannot be achieved despite the increasing efforts of colonization. Nevertheless, as concluded earlier a strong element of territorial control is ensured which already imposes actual control and sovereignty upon the population and resources in the Gaza Strip.

11.5 Suggested Solutions

The Gaza Strip population phenomenon is considered as a unique one in the Middle East and even in the world as a whole. It has neither a national authority to initiate a population policy nor a recognized territorial unit to apply this policy upon. So, when somebody deals with the population problems of the Gaza Strip, the above individuality should be taken into consideration. There is no doubt that the Strip has severely suffered from heavy population pressure upon a very limited and economically poor area. However, solutions to the population problems can be achieved in two stages:

11.5.1 Temporary Solution

It is assumed that, in the short term, the heavy population concentration and gloomy housing conditions in the Gaza Strip can be alleviated by improving the socio-economic characteristics of the Gazan population, particularly those related to employment, environmental health, housing and public services. There is no doubt that a new situation would encourage people to take more interest in reducing the high rates of natural increase through a reduction in births.

Improving housing conditions and public services can be achieved by adopting a master plan for the areas of Gazan refugee camps in particular and the Strip as a whole in general. Following this step, refugees who are financially able and willing to rebuild their shelters as multi-storey dwellings must be allowed to do so. At the same time, guided by the financial incapability of the majority of Gazan refugees, financial

assistance might be secured to help them in replacing their shelters by more comfortable ones. Consequently, the question may be asked - who will finance such a plan?

Obviously, the Israeli authorities can take part in this plan through providing the residents with infrastructural assistance such as preparing the lands, building roads ... etc., and by giving them long financial loans with low interest rates. However, the plan must depend on foreign financial aid from the U.S.A., international aid organizations and the Arab oil-rich states. Currently, several small projects are carried out in the Gaza Strip through outside financial assistance: in higher education (The Islamic University of Gaza), teacher training, building classes and laboratories in schools, and some other infrastructure. But such small projects are insufficient to cope satisfactorily with the explosive population in the Strip. Indeed, the Strip needs an exclusive population strategy to save it from heading to disaster.

It is reported that Saudi Arabia announced its willingness to finance a sewage system for Gaza's Jabalya camp which will cost US$1 million. Also, the United Nations Development Programme will pay for a more extensive sewage system for northern Gaza costing US$3.5 million. Foreign aid will reportedly pay for several planned projects in Gaza, including a new school, an ice factory, a fish market, a new shopping centre, and a fishermen's wharf (Al Fajr, 1986). However, these projects cannot be carried out unless Israeli approval is granted; some were planned in the early 1980s and are still awaiting Israeli approval. Indeed, several projects to improve housing conditions and public services in the Strip were paralyzed or aborted by the Israeli authorities, for example, the sewage disposal system of Khan Yunis city (see Chapter 9). The Israelis are unwilling to improve the quality of life of the Gazan population, because that would contradict their policy of pressuring the Gazan population to emigrate.

Furthermore, voluntary resettlement of refugees in the Israeli-sponsored rehousing projects could be continued, only in the interests of the population concerned, since the 1985 survey concludes that a significant proportion of the households sampled were willing to be resettled. Also, resettlement in the West Bank could take place under the same conditions.

11.5.2 Permanent Solution

The second stage is outlined for a long term population policy which could reduce the population concentration in the Gaza Strip and control population growth as well (see Figure 11.1). The starting point in this stage begins at achieving a final settlement of the Palestinian problem, which might solve all of its national, political, social and economic roots. However, from the Palestinian point of view such a settlement must result in creating an independent Palestinian state governed by a national authority. Simultaneously, the chronic problem of the Palestinian refugees must be solved on the basis of the UN General Assembly Resolution 302(4) of December, 8th 1949. The resolution made it clear that the refugees should be permitted to return to their homes, and compensation paid to those who choose not to return. Consequently, if the above three conditions come to exist, a successful national population policy could apply for the Gaza Strip within the territory of the new state.

In fact, the population problems in the Gaza Strip cannot be solved as long as the Palestine question remains unsolved and the Palestinians are fragmented in the world. Yet, "Gaza is a microcosm of the tangled and anguished Israeli - Palestinian dilemma" (Lesch, 1984a).

Assuming a final settlement of the Palestinian question, and based on the right of return of the uprooted population, the Palestinian refugees must be allowed to return to their homeland if they want to do so. Obviously, from the outset, "refugee repatriation represents the most crucial issue in the Palestinian refugee question. The Arab states have steadfastly maintained the right of repatriation of these refugees, while Israel has refused even to discuss the issue" (Peretz, 1955). So far, numerous resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly since 1948 have called on Israel to take steps toward the repatriation of the Palestinian refugees, while Israel has let no one return.

Nevertheless, it is relevant to examine the concept of the word "refugee" in quantifying the number of Palestinian refugees. The word "refugee" has an immediacy suggesting an emergency status or at least a short-term problem. However, the historical indications are that, almost inevitably, a proportion of refugees will become semi-permanent exiles. The most extreme and unique case of the long-term ill-consequence of

Figure 11.1 Schematic Diagram Showing Possible Solutions to the Population Problems in the Gaza Strip



political upheaval is represented by the Palestinian refugees (D'Souza and Crisp, 1985).

Furthermore, what is the definition of a refugee? The United Nations Convention of 1951 and the Protocol of 1967 Relating to Refugee Status define a refugee as someone who leaves or remains outside their own country owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reason of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. This definition has been widened by the Organization of African Unity to include any individual who, owing to external aggression, occupation or foreign domination, or events seriously disturbing public order, is compelled to leave his habitual place of residence (Salt, 1986).

Based on the previous definitions of a refugee, a major question to be asked is how many Palestinians are refugees? As demonstrated in Table 1.1, there were about 3.5 million Palestinians with their descendants classified as refugees in 1982. This figure includes all Palestinians who were living outside the so-called state of Israel, and about 39% and 70% of the total population of the West Bank (including Arab East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip respectively, who were registered as refugees with UNRWA. In contrast, by June 1982, there were only 1,925,726 registered Palestinian refugees with UNRWA living in its area of operations (Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon). The difference in the number of refugees resulted from the differences in the definitions, since the UNRWA definition is a purely economic one (see Chapter 2). So, it can be concluded that the number of Palestinian refugees is much higher than those reported by UNRWA, and any future settlement to their problem must consider this fact.

To sum up, solutions for the Gazan population problems are complex and with no guarantee of success. The political and economic uncertainty in the Strip confronts any attempt of adopting population policy for the future.

11.6 Overview

Today, about four decades have passed since the Palestinian exodus of 1948, with no indications of achieving a final and lasting political

settlement to this tragedy. However, all people involved in the politics of the Middle East ask why do all initiatives to solve the Israeli-Arab conflict fail? The answer is that they have failed to pinpoint and treat the core of the conflict, which is "the Palestinian dilemma." Consequently, it is important to conclude the thesis by a short overview, showing future prospects for the Palestinian problem.

Up to 1973, the international community treated the Palestinians as refugees rather than a nation, and the Middle East conflict as a territorial dispute between Israel and its neighbouring Arab countries. However, "in October 1974 a substantial transition in the Palestine question occurred when the Arab League recognized a rejuvenated PLO as "the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people on any liberated territory" (Forsythe, 1983). In addition, "in November 1974, the UN General Assembly recognized the PLO as an observer organization, and endorsed the "inalienable right of the Palestinians to self-determination." This endorsement was to be repeated yearly thereafter" (Forsythe, 1983 and United Nations, 1984).

Furthermore, the nine countries of the European Council called for the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people (Venice Declaration of 13 June 1980). They called for a just solution to the Palestine problem, which is not simply one of refugees. The declarants continued : "The Palestinian people, which are conscious of existing as such, must be placed in a position, by an appropriate process defined within the framework of the comprehensive peace settlement, to exercise fully their right to self-determination" (Laqueur and Rubin, 1984).

Similarly, the 1983 Geneva Declaration on Palestine (which was an outcome of the International Conference on the Question of Palestine convened by the UN General Assembly to heighten awareness of the causes of the Palestinian problem) accentuated the attainment by the Palestinian people of their legitimate inalienable rights, including the right to return, the right to self-determination, the right to establish their own independent state in Palestine, and the right of the PLO to participate on an equal footing with other parties in all efforts, deliberations and conferences on the Middle East. This conference was attended by representatives of 137 states, of which 117 were full participants and 20 were observers (United Nations, 1984).

From the above account, it becomes clear that the Palestinians, with the help of the Arab countries, have succeeded through diplomacy in the UN in transforming their tragedy from a refugee problem into one about self-determination. It is now accepted as the core of the Israeli-Arab conflict. Hence, from 1974 onward, the Palestine question has become a regular feature of the UN General Assembly after an absence of more than 20 years from its agenda. As a consequence of this achievement, all parties involved in the conflict, including Israel, have realized the importance of the Palestinian problem in Middle East policy. So, what is the Israeli view toward solving the problem and what solution would the Palestinians accept?

As a pre-condition to talks with the Palestinians, Israel and the USA require the Palestinians to recognize Israel's right to exist, and to recognize the UN Security Council Resolution 242 (see Appendix 14), while the Palestinians require Israel and the USA to recognize their right of self-determination, their right to an independent Palestinian state, and their right to be treated as a nation. At the same time, the Palestinians reject resolution 242 because it deals with their problem as a border conflict between Israel and the Arab states, regarding it as simply a refugee problem, with no indication of the rights of self-determination.

From the Israeli point of view, a Palestinian state already exists : Jordan, where over half of the population are Palestinians. Therefore, the Palestinian problem must be solved through some particular arrangement with Jordan. However, there is a division between the largest two parties in Israel, Labour and Likud, as to how such an arrangement might work in practice. "While Likud sees that overall Gaza and the West Bank might remain under Israeli control and their Palestinian population might be resettled in Jordan, Labour has called for "territorial compromise", entitling Israel to annex a large part of the Strip and the West Bank and to demilitarize the rest and transfer it to Jordan (Amitay, 1982). However, quantifying the response of the Gazan population towards resettlement in Jordan no one from the households sampled in Khan Yunis camp approved such action, which means that the Jordanian option is unacceptable to the Gazan people in particular.

Nevertheless, "both Israeli parties have one thing in common: no part of Palestinian territory is to be released to an independent Palestinian

state. The following account is mainly based on a document published in April, 1982, by the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. The document was compiled after a two-year seminar on the subject in which a number of Israeli academics and politicans took part" (Rowley, 1987).

From the Palestinians side, a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip would be accepted. But to many in Israel, it remains a question whether this would be a final or dangerous intermediate solution (Forsythe, 1983). Also, Gazans adhere to their aspiration for an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel. The new state might even choose to federate with Jordan, but this step could be considered only after its independence was assured (Lesch, 1984b).

The Palestinians and the Arabs see that the only possible solution to the Israeli-Arab conflict is through holding an international peace conference on the Middle East. The peace conference should be convened under the auspices of the UN with the participation of the permanent members of the Security Council, including all parties involved in the conflict, aiming to achieve a comprehensive, just and lasting solution. In contrast, Israel rejects the initiative and demands direct negotiations with the Arab states without prior conditions. This position would enable Israel to evade discussion of the Palestinian problem since it knows that the international community supports the Palestinian right to self-determination and to an independent state.

The Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir has rejected the idea of convening an international Middle East conference. He said such a conference will not bring peace to Israel, but will isolate it, because the conference will demand an Israeli withdrawal to the pre-1967 border and the establishment of a Palestinian state (The Jerusalem Post, 1987). Therefore, with such a contradiction in the viewpoints, a solution to the Palestinian problem is hard to discern in the forseeable future. Consequently, Gazan population problems will remain and grow.

Arriving at the Gaza Strip from the north, there is a permanent roadblock guarded by Israeli troops. Every vehicle going in or out is searched and the identity cards of the passengers are checked. There are Israeli troops everywhere, patrolling the cities, villages and even the

alleys of the refugee camps. The Strip is surrounded by barbed wire and guarded by soldiers from the north, the east and the south, and from the sea with Israeli military beachtowers.

Inside the teeming Gaza Strip, the Gazan people like most of the Palestinians are looking and waiting, with their eyes on their homeland, on the fragmentation of the continuity of their settlements by the Israeli colonies, on the continuous confiscation of their land, on the paralysis of peace initiatives, on the prisons and fear of being imprisoned, and on the disappointing performance of the Arab states and the international community. Thirty-nine years of statelessness and uprootedness have not weakened the dream to return and to start their Palestinian lives again.

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APPENDIX 1

Gaza Strip : Index of Population Concentration, 1982.

Locality	% of total area X	% of total population Y	The positive difference (X - Y)
Nuseirat	0.7	4.7	4.0
Bureij	1.2	2.7	1.5
Gaza city and Beach camp	26.0	37.9	11.9
Jabalya-Nazla and Jabalya camp	7.9	10.5	2.6
Khan Yunis city and Khan Yunis camp	11.9	15.5	3.6
Mughazi	1.7	1.9	0.2
Rafah city and Rafah camp	10.9	12.3	1.4
Abasan el Saghira	0.9	0.7	0.2
Deir el Balah and Deir el Balah camp	8.7	5.3	3.4
Beit Lahiya	5.2	2.3	2.9
Abasan el Kabira	3.0	1.3	1.7
Bani Suheila	4.7	1.9	2.8
Beit Hanun	8.6	1.9	6.7
Ikhza'a	3.0	0.6	2.4
Zawaida	5.4	0.5	4.9
Total	100.0	100.0	50.2

$$\text{Index of population concentration} = \frac{X - Y}{2}$$

$$= \frac{50.2}{2} = 25.1 \text{ per cent}$$

When the index of population concentration is low it follows that the population distribution is more even and scattered.

APPENDIX 2

U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION ON THE PARTITION OF PALESTINE 29 November 1947 [Resolution 181 (II)]

Excerpts:

A

The General Assembly,

. . .

Recommends to the United Kingdom, as the mandatory Power for Palestine, and to all other Members of the United Nations the adoption and implementation, with regard to the future government of Palestine, of the Plan of Partition with Economic Union set out below;
Requests that

. . .

(c) The Security Council determine as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter, any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by this resolution;

. . .

Calls upon the inhabitants of Palestine to take such steps as may be necessary on their part to put this plan into effect;

Appeals to all Governments and all peoples to refrain from taking any action which might hamper or delay the carrying out of these recommendations...

PLAN OF PARTITION WITH ECONOMIC UNION

. . .

3. Independent Arab and Jewish States and the Special International Regime for the City of Jerusalem, set forth in part III of this plan, shall come into existence in Palestine two months after the evacuation of the armed forces of the mandatory Power has been completed but in any case not later than 1 October 1948. The boundaries of the Arab State, the Jewish State, and the City of Jerusalem shall be as described in parts II and III below.

4. The period between the adoption by the General Assembly of its recommendation on the question of Palestine and the establishment of the independence of the Arab and Jewish States shall be a transitional period.

B. STEPS PREPARATORY TO INDEPENDENCE

1. A Commission shall be set up consisting of one representative of each of five Member States. The Members represented on the Commission shall be elected by the General Assembly on as broad a basis, geographically and otherwise, as possible.

2. The administration of Palestine shall, as the mandatory Power withdraws its armed forces, be progressively turned over to the Commission, which shall act in conformity with the recommendations of the General Assembly, under the guidance of the Security Council. The mandatory Power shall to the fullest possible extent coordinate its plans for withdrawal with the plans of the Commission to take over and administer areas which have been evacuated.

. . .

3. On its arrival in Palestine the Commission shall proceed to carry out measures for the establishment of the frontiers of the Arab and Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem in accordance with the general lines of the recommendations of the General Assembly on the partition of Palestine ...

4. The Commission, after consultation with the democratic parties and other public organizations of the Arab and Jewish States, shall select and establish in each State as rapidly as possible a Provisional Council of Government. The activities of both the Arab and Jewish Provisional Councils of Government shall be carried out under the general direction of the Commission.

6. The Provisional Council of Government of each State, acting under the Commission, shall progressively receive from the Commission full responsibility for the administration of that State in the period between the termination of the Mandate and the establishment of the State's independence.

10. The Constituent Assembly of each State shall draft a democratic constitution for its State and choose a provisional government to succeed the Provisional Council of Government appointed by the Commission. The constitutions of the States shall embody chapters 1 and 2 of the Declaration provided for in section C below and include inter alia provisions for:

(b) Settling all international disputes in which the State may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered;

(c) Accepting the obligation of the State to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations;

(e) Preserving freedom of transit and visit for all residents and citizens of the other State in Palestine and the City of Jerusalem, subject to considerations of national security, provided that each State shall control residence within its borders.

11. The Commission shall appoint a preparatory economic commission of three members to make whatever arrangements are possible for economic cooperation, with a view to establishing, as soon as practicable, the Economic Union and the Joint Economic Board, as provided in section D below.

. . .

C. DECLARATION

A declaration shall be made to the United Nations by the provisional government of each proposed State before independence. It shall contain inter alia the following clauses:

. . .

Chapter 1

Hold Places, religious buildings and sites

1. Existing rights in respect of Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall not be denied or impaired.

2. In so far as Hold Places are concerned, the liberty of access, visit and transit shall be guaranteed, in conformity with existing rights, to all residents and citizens of the other State and of the City of Jerusalem, as well as to aliens, without distinction as to nationality, subject to requirements of national security, public order and decorum.

. . .

Chapter 4

Miscellaneous provisions

. . .

D. ECONOMIC UNION AND TRANSIT

1. The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall enter into an undertaking with respect to Economic Union and Transit. This undertaking shall be drafted by the Commission provided for in section B, paragraph 1, utilizing to the greatest possible extent the advice and cooperation of representative organizations and bodies from each of the proposed States. It shall contain provisions to establish the Economic Union of Palestine and provide for other matters of common interest. If by 1 April 1948 the Provisional Councils of Government have not entered into the undertaking, the undertaking shall be put into force by the Commission.

The Economic Union of Palestine

2. The objectives of the Economic Union of Palestine shall be:

(a) A customs union;

(b) A joint currency system providing for a single foreign exchange rate;

(c) Operation in the common interest on a non-discriminatory basis of railways; inter-State highways; postal, telephone and telegraphic services, and ports and airports involved in international trade and commerce;

(d) Joint economic development, especially in respect of irrigation, land reclamation and soil conservation;

(e) Access for both States and for the City of Jerusalem on a nondiscriminatory basis to water and power facilities.

. . .

APPENDIX 3 :

Population Data Sheet Used in the 1985 Sample Survey

POPULATION STRUCTURE (DATA REFER TO INDIVIDUALS)

LOCALITY

١- المحلـــة العمرانية

Serial Number الرقم المسلسل	Name of Members اسماء الافراد	Relation to the head of household العلاقة مع عائل الاسرة	Date of Birth تاريخ الميلاد	Sex الجنس		Marital Status الحالة الاجتماعية				Occupation الوظيفة	Employment status الحالة الوظيفية		Place of work مكان العمل		Education Level المستوى العلمي					Literacy التعلم	
				Male ذكر	Female انثى	Single اعزب	Married متزوج	Widowed أرمل	Divorced مطلق		Employed يعمل	Unemployed لا يعمل	In Gaza Strip في غزة	In Israel في اسرائيل	Elementary ابتدائي	Preparatory اعدادي	Secondary ثانوي	Tech.& Teachers Inst. معاهد معلمين	University جامعي	Read & write يقرأ ويكتب	Illiterate امي
1.																					
2.																					
3.																					
4.																					
5.																					
6.																					
7.																					
8.																					
9.																					
10.																					
11.																					
12.																					
13.																					
14.																					
15.																					

APPENDIX 4 : Questionnaire on Fertility, Mortality and Family Planning
(Khan Yunis Area)

CASE STUDY : KHAN YUNIS AREA

Fertility, Mortality & Family Planning
(Data refers to couples)

Tick (✓) the correct answer: ضع علامة (✓) امام الاجابة الصحيحة

1. Are you from: ١- هل أنت من ؟

1. Khan Yunis City ١- مدينة خان يونس
2. Khan Yunis refugee camp ٢- معسكر خان يونس للاجئين
3. Khan Yunis villages ٣- قرى منطقة خان يونس

2. Are you (For the husband only) ٢- هل أنت (خاص بالزوج فقط)

1. A refugee ١- لاجىء
2. An indigenous ٢- مواطن

3. Level of education of the husband ٣- مستوى تعليم الزوج

1. Illiterate ١- امـــي ·
2. Elementary ٢- ابتدائي·
3. Preparatory ٣- اعدادى ·
4. Secondary ٤- ثانـوى ·
5. Technical and teachers institutes ٥- معاهد فنية ومعاهد معلمين
6. University ٦- جامعـــي ·

4. Level of education of the wife ٤- مستوى تعليم الزوجة

1. Illiterate ١- امـــي ·
2. Elementary ٢- ابتدائي ·
3. Preparatory ٣- اعدادى ·
4. Secondary ٤- ثانـوى ·
5. Technical and teachers institutes ٥- معاهد فنية ومعاهد معلمين
6. University ٦- جامعـي ·

5. Age of Husband when married ٥- عمر الزوج عند الزواج

1. below 18 ١- أقل من ١٨ سنة
2. 18-19 ٢- ١٨ - ١٩
3. 20-21 ٣- ٢٠ - ٢١
4. 22-23 ٤- ٢٢ - ٢٣
5. 24-25 ٥- ٢٤ - ٢٥
6. 26-27 ٦- ٢٦ - ٢٧
7. 28 years and over ٧- أكبر من ٢٨ سنة

6. Age of Wife when married ٦- عمر الزوجة عند الزواج

1. below 16 ١- أقل من ١٦ سنة
2. 16-17 ٢- ١٦ - ١٧
3. 18-19 ٣- ١٨ - ١٩
4. 20-21 ٤- ٢٠ - ٢١
5. 22-23 ٥- ٢٢ - ٢٣
6. 24-25 ٦- ٢٤ - ٢٥
7. 26-27 ٧- ٢٦ - ٢٧
8. 28 years and over ٨- أكبر من ٢٨ سنة

7. Duration of marriage ٧- فترة الـــزواج

1. below 5 years ١-أقل من خمس سنوات
2. 5-9 ٢- ٥ - ٩
3. 10-14 ٣- ١٠ - ١٤
4. 15-19 ٤- ١٥ - ١٩
5. 20-24 ٥- ٢٠ - ٢٤
6. 25-29 ٦- ٢٥ - ٢٩
7. 30 years and over ٧- أكبر من ٣٠ سنة

For women only

للنساء فقط .

8. Wife occupational status

1. Employed
2. Not employed

٨- الحالة الوظيفية للزوجة
١- تعمـــل .
٢- لا تعمـل .

9. Number of children born throughout your marriage

1. 1
2. 2
3. 2
4. 4
5. 5
6. 6
7. 7
8. 8
9. 9
10. 10
11. 11
12. 12
13. 13 children and over

٩- عدد الاطفال التي تم انجابهم خلال فترة الزواج .
١- طفل واحد .
٢- طفلان .
٣- ثلاثة اطفال .
٤- اربعة اطفال .
٥- خمسة اطفال .
٦- ستة اطفال .
٧- سبعة اطفال .
٨- ثمانية اطفال .
٩- تسعة اطفال .
١٠- عشرة اطفال .
١١- احد عشر طفلا .
١٢- اثني عشر طفلا .
١٣- أكثر من ثلاثة عشر طفلا .

10. Number of whom dead

1. 1
2. 2
3. 3
4. 4 persons and over

١٠- عدد الوفيات
١- طفل واحد .
٢- طفلان .
٣- ثلاثة اطفال .
٤- اكثر من ثلاثة اطفال .

11. Number of whom still alive

1. 1
2. 2
3. 3
4. 4
5. 5
6. 6
7. 7
8. 8
9. 9
10. 10
11. 11
12. 12
13. 13 persons and over

١١- عدد الباقين على الحياة .
١- طفل واحد .
٢- طفلان .
٣- ثلاثة اطفال .
٤- اربعة اطفال .
٥- خمسة اطفال .
٦- ستة اطفال .
٧- سبعة اطفال .
٨- ثمانية اطفال .
٩- تسعة اطفال .
١٠- عشرة اطفال .
١١- احد عشر طفلا .
١٢- اثنى عشر طفلا .
١٣- اكثر من ثلاثة عشر طفلا .

12. Age when they died

1. below 1 year
2. 1 - 4
3. 5 - 9
4. 10 - 14
5. 15 years and over

١٢- العمر عند الوفاة .
١- أقل من سنة .
٢- ١ - ٤
٣- ٥ - ٩
٤- ١٠ - ١٤
٥- اكبر من ١٥ سنة

13. Place of Death

1. In the hospital
2. In the house
3. Elsewhere

١٣- مكان الوفـــاة .
١- في المستشفى .
٢- في المنـــزل .
٣- مناطق اخـــرى .

14. Have you heard about contraceptive methods:

1. Not heard
2. Heard and not used
3. Heard and used

١٤- هل سمعت عن وسائل منع الحمل ؟

١- لم أسمع .
٢- سمعت ولم استعمل .
٣- سمعت و استعملت .

15. If heard and not used please mention why

1. Islamic religion forbi ds
2. Political reasons
3. Harmful to health
4. Your husband wants more children to improve his social standing
5. Wants more children to prevent your husband from thinking about getting married again
6. Help old age
7. Others

١٥- اذا سمعت ولم تستعملي . وضحي لماذا؟

١- تحريم الدين الاسلامي .
٢- اسباب سياسية .
٣- اضرار صحية .
٤- رغبة زوجك في تقوية مكانته الاجتماعية بين العائلات (عزوة)
٥- رغبتك في انجاب الاطفال لمنع زوجك من الزواج بأخرى .
٦- لرعايته عند الشيخوخة .
٧- اخرى .

16. If heard and used, please clarify why?

1. Family spacing
2. Birth control
3. Medical reasons
4. Others

١٦- سمعت و استعملت . وضحي لماذا ؟

١- تنظيم الاسرة .
٢- تحديد النسل .
٣- اسباب صحية .
٤- اخرى .

17. Do you think that you would use contraceptive methods in the future?

1. Yes
2. Not sure
3. No

١٧- هل تعتقدين أنك ستستعملين مثل هذه الاساليب في المستقبل .

١- نعم .
٢- غير متأكدة .
٣- لا .

APPENDIX 5 ; Questionnaire on Gazan Workers Employed in Israel

FOR WORKERS IN ISRAEL ONLY

Tick (✓) the correct answer:

ضع علامة (✓) امام الاجابة الصحيحة

1. Are you from:

1. Northern zone
2. Central zone
3. Southern zone

١- هل انت مـــــن :

١- المنطقة الشمالية
٢- المنطقة الوسطى
٣- المنطقة الجنوبية

2. Are you:

1. A refugee
2. An indigenous

٢- هل انت :

١- لاجيء
٢- مواطن

3. Sex

1. Male
2. Female

٣- الجنس :

١- ذكر
٢- انثى

4. Marital Status

1. Single
2. Married
3. Widowed
4. Divorced

٤- الحالة الاجتماعية :

١- اعزب
٢- متزوج
٣- ارمل
٤- مطلق

5. Age

1. Below 15
2. 15-19
3. 20-24
4. 25-29
5. 30-34
6. 35-39
7. 40-44
8. 45-49
9. 50-54
10. 55-59
11. 60 and over

٥- العمر:

١- اقل من ١٥ سنة
٢- ١٥ - ١٩
٣- ٢٠ - ٢٤
٤- ٢٥ - ٢٩
٥- ٣٠ - ٣٤
٦- ٣٥ - ٣٩
٧- ٤٠ - ٤٤
٨- ٤٥ - ٤٩
٩- ٥٠ - ٥٤
١٠- ٥٥ - ٥٩
١١- ٦٠ سنة فاكثر

6. Level of Education

1. Illiterate
2. Elementary
3. Preparatory
4. Secondary
5. Technical and teachers Institutes
6. University

٦- مستوى التعليم :

١- امي (لا يقرأ ولا يكتب)
٢- ابتدائي
٣- اعدادى
٤- ثانوى
٥- معاهد فنية ومعاهد معلمين
٦- جامعـــي

7. Place of work

1. Ashqelon and Qiryat Gat area
2. Qiryat Malakhi area
3. Ashdod
4. Netivot and Beer sheva regiors
5. Besor area
6. Rishon Le Ziyyon, Rehovot and Yavne
7. Ramla and Lod area
8. Tel Aviv, Yafa and Petah Tiqwa
9. Kefar Sava, Netanya and Hadera
10. Others

٧- مكان العمل :

١- منطقة المجدل وكريات جاد (الفالوجه)
٢- منطقة كريات ملاخي (القسطينة)
٣- اســـــدود
٤- منطقة بئر السبع ونتيفوت
٥- منطقة وادى بيسور (غزة)
٦- منطقة ريشون، زخبوت ،يبنا
٧- الرمله واللد
٨- تل ابيب - يافا وبتاح تكفا
٩- كفار سابا - نتانيا والخضيره
١٠- مناطق اخـــرى

8. Types of work:

1. Construction(Building and public works)
2. Industry (Mining and Manufacturing)
3. Restaurants, coffee places hotels and shops
4. Agriculture
5. Transport, storage and communication
6. Public and community services
7. Others

٨- نوع العمـــل :

١- بناء واشغال عامة
٢- صناعة ،ومعامل وتعدين
٣- مطاعم ،مقاهي ،فنادق ،دكاكين
٤- زراعـــة
٥- مواصلات ،تخزين ، اتصالات
٦- خدمات عامة
٧- اخـــرى

9. Are you employed by the Labour Office

1. Yes
2. No

٩- هل تعمل عن طريق مكتبة العمل:

١- نعـــم
٢- لا

10. If no, why?

1. Because can earn more privately
2. Do not want to pay tax
3. Do not want work throughout the year
4. Other reasons

١٠- اذا اجبت بلا ،لماذا ؟

١- للحصول على أجر اعلى
٢- لعدم دفع الضريبة
٣- لعدم رغبةفي العمل باستمرار
٤- اسباب اخرى

11. Distance from home to work:

1. Less than 50 km.
2. 50- 69km.
3. 70- 89km.
4. 90-109 km.
5. 110 km and more

١١- المسافة من المنزل الى مكان العمل :

١- اقل من ٥٠كم
٢- ٥٠ - ٦٩ كم
٣- ٧٠ - ٨٩ كم
٤- ٩٠ - ١٠٩كم
٥- اكثر من ١١٠ كم

12. Do you travel to work

1. Daily
2. Weekly
3. Less often

١٢- هل تذهب الى العمـل :

يوميـــا
اسبوعيـــا
اكثر من اسبوع

13. If answer 2 or 3 in the former question, please clarify. How do you stay there

1. With permission
2. Without permission

١٣- اذا اجبت كلا من ٢ ،أو ٣ في السؤال السابق بين كيف تقيم هناك

باذن اقامة (تصريح)
بدون اذن

14. Net income per month (in American dollars)

1. less than $100
2. $100 - 199
3. $200 - 299
4. $300 - 399
5. $400 - 499
6. $500 or more

١٤- صافي الدخل الشهرى بالدولار الامريكي

١- اقل من ١٠٠ دولار
٢- ١٠٠ - ١٩٩
٣- ٢٠٠ - ٢٩٩
٤- ٣٠٠ - ٣٩٩
٥- ٤٠٠ - ٤٩٩
٦- اكبر من ٥٠٠ دولار

15. Number of days worked per month

1. Less than 10 days
2. 10 - 14
3. 15 - 19
4. 20 - 24
5. 25 - 29

١٥- متوسط ايام العمل شهريا :

١- اقل من عشرة ايام
٢- ١٠ - ١٤
٣- ١٥ - ١٩
٤- ٢٠ - ٢٤
٥- ٢٥ - ٢٩ يوم

APPENDIX 6 : Questionnaire on Gazan Migrant Workers Employed Abroad

PEOPLE WORKING IN THE ARAB AND NON-ARAB COUNTRIES

Tick ( ) the correct answer

ضع علامة (✓) امام الاجابة الصحيحة

1. Sex

١- الجنـــس

1. Male ☐ ١- ذكـــر

2. Female ☐ ٢- انثى

2. Marital Status

٢- الحالة الاجتماعية :

1. Single ☐ ١- اعـزب

2. Married ☐ ٢- متـــزوج

3. Widowed ☐ ٣- أرمـــل

4. Divorced ☐ ٤- مطـــلق

3. If Married, accompanied by family

٣- اذا كان متزوجا ، هل مصطحبا عائلته

1. Yes ☐ ١- نعـــم

2. No ☐ ٢- لا

4. Place of work

٤- مكـــان العمـــل :

1. Saudi Arabia ☐ ١- السعودية

2. United Arab Emirates ☐ ٢- الامارات العربية المتحدة

3. Kuwait ☐ ٣- الكويـــت

4. Qatar ☐ ٤- قطـــر

5. North and South Yemen ☐ ٥- اليمن الشمالي والجنوبي

6. Libya ☐ ٦- ليبيـــا

7. Algeria ☐ ٧- الجـــزائر

8 Other countries ☐ ٨- اقطار اخـــرى

5. Types of work

٥- نوع العمـــل :

1. Teaching ☐ ١- تدريس

2. Medical professions ☐ ٢- مهن طبيـــة

3. Construction & Engineering ☐ ٣- هندسة وانشاءات

4. Workers (skilled & semi skilled) ☐ ٤- عمـــال

5. Other professions ☐ ٥- مهـــن اخـــرى

6. Number of family members(For married)

٦- عدد افـراد الاسـرة (بالنسبة للمتزوجين) فقط:

1. 1 - 2 ☐ ١- ١ - ٢

2. 3 - 4 ☐ ٢- ٣ - ٤

3. 5 - 6 ☐ ٣- ٥ - ٦

4. 7 - 8 ☐ ٤- ٧ - ٨

5. 9 - 10 persons ☐ ٥- ٩ - ١٠ افـــراد

APPENDIX 7 : Questionnaire on Israeli-Sponsored Rehousing Projects for Gazan Refugees (Al-Amal Project)

CASE STUDY : REFUGEE DWELLING PROJECTS

For Al Amal Refugee Dwelling Project only

Number of square : رقم المربـــــع

---

1. Household Head - level of Education

١ - المستوى التعليمي لعائل الأسرة

1. Illiterate — ١ - أمـــــي
2. Elementary — ٢ - ابتدائـــي
3. Preparatory — ٣ - اعـــدادى
4. Secondary — ٤ - ثانـــوى
5. Technical and teachers institutes — ٥ - معاهد فنيه ومعاهد معلمين
6. University — ٦ - جامعـــي

2. Occupation

٢ - الوظيفـــــه

1. Doctor or Nurse — ١ - طبيب أو ممـــرض
2. UNRWA School Teacher — ٢ - مدرس في مدارس الوكالة (أونروا)
3. Governmental School Teacher — ٣ - مدرس في المدارس الحكوميـــة
4. Merchant, Shopowner — ٤ - تاجر ، بائع في محل خـــاص
5. Transport, service worker — ٥ - مواصـــلات وخدمـــات
6. Technical workshops — ٦ - ورش فنيـــــه
7. Construction worker — ٧ - عامـــل بنـــاء
8. Industry and manufacturing — ٨ - صناعـــه ومعامـــل
9. Not mentioned above — ٩ - غيـــر مذكـــور سابقـــا

3. Place of work

٣ - مكـــان العمـــل

1. In the Gaza Strip — ١ - في قطاع غـــزه
2. In Israel — ٢ - فـــي اسرائيـــل

4. Employment Status

٤ - الحالـــه الوظيفيـــه

1. Employed — ١ - يعمـــــل
2. Unemployed — ٢ - لا يعمـــــل
3. Retired — ٣ - متقاعـــــد
4. Self-employed — ٤ - عمـــل خـــاص

5. Are you

٥ - هـــل أنـــــت

1. A refugee — ١ - لاجـــيء
2. An indigenous — ٢ - مواطـــن

6. Position before moving in the Dwelling projects

٦ - مكان السكن قبل الانتقال الى مشروع اسكان اللاجئيـــن .

1. Khan Yunis Refugee Camp — ١ - معسكـر خان يونـــس
2. Khan Yunis City — ٢ - مدينـة خان يونـــس
3. Al Arish City — ٣ - مدينـة العريـــش
4. Others — ٤ - مناطـق أخـــرى

7. If from Khan Yunis Refugee Camp, please mention your block number

٧ - اذا كنت من سكان معسكر خان يونس للاجئين اذكر رقم البلوك .

1. Block A — ١ - بلـــوك A
2. B — ٢ - = B
3. C — ٣ - = C
4. D — ٤ - = D
5. E — ٥ - = E
6. F — ٦ - = F
7. G — ٧ - = G
8. H — ٨ - = H
9. I — ٩ - = I
10. J — ١٠ - = J

11. Block K
12. L
13. M
14. N
15. O



K بلـــوك - ١١
L = - ١٢
M = - ١٣
N = - ١٤
O = - ١٥

8. If from Al Arish City, please mention your previous camp

1. Jabalya
2. Beach
3. Buriej
4. Nusirat
5. Maghazi
6. Deir el Balah
7. Khan Yunis
8. Rafah



٨ - اذاكنت من مدينة العريش ، اذكر اســـم المعسكر السابق(قبل الانتقال الى العريش)

١ - معسكر جباليـــا
٢ - = الشاطـــيء
٣ - = البريـــج
٤ - = النصيـــرات
٥ - = المغـــازى
٦ - = دير البلـح
٧ - = خان يونـــس
٨ - = رفـــــح

9. How did you get your accommodation?

1. After the demolition of your camp shelter
2. Buying from the owner
3. Buying a camp shelter and demolishing it
4. Rent
5. Directly from the accommodation office
6. Others

٩ - كيف حصلت على منزلك فـي المشـــروع

١ - بعد هدم منزلك في المعسكـــر
٢ - شراوء من المالك الاصلـــي
٣ - شراء منزل من المعسكر وثـم هدمـــــــه
٤ - استئجـــــــــار
٥ - مباشرة من مكتب الاسكـــان
٦ - طـــــرق أخـــــرى

10. Date of moving to the Refugee Dwelling projects

1. 1976-77
2. 1978-79
3. 1980-81
4. 1982-83
5. 1984-85



١٠ - تاريخ الانتقال الى مشروع اسكان اللاجئين

١ - ١٩٧٦ - ١٩٧٧ م
٢ - ١٩٧٨ - ١٩٧٩ م
٣ - ١٩٨٠ - ١٩٨١ م
٤ - ١٩٨٢ - ١٩٨٣ م
٥ - ١٩٨٤ - ١٩٨٥ م

11. Did you receive

1. A built house
2. A plot of land



١١ - هـل حصلـت علـــــى :

١ - منـــزل مبنـــي
٢ - قطعـــــة ارض

12. How many housing units did your household receive?

1. One unit
2. Two units
3. Three units
4. Over three units



١٢ - كم عدد الوحدات السكنية التي تسلمتها:

١ - وحـــــده واحـــده
٢ - وحدتـــــــــان
٣ - ثـــلاث وحـــــدات
٤ - اكثر من ثلاث وحدات

13. Area of each Housing Unit

1. 250 sq.m.
2. 125 sq.m.



١٣ - مساحـة كل وحـــده سكنيـــة

١ - ٢٥٠ م ٢
٢ - ١٢٥ م ٢

14. Number of rooms in the previous shelter

1. 1
2. 2
3. 3
4. 4
5. 5
6. over 5



١٤ - عدد الغرف في المنزل السابق(منزل المعسكر)

١ - غرفـه واحـــده
٢ - غرفتـــــــان
٣ - ثـلاث غـــــرف
٤ - اربـع غـــرف
٥ - خمـــس غـــرف
٦ - اكثر من خمـس غـــرف

15. Number of families in the previous shelter
    1. 1
    2. 2
    3. 3
    4. over 3

١٥ ـ عدد العائلات في المنزل السابق(منزل المعسكر)

١ ـ عائلة واحـــدة
٢ ـ عائلتـــان
٣ ـ ثلاث عائـــلات
٤ ـ اكثر من ثلاث عائـــلات

16. Number of persons in the previous shelter
    1. Male
    2. Female

١٦ ـ عدد الاشخاص في المنزل السابق(منزل المعسكر)

١ ـ ذكـــور
٢ ـ انـــاث

17. Did you make alterations to the new house?
    1. Yes
    2. No

١٧ ـ هل ادخلت تعديلات على بيتك الجديد

١ ـ نعـــم
٢ ـ لا

18. If yes:
    1. Adding rooms, halls, kitchens
    2. Demolishing the house, and rebuilding as multi-storey
    3. Others

١٨ ـ اذا اجبت بنعـــم

١ ـ اضافة غرف ،صالات ،مطابخ
٢ ـ هدم البيت واعادة بناؤه على شكل طوابـــق
٣ ـ اخـــــــرى

19. Number of rooms in your new accommodation
    1. 1
    2. 2
    3. 2
    4. 4
    5. 5
    6. 6
    7. 7
    8. 8
    9. 9
    10. 10
    11. over 10

١٩ ـ عدد الغرف في منزلك الجديـــد (بيت المشـــروع)

١ ـ غرفـــة واحـــده
٢ ـ غرفتـــان
٣ ـ ثلاث غـــرف
٤ ـ اربـــع غـــرف
٥ ـ خمـــس غـــرف
٦ ـ ســـت غـــرف
٧ ـ سبـــع غـــرف
٨ ـ ثمـــان غـــرف
٩ ـ تســـع غـــرف
١٠ـ عشـــر غـــرف
١١ـ اكثر من عشر غـــرف

20. Area of rooms (Average)
    1. 3 x 3 (9 sq.m)
    2. 3½ x 7½ (10.5 sq.m)
    3. 3 x 4 (12 sq.m)
    4. 4 x 4 (16 sq.m)

٢٠ ـ مساحـــة الغـــرف

١ ـ ٣ x ٣ = ٩ م٢
٢ ـ ٣ر٥ x ٣ر٥ = ١٠ر٥ م٢
٣ ـ ٣ x ٤ = ١٢ م٢
٤ ـ ٤ x ٤ = ١٦ م٢

21. Number of stores in your new house
    1. 1
    2. 2
    3. 3
    4. over 3

٢١ ـ عدد الطوابق في المنزل الجديـــد (منزل المشـــروع)

١ ـ طابـــق واحـــد
٢ ـ طابقـــــان
٣ ـ ثلاثـة طوابـــق
٤ـ اكثر من ثلاثة طوابـــق

22. Number of apartments
    1. 1
    2. 2
    3. 3
    4. 4
    5. 5
    6. 6
    7. over 6

٢٢ ـ عـــــدد الشقـــق

١ ـ شقـــة واحـــدة
٢ ـ شقتـــــان
٣ ـ ثـــلاث شقـــق
٤ ـ اربـــع شقـــق
٥ ـ خمـــس شقـــق
٦ ـ ســـت شقـــق
٧ ـ اكثر من ست شقـــق

23. Number of families presently living there

1. 1
2. 2
3. 3
4. 4
5. over 4

٢٣ ـ عدد العائلات التي تسكن منزل المشروع حاليا

١ ـ عائلة واحدة
٢ ـ عائلتان
٣ ـ ثلاث عائلات
٤ ـ اربع عائلات
٥ ـ اكثر من اربع عائلات

24. Number of persons

1. Male
2. Female

٢٤ ـ عدد الاشخاص

١ ـ ذكور
٢ ـ اناث

25. The percentage of compensation for your previous camp shelter was

1. below 5% of its value
2. 5 - 9%
3. 10- 19
4. 20 - 29
5. 30 - 39
6. over 40%

٢٥ ـ نسبة التعويض عن المنزل السابق (منزل المعسكر) كانت تعادل من قيمة المنزل

١ ـ أقل من ٥ ٪
٢ ـ ٥ ـ ٩ ٪
٣ ـ ١٠ ـ ١٩ ٪
٤ ـ ٢٠ ـ ٢٩ ٪
٥ ـ ٣٠ ـ ٣٩ ٪
٦ ـ اكثر من ٤٠٪

26. The compensation was (In American Dollars)

1. below 500
2. 500 - 999
3. 1000 - 1499
4. 1500 - 1999
5. 2000 - 2499
6. 2500 and more

٢٦ ـ التعويضات (بالدولار الامريكي) كانت تعادل

١ ـ اقل من ٥٠٠ دولار
٢ ـ ٥٠٠ ـ ٩٩٩
٣ ـ ١٠٠٠ ـ ١٤٩٩
٤ ـ ١٥٠٠ ـ ١٩٩٩
٥ ـ ٢٠٠٠ ـ ٢٤٩٩
٦ ـ اكثر من ٢٥٠٠ دولار

27. The net income per month

1. below $300
2. $300 - 399
3. $400 - 499
4. $500 - 599
5. $600 - 699
6. $700 - 799
7. $800 and more

٢٧ ـ صافي الدخل الشهري يعادل

١ ـ اقل من ٣٠٠ دولار
٢ ـ ٣٠٠ ـ ٣٩٩
٣ ـ ٤٠٠ ـ ٤٩٩
٤ ـ ٥٠٠ ـ ٥٩٩
٥ ـ ٦٠٠ ـ ٦٩٩
٦ ـ ٧٠٠ ـ ٧٩٩
٧ ـ اكثر من ٨٠٠ دولار

28. Number of household members contributing to household income

1. 1
2. 2
3. 3
4. four members and more

٢٨ ـ عدد افراد الاسرة الذين يساهمون في دخل الاسرة

١ ـ فرد واحد
٢ ـ اثنان
٣ ـ ثلاثة افراد
٤ ـ اربعة افراد واكثر

29. Number of family members contributing to household income from outside the Gaza Strip

1. 1
2. 2
3. 3
4. four members and more

٢٩ ـ عدد افراد العائلة الذين يساهمون في دخل الاسرة من خارج قطاع غزه

١ ـ فرد واحد
٢ ـ اثنان
٣ ـ ثلاثة افراد
٤ ـ اربعة افراد واكثر

30. If you answer positively question 29, what is the relationship between the contributor and the head of the household. The contributor is his:

٣٠ - اذا اجبت سؤال ٢٩ بالايجاب فما هي العلاقة بين المساهم في دخل الاسرة وعائل الاســـــــــرة

1. Father
2. Son
3. Brother
4. Sister
5. Daughter
6. Others

١ - اب
٢ - ابـــــن
٣ - اخ
٤ - اخـــــت
٥ - بنـــــت
٦ - اخـــــرى

31. Have you moved

٣١ - هل انتقلـت الى المشـــروع

1. Voluntarily
2. Compulsorily
3. Others

١ - ارادى
٢ - اجبـــــارى
٣ - اخـــــرى

32. Do you suffer from

٣٢ - هـــل تعانـــى مـــن

1. Shortage of water supply
2. Sewerage problem
3. Bad sanitation
4. Bad housing
5. Others

١ - من نقص في مياه الشرب
٢ - مشكلـة مجـــــارى
٣ - سوء خدمـات النظافـة
٤ - اسكـــــان ســـيء
٥ - اخـــــــرى

33. Would you advise the residents of refugee camps to move into the refugee Dwelling projects?

٣٣ - هل تنصح سكان المعسكرات بالانتقال الى مشاريع اسكان اللاجئيـــن

1. Yes
2. Maybe
3. No
4. Certainly not

١ - نعـــم
٢ - مـــن المحتمـــل
٣ - لا
٤ - بالتأكيد لا انصح

34. Did you sign any contract when you obtained your accommodation?

٣٤ - هل وقعت على عقد عند حصولـك على منزل المشـــروع

1. Yes
2. No

١ - نعـــم
٢ - لا

35. If yes, did you know what this contract included?

٣٥ - اذا اجبت بنعم ، هل عرفت مـــا يتضمـن هـذا العقـــد

1. Yes
2. No

١ - نعـــم
٢ - لا

36. If yes , did it include

٣٦ - اذا اجبت بنعم ، هل يتضمن العقد على

1. Losing your refugee identity
2. Renting your house for 99 years
3. Others

١ - حرمانك من بطاقة لاجـيء
٢ - استئجار المنزل لمدة ٩٩ عاما
٣ - اخـــــرى

37. In what language was the contract written

٣٧ - بأى لغـــة كتب العقـــد

1. Hebrew
2. Arabic
3. Hebrew & Arabic
4. Others

١ - باللغة العبريـــــة
٢ - = العربيـــــة
٣ - عبريـــة وعربيـــة
٤ - اخـــــــرى

THE END

APPENDIX 8

Houses and Plots of Land in Government Housing Projects, November 1985

A) Houses built by government

Camp/Area	Project	Commencement of Project	Planned & Completed			Inhabited				Vacant	
			Houses	Rooms in a house	Rooms	Houses	Rooms	Families	Persons	Houses	Rooms
Gaza	Sheikh Radwan "A"	March/1975	64	3	192	64	192	66	436	-	
"	Sheikh Radwan "B"	"	684	2	1368	684	1368	669	4269	-	-
"	Sheikh Radwan "C" 16 x 2 storeys (a)	"	32	3	96	32	96	29	168	-	-
Khan Yunis	Shuqari No I "A"	March/1973	113	3	339	113	339	113	695	-	-
	Shuqari No.I "B"	"	15	2	30	15	30	22	153	-	-
	Al-Amal "A"	May/1975	842	2	1684	842	1684	802	4853	-	-
Rafah	Brazil No.I "A"	April/1973	84	3	252	84	252	90	561	-	-
	Brazil No.I "B"	"	154	2	308	154	308	163	1124	-	-
	Brazil No 2 "A"	"	184	2	368	184	368	183	1135	-	-
	Canada Camp-Sinai (Established in 1971	Amended June 1983, Re-amended December 1984 & Sept. 1985. 5 units of 15 rooms demolished on the border line in 1982.	496	2-3	1244	488	1220	789	4623	3	9
Total			2668		5881	2660	5857	2957	18017	3	9

B) Plots of Land-Housing built by Residents			Plots allocated	Plots under construction								Plots without construction
Jabalya	Beit Lahiya "A"	October/1977	700	65	-	345	-	599	3735	-	-	290
	Nazla Site	April/1981	180	36	-	131	-	126	919	-	-	13
Gaza	Nasr Site	September/1974	36	-	-	36	-	36	186	-	-	-
	Yarmouk site "A"	"	89	-	-	89	-	89	506	-	-	-
	Sheikh Radwan "A"	July/1976	920	158	-	593	-	894	5484	-	-	169
Khan Yunis	Al-Amal "B"	July/1979	180	12	-	151	-	282	1659	-	-	17
Rafah	Brazil No.1"D"	April/1979	109	2	-	107	-	159	1029	-	-	-
	Tal el Sultan	April/1978	1500	50	-	828	-	893	5488	-	-	622
Total			3714	323	-	2280	-	3078	19006	-	-	1111
Grand Total			6382	323	5881	4940	5857	6004	37023	3	9	1111

(a) This refers to 16 units of two storeys buildings, i.e. 32 housing units of three rooms each

N.B. Data collected by UNRWA accommodation employees

Source : UNRWA Accommodation Office of Gaza, 1985

APPENDIX 9 : Instructions to Applicants for Purchasing Housing Units in the Israeli-Sponsored Rehousing Projects

THE MILITARY AUTHORITY OF THE GAZA STRIP REGION

REFUGEE REHABILITATION BRANCH

To the applicant:- ..... Identity Card No. .....

..... Identity Card No. .....

..... Identity Card No. .....

..... Identity Card No. .....

Plot no. ..... Project ..... Locality .....

From the Department of Surveying, Housing Section:

Information about the plot:-

The requirements which must be implemented before receiving the plot:-

1 - The applicant should obtain a licence from the municipality or the council, and it is necessary to mark the intended initial part of the building which should be identified on tracing paper.

A - General and specific sketch of the site.

B - It should be designated by the horizontal plan of each floor.

2 - The building which is to be implemented in the first stage must be marked in green colour on the map draft, and it must be built within six months of receiving the plot (land).

3 - The postponed part of the building should be mentioned on the tracing map.

4 - The plot can be obtained, when the aforesaid conditions are implemented.

Surveyor's Signature.

Original copy in Arabic

APPENDIX 10 : Legal Procedures Required for Purchasing Housing Units in the Israeli-Sponsored Rehousing Projects.

THE MILITARY AUTHORITY OF THE GAZA STRIP

REFUGEE REHABILITATION BRANCH

POPULATION REGISTRATION - AUTHORITY .....

Municipality .....

Subject: Housing unit. .....

1 - .....

2 - Name: .....

3 - .....

1 - The aforesaid has bought housing unit no. ..... neighbourhood ...

.....

2 - It is hoped to implement the application form according to the law

.....

THE MILITARY AUTHORITY OF THE GAZA STRIP

REFUGEE REHABILITATION BRANCH

POPULATION REGISTRATION - AUTHORITY .....

Municipality .....

Subject: Housing unit .....

1 - .....

2 - Name: .....

3 - .....

1 - The aforesaid has bought housing unit no. ..... neighbourhood ...

.....

2 - It is hoped to implement the application form according to the law

.....

Original copy in Arabic and Hebrew

APPENDIX 11 : Bills of Exchange Required to be Signed for Purchasing Housing Units in the Israeli-Sponsored Rehousing Projects

Bill of Exchange

On the Value of Compensation

Identity Card No.
Identity Card No.

Shekel Agorat

....

Only ..... and paid accordingly.

In effect ..... I will pay according to this bill of exchange to ..... the above-mentioned sum which amounts to .....

The value: The compensation value of the house no. .....

block ..... camp .....

Name:
Name:

This bill of exchange is cancelled after the destruction of the above-mentioned house.

Signature,

Bill of Exchange

On the Value of Compensation

Identity Card No.
Identity Card No.

Shekel Agorat

....

Only ..... and paid accordingly.

In effect ..... I will pay according to this bill of exchange to ..... the above-mentioned sum which amounts to .....

The value: The value of the postponable loan.

This bill of exchange is cancelled after 10 years.

Signature,

Name:
Name:

Original copy in Arabic

Continued/.....

I, the signatory below, confirm and recognize that I am in full cognizance that I have guaranteed Mr:

1 - .....

2 - .....

On the value of the house compensation no. ..... block ..... in the refugee camp, Area ..... and this is my signature to that effect.

Signature,

I, the signatory below, confirm and recognize that I am in full cognizance that I have guaranteed Mr:

1 - .....

2 - .....

On the value of the house compensation no. ..... block ..... in the refugee camp, Area ..... and this is my signature to that effect.

Signature,

APPENDIX 12 : Israeli Building Regulations in the Refugee Camps of the Gaza Strip

The Civil Administration of the Gaza Strip

-Announcement for the Public-

To:

Address:

In execution of the competence authorized to me as the Director of Welfare Affairs and Refugees, in accordance with ordinance No. 4 of 1960. It has to be made known to the public the substance of resolutions relating to organizing the constructions and building affairs in the refugee camps; and according to what has been provided in the minutes issued by the officials for refugee affairs on the 3rd May 1958 and the 1st June 1960, we issue the below mentioned regulations:-

One: If anyone may try to sell, buy, rent, mortgage, or transfer his place of living to another person in the camps area, shelter should be withdrawn completely from the two parties without having the right to claim any compensation.

Two: It is forbidden to construct any buildings or constructions, and to add to or extend the existing shelters, or to demolish the existing shelters so as to set up a new one, or to make any other construction in the refugee camps area without obtaining a permit from the Director of Welfare Affairs and Refugees or from his authorized deputy.

Three: Whoever has the desire to relinquish his shelter in the refugee camps area must submit an application form to the refugee rehabilitation office in order to implement the procedures.

Four: It is forbidden to move from one camp to another without a pre-permit granted by the authorities in accordance with legal requirements.

Five: Whoever may violate these orders is required to remove the building at his own expense, otherwise the building is taken from him, or he will pay a fine in cash or be imprisoned, or he may be subject to both penalties. Besides, the building should be removed at the expense of the violators (completely and administratively).

Ravi Sadeeh

Head of Refugee Rehabilitation Branch

Director of Welfare Affairs and Refugees

Date: 29/12/1982

Original copy in Arabic

APPENDIX 13 : Questionnaire on the Housing Problem of Khan Yunis Refugee Camp

CASE STUDY : HOUSING PROBLEM

(Data refer to households)

For Khan Yunis refugee camp only

Tick (✓) the correct answer:

فع علامة (✓) أمام الاجابة الصحيحة

1. Shelter construction by

1. UNRWA shelter
2. Private
3. Others

١- المنزل مبني بواسطة :

١- سكن وكالة (أونروا)
٢- سكن خاص
٣- اخـــرى

2. Number of rooms

1. 1
2. 2
3. 3
4. 4
5. 5
6. 6
7. seven rooms and more

٢- عـــدد الغـــرف

١- غرفة واحدة
٢- غرفتـــان
٣- ثلاث غـــرف
٤- اربع عـــرف
٥- خمس غـــرف
٦- ست غـــرف
٧- سبع غـــرف

3. Area of rooms (Average)

1. 3 x 3 (9 sq.m)
2. 3½ x 3½ (10.5 sq.m)
3. 3 x 4 (12 sq.m)
4. 4 x 4 (16 sq.m)

٣- مساحة الغرفـة

١- ٣x٣ = ٩ م٢
٢- ٣ر٥ x ٣ر٥ = ١٠ر٥ م٢
٣- ٣ x ٤ = ١٢ م٢
٤- ٤ x ٤ = ١٦ م٢

4. Number of families

1. 1
2. 2
3. 3
4. four families and more

٤- عـــدد العائلات

١- ١
٢- ٢
٣- ٣
٤- اربع عائلات فاكثـر

5. Number of persons

1. Male
2. Female

٥- عـــدد الافـــراد

١- ذكـــور
٢- انـــاث

6. Do you wish to move to the refugee dwelling projects

1. Yes
2. No
3. Not sure

٦- هل ترغب في الانتقال الى مشاريع اسكان اللاجئين:

١- نعـم
٢- لا
٣- غير متاكـد

7. If yes, why?

1. Solve the housing problem
2. Pressure from Israeli authority
3. Better facilities and services
4. To gain the right to future expansion of the house
5. Others

٧- اذا اجبت بنعم ، لمـاذا ؟

١- حل مشكلة الســـكن
٢- لضغوط من السلطات الاسـرائيلية
٣- لخدمات وتســـهيلات افضـل
٤- لاكتساب الحق في حرية التصرف في بناء السكن

٥- اخـــرى .

8. If no, why?

٨- اذا اجبت بلا ، لماذا ؟

1. Financial problems
2. Preserve your refugee identity
3. Government compensations are not sufficient
4. Others

١- مشاكل مالية
٢- للحفاظ على هوية لاجيء
٣- لعدم كفاية التعويضات الحكومية
٤- اخرى

9. Would you like to get permission to replace your camp shelter with a multi-storey building?

٩- هل ترغب في الحصول على تصريح لبناء بيت المعسكر على شكل سكن دائم متعدد الطوابق ؟

1. Yes
2. No
3. Not sure

١- نعم
٢- لا
٣- غير متاكد

10. Would you agree to move to the West Bank dwelling projects if they were implemented

١٠- هل توافق على الرحيل الى مشاريع الاسكان في الضفة الغربية اذا قام تنفيذها ؟

1. Yes
2. No

١- نعم
٢- لا

11. The best solution for the refugee camp inhabitants

١١- الحل الافضل لسكان معسكرات اللاجئين :

1. Resettlement in the refugee dwelling projects
2. Repatriation (awda)
3. Financial compensation
4. Resettlement in Jordan
5. Others

١- اعادة التوطين في مشاريع اسكان اللاجئين
٢- العودة
٣- تعويضات مالية
٤- اعادة التوطين في الاردن
٥- اخرى

12. Do you suffer from

١٢- هل تعاني من

1. Shortage of water supply
2. Sewerage problem
3. Inadequate electricity
4. Rats
5. Other problems

١- نقص في مياه الشرب
٢- مشكلة المجاري
٣- ضعف في التيار الكهربائي
٤- الجرذان
٥- مشاكل اخرى .

13. If you suffer from shortage of water supply, is there

١٣- اذا كنت تعاني من نقص في مياه الشرب ، هل هي :

1. Shortage in summer
2. " " autumn
3. " " winter
4. " " spring

١- النقص في الصيف
٢- النقص في الخريف
٣- النقص في الشتاء
٤- النقص في الربيع

THE END

APPENDIX 14

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242

(November 22, 1967)

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every state in the area can live in security.

Emphasizing further that all member states in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both of the following principles:

(i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories of recent conflict;

(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. Affirms further the necessity

(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. Requests the Secretary General to designate a special representive to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the states concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution.

4. Requests the Secretary General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the special representative as soon as possible.

APPENDIX 15 : Selected Equations Used in the Research

In this research the following equations have been used:

Net migration by using:

$$M = I - O = (Pt - Po) - (B - D)$$

Where: M is the net migration to or from the area
I is in-migration
O is out-migration
Pt is the population at the end of the period
Po is the population at the beginning of the period
B is births
D is deaths

Population change by using:

$$r = \frac{\log\left(\frac{Pn}{Po}\right)}{n \log e}$$

Where: r is the rate of population change
Pn is the population at the end of the period
Po is the population at the beginning of the period
n is the time interval between Pn and Po
e is equal to 2.71828

Population projection by using:

$$Pn = Po \ e^{rt}$$

Where: Pn stands for projected population
Po stands for existing population
e is equal to 2.71828
r is the annual rate of increase
t is the time interval between Pn and Po

Time required for population to double by using:

$$t = \frac{\text{lin } 2}{r}$$

Where: t is the required doubling time
lin 2 is the natural Log. of 2 which equals 0.69315
r is the annual rate of increase